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1 Introduction		 In	 the	Western	 world,	 flying	 became	 a	 part	 of	 modern	 lifestyles	 and	 with	 the	advent	 of	 low-fare	 airlines	 it	 is	 no	 longer	 considered	 a	 luxury.	While	 using	planes	 for	leisure,	business	or	even	daily	commute,	travellers	are	not	always	aware	of	their	climate	impacts.	Little	did	they	also	know	that	the	European	Union	(EU)’s	attempts	to	instigate	international	action	to	tackle	aviation	emissions	could	have	grounded	EU	civil	aviation	in	2012.	The	Eyjafjallajökull	eruption	in	2010	gave	an	idea	of	what	Europe	with	empty	skies	means,	and	a	potential	paralysis	in	2012	could	have	been	even	more	painful	both	for	passengers	and	EU	economies.			 This	 thesis	 focuses	 however	 on	 the	 process	 that	 led	 to	 this	 potential	 crisis.	 It	advances	knowledge	of	 the	genesis	and	effects	of	ambitious	political	action	aspiring	to	tackle	 carbon	 dioxide	 emissions	 from	 civil	 aircraft.	 It	 unpacks	 the	 complexity	 of	contemporary	governance.	Furthermore,	 it	offers	a	unique	account	of	many	voices	and	even	more	interests	underlying	current	regulations	aiming	at	reducing	green	house	gas	(GHG)	emissions	globally.			 The	interviewees	that	took	part	in	this	study	always	started	telling	their	version	of	 the	 EU’s	 attempts	 to	 regulate	 aviation	 emissions	 with	 worried	 faces.	 This	 thesis	unpacks	 the	 reasons	 for	 these	 concerns,	 with	 the	 objective	 to	 provide	 a	 balanced	account	 of	 the	 events,	 but	 also	 challenge	 some	of	 the	 theoretical	 premises	 of	 the	way	scholars	look	at	governance	of	climate	change.			 This	 first	chapter	of	 the	thesis	aims	at	showing	the	rationale	 for	conducting	the	study	presented	here	and	proposes	the	particular	approach	taken.	It	also	introduces	the	case	analysed	and	lists	the	research	questions	together	with	research	objectives.	Finally,	it	 explains	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 thesis	 by	 offering	 short	 summaries	 of	 the	 following	chapters.		
1.1 Research	rationale		 The	 rationale	 for	 this	 research	 is	 based	 on	 its	 relevance	 for	 contemporary	research	 themes	 around	 the	 contestation	 of	 policies	 and	 the	 pace	 of	 climate	 change.	These	can	be	divided	into	three	themes	that	are	further	developed	below:	international	aspects	 of	 policy-making	 in	 the	 area	 of	 environment,	 EU’s	 policy	 endeavours	 and	sectoral	exceptionalism	in	regulation.		
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	 Social	 science	 research	 on	 the	 European	 Union	 (EU),	 has	 flourished	 in	 recent	years	and	the	study	of	the	EU	has	become	a	mainstream	endeavour	among	economists,	sociologists,	planners,	political	scientists,	geographers	and	others.	The	environment,	and	more	particularly	climate,	joined	EU	policy-making	agendas	only	in	the	1970s,	after	the	1972	Paris	 Summit.	Through	a	 subsequent	adoption	of	 the	 first	Environmental	Action	Programme,	the	topic	has	quickly	become	one	of	the	most	dynamic	areas	of	research	on	the	 EU.	 This	 trend	 has	 been	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 motivated	 by	 the	 environmental	 and	climate	 policies	 requiring	 essential	 cooperation	 between	 the	 EU	 Member	 States	 and	various	levels	of	governance.			 Another	 important	aspect	 is	 that	 the	environmental	and	climate	policies	can	be	highly	contested	by	the	policy	process	participants	as	they	pertain	to	differing	interest	at	national,	 regional	 and	 local	 levels	 as	 well	 as	 differing	 concerns	 between	 the	 industry	sectors,	 consumers	 and	 environmental	 organisations.	 What	 is	 more,	 the	 regulatory	issues	 regarding	 climate	 change	 go	 beyond	 EU	 borders.	 For	 example,	 some	 of	 the	regulations	 and	 standards	directly	 affect	 foreign	 companies	doing	business	 in	Europe.		 Lastly,	the	alarming	pace	of	anthropogenic	climate	change	makes	research	on	the	environment	and	climate	vital,	not	only	with	respect	to	its	causes	and	implications	but	also	with	regards	to	the	political	tools	that	can	be	implemented	in	order	to	challenge	the	continued	growth	of	global	GHG	emissions	levels.	Finally,	this	thesis	is	a	result	of	a	long-standing	interest	of	its	author	in	aviation	issues	and	academic	fascination	in	the	market-based	measures	addressing	climate	change.			 By	looking	at	the	EU’s	climate	policy	initiatives	one	can	examine	various	political	phenomena	 that	 condition	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 international	 climate	 arena.	One	 can	identify	insights	regarding	the	nature	of	venues	where	policymaking	is	effectively	taking	place	 and	 also	 ask	 why	 certain	 decisions	 are	 being	 made	 and	 other	 initiatives	abandoned.	While	 the	 literature	 gives	 prominence	 to	 investigating	 the	 importance	 of	various	 parts	 of	 the	EU	 institutional	 architecture	 and	 the	Member	 States,	 the	 broader	picture	of	 the	EU	confronting	global	 sectoral	organisations	and	non-EU	states	 is	much	less	thoroughly	analysed,	which	creates	an	important	research	gap.	Secondly,	only	via	a	critical	 assessment	 of	 the	 actual	 implementation	 of	 the	 ideas	 can	 one	 systematically	consider	the	European	position	in	the	climate	debate	globally.			 One	 of	 the	 recent	 and	 highly	 debated	 ideas	 of	 the	 EU	 has	 been	 the	 European	Union	 Emission	 Trading	 System	 (EU	 ETS),	 an	 initiative	 created	 to	 address	 climate	
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change	 through	 putting	 a	 cap	 on	 emissions	 of	 GHG	 from	 specified	 installations	 in	selected	industries	and	allowing	carbon	trading	between	the	participating	entities.	The	EU	 ETS	 is	 considered	 the	 main	 pillar	 of	 the	 EU’s	 fight	 against	 climate	 change	 and	 a	flagship	 climate	 initiative	 of	 the	 EU	 (European	 Commission	 2015a;	 European	Commission	 2015c;	 Skjaerseth	 &	Wettestad	 2008;	 Ellerman	 et	 al.	 2014).	 This	 strong	affirmation	for	flexible	mechanisms,	such	as	emissions	trading,	provided	by	the	EU	itself	directs	 the	 researchers	 to	analyse	 the	 scheme	not	only	with	 regards	 to	 its	 functioning	but	 also	 pushing	 the	 enquiry	 towards	 the	 political	 intricacies	 of	 the	 largest	 carbon	trading	 mechanism	 in	 the	 world.	 As	 will	 be	 shown	 in	 the	 next	 chapter,	 a	 variety	 of	research	 projects	 have	 examined	 the	 EU	 ETS	 from	 economic	 and	 legal	 perspectives,	however	 approaching	 the	 topic	 from	 a	 governance	 perspective	 has	 to	 date	 received	limited	 attention.	 The	 case	 offers	 to	 address	 the	 following	 puzzle	 –	what	 explains	 the	EU’s	capacity	to	successfully	implement	its	allegedly	model	policy?			 Analysing	 the	 political	 construction	 of	 the	 scheme	 through	 its	 institutional	 and	organisational	 architecture	 provides	 an	 opportunity	 to	 examine	 governance	 as	 a	theoretical	 framework.	 Climate	policies	have	 also	been	 identified	 as	 fertile	 ground	 for	theory-testing,	 especially	 in	 the	multi-level	 governance	 realm	 (Schreurs	 &	 Tiberghien	2007;	 Zelli	 et	 al.	 2010;	 Blok	 2013).	 This	 means	 that	 for	 example,	 the	 capacities	 of	individual	 actors	 present	 in	 the	 policy	 process	 can	 be	 assessed	 and	 the	 relations	between	them	explored	by	providing	in	this	thesis	adequate	space	for	non-state	actors,	which	have	been	previously	ignored	in	the	literature.	Furthermore,	the	examination	can	consider	 the	 exercise	 of	 authority	 that	 takes	 place	 outside	 of	 the	 usual	 jurisdictions	(Rosenau	2000,	p.172).	The	EU	ETS	has	also	been	a	fruitful	arena	for	lobbyists	and	the	level	of	 interaction	between	the	stakeholders	has	been	extremely	high	in	this	 file.	This	allows	further	examination	of	the	governance	frameworks	that	gives	prominent	space	to	industry	–	policy-makers’	interaction	in	relation	to	climate	policy.		 These	 three	 research	 rationales	 are	 pursued	 through	 a	 case	 study	 of	 a	 specific	period	 and	 sectoral	 context	 for	 policy	 implementation:	 the	 inclusion	 of	 aviation	operations	 into	 the	EU	ETS.	Although	regulation	of	aviation	emissions	has	been	at	 the	discretion	of	the	International	Civil	Aviation	Organization	(ICAO),	the	EU	-	responding	to	what	 it	saw	as	ICAO’s	 idleness	-	decided	to	add	this	sector	 into	the	EU	ETS	in	order	to	curb	rapidly	growing	aviation	emissions	related	 to	 increased	demand	 for	 flying.	Given	the	 hitherto	 special	 position	 of	 aviation	within	 international	 governance	 regimes,	 this	
Chapter	1:	Introduction	
 14	
appears	 a	 substantial	 policy	 change1 	of	 multilateral	 dimension	 as	 all	 civil	 flights	departing	from	and	landing	at	European	airports	were	to	be	included	in	the	scheme,	no	matter	 what	 the	 country	 of	 an	 aircraft’s	 registration.	 Indeed,	 the	 EU’s	 decision	 on	inclusion	can	be	seen	as	an	attempt	to	limit	the	exceptional	treatment	of	the	sector.	The	case	offers	a	compelling	example	to	analyse	the	process	of	change	in	public	policy	at	the	international	 level	 and	 the	 resistance	 to	 it	 given	 the	 sector	 in	 question	 and	 spatio-political	dimensions	of	the	issue.	It	addresses	then	the	puzzle	of	extraordinary	power	of	the	aviation	sector	that	disabled	the	implementation	of	the	EU	ETS	and	the	remarkable	situation	 in	 which	 the	 EU	 has	 been	 confronted	 with	 multi-directional	 international	resistance	blocking	its	policy.		The	 EU’s	 decision	 to	 include	 aviation	 activities	 into	 the	 EU	 ETS	 led	 to	 various	political	 controversies,	 which	 unexpectedly	 for	 the	 EU,	 involved	 a	 large	 number	 of	countries	 including	 the	US,	 Russia,	 China,	 India	 and	Brazil	 as	well	 as	 other	 important	political	and	business	partners	of	the	EU.	The	countries	opposing	the	EU	ETS	answered	to	the	inclusion	with	threats	such	as	involving	the	World	Trade	Organisation,	grounding	EU	 aircraft	 abroad	 and	 imposing	 additional	 levies	 on	 EU	 airlines.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	opposition	managed	to	block	the	EU’s	leadership.	Legal	bills	enabling	the	prohibition	of	participation	in	the	EU	ETS	as	approved	by	the	decision-makers	of	the	US,	China	or	India	gave	little	room	for	the	EU	to	manoeuvre.	The	situation	has	been	further	aggravated	by	some	EU	Member	States	 trying	 to	protect	 their	national	aviation-related	activities	and	the	European	Commission’s	internal	issues	surrounding	leadership	of	the	ETS	file.	In	the	background	 of	 the	 high	 politics,	 environmental	 non-governmental	 organisations	(eNGOs)	tried	to	support	the	EU,	but	often	their	lobbying	capacities	were	surpassed	by	the	aviation’s	business	flair	for	putting	pressure	on	decision-makers.		The	 context	 outlined	 above	 allows	 this	 thesis	 to	 explain	 various	 aspects	 of	international	 regulation.	 The	 thesis	 thus	 looks	 beyond	 the	 European	 regulations	concerning	 aviation	 CO2	 emissions	 and	 provides	 an	 insight	 into	 the	 reactions	 coming	from	 the	 non-EU	 countries	 and	 negotiating	 over	 the	 shape	 of	 the	 international	 rules	
																																																								1The	 EU	 policy-makers	 started	 to	 think	 about	 abolishing	 kerosene	 exemption	 from	 taxing	 back	 in	 the	1990s.	According	to	the	Directive	92/81/EEC	Member	States	were	able	to	limit	the	exemptions	for	jet	fuel.	In	 1996	 the	 European	 Commission	 endorsed	 abolition	 of	 the	 exemption	 as	 soon	 as	 the	 international	situation	 is	 formed	 in	 a	 way	 that	 non-EU	 countries	 could	 be	 included	 in	 the	 project	 (EC	 Cons	 Doc	11452/96,	 19	November	1996).	 In	 2003,	 according	 to	Article	14(2)	 of	 2003/96/EC	Member	 States	 are	allowed	 to	 limit	 the	 exemption	 “to	 international	 and	 intra-Community	 transport”	 or	 where	 the	 states	“entered	into	a	bilateral	agreement	with	another	Member	State.”	
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concerning	aviation	emissions.	In	this	way,	this	thesis	addresses	the	gap	in	the	literature	pertaining	to	sovereignty	of	states,	states’	authority	and	regulatory	jurisdiction	but	also	engages	with	 literatures	pertaining	 to	 leader	 –	 laggard	dynamics	 in	 the	 climate	 realm	(Andresen	 &	 Agrawala	 2002;	 Knill	 et	 al.	 2012).	 It	 also	 contributes	 to	 bridging	 the	research	 gap	 between	 scholarship	 focusing	 on	 climate	 leadership	 within	 the	 EU	 and	research	on	climate	leadership	globally.	Given	that	the	most	vocal	and	organised	response	to	the	inclusion	of	aviation	into	the	EU	ETS	has	come	from	the	United	States,	this	country	receives	careful	consideration	in	this	thesis.	From	the	US,	“The	European	Emissions	Trading	Scheme	Prohibition	Act	of	2011”	(US	House	of	Representatives	2012b)	marks	a	dramatic	disagreement	with	the	EU	policy	and	creates	an	 international	precedent.	By	examining	 the	US’s	 responses	 to	 the	inclusion	 of	 aviation	 into	 the	 EU	 ETS,	 the	 thesis	 is	 able	 to	 look	 into	 transatlantic	relations,	their	dynamics	and	the	EU’s	ability	to	influence	a	country	that	has	been	visibly	reluctant	to	adopt	binding	global	climate	agreements	(Schreurs	et	al.	2009b).		A	further	facet	of	the	debate	that	is	analysed	here	concerns	the	EU’s	inclusion	of	aviation	 into	 the	 EU	 ETS	 as	 a	 unilateral	 step	 that	 happened	 without	 obtaining	 third	countries’	consent.	This	lack	of	consent	resulted	in	significant	resistance	mostly	from	the	US	with	support	from	China,	Russia,	India	and	others.	Opponents	emphasised	problems	such	 as	 protection	 of	 their	 sovereignty,	 breaking	 of	 international	 law,	 the	 creation	 of	substantial	 costs	 for	 third	 country	 customers,	 and	 trade	 distortions.	 All	 these	 were	represented	 as	 severe	 threats	 for	 aviation	 operations	 at	 EU	 airports	 as	 well	 as	 for	operations	 of	 EU-based	 airlines	 globally.	 The	 case	 allows	 the	 analysis	 of	 multiple	understandings	 of	 climate	 policies	 by	 non-EU	 countries	 to	 be	 brought	 to	 bear	 on	understanding	of	the	construction	of	EU	climate	policy.		Furthermore,	 given	 the	 EU’s	 failure	 to	 implement	 the	 EU	 ETS	 in	 its	 ambitious,	broad	scope,	 it	 is	crucial	 to	analyse	the	 fate	of	attempts	to	 include	aviation	 in	the	ETS,	given	that	the	EU	is	often	regarded	as	a	“leader”,	setting	the	pace	for	environmental	and	climate	 policies	 worldwide	 (Vogler	 &	 Stephan	 2007;	 Oberthür	 &	 Roche	 Kelly	 2008;	Mehling	 et	 al.	 2013;	 Oberthür	 2009;	 Rayner	 &	 Jordan	 2013;	 Schreurs	 &	 Tiberghien	2007).	Another	 important	 theme	 that	 this	 thesis	 addresses	 pertains	 to	 circumstances	under	which	 aviation	 happens	 to	 operate.	 The	 aviation	 industry	 offers	 an	 interesting	case	of	a	sector	whose	main	features	are	high	levels	of	mobility	and,	partly	as	a	corollary,	
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1.2 Research	questions		 	 The	 circumstances	 presented	 above	 pose	 a	 case	 for	 investigating	 complex	governance	and	control	issues	at	the	international	level	and	provide	the	justification	for	the	following	research	questions,	as	below:		1. What	were	the	effects	of	the	EU’s	attempt	to	include	aviation	in	the	ETS?	2. Who	are	the	most	prominent	actors	of	the	debate	on	inclusion?	3. Why	were	particular	venues	of	policy	processes	regarding	aviation	emissions	preferred?		4. Why	 do	 EU	 and	 non-EU	 countries	 differ	 on	 the	 shape	 of	 a	 global	 aviation	emissions	policy?	5. How	are	the	policy	differences	between	the	US	and	the	EU	being	resolved	at	the	international	level?			 More	 specifically,	 the	 first	 research	 question	 aims	 to	 understand	 the	 EU’s	potential	to	influence	international	climate	decision-making	(Kilian	&	Elgström	2010;	L.	G.	 van	 Schaik	 2013),	 and	 is	 addressed	 by	 reconstructing	 the	 full	 picture	 of	 the	 issues	surrounding	the	inclusion	of	aviation	into	the	scheme	both	in	the	EU	and	internationally.	Thus,	 while	 focusing	 on	 opposition	 it	 invites	 further	 queries.	 Which	 key	 discourses,	interests,	and	actors	have	brought	the	EU	to	this	decision?		Why	were	these	rationales	met	 antagonistically	 by	 the	 EU’s	 key	 international	 partners?	 What	 have	 been	 the	political	rationales	and	consequences	of	 the	EU’s	attempt	to	 include	aviation	 in	the	EU	ETS?			 The	second	question	examines	the	claims	regarding	aviation’s	privileged	position	(Kopsch	 2012;	 Havel	 &	 Sanchez	 2011a;	 Havel	 &	 Sanchez	 2012)	 and	 contributes	 to	assessing	 the	 feasibility	 of	 a	 global	 agreement	 for	 aviation	 emissions	 trading	 systems	(Susskind	&	Ali	2014).	Furthermore,	 it	addresses	a	 frequently	asked	question:	what	 is	the	nature	of	relationships	between	the	state	and	non-state	organisations?	(Keohane	&	Nye	1971;	Keohane	1984;	Biermann	et	al.	 2010;	 Chan	et	al.	 2015;	Newell	et	al.	 2012;	
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Arts	 et	 al.	 2001;	 Willets	 2001;	 Bieler	 et	 al.	 2004).	 It	 also	 uncovers	 the	 relationships	between	 the	 actors	 included	 in	 the	 debate,	 and	 investigates	 in	 depth	 the	 following	issues:	 the	 role	 of	 sectoral	 organisations	 such	 as	 International	 Civil	 Aviation	Organisation	(ICAO)	in	the	facilitation	of	aircraft	emissions’	governance,	the	regulatory	capacities	 of	 such	 organisations	 and	 the	 interplay	 between	 the	 sectoral	 organisations	and	the	EU	initiatives	targeting	emissions.	The	third	question	gives	special	attention	to	the	 decision-making	 process	 per	 se.	 By	 unpacking	 it,	 the	 thesis	 answers	 why	 some	decision-making	venues	are	more	important	than	others,	why	less	formal	venues	gained	importance	 and	 what	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 venues	 is	 (material	 versus	 non-material).	 It	advances	the	venue	shopping	theory	(Baumgartner	2007;	True	et	al.	1999;	Pralle	2003)	as	it	not	only	asks	which	are	the	important	venues	but	inquires	further	why	and	under	what	circumstances	 their	 importance	 increases.	At	 the	same	time	 it	expands	 the	scant	research	on	intra-European	Commission	proceedings	(Delreux	&	Van	den	Brande	2013;	Kassim	 2013).	 By	 tracing	 venues	 and	 actors	 the	 thesis	 is	 able	 to	 contribute	 to	wider	debates:	 the	 effects	 of	 unilateral	 action	 on	 international	 bodies,	 the	 ability	 of	 a	 non-specialized	actor	to	influence	a	highly	technical	sector,	and	the	leverage	of	one	actor	to	regulate	the	transnational	conduct	and	behaviours	of	other	states.		 Questions	 4	 and	 5	 tackle	 a	 broader,	 international	 area	 of	 investigation.	 They	pertain	 to	assessing	 the	 feasibility	of	EU	 leadership(s)	with	regards	 to	climate	policies	(Schreurs	&	Tiberghien	2007;	 Zito	2005;	 Skodvin	&	Andresen	2006;	Gupta	&	Van	der	Grijp	2000;	Christiansen	&	Wettestad	2003)	and	further	contribute	to	understanding	the	role	 and	 construction	 of	 the	 interests	 the	 involved	 parties	 have	 had.	 Furthermore,	 by	building	on	comparisons	between	policy	networks	(Marsh	&	Rhodes	1992)	it	confirms	that	 the	EU	and	 the	US	have	divergent	 approaches	 to	 their	 respective	 climate	policies	(Skjærseth	et	al.	2013;	Schreurs	&	Tiberghien	2007;	Schreurs	et	al.	2009a).	While	the	US	and	the	EU	have	decided	to	deal	differently	with	 issues	such	as	commitments	towards	Kyoto	Protocol	targets,	renewable	energies	or	emissions	trading,	this	thesis	shows	that	the	 transatlantic	division	may	be	deeper	 than	generally	assessed	and	 the	EU	ETS	case	poignantly	documents	that.			 		 The	 questions	 pertaining	 to	 the	 interactions	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 non-EU	countries	 resonate	 strongly	 with	 debates	 on	 the	 EU’s	 environmental	 and	 climate	leadership	 (Gupta	 &	 Van	 der	 Grijp	 2000;	 Oberthür	 &	 Rabitz	 2013).	 Investigating	
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leadership	 facilitates	 interpreting	 the	EU’s	 position	 internationally	 and	 the	 level	 of	 its	regulatory	ambitions.	It	also	contributes	to	understanding	the	base	of	the	EU’s	political	power,	 and	 a	 series	 of	 subsidiary	 questions.	 Is	 it	 based	 on	 coercion	 and	 threats	 to	achieve	its	results?	Is	the	EU’s	leadership	based	on	a	voluntary	followership	(Lindenthal	2009)?	 Or	 is	 the	 EU	 leadership	 structural	 and	 simply	 utilizing	 its	 power	 resources	(Young	1991)?	The	 inclusion	of	 aviation	 into	 the	EU	ETS	offers	 a	 case	where	 a	 policy	envisaged	 as	 a	 domestic	 (intra-EU)	 tool,	 started	 to	 be	 perceived,	 by	 some	 non-EU	countries,	 as	 of	 an	 external,	 international	 character	 infringing	 their	 sovereignty.	 This	thesis	contributes	thus	to	comprehending	the	EU’s	position	for	future	involvements	with	climate	change	policies	at	a	global	level	but	also	the	EU’s	external	policy	in	general.	Pulling	 these	 threads	 together,	 the	 overall	 aim	 of	 the	 thesis	 is	 to	 assist	 in	
understanding	 how	 aviation	 came	 to	 be	 included	within	 the	 EU	 ETS	 and	what	were	 its	
consequences.	 It	 looks	 at	 the	 change	 that	 the	 EU	 aspired	 to	 achieve	 with	 regard	 to	aviation	 emissions	 regulation.	 The	 “change”	 here	 is	 understood	 broadly	 following	Convery’s	thinking:		“change	 is	 a	 product	 of	 many	 forces,	 including:	 an	 enabling	 legislative	 and	institutional	context;	an	international	context	and	sense	of	crisis	that	stimulates	and	supports	action;	an	intellectual	framework	and	experience	that	provides	the	animating	 idea	 and	 evidence	 to	 support	 action;	 effective	 political	 and	bureaucratic	leadership”	(2009,	p.392).	Drawing	 on	 interviews	 with	 policy-makers,	 industry	 representatives,	 policy	experts	and	non-governmental	organisations	in	Washington	DC	(US)	and	Brussels	(EU)	as	well	as	document	and	media	content	analysis	 the	thesis	aspires	 to	 look	at	 the	 issue	from	a	perspective	of	different	national	stances.	The	range	of	issues	that	are	tackled	in	this	thesis	enable	it	to	speak	to	a	number	of	current	scholarly	debates.	Firstly,	 it	addresses	the	problem	of	climate	policy-making	both	 in	 Europe	 and	 the	 reactions	 to	 it	 in	 third	 countries	 whose	 industries	 may	 be	affected	 by	 EU	 regulations.	 It	 contributes	 also	 to	 understanding	 of	 inter-	 and	transnational	policy-making	while	looking	at	the	role	of	state	versus	industry,	venues	of	policy-making	and	political	 support	 for	market-based	mechanisms.	While	employing	a	multi-level	 governance	 framework,	 the	 research	 also	 serves	 to	 uncover	 transnational	policy	 networks,	 the	 strategies	 they	 use	 to	 influence	 decision-making	 and	 their	dynamics.		
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On	the	other	hand,	this	thesis	also	focuses	on	the	one-sided	leadership	of	the	EU	that	calls	for	a	global	answer	for	the	issue	of	emissions.	The	leadership	brokered	by	the	EU	is	based	on	exporting	its	rules,	attempting	to	bypass	multilateral	negotiations	and	in	this	way	incentivise	non-EU	countries’	action.	This	in	turn	marks	a	new	dynamic	in	the	multi-level	governance	context	showing	how	modification	of	behaviour	of	other	states	can	 be	 induced	 by	 extension	 of	 authority	 (Buenger	 2013).	 The	 mobile	 nature	 of	 the	activities	 in	the	aviation	industry	presents	a	case	for	exploring	the	spatial	extension	of	power	beyond	governmental	boundaries.		 This	 thesis	 supplements	 the	 existing	 knowledge	 on	 the	 EU	 climate	 policy	 and	provides	 novel	 insights	 into	 the	 process	 of	 creating,	 negotiating	 and	 implementing	policies	 that	 reach	 (at	 least	 according	 to	 the	understanding	of	 some)	beyond	 the	EU’s	borders.	It	talks	therefore	to	literatures	concerning	policy	processes	at	the	international	level	 and	 dealing	 with	 a	 collective	 action	 problem	 as	 well	 as	 pertaining	 to	 certain	authors’	 concerns	 about	 the	 extension	 of	 the	 EU’s	 regulatory	 power	 (Lavenex	 2014;	Damro	2012).			 By	 employing	 empirical	 data	 and	 a	 multi-angled	 theoretical	 perspective,	 this	thesis	responds	to	the	proposed	questions	while	giving	special	attention	to	the	variety	of	actors	 present	 in	 the	 policy	 process,	 their	 interests	 and	 their	 interactions	 with	 each	other.	Additionally,	the	proposed	framing	of	the	questions	guarantees	reaching	beyond	the	 mere	 analysis	 of	 the	 process	 within	 the	 EU	 structures,	 but	 allows	 additional	important	actors	to	be	involved.	This	is	due	to	the	global	character	of	climate	change	and	the	regulatory	architecture	of	 international	aviation,	which	is	based	on	ICAO’s	primary	role	and	consensual	decision-making.	This	research	considers	thus	states,	industry,	non-governmental	 and	 trans-governmental	 organisations	 as	 well	 as	 less	 formal	 venues	 of	decision-making.	 Furthermore,	 this	 framing	 takes	 into	 account	 the	 theoretical	underpinnings	employed	and	provides	space	 for	analysis	of	 the	non-state	actors’	roles	and	 their	 importance	 for	 shaping	 international	 emissions	 policies.	 In	 this	 way,	 it	contributes	to	examining	interdependence	and	decentralization	(Bevir	&	Rhodes	2003).	In	 a	 similar	 manner,	 it	 explores	 interactions	 between	 markets	 and	 political	 actors	(Pierre	2000).	This	is	done	by	offering	an	in-depth	analysis	of	the	case	and	by	drawing	on	literatures	concerning	stakeholders’	participation	(Newell	2000).	This	thesis	instead	of	analysing	the	various	actors	of	the	political	scene	separately	advances	the	debate	by	examining	 all	 the	 stakeholders’	 networks	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 Furthermore,	 special	
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attention	 is	 given	 to	 venues	 of	 decision-making	 and	 by	 this	 governance	 theories	 are	better	 sited	 in	 a	 tangible,	 institutional	 context	 (EU	 institutions,	 ICAO,	 national	governments,	 sectoral	 organisations,	 non-governmental	 organisations).	 Finally,	theoretical	advancement	 is	offered	by	an	 innovative	approach	to	global	environmental	governance,	which	 is	supplemented	by	 interpretive	policy	analysis	and	policy	network	analysis.		
1.3 Structure	of	the	thesis			 Taking	 into	 account	 all	 the	 premises	 mentioned	 above	 and	 responding	 to	 the	arguments	outlined,	the	thesis	sets	out	firstly	to	examine	the	literatures	concerning	the	EU	ETS	and	the	policy-making	in	the	European	Union.	The	second	chapter	is	thus	tasked	with	 introducing	 concepts	 relevant	 to	 emissions	 trading	 and	 also	 provides	 an	introduction	to	the	regulatory	context	of	 international	aviation,	which	 is	 important	 for	the	 contextualization	 of	 inclusion.	 The	 latter	 part	 of	 the	 chapter	 outlines	 the	 main	assumptions	behind	the	inclusion,	based	on	the	EU	regulations.	As	a	whole,	the	chapter	indicates	the	main	shortcomings	of	the	available	studies	and	supplies	a	context	for	the	analysed	issues.			 In	chapter	3	the	main	theoretical	discussion	is	presented.	The	key	contribution	of	the	chapter	is	based	on	proposing	a	new	way	of	investigating	governance:	by	involving	interpretive	policy	analysis	(IPA)	and	policy	network	analysis	(PNA).	Firstly,	drawing	on	the	 scholarship	 of	Marsh	 and	Rhodes	 (Rhodes	 2006;	Rhodes	&	Marsh	 1991;	Marsh	&	Rhodes	1992),	a	brief	account	of	development	of	both	types	of	analysis	is	presented.	The	rationale	of	this	new	approach	is	based	on	interest	in	the	wider	context	of	governance	in	action.	This	is	followed	by	the	explanation	of	blending	IPA	and	PNA.	It	is	explained	how	multi-level	 governance	 succeeds	 in	 grasping	 a	 macro	 perspective	 while	 network	analysis	provides	a	robust	framework	for	investigating	stakeholders’	relations	and	their	institutionalised	 contexts.	 Additionally,	 the	 chapter	 draws	 from	 Yanow	 (2000)	 and	Wagenaar	 (2011)	 to	 explain	 the	 importance	 of	 interpretive	 policy	 analysis	 for	supplementing	multi-level	governance	with	examination	of	beliefs	and	meaning	making	practices,	 which	 are	 crucial	 if	 an	 effective	 answer	 to	 the	 research	 questions	 is	 to	 be	provided.	 Lastly,	 this	 part	 gives	 consideration	 to	 the	 issue	 of	 power	 in	 the	 conducted	research	and	answers	the	question	of	how	power	is	situated	in	the	governance	context.		
Chapter	1:	Introduction	
 22	
	 In	chapter	4	the	methodology	 is	explained	and	 justified.	This	chapter	 is	 focused	on	the	two	waves	of	fieldwork	conducted	in	Brussels	and	Washington,	DC	that	informed	the	research.	It	clarifies	how	a	case	study	design	has	been	employed	to	provide	a	multi-angle	 perspective	 and	 also	 to	 be	 able	 to	 answer	 the	 “how”	 and	 “why”	 questions.	 The	chapter	explains	the	interviewing	process,	from	drafting	the	interview	schedule	through	to	approaching	potential	interviewees,	conducting	the	interviews,	transcribing	them	and	finally	analysing	the	interview	data.	It	also	explains	how	other	data	(policy	documents,	media	 content	 and	 grey	 literature)	 contributed	 to	 increasing	 the	 quality	 of	 the	 study.	Equally	importantly,	it	briefly	discusses	ethical	issues	pertaining	to	the	research.			 Chapter	5,	the	first	analytical	chapter	offers	answers	to	research	questions	1	and	2.	 It	 provides	 an	 historical	 account	 of	 ICAO’s	 involvement	 with	 environment-related	regulation	and	explains	how	the	EU	came	to	a	decision	to	lead	global	efforts	by	denting	ICAO’s	 primacy	 in	 aviation	 regulation.	 Not	 only	 does	 it	 draw	 from	 documents	 and	policies,	 but	 also	employs	 first-hand	accounts	 and	 judgements	 from	 interviewees	who	either	 worked	 at	 ICAO	 or	 have	 been	 close	 to	 the	 ICAO	 decision-making	 processes.	Additionally,	the	chapter	addresses	an	important	gap	identified	by	the	interviewees:	the	disagreements	 between	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 European	 Commission	 with	 regards	 to	how	the	inclusion	of	aviation	should	proceed.			 Chapter	6	focuses	on	US	perceptions	of	the	inclusion	of	aviation	into	the	EU	ETS	and	 the	US’s	actions	against	 the	EU	ETS,	 and	hence	draws	mostly	on	data	gathered	 in	Washington	 DC.	 It	 continues	 answering	 research	 question	 2	 and	 starts	 answering	research	 questions	 3	 and	 4.	 It	 also	 responds	 to	 question	 5.	 The	 chapter	 provides	 a	unique	 blend	 of	 accounts	 provided	 by	 policy-makers,	 representatives	 of	 sectoral	organisations	 and	 non-governmental	 organisations	 as	 well	 as	 policy	 think-tank	representatives.	It	is	argued	that	the	EU	ETS	has	been	to	a	large	extent	interpreted	as	a	political	rather	than	a	legal	or	economic	issue	for	the	US	and	sectoral	organisations	were	able	to	employ	sovereignty	arguments	to	undermine	the	EU’s	plan	to	extend	its	scheme.	It	 is	 also	 shown	 how	 venue	 shopping	 has	 played	 a	 role	 in	 amplifying	 counter-ETS	arguments.	This	theme	is	closely	related	to	the	EU	and	US	having	different	approaches	to	ICAO’s	position	concerning	aviation	regulation.			 Chapter	 7	 positions	 the	 debate	 on	 the	 EU	 ETS	 in	 the	 context	 of	 global	environmental	 governance	 while	 focusing	 on	 opposition	 to	 the	 scheme	 coming	 from	non-EU	 countries.	 It	 thus	 concludes	 the	 response	 to	 questions	 2	 and	 4.	 The	 chapter	
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2.1 Introduction		 The	previous	chapter	has	outlined	the	main	issues	this	thesis	is	aspiring	to	tackle	and	the	RQs	it	seeks	to	answer.	This	chapter	offers	more	detailed	contextual	information	regarding	 the	 problems	presented	 in	 Chapter	 1.	 It	 introduces	 existing	 knowledge	 and	points	at	the	gaps	that	are	filled	in	the	following	chapters.	It	also	aims	at	evaluating	the	existing	 scholarship	 in	 the	 field	 of	 EU	 studies,	 governance	 and	more	broadly,	 political	science.		 The	chapter	is	divided	into	four	sections.	Firstly,	emissions	trading	is	analysed	as	a	concept	for	mitigating	climate	change.	In	this	part	attention	is	also	given	to	the	Kyoto	Protocol	that	introduced	the	flexible	mechanisms	on	a	global	scale.	The	second	section	focuses	on	the	EU	ETS.	It	is	considered	with	regards	to	its	initiation,	implementation	and	issues	that	it	faced	in	the	first	years	of	operation.			 The	 third	 section	 examines	 aviation	 from	 two	 distinct	 perspectives:	 as	 a	 GHG	producing	 sector	 and	 as	 an	 internationally	 regulated	 area	whose	policy	patterns	have	developed	over	the	years.	The	existing	research	on	environmental	impacts	of	aviation	is	presented	to	elucidate	the	rationale	for	engaging	market	based	solutions	to	the	problem.			 Finally,	 the	 fourth	section	offers	a	closer	examination	of	 the	aviation	regulation	over	 the	 period	 between	 the	 production	 of	 the	 Chicago	 Convention	 in	 1945	 and	 the	introduction	of	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation.	This	allows	identification	of	the	determinants	of	policy-making	in	the	area	and	circumstances	under	which	the	sector	is	operating.	These	considerations	direct	the	argument	towards	the	issue	of	“exceptionalism”	(see:	Section	2.6)	 that	 is	 enjoyed	 by	 the	 sector	 and	 its	 consequences	 for	 global	 environmental	regulations	of	aviation.	Finally,	the	issue	of	policy	change	is	considered.	
2.2 Emissions	trading			 The	problem	of	GHG	emissions	has	been	present	internationally	as	early	as	at	the	United	Nations	World	Summit	in	Rio	de	Janeiro	in	1992.	It	was	however	only	the	Kyoto	Protocol	 to	 the	 United	 Nations	 Framework	 Convention	 on	 Climate	 Change	 (UNFCCC)	that	proposed	binding	emissions	 targets.	These	were	supposed	 to	be	 reached	 through	
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various	 initiatives 2 	aiming	 at	 reducing	 the	 volumes	 of	 emissions	 released	 to	 the	atmosphere,	but	it	also	offered	so	called	flexible	or	market-based	mechanisms3:	“Any	Party	included	in	Annex	I	may	transfer	to,	or	acquire	from,	any	other	such	Party	 emission	 reduction	 units	 resulting	 from	 projects	 aimed	 at	 reducing	anthropogenic	 emissions	 by	 sources	 or	 enhancing	 anthropogenic	 removals	 by	sinks	 of	 greenhouse	 gases	 in	 any	 sector	 of	 the	 economy”	 (Kyoto	 Protocol	 Art.	6.1).			 The	Kyoto	Protocol	assumed	that	this	idea	could	be	implemented	through	three	policy	 instruments:	 Clean	 Development	 Mechanism	 (CDM),	 Joint	 Implementation	 (JI)	and	Emissions	Trading	 (ET).	The	Protocol	has	 also	outlined	 that	 these	 should	be	only	supplemental	 to	 domestic	 actions	 (Art	 6.1d),	 and	 should	not	 form	 the	 only	mitigation	effort	of	the	parties	to	the	Convention.	According	to	Grubb,	Vrolijk	and	Brack	(1999)	the	idea	of	 emissions	 trading	was	an	 issue	 that	 almost	killed,	but	 saved	 the	Protocol.	 It	 is	hard	to	disagree	with	them,	as	 the	 flexible	mechanisms	were	at	 the	centre	of	a	heated	debate	 in	 Kyoto	 and	 without	 them,	 the	 Protocol	 would	 have	 been	 much	 weaker.	Simultaneously,	 they	 caused	 a	 heated	 debate	 and	 led	 to	 disagreements	 between	 the	Parties	to	the	Protocol.			 The	discussion	on	market	based	mechanisms	animated	within	the	Kyoto	Protocol	framework	would	not	have	been	possible	however	without	intellectual	foundations	laid	well	before	the	climate	change	issues	were	of	interest	for	the	international	community.	When	looking	at	the	origins	of	emissions	trading,	Convery	(2009:	p.	396)	looks	back	to	Pigou’s	 “The	 economics	 of	 welfare”	 (1920)	 seeing	 the	 underpinnings	 of	 emissions	market	in	the	idea	of	avoiding	internalising	external	costs	via	extra	taxes.	Another	work	quoted	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 inspiration	 for	 emissions	 trading	 is	 “The	 Problem	 of	 Social	Cost”,	 where	 it	 is	 claimed	 that	 property	 rights	 and	 elimination	 of	 transaction	 costs	would	 allow	 more	 efficient	 use	 of	 environmental	 endowments	 (Coase	 1960).	 These	ideas	were	brought	further	by	Crocker	(1966)	and	Dales	(1968),	however	they	still	did	not	propose	a	 spatially	 fixed	ETS	and	rather	 speculated	on	market-based	possibilities.	
																																																								2The	Kyoto	Protocol	lists	among	them	enhancement	of	energy	efficiency,	protection	and	enhancement	of	sinks	 and	 reservoirs	 of	 greenhouse	 gases	 not	 controlled	 by	 the	 Montreal	 Protocol,	 promotion	 of	sustainable	forms	of	agriculture,	Research	on,	and	promotion,	development	and	increased	use	of,	new	and	renewable	forms	of	energy,	of	carbon	dioxide	sequestration	technologies	and	of	advanced	and	innovative	environmentally	sound	technologies,	reduction	or	phasing	out	of	market	imperfections,	fiscal	incentives,	tax	and	duty	exemptions	and	subsidies	in	all	greenhouse	gas	emitting	sector	(Art.	2.1a)	3Keohane,	 Revesz	 and	 Stavins(1998,	 p.317)	 include	 in	 the	 term	 flexible	 mechanisms	 also	 taxes	 and	revenue-neutral	taxes,	however	in	this	thesis	the	definition	refers	to	emissions	trading. 
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Soon	after,	Montgomery	(1972)	advocated	explicit	and	transferable	property	rights	(the	rights	 to	 release	 emissions),	 so	 that	 the	 allocation	 of	 permits	 is	 efficient	 and	 also	independent	 from	the	 initial	allocation.	These	theoretical	underpinnings	allowed	more	concrete	experiments	with	emissions	trading	in	the	1970s	that	started	in	the	US.			 Emissions	 trading	 mechanisms	 are	 based	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 providing	economic	 incentives	 will	 result	 in	 a	 decrease	 in	 the	 volume	 of	 any	 given	 emitted	substance.	 In	 principle,	 there	 is	 a	 total	 number	 of	 allowances	 issued	 by	 the	 authority	running	 a	 given	 scheme	 and	 these	 allowances	 are	 later	 traded	 between	 the	 parties	involved	in	the	scheme.	In	a	case	that	an	involved	entity	cannot	meet	the	targets	given	by	 the	 authorities	 operating	 the	 system,	 it	 is	 obliged	 to	 acquire	 permits,	 usually	 from	emitters	 who	were	 able	 to	 decrease	 their	 emissions	 below	 the	 pre-given	 target.	 This	means	that	if	the	abatement	costs	were	high,	one	industry	would	rather	buy	allowances	from	another	industry	whose	abatements	costs	are	low.	In	this	way	the	environmental	benefit	can	be	realized	at	the	lowest	possible	cost.		
2.2.1 Benefits	of	flexible	mechanisms			 The	rationales	for	ETS	are	centrally	concerned	with	the	merits	and	realization	of	economic	efficiency.	Policy-makers	assume	that	by	allowing	heavily	polluting	sectors	to	surrender	 their	 emissions	where	 it	 is	more	 cost-efficient,	 they	 are	 able	 to	 incentivise	reductions	 happening	 across	 a	 range	 of	 industries.	 It	 is	 argued	 that	 in	 this	 way	reductions	are	made	in	the	most	cost-efficient	way	and	also	the	costs	for	society	are	low	(Hansjürgens	2005,	p.3).	What	is	more,	the	regulatory	costs	are	presumably	lower	than	in	 the	 case	 of	 control	 and	 command	 policies	 that	 usually	 are	 more	 cumbersome	 to	implement	 and	 monitor	 (Baldwin	 2008;	 Tietenberg	 1996;	 Harrington	 &	 Morgerstern	2007).	 It	has	been	also	argued	that	emissions	trading	discourages	 litigation	and	 in	 the	case	of	controversies,	it	is	fairly	easy	to	deal	with	them	in	case	they	arise	(Ackerman	&	Stewart	1985,	p.1342).	This	is	particularly	important	in	the	case	of	international	policy-making	 and	 the	 EU	 context,	 where	 there	 is	 a	 visible	 turn	 towards	 more	 general	principles,	instead	of	precise	rules	that	the	Member	States	have	to	comply	with.			 Ackerman	 and	 Stewart	 (1985,	 p.1342)	 also	 consider	 that	 in	 the	 US	 context,	emissions	trading	reduces	bureaucratic	burdens	and	costs	for	the	federal	government.	It	is	 also	 added	 that	 if	 examined	 from	 a	 total-cost	 perspective,	 emissions	 trading	 is	 less	expensive	than	emission	standards	(Keohane	et	al.	1998,	p.348).	One	can	see	how	this	
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2.2.2 Challenges	faced	by	the	emissions	trading	concept			 In	 the	 previous	 section,	 the	 advantages	 of	 emissions	 trading	 were	 presented,	however	the	concept	is	not	free	from	challenges	and	problems.	These	usually	pertain	to	issues	related	to	allocation	of	allowances	(Butzengeiger	&	Michaelowa	2004;	Svendsen	2005),	 which	 can	 easily	 translate	 to	 over-allocation,	 extremely	 low	 prices	 of	 carbon	credits	as	well	as	windfall	profits	that	participating	companies	are	able	to	harness.	The	literature	 also	 suggests	 difficulties	 in	 revisions	 of	 once	 established	 schemes,	 claiming	that	 emissions	 trading	 is	 a	 “cheap	 fix”	 that	 actually	 weakens	 endeavours	 addressing	pollution	 especially	 if	 prices	 of	 allowances	 are	 low	 and	 companies	 would	 prefer	 to	render	small	fees	(often	passed	on	to	customers)	rather	than	innovate	(Driesen,	1998).	In	 the	 same	 manner,	 instead	 of	 investing	 in	 often-expensive	 technological	 upgrades,	highly	polluting	sectors	can	purchase	their	allowances	where	the	upgrades	are	less	cost-intensive.	 A	 similar	 argument	 is	 made	 by	 Lohmann	 who	 says:	 “why	 bother	 making	expensive	 long	 term	 structural	 changes	 if	 you	 can	 meet	 your	 pollution	 rights	 from	operators	 that	 can	 cut	 their	 carbon	 cheaply?”	 (2006b,	 p.18).	 Also	 the	 advocates	 of	imposing	standards	use	the	argument	concerning	 low-cost	solutions	against	emissions	trading.	If	a	standard	is	imposed	by	authorities,	the	sectors	covered	by	it	need	to	comply	with	the	limits	regardless	of	the	price	hence	environmental	benefit	is	realized	in	spite	of	financial	circumstances.	The	standards	would	also	provide	quicker	results	compared	to	trading.			 Besides	 this,	Hayward	 (2007)	 looking	mostly	at	a	nation-state	 level	argues	 that	the	 idea	 of	 treating	 emissions	 as	 alienable	 rights	 is	 ethically	 controversial	 and	 he	maintains	 that	 there	 is	 a	 significant	 difference	 between	 carbon	 emission	 rights	(understood	as	property	rights)	and	other	fundamental	rights.	Although	he	sees	carbon	emissions	essentially	needed	for	providing	subsistence,	he	disagrees	with	granting	them	a	 human	 rights	 status	 since	 that	 would	 oppose	 the	 individual’s	 right	 to	 a	 healthy	environment.	 In	 a	 similar	way	 Lohmann	 stresses	 that	 “if	 there	 is	 not	 enough	political	pressure	to	reduce	emissions	in	the	first	place,	the	result	will	be	merely	a	gaming	of	the	system	and	continual	over-allocation	of	pollution	rights.	Carbon	trading	does	not	offer	a	
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way	 around	 tough	 political	 decisions”(Lohmann	 2006a,	 p.90),	 hence	 market	mechanisms	are	politically	vulnerable.		 Contrary	 to	 the	 advocates	 of	 flexible	 mechanisms	 –	 opponents	 believe	 that	emissions	trading	does	not	encourage	innovation	as	effectively	as	command	and	control	policies	 (Driesen	 1998;2003;2007;	 Fischer	 2005).	 They	 also	 claim	 that	 at	 times,	 the	public	 debate	 about	 a	 market-based	 mechanism	 may	 last	 long	 and	 therefore	 delay	implementation	 and	 possible	 reductions	 for	 years	 (Colby	 2000,	 p.650).	 Furthermore,	there	 are	 some	 scholars	 who	 give	 accounts	 of	 situations,	 in	 which	 after	 introducing	emissions	 trading,	 the	 regulated	 entities	 would	 hold	 off	 from	 investments	 in	infrastructure	addressing	emissions	until	they	are	certain	of	how	the	scheme	will	work	and	what	the	prices	of	allowances	will	be	(Sullivan	&	Blyth	2006;	Ben-David	et	al.	2000;	Leiter	et	al.	2011).	Under	such	scenarios	the	reductions	would	likely	happen	with	great	delays.		 Another	set	of	arguments	against	emissions	trading	come	from	the	proponents	of	the	environmental	justice	framework.	This	perspective	focuses	more	on	low-income	as	well	 as	 minority	 communities	 rather	 than	 on	 cost-efficiency	 of	 emissions	 abatement	(Chinn,	 1999;	 Hayward,	 2007;	 Lam,	 2012).	 Firstly,	 it	 is	 reported	 that	 its	 proponents	believe	that	trading	schemes	can	contribute	to	the	creation	of	areas	where	air	pollution	is	 high,	 mostly	 with	 regards	 to	 nitrogen	 oxides	 (NOx)	 and	 sulphur	 oxides	 (SOx)	emissions,	 affecting	 local	 communities	 (Solomon	 &	 Lee	 2000).	 These	 areas	 can	 be	created	 if	 	 “a	high	 concentration	of	 emissions	 credits	 [is]	purchased	 in	 an	ecologically	sensitive	area”	(Solomon	&	Lee	2000,	p.40).	For	example,	in	a	case	study	of	Los	Angeles	pollution	 market	 it	 is	 claimed	 that	 thanks	 to	 allowing	 emissions	 trading,	 marine	terminals	 were	 able	 to	 release	 volatile	 organic	 compounds	 to	 the	 atmosphere	 while	acquiring	 credits	 from	 initiatives	 addressing	 scrapping	 high-polluting	 vehicles	 (Chinn	1999).	This	meant	however	that	the	credits	were	gained	from	all	over	the	region	where	the	market	was	operating	and	the	marine	terminal	emissions	were	affecting	only	certain	communities	 residing	 in	 the	 plants’	 neighbourhood.	 In	 this	 way,	 emissions	 trading	remains	 blind	 to	 spatial	 distribution	 effects.	 On	 a	 global	 scale,	 these	 inequalities	may	translate	 into	 cheap	 allowances	 being	 generated	 in	 developing	 countries	 where	monitoring	 and	 enforcing	 of	 the	 schemes	 is	 poor	 and	 then	 sold	 in	 the	 developed	countries	(Richman	2003).		
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	 Carbon	trading	has	also	been	called	“a	form	of	modern-day	colonialism”	(Rising	Tide,	 2011)	 and	 Christian	 Aid	 UK	 has	 underlined	 that	 it	 can	 “defraud	 developing	countries	 of	 their	 rights	 to	 use	 the	 global	 atmosphere”	 (Whittington	 2009).	 Baldwin	(2008)	also	presents	a	development	perspective	of	Mehmet	(2002)	and	Richman	(2003)	who	 explain	 that	 trading	 emissions	 often	 happens	 between	 wealthy	 and	 developing	countries,	which	may	lead	to	a	situation	where	even	though	there	is	transfer	of	money	towards	 the	 developing	 world,	 these	 countries	 bear	 costs	 in	 the	 form	 of	 lost	opportunities.	The	polluters	are	 then	still	able	 to	maximize	 their	profits	on	 the	cost	of	developing	countries	holding	carbon	allowances.	Richman	would	maintain	further	that		“emissions	trading	may	conflict	with	the	post-Rio	developed	country	leadership	principle	in	several	ways.	Most	obviously,	it	allows	developed	countries	to	claim	that	 they	 are	 meeting	 their	 reductions	 obligations	 through	 trading	 and	 to	‘double	count’	trades	as	both	domestic	reductions	and	assistance	to	developing	countries”	(2003,	p.170).		It	is	through	such	colonial	narratives,	that	the	spatial	reach	of	emissions	trading	systems	has	been	challenged.	As	this	thesis	will	go	on	to	explain,	the	issue	of	spatial	extension	of	the	EU	ETS	raises	a	host	of	other	governance	issues	too,	which	are	rather	less	examined	in	the	existing	literature.	These	are	related	to	overlapping	spaces	of	authority	between	international	 organisations	 and	nation	 states,	 spatial	 reach	 of	 the	 ICAO	 regulations	 or	the	reach	of	regulations	issued	by	the	states	themselves.	Furthermore,	emissions	trading	especially	 if	discussed	 in	 the	context	of	 the	EU	ETS	calls	 for	special	attention	to	 issues	related	 to	 justice	not	only	of	 the	 trading	processes	 themselves,	but	also	while	drafting	the	rules.	This	relates	to	procedural	justice	(Tyler	&	Blader	2003)	(i.e.	providing	fairness	in	the	processes	related	for	example	to	burden-sharing	of	 the	consequences	of	climate	change)	 and	participatory	 justice	 for	 example	 via	 community-based	projects	 (Shepard	2002)	as	well	as	the	importance	of	broad	involvement	in	global	decision-making.	It	has	also	been	underlined	that	public	participation	is	limited	in	the	case	of	emission	trading	schemes	as	 they	are	very	much	 industry-centred	 (Kaswan,	2008;	2011).	Finally,	 some	authors	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	 ethical	 framework,	which	 ensues	 the	 emissions	 trading	concept	 while	 asking	 about	 the	 common	 but	 differentiated	 responsibilities	 principle	with	regards	to	the	systems	or	by	looking	at	how	the	raised	finance	is	used	(Light	2012;	Caney	2010;	Ott	&	Sachs	2002).		 Another	 important	 issue	 that	 pertains	 to	 emissions	 trading	 is	 so	 called	 carbon	leakage,	 which	means	 that	 carbon-intensive	 activities	 can	 be	 relocated	 outside	 of	 the	
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territory	 that	 is	 covered	 by	 a	 given	 scheme	 (van	 Asselt	 &	 Brewer	 2010;	 van	 Asselt	&Biermann	2007;	Levy	&	Newell	2005).	This,	in	an	obvious	manner	limits	effectiveness	of	a	scheme.	Another	result	of	carbon	leakage	can	be	the	displacement	of	products	made	under	 stricter	emission	 regimes	by	 imported	 substitutes	 that	are	 cheaper	due	 to	non-existent	climate-related	fees.	Although	these	adverse	consequences	can	be	addressed	by	additional	 regulatory	 measures	 such	 as	 border	 adjustments	 for	 imported	 goods	 or	mitigating	 the	 costs	 of	 compliance	 for	 the	 producers	 (Neuhoff	 2008)	 they	 themselves	have	 disadvantages.	 For	 example	 they	 create	 threats	 to	 energy	 security	 or	 internal	energy	markets	 (Kama	2014)	 and	would	 require	 considerable	 cooperation	 and	 policy	learning	between	regions	(van	Asselt	&	Brewer	2010).			 The	 arguments	 pertaining	 to	 carbon	 leakage	 need	 to	 be	 also	 considered	 for	investigating	how	carbon	markets	are	arranged	spatially.	The	only	way	of	 factoring	 in	the	spatial	aspect	of	where	the	reductions	are	being	made	is	based	on	the	assumption	of	introducing	 carbon	 border	 measures.	 These	 can	 potentially	 mitigate	 effects	 of	 some	countries	having	carbon	policies	whereas	others	having	them	in	a	rudimentary	form	or	not	at	all	(van	Asselt	&	Brewer	2010).	Although	such	a	solution	could	in	theory	reduce	the	 negative	 aspects	 of	 differentiated	 policies,	 they	 may	 be	 challenged	 by	 the	 World	Trade	Organisation	 regime	as	 creating	obstacles	 for	 free	 trade.	Furthermore,	 it	 is	 also	not	entirely	clear	how	various	carbon	mechanisms	should	interact	with	each	other	and	if	such	 interactions	 would	 not	 water	 down	 the	 regulations	 and	 decrease	 effectiveness.	Linkage	 can	 create	 various	 issues	 and	 so	 far	 no	 substantial	 links	 have	 been	 created	between	 major	 emissions	 trading	 schemes	 (Pustelnik	 2013;	 Flachsland	 et	 al.	 2008;	Tuerk	et	al.	2009).		 The	debate	 concerning	 space	 and	boundaries	 in	 the	EU	ETS	has	 been	 reflected	also	 within	 the	 EU.	 As	 some	 claim	 responding	 to	 the	 EU	 ETS	 meant	 a	 conflict:	“negotiations	 on	 the	 scheme	 involved	 an	 intense	 struggle	 between	 the	 differing	territorial	 logics	 of	 the	 European	 Commission,	 the	member	 states	 and	 industry	 NSAs	[non-state	actors],	with	state	and	industry	actors	forming	defensive-territorial	‘alliances’	that	stressed	‘fairness’	in	national	and	sectoral	emissions	allocations”	(Bailey	&	Maresh	2009,	p.447).	These	alliances	negatively	affect	the	level	of	ambition	of	the	ETS	and	led	to	a	 situation,	 in	which	at	 the	design	 stage,	 the	Member	States	 and	 industries	have	been	creating	 coalitions	 that	 would	 advocate	 for	 “national	 territorial	 interests”	 (Bailey	 &	Maresh	 2009,	 p.452).	 What	 is	 more,	 these	 coalitions	 were	 able	 to	 influence	 the	
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territorial	 distribution	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	 allowances	 (Smale	 et	 al.	 2006)	 and	 in	 this	 way	establish	 business-state	 alliances	working	 against	 the	 legislation	 produced	 at	 the	 EU-level	(Bailey	&	Maresh	2009,	p.457).	As	it	will	be	shown,	the	territorial	interests	played	an	important	role	in	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation	file	while	Member	States	tried	to	safeguard	long-lasting	alliances	with	the	airlines	based	within	their	territories.			 This	 section	 has	 reviewed	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 emissions	 trading	 systems	 are	claimed	 to	 work,	 and	 different	 approaches	 and	 evaluations	 of	 the	 concept.	 The	introduction	 allowed	 situating	 the	 issue	 analysed	 in	 a	 wider	 area	 of	 climate	 change	mitigation	strategies.	This	allows	delving	further	into	the	details	of	the	EU	ETS	itself.	The	next	section	gives	a	further	overview	of	the	mechanism.	
2.3 The	European	Union	Emissions	Trading	System			 Once	 the	 emissions	 trading	 concept	 has	been	 sketched,	 the	 thesis	 can	 continue	with	the	presentation	of	the	EU	ETS.	Between	1990	and	1997,	the	European	Commission	was	mostly	 interested	 in	 exploring	 possibilities	 to	 introduce	 a	 carbon	 tax	 (Boasson	&	Wettestad	2013,	p.1)	and	the	ideas	related	to	the	carbon	trading	system	had	to	wait	for	a	more	 favourable	 period.	 Given	 that	 the	 preliminary	 proposals	 regarding	 a	 European	carbon	 tax	 presented	 by	 the	 Commission	 (Commission	 of	 the	 European	 Communities	1992;	 Commission	 of	 the	 European	 Communities	 1991)	 met	 with	 unprecedentedly	fierce	lobbying	activities	against	the	proposal	(Skjaerseth	&	Wettestad	2008;	Svendsen	2005),	quite	soon	it	became	obvious	that	the	Commission’s	plans	would	not	be	realized.	Opposition	 was	 coming	 both	 from	 the	 industry,	 worried	 about	 the	 potential	 costs	related	to	the	scheme,	but	also	from	the	Member	States	who	did	not	want	to	grant	the	EU	an	opportunity	 to	decide	about	an	EU-wide	 tax	 (Convery	2009,	p.392).	As	a	result,	the	 EU	 had	 to	 decide	 on	 an	 alternative	 way	 of	 tackling	 the	 issue	 of	 excessive	 CO2	emissions.	The	idea	of	carbon	tax	failed	but	the	shape	of	the	Kyoto	Protocol	directed	the	EU	 to	 look	 at	 the	US	 experiences	with	 emissions	 trading	 for	 other	 types	 of	 pollutants	(mostly	NOx	and	SOx),	and	later	to	consider	implementing	such	market-based	measures	on	European	ground.			 Paradoxically,	the	EU	was	drawing	its	own	scheme	looking	at	a	country	that	did	not	 ratify	 the	Kyoto	 Protocol,	 even	 if	 the	US’s	 endorsement	 for	 emissions	 trading	 has	been	 always	 evident.	 The	 EU	 did	 not	 however	 regard	 the	 US’s	 lack	 of	 action	internationally	as	a	major	issue.	The	Commission	took	advantage	of	the	US	experiences	
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with	emissions	trading	design	going	back	to	the	1960s	(Voß	2007;	van	Asselt	2010)	and	learnt	 from	 their	 successful	 implementation	 in	 the	 1970s	 (Ellerman,	 Convery,	 &	Harrison,	2003;	Stavins,	2001).	The	US	Acid	Rain	Program	initiated	with	Clean	Air	Act	Amendments	in	1990	was	a	flagship	initiative	that	aimed	at	reducing	nitrogen	oxide	and	sulphur	oxide	emissions	(Environmental	Protection	Agency	2013).	Another	example	 is	the	Regional	Clean	Air	Incentives	Market	(RECLAIM),	which	had	a	more	regional	scope	and	 was	 the	 first	 regional	 emissions	 trading	 scheme	 (Harrison	 1998).	 These	 two	schemes	 received	 considerable	 academic	 attention	 (Hahn	 &	 Noll,	 1990;	 Joskow,	Schmalensee,	&	Bailey,	1998;	Schmalensee,	et	al.,	1998;	Stavins,	1995)	and	later	inspired	the	EU	when	the	EU	ETS	legislation	was	under	construction.			 At	the	beginning	of	2000	the	European	Commission	put	forward	a	“Green	Paper	on	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 trading	 within	 the	 European	 Union”	 with	 the	 aim	 of	establishing	 an	 EU	 scheme	 for	 trading	 carbon	 (Commission	 of	 the	 European	Communities	 2000;	 Viguier	 2001).	 The	 paper	 asked	 the	 following	 question:	 “Should	there	 be	 a	 common	 emissions	 trading	 scheme	 within	 the	 European	 Community	 for	certain	 sectors	 in	 the	 interest	 of	 fair	 competition,	 maximum	 transparency	 and	 legal	certainty	for	companies?”	Countries	such	as	Norway	(not	an	EU	Member	State	though),	United	 Kingdom	 and	 Denmark	 (probably	 the	 most	 disposed	 towards	 flexible	mechanisms	 in	 the	EU)	 that	 in	some	form	were	already	experimenting	with	emissions	trading	 domestically	 would	 answer	 positively	 to	 the	 idea.	 Also	 Sweden,	 France	 and	Germany	 were	 interested	 in	 realizing	 Kyoto	 commitments	 through	 carbon	 trading	(Ellerman	 2000,	 p.12).	 However	 the	 German	 industry	 lobby	 was	 concerned	 about	competitiveness	issues	related	to	carbon	trading	(Convery,	2009,	p.	402).	Initially	the	EU	ETS	was	planned	as	a	very	 centralized	 system	with	 strong	control	 from	 the	European	Commission	 and	 wide	 auctioning	 of	 allowances	 but	 the	 EU	 eventually	 yielded	 to	 the	pressures	coming	from	industry	and	Member	States	and	limited	its	ambition	(Boasson	&	Wettestad	2013,	p.54;	Skjaerseth	&	Wettestad	2008).		 In	1999	the	Commission	would	consider	the	Kyoto	mechanisms	“fundamentally	different	from	the	way	the	European	Community	and	its	Member	States	have	organised	their	environmental	policy	over	the	last	decades”	but	would	still	encourage	investigating	them	 closer	 (European	 Commission	 1999b).	 Shortly	 after,	 a	 threat	 for	 the	 binding	commitments	included	in	the	Protocol	was	embodied	by	a	spectacular	failure	of	COP	6	that	took	place	in	2000	in	The	Hague	(Grubb	&	Yamin	2001).	Later,	in	March	2001,	the	
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US	withdrew	 from	 the	Kyoto	 Protocol	 but	 this	 step	 gave	 the	EU	 another	 argument	 to	push	 for	 a	 European	 emissions	 market	 to	 save	 the	 Kyoto	 regulations	 (Cass	 2005).	Following	 the	US	withdrawal	 and	 revival	 the	Kyoto	 Protocol	 experienced	 through	 the	Bonn	 Agreement5,	 the	 EU	 ratified	 the	 Protocol	 in	 May	 2002	 and	 encouraged	 other	countries	 to	 follow	 its	 steps	 (European	Commission	2002a).	Without	 the	US	on	board	and	with	a	weak	response	from	the	then	EU	Member	States	and	EU	candidate	countries,	the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 would	 have	 become	 a	 major	 climate	 regulation	 failure.	 After	 the	Canadian	and	Russian	ratifications	in	2002	of	the	Protocol,	it	entered	into	force	in	2005	with	 its	 first	commitment	period	set	 for	2008-20126.	The	EU	governments	understood	that	 an	 emissions	 trading	 system	was	 needed	 in	 order	 to	 fulfil	 the	 obligations	 of	 the	Protocol	 (Ellerman	&	Buchner	2007).	 The	Kyoto	Protocol	 together	with	disagreement	for	a	EU-wide	carbon	tax	can	be	considered	the	largest	EU	ETS	catalysts	(Braun	2009).	The	EU	ETS	provided	then	a	platform	for	the	EU	Member	States	to	further	involve	with	the	Kyoto	Protocol	flexible	mechanisms	(CDM,	JI)	since	their	allowances	are	considered	compliance	tools	for	the	EU	ETS.		 As	a	result	of	the	policy	debate	documented	in	great	detail	elsewhere	(Skjaerseth	&	 Wettestad	 2008;	 Delbeke	 2006;	 Lefevere	 2005;	 Egenhofer	 2007)	 the	 EU	 ETS	 was	established	in	2005	and	then	quickly	became	a	flagship	of	the	European	Union’s	Climate	Action	Programme.	 It	 is	 the	 first	 international	cap-and-trade	scheme	 in	 the	world	 that	operates	 at	 the	 company	 level.	 The	 EU	 ETS	 has	 been	 nicknamed	 “a	 parade	 horse”	(Peeters	 &	 Deketelaere	 2006,	 p.8),	 the	 “eight-hundred-pound	 gorilla”	 (Ghaleigh	 2010,	p.48)	 and	 “a	 political	 pet	 that	 the	 EU	 has	 aggressively	 implemented	 and	 promoted”	(Parker	&	Karlsson	2010,	p.930).	Its	pioneering	role	was	visible	not	only	through	its	size	in	terms	of	tonnes	of	carbon	traded	but	also	in	terms	of	the	sectoral	scope	of	the	project.	Although	at	the	beginning	of	its	operation	the	“flagship	seemed	lost	in	the	sea”	(Boasson	&	 Wettestad	 2013,	 p.53),	 following	 the	 revisions	 introduced	 in	 2008	 many	commentators	believed	it	had	made	progress	(Juergens	et	al.	2013;	Wråke	et	al.	2012).																																																										5	The	 Bonn	Agreement	 has	 been	 reach	 in	 July	 2001	 and	 established	 operational	 rulebook	 for	 the	 1997	Kyoto	Protocol.	 In	this	way,	 the	parties	managed	to	come	to	an	agreement	on	carbon	sinks,	compliance,	concern	 of	 the	 developing	 countries,	 implementation	 of	 the	 Protocol’s	 flexible	mechanisms	 and	 further	steps	regarding	the	negotiations.	The	meeting	in	Bonn	concluded	the	adjourned	COP	6.	The	political	will	of	the	 Bonn	meeting	 has	 been	 later	 translated	 into	 concrete	 decisions	 during	 COP	 7	 in	Marrakech,	 when	Marrakech	Accords	were	reached.	6According	to	Article	25	of	the	Protocol	it	enters	into	force	when	"on	the	ninetieth	day	after	the	date	on	which	 not	 less	 than	 55	 Parties	 to	 the	 Convention,	 incorporating	 Parties	 included	 in	 Annex	 I	 which	accounted	in	total	for	at	least	55%	of	the	total	carbon	dioxide	emissions	for	1990	of	the	Annex	I	countries,	have	deposited	their	instruments	of	ratification,	acceptance,	approval	or	accession”.	
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	 Until	2008	the	EU	ETS	included	spatially-fixed	plants	generating	heat	and	power,	energy	 intensive	 industries	 such	 as	 oil	 refineries,	 steel	works	 and	 production	 of	 iron,	aluminium,	 metals,	 cement,	 lime,	 glass,	 ceramics,	 pulp,	 paper,	 cardboard,	 acids	 and	several	organic	chemicals,	which	all	together	accounted	for	more	than	45%	of	the	EU’s	greenhouse	gas	emissions	(European	Commission	2013b).	The	principle	rule	of	the	EU	ETS	is	 the	premise	that	 it	 is	a	cap	and	trade	mechanism	based	on	both	grandfathering	and	auctioning	of	 the	allowances.	This	means	 that	 the	companies	receive	a	part	of	 the	allowances	for	free	and	a	certain	share	of	credits	is	auctioned.	In	Phase	III	of	the	scheme	(2013-2020)	 the	 Commission	 estimates	 that	 at	 least	 48%	 of	 allowances	 will	 be	auctioned	(European	Commission	2013b)	compared	with	10%	in	Phase	II	(Hepburn,	et	
al.,	2006)	and	almost	all	allowances	given	for	free	in	Phase	I	(2005-2007).	What	is	more,	the	overall	aim	 is	 to	stop	the	 free	allocation	no	 later	 than	2027	(Official	 Journal	of	 the	European	Union,	 2011).	One	 exception	has	 been	 established	 though:	 for	 aviation	 only	15%	of	 allowances	will	 be	 auctioned	 through	 the	whole	 of	 Phase	 III	 and	85%	will	 be	given	to	the	aircraft	operators	for	free	(European	Commission	2013a).		 From	its	very	beginning	the	EU	ETS	has	attracted	a	broad	scholarly	interest	both	in	terms	of	it	design	and	functioning	as	well	as	in	terms	of	its	economic	dimensions.	An	important	 review	 of	 the	 research	 on	 the	 EU	 ETS	 can	 be	 found	 in	 works	 by	Convery(2008)	and	Zhang	and	Wei	(2010).		 There	 are	 several	 approaches	 from	which	 the	 EU	 ETS	 has	 been	 viewed	 in	 the	existing	literature:	the	structure	of	the	system	(allocations,	decision-making,	monitoring,	implementation,	etc.),	the	price	of	the	allowances,	issues	related	to	the	separate	trading	periods,	competitiveness,	and	possible	links	between	the	EU	ETS	and	other	mechanisms.			 The	 allocation	 process	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	 has	 attracted	 greatest	 attention.	 This	 is	related	 to	 the	 initial	 overallocation	 of	 allowances	 (McAllister	 2009)	 and	 dramatic	decline	 in	 carbon	 prices	 and	 consequently	windfall	 profits	 of	 participating	 companies	(Sijm	 et	 al.	 2006).	 These	 profits,	 caused	 mostly	 by	 free	 allowances	 awarded	 to	 the	industries,	were	gathered	for	example	by	the	power	producers,	who	increased	prices	by	12-27%	compared	with	no	emissions	trading	scenarios	(Lise	et	al.	2010,	p.42).	They	also	estimate	that	the	pass-through	rates	(costs	of	complying	with	the	EU	ETS)	are	between	70-90%,	which	 indicates	 that	both	producers	and	end-pipe	consumers	are	affected	by	the	 scheme	 (Lise	et	al.	 2010,	p.42).	Buchner,	Carraro	and	Ellerman	 (2006)	 look	at	 the	initial	 mechanism	 of	 allocating	 allowances.	 This	 picture	 is	 complemented	 by	
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Georgopoulou	and	colleagues	(2006)	who	focus	on	the	allocation	issues	that	they	were	projecting	in	the	second	phase	of	EU	ETS	operation.			 Through	 looking	at	credits	distribution	within	the	EU	ETS	one	can	also	observe	how	separate	Member	 States	were	dealing	with	 this	 issue	 in	 their	National	Allocation	Plans	 (NAPs)	 (Gilbert	 et	 al.	 2004).	With	 regards	 to	 this	 issue	 it	 has	 been	 claimed	 for	example	 that	 the	NAPs	were	 important	as	 they	set	 the	 level	of	reductions	and	only	by	looking	at	 them	can	the	effectiveness	of	ETS	as	a	policy	 tool	can	be	evaluated	(Soleille	2006).	Even	 though	 there	were	problems	with	 the	number	of	 allowances	available	on	the	market,	there	is	consensus	with	regards	to	the	success	of	the	first	trading	period:	the	implementation	 was	 effective,	 no	 major	 technical	 issues	 arose,	 first	 changes	 in	 the	energy	production	towards	greener	sources	were	observed	(Anderson	&	Di	Maria,	2011;	Delarue,	Voorspools,	&	D’Haeseleer,	2008;	Ellerman	&	Buchner,	2008).			 The	 experiences	 from	 allocating	 credits	 for	 stationary	 sources	 are	 crucial	 for	more	 advanced	 analysis	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	 for	 aviation,	 whose	 dynamics	 are	 inherently	different	as	aviation	receives	a	separate	cap,	however	aircraft	operators	can	buy	credits	from	fixed	installations	to	cover	their	needs,	but	not	the	other	way	around.	This	solution	was	enabled	also	because	of	the	reform	of	EU	ETS	design:	from	2009	there	is	only	one	central	 ETS	 registry	 (that	 includes	 aircraft	 operators)	 controlled	 by	 the	 Commission	instead	 of	 NAPs	 and	 the	 member	 states’	 role	 was	 decreased	 to	 liaising	 in	 opening	accounts	in	the	central	registry.			 While	allocation	issues	with	regards	to	the	energy	industry	received	considerable	academic	attention,	much	less	has	been	said	about	this	problem	with	regards	to	aviation.	Malina	and	colleagues	(2012)	look	at	this	issue	from	the	perspective	of	the	US	carriers	claiming	 that	 the	 windfall	 profits	 these	 carriers	 may	 receive	 can	 be	 considerable.	Elsewhere	a	stimulation	model	was	employed	to	estimate	these	profits	for	Lufthansa,	a	German	airline	operator	(Vespermann	&	Wittmer	2011).		 Another	 frequently	 discussed	 feature	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	 was	 the	 aforementioned	fluctuation	of	prices	that	at	some	point	in	2007	came	close	to	zero	(Zhang	&	Wei,	2010:	p.1807).	The	volatility	of	 the	prices	has	been	an	 issue	mainly	 for	power	plants	whose	investment	plans	are	usually	 long-term	(Convery	&	Redmond,	2007).	The	value	of	 the	credits	has	been	central	also	to	several	other	analyses	(Convery	&	Redmond,	2007;	Creti,	Jouvet,	&	Mignon,	2012;	Hintermann,	2010).	
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	 Convincing	 arguments	 have	 been	 presented	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 process	 of	learning	from	“practising”	the	ETS	(Betz	&	Sato	2006;	Zhang	&	Wei	2010).	This	strand	of	research	answers	the	EU’s	pledge	that	implementation	of	the	EU	ETS	is	still	a	learning-by-doing	 process.	 Interestingly,	 the	 case	 of	 inclusion	 of	 aviation	 in	 the	 EU	 ETS	 is	 not	viewed	 as	 another	 “practice”	 but	 it	 is	 looked	 at	 separately.	 It	 is	worth	 noting	 that	 no	other	country	or	group	of	countries	was	 trying	 to	 implement	such	a	system,	 therefore	the	EU	has	been	obviously	experimenting	while	producing	the	EU	ETS	framework.			 The	more	recent	criticism	of	the	EU	ETS	was	even	suggesting	that	the	system	was	a	failure	to	the	extent	that	 it	should	be	terminated	as	the	reductions	achieved	are	low,	the	scheme	was	not	immune	to	frauds	and	carbon	leakage	was	not	prevented	(Branger	
et	al.	2015).	Some	also	argued	that	the	abatement	achieved	by	the	EU	in	2005-2012	was	mostly	caused	by	the	economic	crisis	instead	of	effective	carbon	policy.	In	spite	of	these	criticisms	expressed	 from	the	very	 institution	of	 the	EU	ETS,	 the	EU	has	developed	 its	scheme	dynamically	and	 in	the	EU’s	Roadmap	for	moving	to	a	competitive	 low	carbon	economy	 in	 2050	 the	 scheme	was	 considered	 “critical	 in	 driving	 a	wide	 range	 of	 low	carbon	 technologies	 into	 the	 market,	 so	 that	 the	 power	 sector	 itself	 can	 adapt	 its	investment	 and	 operational	 strategies	 to	 changing	 energy	 prices	 and	 technology”	(European	Commission	2011b).	However,	this	issue	has	not	been	brought	to	any	closer	investigation	with	regards	to	aviation.			 It	may	seem	that	 the	critique	of	 the	EU	ETS	and	emissions	 trading	 in	general	 is	substantial	and	designating	it	as	a	tool	to	tackle	CO2	emissions	in	the	EU	is	not	adequate.	However,	 there	have	been	various	steps	 taken	by	the	 legislators	 to	mitigate	 the	 issues	stated	 above.	 For	 example,	 from	 2008	 on	 the	 European	 emissions	 market	 stabilized	thanks	to	 increased	 liquidity	and	transparency	as	well	as	 larger	participation	(new	EU	Members	as	well	as	Norway,	Lichtenstein	and	Iceland	joining	from	the	Phase	II	(2008-2012)	on(Sanin	et	al.	2015).	In	order	to	facilitate	the	running	of	the	scheme,	the	National	Allocation	Plans	were	phased	out	 and	 replaced	with	 a	EU-wide	 registry	 (Newell	et	al.	2013).	The	EU,	answering	to	the	criticism	concerning	grandfathering	decided	to	sharply	increase	 the	 number	 of	 auctioned	 allowances	 and	 decrease	 those	 given	 for	 free.	 This	however	causes	issues	related	to	carbon	leakage	as	the	manufacturers	may	suffer	from	unfair	competition	based	outside	of	the	EU.	At	the	same	time	the	exemptions	offered	to	the	 industries	particularly	exposed	to	competition	may	undermine	the	effectiveness	of	the	scheme	(Martin	et	al.	2014)	Additionally,	to	increase	the	prices	of	allowances,	in	the	
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Phase	 III,	 the	 Commission	 managed	 to	 backload	 (postpone	 auctioning)	 900	 mln	allowances	 until	 2019-2020	 in	 order	 to	 address	 oversupply	 in	 the	 market	 (Official	Journal	of	the	European	Union	2014).	Also,	the	Commission	implemented	new	rules	in	order	to	boost	integrity	of	the	scheme	and	safeguard	from	manipulations	pertaining	to	"recycling"	allowances	and	value-added	tax	differences	in	the	EU	Member	States	(Newell	
et	al.	2013).	Finally,	the	Commission	believes	that	the	stakeholder	input	has	been	taken	into	 greater	 consideration	 for	 the	 future	 of	 the	 scheme	 thanks	 to	 both	 events	 and	written	consultations	(European	Commission	2015b).		 For	 all	 the	 criticisms,	 the	 EU’s	 activities	 within	 the	 sphere	 of	 greenhouse	 gas	regulation	have	been	seen	as	highly	significant.	It	has	been	argued	that	the	mechanism	itself	 is	 an	 important	 form	of	 international	 institutional	 entrepreneurship	 (Boasson	&	Wettestad	 2013,	 p.76).	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 explained	 that	 the	 developments	within	 the	climate	 regime	 (Kyoto	 Protocol,	 US	 failure	 in	 leading	 international	 climate	 policies,	development	of	regional	carbon	trading	schemes)	strengthened	the	EU’s	policy	decision	regarding	initiation	of	its	ETS	(Boasson	&	Wettestad	2013,	p.76).	It	has	also	been	viewed	as	concomitant	of	the	institutional	proclivity	to	favour	multi-level	governance	structures	within	the	EU,	and	at	the	same	time	consistent	with	the	global	regime’s	endorsement	of	emissions	trading	schemes	(Boasson	&	Wettestad	2013).	
2.4 Aviation,	climate	change	and	the	EU	ETS		 		 With	 the	 framework	 for	 emissions	 trading	 and	 the	 EU	 ETS	 outlined,	 the	 thesis	now	proceeds	to	its	main	focus:	the	inclusion	of	aviation	in	the	EU	ETS.	Firstly,	attention	is	given	to	the	impacts	of	the	airline	industry	on	the	environment	and	legal	regulations	with	respect	to	this	sector,	concluding	with	a	review	of	literature	on	inclusion	per	se.		
2.4.1 Impacts	of	aviation	on	climate	change	




al.	 2013).	The	 Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	 (IPCC)	also	points	out	 that	non-CO2	emissions	double	 or	 even	quadruple	 aviation’s	 impact	 on	 climate	 (Metz	et	al.	2007).	 Also,	 the	 aforementioned	 substances	 are	 released	 at	 high	 altitudes,	 thus	 they	impact	differently	 than	 if	 released	 on	 the	 surface	 (Chapman	 2007;	 Frömming	 et	 al.	2012)	 and	 may	 possibly	 affect	 the	 climate	 through	 contributing	 to	 the	 formation	 of	contrails	 and	 cirrus	 clouds	 (Marquart	 et	 al.	 2003;	 Stubenrauch	 &	 Schumann	 2005;	Carleton	 &	 Travis	 2013;	 Zerefos	 et	 al.	 2003),	 This	 thesis	 deals	 however	 with	 CO2	emissions	from	aviation,	the	other	effects	will	be	referred	to	only	briefly.	Nonetheless,	it	is	 important	 to	 remember	 that	 when	 burning	 jet	 fuel	 an	 airplane's	 engine	 produces	several	 environment-affecting	 substances.	 These	 include	 nitrogen	 oxides,	 hydrogen	oxides,	water	 vapour,	 soot	 and	particulates	 as	 listed	by	 a	 supplementary	 report	 to	 the	IPCC	proceedings	 (Penner	et	al.,	 1999).	More	detailed	 evidence	of	 processes	 that	 take	place	in	atmosphere	and	troposphere	can	be	found	elsewhere	(Azar	&	Johansson	2012;	Wild	et	al.	2001;	Unger	2011).			 As	far	as	climate	change	is	concerned,	the	substance	that	is	central	in	the	debate	is	 CO2.	 Aviation	 itself	 is	 responsible	 for	 approximately	 2-2.5%	 total	 CO2	 emissions	globally	 (Lee	 et	 al.,	 2009)	 and	 13%	 of	 all	 GHG	 emissions	 related	 to	 transportation	(European	Commission	2005).	The	growth	trend	 is	continuous,	according	to	estimates	aviation	emissions	will	 increase	by	230%	to	667%	by	2050	(Runge-Metzger	2011).	 In	2006	aviation	emissions	amounted	to	630	Mtonnes	CO2	where	62%	of	the	volume	was	produced	by	international	aviation	and	38%	by	domestic	operations	(Lee,	Lim,	&	Owen,	2013).	 According	 to	 the	 data	 reported	 by	 the	 Annex	 I	 countries	 to	 the	 UNFCCC,	 the	European	 Union	 accounted	 for	 more	 than	 a	 half	 of	 international	 aviation	 emissions	(European	Commission	2005a,	p.5).		 Even	 though	 it	 may	 seem	 that	 there	 is	 an	 abundance	 of	 research	 on	 the	environmental	 and	 climate	 impacts	 of	 aviation,	 various	 aspects	 of	 this	 issue	 are	perceived	 as	 being	 not	 fully	 understood.	 The	 controversies	 include	 accuracy	 of	 the	measurements	 and	 precision	 of	 estimates.	 In	 2004	 the	 US	 Congress	was	 alerted	 by	 a	group	of	scientists	that	“the	topic	of	greatest	uncertainty	and	contention	is	the	climate	change	impact	of	aircraft”	(Waitz,	et	al.,	2004,	p.	18).	At	the	same	time,	some	argue	that	“there	are	tantalizing	hints	of	possible	aviation	impacts	on	climate	and	climate	trends”	
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(Carleton	 &	 Travis	 2013,	 p.422).	 The	 lack	 of	 certainty	 has	 been	 raised	 recently	 with	regards	to	radiative	forcing	and	atmosphere	chemistry	related	to	it	(Holmes	et	al.	2011;	Wuebbles	 et	 al.	 2010)	 and	 with	 regards	 to	 uncertainties	 in	 short-lived	 effects	 from	aviation	(Dorbian	et	al.	2011).	More	recently,	there	have	been	also	voices	asserting	that	the	 use	 of	 the	Radiative	 Forcing	 Index	 (RFI),	which	 combines	 the	 non-CO2	 impacts	 of	aviation,	 should	 be	 abandoned	 for	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 Global	 Warming	 Potential	(GWP)	index(Airport	Watch	2015).		These	uncertainties	apply	also	to	the	measurement	of	the	level	of	emissions	from	the	aircraft’s	engine:	there	are	large	differences	between	emissions	from	an	airborne	plane	and	a	taxiing	one.			 As	far	as	one	can	be	quite	certain	of	airborne	emissions,	when	it	comes	to	those	produced	on	ground	there	is	much	less	precision	in	estimates(Garcia-Naranjo	&	Wilson	2005).	Similarly,	it	is	known	that	the	formation	of	clouds	is	related	to	aviation	activities,	however	 it	 is	not	certain	how	these	contribute	 to	a	 larger	radiative	 impact	of	aviation	(Lee	et	al.	2009).	Scientists	struggle	even	with	assessing	the	thickness	of	contrails,	which	is	 crucial	 for	 further	 estimates	 of	 their	 climate	 impact	 (Lee	 et	 al.	 2010;	 Meyer	 et	 al.	2002).	 These	 uncertainties	 have	 been	 important	 enough	 to	 deter	 policy-makers	 from	attempts	 to	 introduce	 emissions	 trading	 for	 substances	 other	 than	 CO2	 (Unger	 2011,	p.5).	
2.4.2 International	regulation	of	aviation	emissions	
		 Considering	 historical	 policies	 regarding	 aviation	 allows	 for	 a	 better	understanding	 of	 the	 complex	 circumstances	 of	 regulating	 this	 sector.	 Historically	aviation	has	been	treated	separately	in	trade	treaties	(Havel	&	Sanchez,	2011b)	and	has	enjoyed	exceptional	 treatment	 from	the	 IPCC	that	decided	not	 to	 include	 international	aviation	activities	in	the	Kyoto	Protocol	(United	Nations	1997).		 The	 regulation	 of	 aviation	 in	 general	 has	 been	 shaped	 via	 agreements	 of	 a	bilateral	 character,	 which	 are	 remnants	 of	 post-war	 arrangements	 still	 visible	 today.	This	 bilateralism	 concerns	 not	 only	 relations	 between	 countries	 but	 also	 relations	between	countries	and	airlines	registered	with	their	governments.	For	example,	the	US	was	 powerful	 because	 of	 the	 technological	 advancement	 of	 its	 aviation	 industry,	however	its	potential	was	locked	due	to	British	(mostly)	resistance	to	letting	Americans	access	their	bases	for	refuelling	and	British	airports	as	final	destinations	(Taneja	1980).	While	drafting	 the	Convention	on	 International	Civil	Aviation,	which	 is	 considered	 the	
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main	treaty	regulating	international	aviation,	governments	were	very	much	focused	on	absolute	sovereignty	(this	means	that	a	state	is	entitled	to	regulate	entry	and	operation	of	 both	domestic	 and	 international	 flights	within	 its	 airspace	 that	 overlies	 a	 country’s	territories	 and	waters)	 over	 their	 airspace	but	 they	were	 at	 the	 same	hoping	 that	 the	signatories	of	the	document	would	grant	access	to	airspace	to	other	signatories	(Button	&	 Stough	2000c,	 p.135).	 The	 optimistic	 vision	has	 not	 been	 realized	 and	 the	world	 of	aviation	started	to	operate	on	the	basis	of	bilateral	agreements.	These	had	repercussions	regarding	how	the	airlines	were	operating:	what	were	their	routes,	passenger	capacities,	where	would	they	pay	for	the	kerosene	burnt,	which	is	crucial	while	fuel	constitutes	25-40%	 of	 all	 the	 costs	 that	 airlines	 bear	 (Fitzgerald	 2011,	 p.215).	 Obviously,	 with	technological	advancements,	the	state	of	affairs	has	changed	but	the	bilateral	character	of	agreements	prevails	until	today.			 Although	 the	 US,	 then	 an	 aviation	 giant,	 was	 trying	 to	 establish	 a	 minimally	regulated	 regime	 for	 the	 international	 air	 transport	 back	 in	 the	 1940s	 its	 endeavours	failed	(Taneja	1980,	p.19).	The	American	idea	was	based	on	liberalization	principles	that	would	make	aviation	work	as	any	other	sector	of	economic	activity.	This	perspective	has	however	been	confronted	internationally.	The	international	community	felt	safer	about	retaining	a	possibility	to	negotiate	rules	separately	with	nation-states	instead	of	having	an	 established	 international	 framework	 of	 aviation	 rules.	 This	 resulted	 in	 a	 largely	piecemeal	 approach.	 One	 of	 the	 first	 examples	was	 the	 Bermuda	 Agreement	 between	Great	Britain	and	the	US	in	1946	(Library	of	Congress	1965)–	it	set	a	precedent	for	the	bilateral	 regulation	 of	 landing	 and	 passage	 rights.	 Notwithstanding	 the	 fact	 that	 the	system	 of	 bilateral	 agreements	 seemed	 to	 work	 quite	 smoothly	 at	 the	 beginning	 the	development	of	new	routes	made	the	network	of	bilateral	agreements	highly	complex.	This	became	very	visible	when	 the	EU	started	 to	 think	about	 the	 inclusion	of	 aviation	into	the	EU	ETS.		It	is	claimed	that	with	regards	to	the	problem	of	aviation	emissions	the	bilateral	 character	 of	 the	 regulations	 makes	 it	 virtually	 impossible	 to	 set	 national	emissions	caps/targets.	The	consequences	of	 such	steps	would	be	an	unsettling	of	 the	web	of	agreements	between	the	countries.	If	they	decided	to	look	for	different	ways	of	achieving	reductions	in	emissions,	the	piecemeal	approach	could	even	hamper	air	traffic	(Miller	1998,	p.727).		 As	 explained	 by	 Doganis	 (2001,	 p.19):	 “while	 each	 country	 and	 government	tightly	 controlled	 its	 own	 domestic	 air	 services,	 the	 traditional	 regulatory	 framework	
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affecting	 international	 air	 transport	 operations	 was	 based	 essentially	 on	 bilateralism	and	emerged	in	the	aftermath	of	the	Second	World	War”.	The	emergence	of	this	kind	of	system	 was	 founded	 on	 the	 Convention	 on	 International	 Civil	 Aviation,	 commonly	known	 as	 the	 Chicago	 Convention	 (ICAO	2006a),	which	 delineated	 the	 foundations	 of	today’s	aviation	regulations.	The	Convention	drafted	by	54	participants	of	 the	Chicago	meeting	 has	 been	 ratified	 by	 190	 countries	 so	 far,	 which	 makes	 it	 a	 truly	 universal	framework	 for	 aviation	 activities.	 Its	 main	 aim	 was	 to	 create	 consistent	 post-war	regulation	 for	 the	 sector	 (Miller	 1998,	 p.706).	 	 Furthermore,	 the	 Convention’s	cornerstone	were	the	freedoms	of	the	air	–	rights	that	become	valid	once	embedded	in	bi-	or	multilateral	agreements	between	countries	(ICAO	2004b).	These	freedoms	include	both	 transit	 (refuelling	 and	 transit	 over	 territory)	 and	 traffic	 rights	 (rules	 regarding	carriers	operating	outside	their	country	of	registration,	cabotage).	The	Convention	also	created	ICAO.			 It	 must	 be	 underlined	 however,	 that	 even	 if	 these	 still	 seem	 today	 to	 be	 a	perfectly	 accurate	 framework,	 there	 have	 been	 voices	 claiming	 that	 the	 Chicago	Convention	 has	 become	 out-dated	 and	 does	 not	 embrace	 the	 whole	 complexity	 of	aviation	in	the	21st	century	(Havel	&	Sanchez	2011a).	In	addition,	the	Convention	did	not	include	 economic	 rights	 between	 the	 countries	 leaving	 space	 for	 further	 bi-	 and	multilateral	 negotiations	 and	 agreements.	 Furthermore,	 it	 was	 underlined	 that	 the	Convention	 restrains	 full	 globalization	 of	 the	 aviation	 market	 and	 its	 further	liberalization	for	example	by	allowing	cabotage.			 While	 a	 general	 introduction	 to	 ICAO	 is	 provided	 below,	 the	 importance	 of	 the	organisation	for	the	analysed	case	will	be	explained	further	in	Chapter	5.	In	terms	of	a	forum	 for	 discussion,	 the	 shape	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 post-war	 regulations	 gave	 a	monopolistic	position	to	ICAO,	which	is	a	United	Nations	agency	established	“to	promote	the	safe	and	orderly	development	of	 international	civil	aviation	throughout	the	world”	(ICAO	2013).	In	the	context	of	thousands	of	bilateral	agreements,	ICAO	remains	the	only	venue	 for	 global	 aviation	 issues,	 such	 as	 climate	 change.	 What	 is	 more,	 the	 Kyoto	Protocol	 has	 indicated	 that	 ICAO	 is	 the	 organization	 best	 placed	 to	 deal	with	 aviation	emissions:		“The	 Parties	 included	 in	 Annex	 I	 shall	 pursue	 limitation	 or	 reductions	 of	emissions	 of	 greenhouse	 gases	 not	 controlled	 by	 the	 Montreal	 Protocol	 from	aviation	 and	 marine	 bunker	 fuels,	 working	 through	 the	 International	 Civil	
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Aviation	 Organization	 and	 the	 International	 Maritime	 Organization,	respectively”	(United	Nations,	1997).		 A	 similar	 statement	 was	 placed	 in	 the	 Revised	 1996	 Guidelines	 for	 National	Greenhouse	 Gas	 Inventories	 of	 the	 IPCC:	 “emissions	 based	 upon	 fuel	 sold	 to	 ships	 or	aircraft	engaged	in	international	transport,	should	not	be	in	national	totals,	but	reported	separately”	(United	Nations	1999).	More	recently,	in	2011	the	same	opinion	concerning	separate	 reporting	 has	 been	 reiterated	 by	 the	 ad	 hoc	 working	 group	 investigating	 a	long-term	cooperative	action	under	the	Convention	(United	Nations	2011).	Its	members	urged	 ICAO	 “to	 continue	 without	 delay	 their	 activities	 for	 the	 development	 of	 policy	approaches	 and	 measures	 to	 limit	 and	 reduce	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions”	 (United	Nations	 2011).	 It	 has	 been	 claimed	 however,	 that	 the	 “ICAO	 does	 not	 have	 exclusive	stewardship”	(Havel	&	Sanchez,	2012,	p.	358)	with	regards	to	regulating	standards	for	reducing	 emissions	 from	 the	 sector	 and	 therefore	 other	 entities	 should	 be	 allowed	 to	tackle	that	issue	outside	of	the	ICAO	framework.		 The	Chicago	Convention	does	not	 set	emissions	standards	 for	CO2.	Annex	16	 to	the	Convention,	in	a	limited	way	refers	to	engine	standards	in	respect	of	hydrocarbons,	carbon	monoxide	 (CO)	 and	NOx	 released	 to	 the	 atmosphere	 by	 aircraft.	 Regardless	 of	this	 gap,	 ICAO	became	 interested	 in	 tackling	 the	problem	of	 emissions	 as	 early	 as	 the	1970s.	 At	 the	 time	 of	 the	 UN	 Conference	 on	 Human	 Environment	 of	 1972,	 ICAO	maintained	that		“in	fulfilling	this	role	ICAO	is	conscious	of	the	adverse	environmental	impact	that	may	be	related	to	aircraft	activity	and	its	responsibility	and	that	of	 its	member	states	 to	 achieve	 maximum	 compatibility	 between	 the	 safe	 and	 orderly	development	 of	 civil	 aviation	 and	 the	 quality	 of	 human	 environment”	 (ICAO,	1972).			 Five	years	later,	in	1977	the	Committee	on	Aircraft	Engine	Emissions	(CAEE)	was	established	at	ICAO,	which	was	the	first	step	to	formally	looking	at	the	problem	within	ICAO.	 The	 Committee’s	 efforts	 led	 to	 the	 elaboration	 of	 aircraft	 emissions	 standards.	Shortly	 afterwards,	 in	 1983,	 CAEE	 was	 replaced	 by	 the	 Committee	 on	 Aviation	Environmental	 Protection	 (CAEP),	 which	 comprises	 23	 member	 countries	 and	 16	observers	 (the	 EU	 among	 them).	 In	 1999	 the	 Committee	 endorsed	 “development,	dissemination	and,	to	the	maximum	practical	extent,	use	of	the	best	operating	practices	to	achieve	near	term	reductions	in	aircraft	[GHG]	emissions”	(ICAO	2006b),	which	was	
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		 The	EU	had	become	dissatisfied	with	progress	at	 ICAO	in	2005	when	 it	pointed	out	that	“as	recognized	in	the	policy	statements	agreed	by	all	its	Contracting	States	it	is	not	realistic	to	expect	ICAO	to	take	global	decisions	on	uniform,	specific	measures	to	be	implemented	by	all	nations”	(European	Commission	2005)	and	came	to	the	conclusion	that	pace	needed	to	be	accelerated	(for	 further	analysis	see	Section	5.4).	 In	relation	to	this,	 the	 EU	 committed	 itself	 to	 treat	 aviation	 as	 another	 sector	 to	 be	 included	 in	 its	emissions	 trading	 scheme.	 In	 this	way	 the	EU	bypassed	 the	need	 to	 create	 a	 separate	system	and	avoid	larger	international	negotiations	on	its	shape.	When	the	Commission	was	proposing	the	inclusion	of	aviation	into	the	EU	ETS	it	had	strong	arguments	in	hand.	The	 growth	 of	 aviation	 emissions	 and	 air	 traffic	 in	 Europe	was	 exponential:	 between	1990	 and	 2006	 GHG	 emissions	 from	 both	 intra-European	 and	 intercontinental	 flights	increased	by	87%	(Europa	2006).	The	situation	looked	even	worse	if	only	flights	within	the	EU	are	 taken	 into	consideration:	 there,	aviation	emissions	grew	by	748%	between	1972	and	2002	(Holden,	2007,	p.	172).	These	two	features,	coupled	with	58%	more	fuel	burnt	 annually	 by	 civil	 aviation	 in	 2000	 compared	with	 1990	 (European	 Commission	2003),	 could	 have	 helped	 persuade	 the	 Commission	 that	 steps	 needed	 to	 be	 taken	 in	order	to	address	this	problem.			 The	 principle	 of	 the	Directive	 2008/101/EC,	 later	 called	 the	 Aviation	Directive	(Official	Journal	of	the	European	Union	2008),	which	formally	establishes	the	principle	for	 including	 aviation	within	 the	 ETS	 is	 based	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 an	 aircraft	 is	 a	mobile	source	of	CO2	emissions7.	The	inclusion	comprised	all	the	planes	landing	at	and	departing	 from	 EU	 airports.	 In	 practice	 this	 meant	 that	 also	 the	 airlines	 that	 are	registered	 outside	 of	 the	 EU	 needed	 to	 comply	 with	 the	 scheme	 and	 surrender	allowances	 (Official	 Journal	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 2008).	 This	 decision	 can	 be	considered	a	continuation	of	EU	climate	change	contingent	unilateralism,	a	situation	in	which	one	entity	aims	at	regulating	emissions	produced	outside	the	territory	of	the	EU	and	on	the	other	hand	it	remains	at	the	EU’s	discretion	to	exempt	third	countries	from	complying	if	they	applied	similar	solutions	(Scott	&	Rajamani	2012,	p.469).		 Although	the	EU	believes	 that	 the	best	solution	would	be	a	global	agreement,	 it	still	 decided	 to	 include	 aviation	 as	 the	 EU	 ETS	 “may	 serve	 as	 a	model	 for	 the	 use	 of																																																									7In	the	Directive	the	word	“installations”	was	changed	to	activities	in	order	to	broaden	the	scope	of	the	EU	ETS.	
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though	as	the	number	of	credits	allocated	to	airlines	can	be	revised	by	the	Commission	from	2015	onwards	(Malina	et	al.	2012).			 To	 conclude,	 it	 merits	 mentioning	 that	 there	 has	 been	 plenty	 of	 scholarly	attention	given	to	the	inclusion	of	aviation	in	the	EU	ETS	per	se.	This	academic	interest	mostly	pertains	to	the	issue	of	wider	EU	transport	and	aviation	policy.	At	this	point,	only	one	 argument	 concerning	 the	 cohesion	 of	 EU	 climate	 policy	will	 be	 raised.	 Fitzgerald	(2011)	claims	 that	 the	European	Commission	 is	 inconsistent	 in	 its	policies	 concerning	transportation.	Instead	of	strongly	promoting	the	virtually	emission-neutral	high-speed	railway	 that	 caused	 the	 Member	 States	 substantial	 costs,	 it	 allows	 its	 regions	 to	subsidize	 low-cost	 airlines.	 This	 in	 turn	 often	may	 lead	 to	 stimulation	 of	 demand	 for	unnecessary	 air	 travel.	 Although	 the	 exact	 costs	 of	 environmental	 impacts	 of	 aviation	are	difficult	to	estimate	(Vespermann	&	Wittmer	2011),	it	is	agreed	that	the	low	prices	of	 tickets	 do	 not	 reflect	 these	 environmental	 footprints	 (Chapman,	 2007),	 especially	given	 the	 preferential	 position	 that	 the	 cheap	 airlines	 are	 being	 provided	 at	 regional	European	airports	 (Fitzgerald	2011).	The	next	 section	will	 investigate	 the	 issue	of	 the	special	position	of	aviation	industry.		
2.4.4 Exceptionalism	in	aviation	policy	and	regulation:	origins,	path	dependency	
and	retrenchment			 The	 previous	 sections	 have	 hinted	 that	 aviation	 has	 been	 enjoying	 a	 special	treatment	both	in	international	and	domestic	realms.	Its	impacts	on	climate	change	are	significant,	however	until	the	EU	decided	to	include	the	sector	in	the	EU	ETS	there	was	no	 international	 answer	 to	 this	 problem	 that	would	 compel	 airlines	 to	 limit	 or	 offset	their	 emissions	 aggressively.	 Visibly,	 aviation	 interests	 remain	 strong	 enough	 to	 keep	their	 privileged	 position.	 Alternatively,	 it	 has	 been	 considered	 a	 special	 sector	 of	 the	economy	 that	 should	be	kept	under	umbrellas	of	national	 support	 and	defended	 from	any	kind	of	additional	costs.			 This	comfortable	position	can,	in	theoretical	terms,	be	viewed	as	a	certain	kind	of	path	dependency	(Peters	et	al.	2005;	Pierson	2000).	The	literature	on	path	dependency	would	 claim	 that	 even	 if	 circumstances	 have	 changed,	 the	 policies	 might	 remain	persistent	and	not	adjust	accordingly.	In	the	analysed	case,	the	dependency	was	related	to	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 Chicago	 Convention	 and	 the	 exclusive	 sovereignty	 of	 the	country	 over	 its	 airspace,	 which	 has	 been	 challenged	 by	 the	 EU,	 who	 questioned	 the	
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aviation	 status	 quo.	 On	 the	 other	 side,	 Krasner	 claims	 that	 once	 a	 decision	 has	 been	taken	to	change	the	path	it	is	very	difficult	to	return	to	the	original	policy	(1984,	p.225).	Elsewhere	 the	 situation	 has	 been	 explained	 as	 the	 joint	 decision	 trap	 –	 a	 situation	 in	which	a	 large	number	of	decision-makers	 cannot	agree	on	a	particular	policy	 solution	(Peterson	&	Bomberg	1999,	p.19).	Perhaps	the	most	comprehensive	explanation	of	the	emergence	of	the	EU	ETS	is	offered	by	Convery	who	claims:		“change	 is	 a	 product	 of	 many	 forces,	 including:	 an	 enabling	 legislative	 and	institutional	context;	an	international	context	and	sense	of	crisis	that	stimulates	and	supports	action;	an	intellectual	framework	and	experience	that	provides	the	animating	 idea	 and	 evidence	 to	 support	 action;	 effective	 political	 and	bureaucratic	leadership”	(2009,	p.392).		 Indeed,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS,	 “an	 economic-political	 hybrid”	 (van	 Asselt	2010,	 p.140),	many	 actors	were	 engaged	 to	 launch	 and	 develop	 the	 project,	 however	given	the	international	scope	of	the	inclusion	of	aviation	and	the	step	being	perceived	as	unilateral(Leggett	et	al.	2012;	Motaal	2012),	this	case	can	be	viewed	as	a	dramatic	policy	change	 with	 implications	 for	 non-EU	 countries.	 The	 circumstances	 of	 aviation	 (more	examples	 from	 the	 US	 context	 are	 offered	 in	 Section	 6.2)	 provide	 an	 example	 where	competing	regulations	or	their	visions	and	the	tensions	between	them	(Feindt	&	Flynn	2009)	(for	example	ICAO	vis	à	vis	EU)	are	driving	policy	change.		 How	 is	 this	 change	 situated	 on	 a	 larger	 canvas?	 Policies	 addressing	 global	environmental	problems	appear	to	be	more	complicated	for	policy	analysis	than	is	the	case	for	national	issues	(Evans	2012).	It	seems	that	given	the	interaction	between	states,	international	organizations,	 industry	as	well	as	NGOs	(as	the	analysis	will	show)	and	a	diffusion	 of	 the	 problem,	 the	 most	 promising	 framework	 for	 understanding	 the	boundaries	 of	 aviation	 emissions	 regulation	 is	 a	 multi-level	 governance	 framework.	Environmental	governance	is	understood	here	as	“the	use	of	institutionalized	power	to	shape	 environmental	 processes	 and	 outcomes”	 (Lemos	&	 Agrawal	 2009,	 p.71),	which	relates	strongly	to	international	environmental	politics.			 Similarly	 as	 in	 the	 sphere	 of	 regulation,	 the	 inclusion	 of	 aviation	 has	 however	remained	 outside	 the	 mainstream	 literature	 concerning	 global	 environmental	governance,	which	in	the	area	of	climate	change	would	focus	on	more	energy-consuming	sectors	such	as	energy	production	or	on	emissions	trading	 in	general	(Voß	2007).	The	inclusion	 of	 aviation	 has	 been	 looked	 at	 systematically	 from	 a	 legal	 point	 of	 view	(Bogojević	2013;	Kulovesi	2011;	Bartels	2012;	Bogojević	2012;	Meltzer	2012;	Ghaleigh	
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2009;	Denza	2012;	Hertogen	2012;	Hartmann	2013;	Mullen	2013;	Romera	&	van	Asselt	2015)	and	also	 its	 international	dimension	would	be	seen	mostly	 in	 legal	or	economic	terms	 (Staniland	 2012;	 de	 Paula	 Domingos	 2012;	 Reagan	 2008)	 or	 as	 a	 possible	preparation	for	including	shipping	into	the	EU	ETS	(Ringbom	2011).	What	is	more,	the	legal	 analyses	 are	 usually	 limited	 to	 the	Air	 Transport	 Association	 of	 America	 filing	 a	case	 to	 the	 High	 Court	 asked	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 (CJEU)	 to	determine	 if	 the	 Aviation	 Directive	 was	 valid.	 The	 mentioned	 articles	 would	 focus	exclusively	 on	 the	 “legality”	 rather	 than	 on	 how	 legislation	 fits	 within	 more	comprehensive	governance	patterns.	While	they	justly	evaluate	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation,	they	 ignore	 the	 nature	 of	 change	 that	 has	 happened	 in	 the	 regulation	 of	 aviation	emissions.	Also,	the	further	implications	of	this	are	usually	limited	to	observing	that	the	EU	ETS	is	an	instance	of	the	EU’s	green	leadership	(Staniland	2012;	Mehling	et	al.	2013;	Lindenthal	2014),	without	then	tracing	how	this	leadership	is	enacted.	
2.5 Conclusions		 		 This	chapter	has	outlined	the	main	policy	areas	in	which	the	topic	of	the	thesis	is	situated	 as	well	 identifying	 literature	 relevant	 to	 the	 subject	matter.	 The	 EU	 ETS	 has	been	placed	within	 a	 larger	 policy-making	 spectrum.	 Furthermore,	 it	 has	 been	 shown	that	 the	EU’s	decision	 to	 focus	on	aircraft	emissions	was	not	only	an	expression	of	 its	leadership	 in	 environmental	 policy-making	 but	 was	 also	 seen	 as	 a	 necessary	 step	 to	address	the	burning	issue	of	soaring	levels	of	CO2	emitted	from	airplanes.		 As	it	emerges	from	the	material	presented,	for	the	emissions	trading	systems	and	for	the	EU	ETS	too,	the	issues	at	stake	pertain	mostly	to	governance	rather	than	to	the	environment.	 For	 the	 latter,	 they	 are	based	on	 the	 claim	 that	potential	 environmental	benefit	 can	 be	 realized	 by	 the	 overall	 decrease	 in	 CO2	 emissions	 achieved	 as	 well	 as	mitigation	 measured	 separately	 according	 to	 the	 included	 sectors.	 The	 evidence	 for	reductions	 varies	 however	 from	 sector	 to	 sector.	 The	 second	 environmental	 aspect	 is	the	 issue	of	 some	areas	being	still	more	exposed	 to	pollution	as	 the	emissions	 trading	systems	do	not	affect	the	 location	of	the	polluting	entity:	allowances	can	be	purchased	and	 the	 emissions	 levels	 at	 a	 given	 emitter	 remain	 at	 the	 same	 level.	 The	 main	governance	issues	identified	relate	to	the	extension	of	authority	of	the	regulating	entity,	the	 process	 of	 design	 of	 a	 mechanism,	 interaction	 between	 the	 emissions	 trading	systems	as	well	 as	between	 the	economic	areas	 that	 feature	different	 climate	policies.	
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3.1 Introduction		 		 The	previous	chapter	gave	an	overview	of	the	substantive	issues	that	this	thesis	seeks	 to	 address.	 It	 has	 provided	 the	 context	 for	 this	 research	 and	 the	 areas	 of	contention,	puzzle	or	disagreement.	As	it	becomes	visible	one	can	identify	several	issues	that	are	particularly	important	and	will	be	analysed	in	the	subsequent	chapters.	These	problems	definitely	 include	the	nature	of	change	that	the	inclusion	of	aviation	into	the	EU	 ETS	 has	 caused	 and	 the	 differences	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 US	 with	 regards	 to	firstly,	 aviation	 pollution	 policies.	 Secondly,	 the	 dynamics	 of	 a	 debate	 on	 a	 global	mechanism	 for	 tackling	 the	 aviation	 emissions	 problem	 have	 to	 be	 taken	 into	consideration.	Finally,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 reflect	on	 the	 location	of	 the	debate	 surrounding	aviation	emissions	in	general	–	the	capacities	of	the	actors	involved	in	decision-making	at	a	global	level,	role	of	international	organisations	and	unilateral	regulation	of	aviation	emissions.	 In	 order	 to	 pursue	 exploration	 of	 such	 a	 wide	 plethora	 of	 issues,	 careful	choices	with	regards	to	theoretical	underpinnings	of	the	whole	project	were	made.			 This	chapter	engages	therefore	with	the	theoretical	perspectives	of	the	thesis	to	explain	 its	 theoretical	 underpinnings.	 As	 becomes	 clear,	 the	 case	 of	 climate	 policy-making	in	the	EU	related	to	aviation	is	enmeshed	in	larger	debates,	notably:	debate	on	sovereignty	versus	unilateral	action,	 the	role	of	 the	EU	as	a	green	 leader	globally	(see:	Chapter	 5),	 and	 the	 dialogue	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 non-EU	 countries	 with	 regards	 to	larger	climate	goals	that	extend	beyond	aviation	itself.		 The	 issues	mentioned	 above	 can	 be	 viewed	 from	 various	 perspectives	 and	 the	chosen	 path	 of	 political	 science	 may	 be	 challenged	 with	 economic	 perspectives	 that	would	 look	 at	 issues	 like	 market	 distortions	 caused	 by	 the	 EU	 ETS	 or	 more	 psycho-sociological	 approaches	 where	 the	 perception	 of	 carbon	 trading	 would	 be	 explored.	Similarly,	one	can	employ	a	legal	theoretical	framework	and	investigate	the	judicial	side	of	 the	 carbon	 mechanism	 in	 question.	 More	 of	 these	 could	 be	 listed,	 however	 as	mentioned	 before,	 this	 thesis	 is	 involved	 with	 policy-making,	 power	 relations	 in	 the	policy	 process	 and	 modes	 of	 governing	 climate	 problems,	 hence	 its	 theoretical	background	draws	more	heavily	on	political	science	than	any	other	discipline.	 	Indeed,	the	 previous	 chapter	 has	 indicated	 that	 economic	 instruments	 tend	 to	 be	 shaped	 by	
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political	choices	and	political	constructs	such	as	state	boundaries	–	 important	political	science	 concerns	 –	 and	 so	 here	 these	 concerns	 are	 juxtaposed	 with	 the	 theories	 this	thesis	 involves.	 In	a	broader	sense,	 this	chapter	offers	explanation	of	how	the	theories	applied	 characterize	 the	world	 this	 thesis	 investigates.	 It	 also	 gives	 an	 account	 of	 the	explanatory	 mechanisms	 they	 provide.	 Adopting	 and	 integrating	 a	 model	 based	 on	multiple	theoretical	perspectives	is	motivated	by	the	intersections	of	various	spheres	of	authority	 that	 are	 present	 in	 this	 research.	 While	 testing	 one	 theory	 to	 evaluate	 its	usefulness	 for	a	given	policy	problem	could	be	an	alternative	 for	 the	model	employed	here,	it	would	not	be	equally	powerful	in	explaining	the	phenomena	this	thesis	aspires	to	address.	In	particular,	the	model	created	enabled	grasping	both	the	inner	dynamics	of	the	 organisations	 investigated	 while	 keeping	 the	 analysis	 of	 a	 broader	 governance	picture	 still	 present.	 Secondly,	 it	 has	 allowed	 combining	methods	 that	 stem	 from	 the	approaches	employed.		 Further	in	this	chapter	it	will	be	explained	how	and	why	multi-level	governance	(MLG)	 became	 the	 main	 theoretical	 framework	 for	 the	 thesis	 and	 why	 two	 more	approaches	 supplement	 it:	 policy	 networks	 analysis	 (PNA)	 and	 interpretive	 policy	analysis	 (IPA).	 The	 next	 sections	 engage	 first	 with	more	 straightforward	 approaches:	PNA	 (3.2)	 and	 IPA	 (3.3)	 by	 showing	 their	 basic	 assumptions,	 criticisms	 that	 they	encounter	 and	 their	 appropriateness	 for	 this	 research.	 The	 latter	 sections	 (3.4,	 3.5)	engage	with	perspectives	on	MLG	and	explain	theoretical	choices	made.	They	also	look	at	 MLG’s	 ontology	 and	 theoretical	 relevance	 for	 the	 analysed	 issue.	 The	 rationale	 of	supplementing	 MLG	 with	 additional	 theories	 is	 explained,	 along	 with	 potential	challenges	and	trade	offs.	Finally,	the	last	section	briefly	discusses	alternative	theoretical	frameworks	that	could	have	been	employed	in	this	thesis	(3.6).	
3.2 The	first	pillar	of	the	investigation:	policy	network	analysis			 In	this	section	policy	network	analysis	 is	presented	with	special	attention	given	to	its	advantages	and	disadvantages	for	this	particular	project.	Among	the	three	theories	applied	here,	PNA	promises	to	be	the	one	that	is	the	most	straightforward	but	crude	at	the	 same	 time.	 Again,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 look	 at	 the	 context	 of	 the	 analysed	 issue	 to	understand	the	merits	of	this	theoretical	perspective.			 Central	 to	 this	 thesis	 is	a	need	 to	understand	policy	change,	 for	which	PNA	has	advanced	 a	 series	 of	 important	 propositions.	 Firstly,	 PNA	 investigates	 the	 success	
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factors	of	groups	working	together	for	a	common	policy	goal	and	changes	these	groups	undergo	over	time	(Heaney	2004).	Secondly,	it	allows	one	to	investigate	the	connectivity	between	stakeholders	across	a	given	policy	domain	while	they	are	attempting	to	affect	decision-making.	Thirdly,	this	approach	provides	for	classification	of	the	policy-relevant	stakeholders,	thus	it	allows	the	mapping	of	the	territory	of	a	given	policy	realm.	Finally,	PNA	has	been	also	able	to	strengthen	understanding	of	how	power	is	shared	in	a	society	and	 in	 this	 way	 directly	 involve	 with	 governance	 (Atkinson	 &	 Coleman	 1989;	 Jordan	1981).	 More	 precisely,	 the	 PNA	 theoreticians	 would	 claim	 that	 ‘instead	 of	 emanating	from	 a	 central	 authority,	 be	 this	 government	 or	 the	 legislature,	 policy	 today	 is	 in	 fact	made	in	a	process	involving	a	plurality	of	both	public	and	private	organizations’	(Mayntz	1993,	p.5);	an	observation	also	clearly	picked	up	by	MLG	scholars.			 The	change	that	 is	analysed	in	this	thesis	pertains	to	broadening	and	tightening	the	environmental	 regulation	of	aviation.	A	sector	whose	environmental	 impacts	were	regulated	only	partially	(chiefly	via	noise	standards)	and	its	impact	on	climate	change	in	the	 context	 of	 international	 policy-making	has	usually	 been	 concealed.	Only	when	 the	European	Union	started	to	consider	aviation	as	another	sector	that	potentially	could	be	included	 into	 its	 carbon	 trading	mechanism,	did	 the	 issue	gain	momentum	 in	political	agendas	in	Europe	and	beyond.			 Policy	change	has	been	a	 focal	point	 for	policy	analysts	 for	a	 long	 time	and	 the	PNA	 approach	 derives	 from	 policy	 scientists	 who	 employed	 it	 in	 the	 late	 1970s	 and	1980s	 (Hanf	&	Scharpf	1978;	Milward	&	Wamsley	1985).	Network	analysis	 is	used	 in	many	branches	of	social	science:	it	has	been	widely	explained	as	social	network	analysis	(Scott	 &	 Carrington	 2011),	 in	 cases	 of	 information	 revolution	 (Castells	 2000)	 or	intercultural	analysis	(Lin,	1999).	In	political	science	network	analysis	took	the	form	of	policy	network	analysis	and	has	been	viewed	as	one	of	the	most	common	tools	to	look	at	the	policy	process	(Rhodes,	2006).	At	the	same	time,	understanding	of	policy	networks	has	been	divided	 into	 two	 concepts	based	on	how	 the	networks	 are	perceived:	policy	networks	as	an	analytical	tool	and	policy	networks	as	a	theoretical	approach,	as	further	developed	by	the	Interest	Intermediation	School	and	Governance	School	(Börzel	1998).	Some	see	the	analysis	of	the	policy	networks	approach	as	a	“heuristic	device”	and	others	as	 “having	 explanatory	 utility”	 (D.	Marsh	 1998b,	 p.3),	 hence	 answering	 the	 questions	that	 political	 scientists	 tend	 to	 ask:	 “who?”	 “what?”	 and	 “why?”–	 these	 clearly	correspond	with	 the	 research	questions	 this	 thesis	 is	 asking.	Over	 time,	 the	 approach	
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has	 become	 further	 refined	 and	 gained	 additional	 concepts	 as	 reported	 in	 Rhodes	(2006):	 issue	 networks	 (Heclo	 1978),	 iron	 triangles	 (Ripley	 &	 Franklin	 1981),	 policy	sub-systems	 or	 sub-governments	 (Freeman	 &	 Stevens	 1987),	 policy	 communities	(Richardson	&	 Jordan	1979)	 and	 epistemic	 communities	 (Haas,	 1992);	 these	however	will	not	be	expanded	on	here.			 For	 anyone	 who	 engages	 with	 policy	 networks	 it	 becomes	 clear	 early	 on	 that	their	 conceptualizations	 vary.	 Some	 even	 call	 the	 variety	 of	 policy	 networks	“Babylonian”	(Börzel	1998).	While	trying	to	find	a	common	definition,	Börzel	proposes	to	 find	a	common	denominator	across	a	variety	of	approaches	 to	policy	networks	and	suggests	the	following	definition:		“a	 set	 of	 relatively	 stable	 relationships	 which	 are	 of	 non-hierarchical	 and	interdependent	nature	linking	a	variety	of	actors,	who	share	common	interests	with	 regard	 to	 a	 policy	 and	 who	 exchange	 resources	 to	 pursue	 these	 shared	interests	 acknowledging	 that	 co-operation	 is	 the	 best	way	 to	 achieve	 common	goals”(1998,	p.254).	Another	 widespread	 definition	 comes	 from	 Benson	 (1982,	 p.148);	 for	 him	 the	 policy	network	is	“a	cluster	or	complex	of	organisations	connected	to	each	other	by	resource	dependencies	 and	 distinguished	 from	 other	 clusters	 or	 complexes	 by	 breaks	 in	 the	structure	 of	 resource	 dependencies”.	 As	 will	 be	 shown	 in	 Chapter	 6	 and	 7,	 these	resource	dependencies	will	be	crucial	for	understanding	states’	involvement	in	the	case.		 In	 more	 practical	 terms,	 Klijn	 for	 example	 points	 out	 “the	 policy	 network	approach	draws	attention	to	the	importance	of	the	institutional	context	for	the	issue	of	governance.	 If	 policy	 processes	 takes	 place	 within	 certain	 institutionalised	 context,	 it	becomes	 important	 to	 understand	 that	 context”	 (1997,	 p.33).	 	 This	 context	 is	 for	example	a	stable	relation	pattern	between	organisations	and	in	the	case	of	this	research,	the	 EU	 institutions	 and	 the	 EU	 ETS	 itself.	 Furthermore,	 attention	 given	 to	 the	institutionalised	 context	 provides	 for	 investigation	 of	 the	 EU	 –	 ICAO	 dynamics	 (see:	Chapter	5).		 Sometimes	 the	 definitions	 of	 policy	 networks	 can	 be	 even	 broader	 than	 those	proposed	 above:	 “the	 notion	 of	 policy	 networks	 does	 not	 so	 much	 represent	 a	 new	analytical	 perspective	 but	 rather	 signals	 a	 real	 change	 in	 the	 structure	 of	 the	 polity”	(Mayntz	 1993,	 p.5).	 This	 view	 helps	 to	 position	 the	 research	 questions	 related	 to	 the	nature	of	change	and	the	actors	who	influence	EU	policy	membership.	Further,	Mayntz	argues	that	policy-making	goes	beyond	the	central	role	of	the	government	but	engages	a	
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multitude	 of	 public	 and	 private	 actors	 (1993).	 Similarly,	 it	 is	 claimed	 that	 “a	 policy	network	includes	all	actors	involved	in	the	formulation	and	implementation	of	a	policy	in	a	given	policy	sector”	(Börzel	1998,	p.260).	The	analytical	inclusiveness	appears	to	be	important	in	the	context	of	complex,	interrelated	memberships	that	one	observes	in	the	analysed	case.		 While	 going	 beyond	 the	 government	 and	 nation-state	 position,	 network	 theory	opens	 up	 the	 analysis	 towards	 the	 issues	 surrounding	 the	 problem	 of	 environmental	policy	 integration	 that	 exemplifies	 a	 situation	 that	 goes	 well	 beyond	 “unilateral	adjustment	of	national	regulatory	arrangements”	(Knill	&	Tosun	2011,	p.171).	It	has	also	been	 regarded	 as	 a	 prominent	 approach	 with	 which	 to	 analyse	 sectoral	 regulation	(Börzel	1998),	which	is	crucial	for	the	issues	investigated	in	this	thesis	as	for	example	it	accommodates	sub-sectoral	differences	(here	based	on	the	differences	between	aircraft	operators,	aircraft	manufacturers	and	airports).		 Finally,	a	good	summary	of	the	strengths	of	this	approach	is	given	by	Klijn	who	sees	 policy	 network	 analysis	 as	 “a	 perspective	 that	 focuses	 on	 the	 interactions	 and	relation	 patterns	 between	 different	 actors	 and	 their	 strategies	 and	 thus	 tries	 to	contextualize	the	policy	process”	(1996,	p.94).		 The	network	approaches	have	however	encountered	several	problems	that	need	consideration.	 Firstly,	 Dowding	 would	 argue	 that	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	 this	approach	 is	 questionable	because	 the	 independent	 variables	 that	 are	 employed	 in	 the	analysis	 “are	 not	 the	 network	 characteristics	 per	 se	 but	 rather	 characteristics	 of	components	 within	 the	 networks”	 (1994,	 p.69).	 This	 means	 then	 that	 not	 only	 the	nature	of	the	network,	but	also	the	nature	of	the	policy	process	are	explained	by	these	components.	Dowding	concludes	that	this	type	of	theory	building	is	“reductionist”(1994,	p.69).	 Marsh	 (1998b)	 too,	 observes	 that	 simple	 classification	 of	 networks	 and	differentiating	 between	 issue	 networks	 (with	 a	 large	 number	 of	 participants	 with	 a	rather	 loose	 relationship	 and	 disparate	 power	 between	 participants)	 and	 policy	communities	(limited	number	of	participants,	close	relationships,	common	basic	values,	conscious	 exclusion	 of	 some	 groups)	 is	 too	 straightforward.	 Even	 though	 these	categories	are	applicable	for	this	thesis,	they	may	be	insufficient	given	the	complexity	of	the	issues	tackled	and	variety	of	actors	involved.	The	question	is	then	what	groups	does	one	want	to	 investigate,	how	to	provide	an	inclusive	approach	and	how	this	translates	into	the	research	agenda.	
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	 Secondly,	one	needs	to	be	cognizant	that	the	policy	network	approach	is	a	meso-level	concept	and	deals	with	the	issues	that	are	situated	between	the	micro	and	macro	levels.	 These	 for	 example	 are	 issues	 pertaining	 to	 the	work	 of	 the	 eNGOs	 that	 can	 be	qualified	as	working	on	the	meso-level.	 It	has	clear	implications:	comprehensive	views	require	some	integration	of	micro-	and	macro-level	approaches,	in	the	sense	that	more	details	 are	 taken	 into	 consideration	 and	 the	 relations	 between	 the	 actors	 can	 be	analysed	 with	 more	 nuance	 (Daugbjerg	 &	 Marsh	 1998,	 p.52).	 Some	 authors	 see	 that	networks	operate	on	the	sectoral	rather	than	sub-sectoral	level	(Dowding,	1994;	Jordan,	Maloney,	 &	 McLaughlin,	 1994)	 whereas	 others	 place	 them	 on	 the	 sub-sectoral	 level,	citing	 examples	 from	 the	 British	 context	 (Smith,	 1991)	 or	 claim	 that	 the	 networks	operate	at	both	levels	(Cavanagh,	1998;	Rhodes	&	Marsh,	1991).	The	meso-level	needs	supplementing	 to	 address	 issues	 related	 to	 the	 broader	 structures	 and	 processes	 this	thesis	 aspires	 to	 study.	 This	 approach	 offers	 then	 an	 insight	 into	 what	 is	 occurring	between	 individual	actions	(on	the	human	behaviour	 level)	and	macro-level	processes	such	as	bargaining	between	civil	society	and	governments.	Indeed,	networks	have	been	conceptualized	as	an	interaction	system	(Burns	&	Flam	1987).		 Finally,	 this	 theory	 does	 not	 reflect	 an	 important	 feature	 of	 the	 policy-making	process,	which	 is	 its	dynamics.	Policy	network	analysis	does	not	 address	 the	 inherent	unpredictability	of	the	policy	process	(Klijn,	1996,	p.	94).	Also,	it	is	noted	that	“networks	are	no	final	solution	to	decision-making	problems	in	bargaining	systems”	(Börzel	1998,	p.263)	thus	relying	on	PNA	as	the	only	tool	of	investigation	would	be	unwise.			 In	 summary,	 PNA	 is	 employed	 as	 a	 theoretical	 tool	 in	 this	 thesis	 as	 it	 gives	prominence	 to	 the	 networks	 that	 have	 been	 clearly	 visible	 and	 active	 in	 EU	 policy-making	 in	general,	and	 in	the	analysed	case	 in	particular.	Secondly,	 it	allows	analysing	the	 change	 itself	 (of	 policies,	 networks,	 policy	 problems	 understanding).	 While	promising	these	merits,	it	clearly	cannot	become	the	only	analytical	lens	mostly	because	it	fails	to	account	for		cases	that	are	not	consistent	with	such	patterns.	Furthermore,	PNA	has	been	mostly	used	to	analyse	stability	and	outcomes	rather	than	change	in	the	policy	process	(Jordan	&	Greenaway	1998).	For	PNA	theorists,	change	 is	primarily	caused	by	exogenous	factors	(Bulkeley	2000).	Attention	to	these	factors	is	however	limited	as	PNA	places	 central	 importance	 on	 resource	 exchanges	 and	 their	 outcomes	 rather	 than	discursive	construction	of	policy	issues.	Policy	networks	are	also	much	more	concerned	with	larger	block	of	actors	(policy	communities,	coalitions),	which	distances	the	theory	
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from	 closer	 involvement	with	 interactions	 happening	 on	 smaller,	 often	 even	 personal	levels.	 These	 issues	 are	 recognized	 and	 addressed	 by	 supplementing	 PNA	 with	interpretive	policy	analysis,	whose	advantages	are	explained	in	the	next	section.	
3.3 The	refinement	provided	by	interpretative	policy	analysis			 Following	the	explanation	of	PNA’s	appropriateness,	this	section	shows	how	IPA	advances	 the	understanding	of	 the	political	 landscape	drawn	by	PNA.	 IPA	 is	more	of	a	“political	 cartography”	 type	 of	 activity	whereas	 there	 is	 a	 need	 for	 a	mise-en-scène	 to	refine	PNA’s	simplifications.	Network	analysis	does	not	fully	explain	how	networks	are	held	together	and	sees	only	the	simplest	resource	exchanges	within	the	network.	Some	of	these	deficiencies	can	be	addressed	by	employing	interpretative	approaches.			 As	 explained	 by	 Bevir	 and	 Rhodes	 (2003,	 p.1)	 “interpretive	 approaches	 begin	from	the	insight	that	to	understand	actions,	practices	and	institutions,	we	need	to	grasp	the	 relevant	meanings,	 the	beliefs	 and	preferences	of	 the	people	 involved”.	Elsewhere	they	add	that	“interpretive	approaches	to	political	studies	focus	on	meanings	that	shape	actions	and	 institutions,	 and	 the	ways	 in	which	 they	do	 so”	 (Bevir	&	Rhodes,	2004,	p.	130).	These	 initial	premises	already	seem	extremely	useful	 for	 the	analysed	 issue:	 the	understanding	of	 the	 inclusion	of	aviation	 into	 the	EU	ETS.	As	 it	was	signalled	earlier,	the	parties	involved	in	the	inclusion,	including	the	legislator	itself,	states,	industries	and	NGOs	 or	 think-tanks,	 were	 interpreting	 the	 step	 differently	 thus	 investigating	 these	interpretations	 allows	 to	 uncover	 the	 mechanisms,	 which	 affected	 production	 of	emerging	understandings.	IPA	looks	then	at	the	exchanges	between	the	stakeholders	in	a	more	refined	manner	by	focusing	much	more	on	“why”	questions	rather	than	simply	“what”.		 IPA	gives	special	attention	to	change,	but	 in	a	different,	complementary	to	PNA,	manner.	As	explained	by	Kay:	“policy	change	is	a	shift	 in	the	framework	of	agreed	and	shared	 meanings	 amongst	 influential	 policy	 stakeholders”	 (2009,	 p.49).	 The	 idea	 of	change	 in	 meanings	 complements	 PNA’s	 focus	 on	 exchanges	 of	 resources	 within	 the	networks	and	thus	gives	 foundation	for	 inquiry	 into	more	thorough	understandings	of	change.			 Furthermore,	 interpretive	 policy	 analysis	 provides	 tools	 for	 a	 better	understanding	of	the	context	of	the	policies	enacted.	What	then	is	the	interpretive	policy	approach?	Wagenaar	 argues	 that	 it	 is	much	more	 than	 just	 a	method,	 he	 sees	 is	 as	 a	
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doctrine,	 as	 a	 set	 of	 beliefs	 about	 “how	 to	 address	 a	 number	 of	 epistemological	 and	methodological	problems	in	the	social	sciences	in	a	fitting	manner”	(2011,	p.4).		 Some	argue	that	“interpretive	policy	analysis	asks	not	only	what	a	policy	means	-	a	context-specific	question	about	a	specific	policy	-	but	also	how	policies	mean”	(Yanow	2014,	p.139),	and	this	is	crucial	for	the	analysed	case.	It	has	been	clear	what	the	EU	has	been	 aspiring	 to	 achieve	 through	 the	 inclusion	 of	 aviation	 onto	 ETS,	 however	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 policy	 has	 been	 neglected.	 The	 IPA	 allows	 putting	 into	 spotlight	 the	learning,	 knowing	 and	 communicating	 of	 a	 given	 policy.	 Furthermore,	 it	 allows	interpretation	 of	 multiple	 meanings	 as	 provided	 by	 policy-relevant	 groups	 (Yanow	1993;	 1996;	 2014).	 Since	 the	method	 is	 based	 on	 the	 reading	 of	 the	 policy,	 it	 allows	investigating	 further	 the	 understandings	 of	 the	 policy	 participants	 identified	 through	network	analysis.	In	this	way,	it	allows	to	investigate	the	case	further	and	ask:	was	the	inclusion	of	aviation	a	step	to	expand	leadership?	Was	it	a	consequential	development	of	a	policy	for	which	the	legislators	presumed	no	external	effects?	Has	the	EU	been	trying	to	dethrone	ICAO?	Investigating	these	interpretations	is	thus	crucial	in	order	to	paint	a	full	picture	and	enable	an	informed	answer	to	the	research	questions.				 In	 addition,	 interpretive	 policy	 analysis	 focuses	 on	 accommodating	 multiple	possible	meanings	and	drawing	on	Pierce	(1955)	 favours	abductive	approaches	 to	 the	deductive	or	inductive	(Fischer,	2001;	Kapitan,	1992).	It	also	looks	at	confusion	caused	by	 the	 expectations	 of	 the	 researcher	who	 goes	 to	 the	 field	 and	 actually	 looks	 for	 the	puzzles	 and	 surprises	 (this	 issue	 will	 be	 analysed	 closer	 in	 the	 next	 chapter).	Interpretive	policy	analysts	are	thus	less	focused	on	the	contestation	of	reality	but	look	more	 closely	 at	 “the	 human	 possibilities	 of	 knowing	 the	 world	 around	 us	 and	 the	character	 of	 that	 knowledge”	 (Yanow	 2000,	 p.7).	 This	 kind	 of	 analysis	 pays	 more	attention	 to	 the	 broader	 audience:	 policy-relevant	 public,	 those	 who	 implement	 the	policies,	legislators,	etc.	–	all	of	them	are	engaged	in	the	meaning-making	and	trying	to	understand	reality	(Yanow	2000,	p.8).			 Furthermore,	 this	 type	 of	 analysis	 emphasises	 the	 beliefs	 of	 people	 and,	 given	that	 the	 data	 for	 this	 research	 comes	 from	 interviews,	 it	 is	 vital	 these	 beliefs	 are	included	 in	 analysis.	 These	 are	 advanced	 to	 an	 even	 higher	 level:	 “interpretative	approaches	do	not	merely	study	beliefs,	ideas	or	discourses.	They	study	beliefs	as	they	appear	 within,	 even	 frame,	 actions,	 practices	 and	 institutions.	 Interpretative	 theory	applies	 to	 all	 of	 political	 science”	 (Bevir	 &	 Rhodes,	 2003,	 p.	 17).	 So,	 whereas	 policy	
Chapter	3:	Theoretical	discussion 
	 59	
network	analysis	focuses	narrowly	on	what	is	happening	between	the	actors,	IPA	brings	into	 the	 picture	 a	 wider	 contextualisation.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 while	 being	 broadly	concerned	with	 the	 context,	 it	 closely	 investigates	 the	 individuals,	which	 is	 crucial	 for	this	thesis	given	it	is	mainly	informed	by	first-hand	accounts	of	stakeholders	involved	in	the	analysed	process.		 Finally,	it	is	important	to	investigate	the	role	of	discourses	in	forming	and	holding	networks	together.	There	are	two	distinct	ways	within	policy	networks	scholarship,	 in	which	 the	 formation	 of	 coalitions	 and	 their	 interactions	 is	 explained.	 The	 first	 one	 is	proposed	 by	 Hajer	 who	 espouses	 the	 idea	 of	 “discourse	 coalitions”	 and	 argues	 that	analysing	 discourse	 within	 the	 policy	 networks	 allows	 determination	 of	 “why	 a	particular	understanding	of	the	environmental	problem	at	some	point	gains	dominance	and	 is	 seen	as	authoritative,	while	other	understandings	are	discredited”	 (Hajer	1995,	p.44).	The	coalitions	themselves	are	not	necessarily	built	around	goals	or	interests	that	the	coalition’s	members	share	but	based	on	common	terms	of	understanding	the	nature	of	 the	 problem	 tackled	 as	 well	 as	 their	 meanings	 (Hajer	 1996,	 p.247).	 The	members	subscribe	also	under	a	certain	frame	and	try	to	impose	it	on	the	other	members	present	in	the	policy	process,	hence	there	is	a	strong	focus	on	participants	of	the	process	(Hajer	&	Versteeg	2005a).	The	second	approach,	 less	applicable	 for	this	research,	 is	based	on	Advocacy	 Coalition	 Framework	 (ACF)	 that	 compete	 with	 each	 other	 within	 policy	subsystems(Sabatier	 1998;	 Sabatier	 1988;	 Jenkins-Smith	 &	 Sabatier	 1994).	 They	 are	based	on	actors	who	“share	a	set	of	normative	and	causal	beliefs	and	engage	in	a	non-trivial	degree	of	co-ordinated	activity	over	time”(Sabatier	1998,	p.103).	The	applicability	of	 the	 ACF	 is	 limited	 here	 as	 it	 very	much	 focuses	 on	 implementation,	 learning	 from	implementation	and	from	policy	performance.	Given	that	the	implementation	process	of	the	 inclusion	 of	 aviation	 into	 the	 EU	ETS	 has	 been	 blocked,	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	ACF	would	be	limited.	By	employing	the	IPA	attention	can	be	given	to	interpretation	of	negotiations	 leading	 to	 a	 change.	 PNA	 in	 turn	 investigates	 interactions	 that	 may	 be	occurring	between	the	communities,	but	also	gives	attention	to	the	outliers.			 As	 it	 is	 shown	above,	 interpretivism	 is	employed	 to	 fill	 the	need	 for	elucidating	the	narratives	in	this	study	and	inclusion	of	contextual	nuances	of	the	research.	It	helps	to	provide	a	fuller	explanation,	in	conjunction	with	tracing	the	relations	between	actors,	of	policy	stability	and	change.	As	far	as	generalizability	is	concerned,	this	issue	is	solved	
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by	 the	 network	 approach	 that	 offers	 a	 framework	 that	 is	 perfectly	 replicable	 (see:	Chapter	3).			 Although	 the	 IPA	 approach	 has	 important	 features	 contributing	 to	 the	understanding	of	the	issue,	there	are	several	criticisms	it	faces.	The	first	argument	of	the	critics	of	interpretivism	is	its	descriptive	approach	to	reality	and	at	the	same	time	poor	possibility	 to	 replicate	 the	 research	 elsewhere	 –	 therefore	 the	 generalizability	 of	 the	findings	 can	 be	 questioned.	 As	 reported	 by	 Lin,	 positivists	 tend	 to	 see	 interpretive	approaches	as	using	anecdotes	to	construct	claims	(1998,	p.172).	This	pertains	later	also	to	the	validity	standards	that	are	used	to	assess	the	validity	of	research	-	using	the	same	criteria	to	evaluate	the	two	approaches	would	be	detrimental	for	both	of	them.		 One	more	objection	 is	made	 in	 relation	 to	 interpretivism	 in	 the	British	context:	although	 policy	 interpretivists	 believe	 that	 their	 main	 explanatory	 tool	 has	 been	‘tradition’	 they	do	not	elucidate	how	these	 traditions	emerged,	developed	or	what	are	their	results	 (Dowding,	2004,	p.	145).	These	are	usually	 taken	 for	granted	and	are	not	analysed	 in	depth,	which	 can	be	 regarded	 as	 an	oversimplified	 approach.	 Interpretive	policy	analysis	does	not,	however,	aspire	to	decide	between	positivist	and	constructivist	views	on	the	nature	of	facts	or	perspectives	on	reality.	It	sees	its	role	as	a	reconciling	one	between	the	different	views	while	rather	democratizing	knowledge	(Fischer,	2003,	pp.	223–224;	Hoppe,	2011,	pp.	43–44).			 Finally,	once	the	approach	has	been	evaluated	 it	 is	useful,	briefly,	 to	 investigate	its	relationship	with	governance.	Similarly	to	PNA,	IPA	users	also	consider	links	between	their	theory	and	governance.	Some	believe	that	the	discursive	turn	in	IPA	has	countered	the	“denial	of	agency	to	those	 ‘targets’	on	the	 ‘receiving	ends	of	policies’	and	helped	in	re-linking	 policy	 analysis	 to	 forms	 of	 governance	 that	 are	 more	 participative	 and	‘democratic’”	(Yanow	2014,	pp.137–138).	Indeed,	the	link	to	participation	in	the	process	is	crucial	and	focusing	on	the	traditional	power	bases	such	as	the	state	alone,	would	be	inadequate	in	the	analysed	case.			 There	 is	also	a	belief	 that	 there	 is	an	 intimate	relationship	between	governance	and	interpretivism.	Some	authors	argue	that	“if	we	are	in	the	midst	of	a	shift	from	top-down	 ‘command	 and	 control’	 to	 a	 looser	 framework	 of	 ‘governance’,	 then	 the	 time	 of	interpretivism	may	well	have	arrived”	(Finlayson	2004,	p.129).	 Indeed,	 it	appears	that	interpretive	approach	answers	better	questions	that	are	situated	 in	a	more	fluctuating	
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context.	In	highly	regulated	systems,	based	on	indicating	what	is	prohibited	and	what	is	allowed,	the	space	for	beliefs	and	meaning	making	practices	would	appear	to	be	of	more	limited	 use.	 In	 the	 analysed	 environment,	 where	 the	 regulation	 is	 in	 the	making,	 IPA	offers	then	a	framework	to	elucidate	these	beliefs	and	see	how	they	affected	the	policy-making	process.	The	struggle	to	give	fixity	to	policies	under	formulation	in	times	of	flux	may	 make	 discourses	 more	 important.	 These	 discourses	 can	 serve	 thus	 as	 a	 tool	 to	pursue	closure	on	areas	of	controversy	that	subsequently	can	be	treated	with	IPA	lenses.	
3.4 Governance	and	Multi-level	governance			 The	 two	 previous	 sections	 discussed	 two	 fairly	 disconnected	 theories.	 This	section	builds	on	the	claims	already	made	and	introduces	multi-level	governance	theory	as	a	binding	arch	between	the	two	and	answers	some	of	 the	deficiencies	they	struggle	with.	 It	 provides	 thus	 a	 perspective	 on	 the	 scalar	 structure	 of	 the	 institutional	architecture	 on	 which	 the	 actors	 interact.	 It	 also	 investigates	 how	 discourses	 are	structured	and	mobilized.	 Firstly,	 the	main	 features	of	 governance	 are	 shown	and	are	followed	by	introduction	of	MLG	theory	(Section	3.4.1).	Next,	implications	of	the	use	of	MLG	 theory	 with	 regards	 to	 power	 are	 offered	 (Section	 3.4.2)	 and	 the	 relationship	between	MLG	theory	and	geography	is	more	closely	investigated	(Section	3.4.3).			 Chapters	 1	 and	 2	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 EU,	 its	 structures	 and	 its	 institutions	occupy	a	central	position	for	this	research.	The	thesis	is	however	not	limited	to	the	EU	only	 and	 has	 strong	 international	 components.	 This	 again	 clearly	 translates	 into	theoretical	choices	made.	A	very	classic	approach	to	governance	indicates	that	a	global	problem	 requires	 a	 global	 solution	 (Paterson	 et	 al.	 2003;	 Ford	 2003).	 The	 negative	reaction	of	 the	US	was	 inter	alia	based	on	the	understanding	that	 the	EU	attempted	to	preclude	a	global	solution	by	implementing	a	piecemeal	approach.	Governance	provides	a	 framework	 to	 capture	 and	 explain	 interest	 intermediation	 between	 stakeholders	within	the	EU	and	internationally.			 How	 then	 can	 governance	 be	 conceptualized?	What	 are	 the	modes	 it	 operates	within?	How	does	 it	conceive	of	 the	policy	process?	Governance	as	a	 term	in	scientific	debate	has	been	very	widely	used	and	so	far	there	are	competing	definitions	given	to	the	topic.	Indeed,	governance	appears	a	capacious	idea	and	as	a	result	of	this	it	has	started	to	be	divided	into	subcategories.	It	is	understood	here	in	a	way	that	Rosenau	defines	it	(2000,	p.172):	 “governance	occurs	on	a	global	 scale	 through	both	 the	co-ordination	of	
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states	 and	 the	 activities	 of	 a	 vast	 array	 of	 rule	 systems	 that	 exercise	 authority	 in	 the	pursuit	of	goals	that	function	outside	normal	national	 jurisdictions”.	Elsewhere	he	also	claims	that	it	includes	much	more	than	just	institutions	or	organizations	that	are	dealing	with	 international	 issues	 (Rosenau	 1995,	 p.13).	 For	 him	 governance	 also	 aspires	 “to	search	 for	 order	 in	 disorder,	 for	 coherence	 in	 contradiction,	 and	 for	 continuity	 in	change”	(Rosenau,	1995,	p.	13).		 An	 alternative	 view	 is	 offered	 by	 Schmitter	 (2002,	 p.52)	 who	 describes	governance	 as	 “a	method/mechanism	 for	 dealing	 with	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 problems	 or	conflicts	in	which	actors	regularly	arrive	at	mutually	satisfactory	and	binding	decisions	by	 negotiating	 with	 each	 other	 and	 co-operating	 in	 the	 implementation	 of	 these	decisions”.	Notwithstanding	 that	 this	 definition	may	 seem	 idealistic	 as	 it	 believes	 in	 a	straightforward	 relationship	between	negotiations	 and	 a	 satisfactory	decision	 (the	EU	ETS	case	proves	that	it	is	not	always	that	effortless),	it	adds	a	process-oriented	aspect	to	the	framework.	This	happens	through	consideration	of	a	sequence	of	events.			 While	building	on	the	definitions	above,	there	are	merits	in	asking	what	are	the	levels	 that	MLG	 theory	 is	 addressing,	 hence	where	 is	 it	 applicable?	The	Rome	Council	explains	as	follows:	“We	use	term	governance	to	denote	the	command	mechanism	of	a	social	system	and	its	actions	that	endeavour	to	provide	security,	prosperity,	coherence,	order	and	 continuity	 of	 the	 system…	 Taken	 broadly,	 the	 concept	 should	 not	 be	restricted	 to	 the	 national	 and	 international	 systems	 but	 should	 be	 used	 in	relation	to	regional,	provincial	and	local	governments	as	well”	(King	&	Schneider	1991,	pp.181–182).	 	A	further	elaboration	is	provided	by	the	Commission	on	Global	Governance:		“Governance	is	the	sum	of	many	ways	which	individuals	and	institutions,	public	and	 private,	 manage	 their	 common	 affairs.	 It	 is	 continuing	 process	 through	which	 conflicting	 or	 diverse	 interests	may	 be	 accommodated	 and	 cooperative	action	may	be	taken”	(The	Commission	on	Global	Governance,	1995,	p.	2).		 These	 two	definitions	add	a	higher	 level	of	 inclusion	as	well	as	an	emphasis	on	non-state	actors.	By	valuing	the	 incremental	manner	of	building	governance	both	with	regards	 to	 territory	and	 the	 types	of	activities	 it	 involves,	 they	complement	Rosenau’s	ideas	(1995,	1997,	2000).		 Two	competing	perspectives	on	governance	were	taken	into	consideration	in	this	thesis.	The	 first	one	suggests	a	more	horizontal	view	of	governance	as	arenas	 that	are	translated	 into	 policy	 networks	 (Börzel	 1998;	 Kohler-Koch	 &	 Eising	 1999;	 D.	 Marsh	
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1998a).	They,	 therefore,	build	on	and	advance	 the	classic	policy	network	analysis	 that	“develops	 the	notion	of	 insiders	and	outsiders	by	examining	 the	mechanisms	used	 for	inclusion	 or	 exclusion	 and	 the	 impact	 they	 have	 on	 policy”	 (Smith	 1993,	 p.3).	 The	governance	 framework	has	matured	 since	 the	 1990s	 and	 insiders-outsiders	 dynamics	have	became	outdated.	A	response	to	this	development	came	in	a	form	of	a	multi-level	approach	(Fairbrass	&	Jordan	2005;	Bulkeley	et	al.	2003;	Hooghe	&	Marks	2001b)	that	instead	 of	 looking	 at	 detached	 policy	 areas	 and	 venues	 focused	 on	 “multiple	 tiers	 of	government”	 and	 “spheres	of	 governance”	 (Bulkeley	&	Betsill	 2005,	p.48).	This	meant	also	 that	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 EU	 context	 governance	 scholars	 were	 able	 to	 show	 that	interactions	happening	between	levels	of	decision-making	outside	of	the	state-centered	paradigm	 are	 more	 efficient	 and	 include	 larger	 constituencies.	 The	 turn	 towards	governance	was	conditioned	by	the	development	of	international	cooperation	in	the	late	20th	and	early	21st	century.	Based	on	this	approach,	MLG	develops	more	independently	and	 “emphasises	 political	 devolution,	 fragmentation	 and	 interdependence,	 and	decentralization”	(Bevir	&	Rhodes,	2003,	p.	60).		 How	are	these	definitions	reflected	in	the	real	world?	What	are	their	applications	in	the	policy	processes?	How	do	concepts	like	devolution	and	fragmentation	play	out	in	international	 forums?	 The	 literature	 focuses	 largely	 on	 spaces	 and	 venues	 where	governance	“is	happening”.	It	is	important	hence	to	investigate	what	these	are.	As	some	argue	“global	environmental	governance	 is	driven	primarily	by	global	meetings,	which	are	 organized	 to	 coordinate	 multilateral	 responses	 to	 environmental	 issues”	 (Evans	2012,	 p.77).	 As	 it	will	 be	 shown	 in	 Chapter	 7,	 this	 attention	 to	meetings	 is	 crucial	 as	through	 a	 series	 of	 consultations,	 an	 international	 anti-ETS	 block	 has	 been	 formed.	According	 to	 the	 theory,	 the	meetings	 are	 then	 supplemented	by	 growing	networking	between	 the	 public	 and	 private	 sectors	 and	 more	 importantly	 into	 moving	responsibilities	 towards	 the	 private	 sector	 (Eckerberg	 &	 Joas	 2004,	 p.405).	 These	processes	 are	 not	 following	 a	 traditional,	 hierarchical	 pattern	 where	 more	 powerful	actors	would	impose	their	views	or	solutions.	From	the	political	science	perspective	this	means	that	what	is	observed	can	be	qualified	as	“erosion	of	traditional	bases	of	political	power”	(Pierre	2000,	p.1).	Pierre	sees	that	the	traditional	interactions	between	political	actors,	markets	and	 individuals	change	and	the	role	of	nation	states	decreases	(2000).	Similarly,	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 “life	 issues”	 of	 the	 type	 analysed	 here	 display	 “less	emphasis	 than	 did	 their	 predecessors	 on	 hierarchy	 and	 the	 state”	 (Bevir	 2011,	 p.1).	
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These	 claims	 show	 that	 MLG	 offers	 a	 more	 precise	 characterization	 of	 the	 field.	 In	certain	areas	however,	nation	state	territoriality	may	be	still	very	alive.		
3.4.1 Multi-level	governance			 After	having	 conceptualized	governance,	one	 can	proceed	 to	 studying	 its	multi-level	dimensions	and	variations.	As	argued	by	Piattoni	(2009,	p.164)	MLG	is	constituted	by	 “networks,	which	may	 include,	 in	 a	 rather	haphazard	way,	 legitimately	 constituted	deliberative	assemblies	together	with	other	public	and	private,	individual	and	collective	actors”.	 As	 a	 consequence	 of	 this,	 pure	 representative	 democracy	 is	 advanced	 –	MLG	theory	 offers	 a	 more	 inclusive	 framework.	 Since	 Marks’	 seminal	 work	 (1992)	 on	decision-making	 in	 the	EU	 the	concept	has	been	used	 in	various	 instances.	Marks	was	mostly	 looking	 at	 the	 cohesive	 dimension	 of	 European	 integration	 and	 its	 structural	policy:	 how	EU	Member	 States	 can	 have	 a	 similar	 standard	 of	 living,	 how	 to	work	 on	common	 legal	 frameworks,	 how	 to	make	 the	European	budget	work	 –	 these	were	his	points	of	interrogation.	His	scrutiny	is	important	for	this	research	since	he	analyses	the	EU	 as	 a	 set	 of	 institutions	 nested	 in	 national	 and	 regional	 contexts	 where	 both	cooperation	 and	 competition	 occur.	 These	 ideas	 were	 later	 developed	 into	 a	 fully-fledged	MLG	theory	of	 the	EU	(Marks	1996).	The	 inclusiveness	offered	by	MLG	theory	allows	for	a	more	detailed	analysis	that	goes	beyond	the	mere	observation	of	simplified	power	relations	that	can	be	seen	in	international	policy-making	and	policy	bargaining.		 MLG	 theory	 aspires	 also	 to	 explain	 how	 non-state	 entities	 become	 visible	 in	international	policy-making,	why	changes	in	policy-making	were	occurring	and	to	what	extent	they	were	a	part	of	larger	strategies.	These	contributions	translate	in	this	thesis	into	 investigating	 the	 role	 of	 sectoral	 organisations	 as	 well	 as	 their	 meaning-making	activities	regarding	inclusion.	On	the	other	hand,	the	EU	structures	for	example	establish	a	meaningful	platform	to	convey	their	ideas	that	used	to	be	restricted	mostly	to	regions	or	countries	(Marks	&	McAdam	1996;	Imig	&	Tarrow	2001;	della	Porta	&	Diani	2009).	Citing	examples	of	cities	taking	part	in	the	Cities	for	Climate	Protection	project,	Bulkeley	(2005,	p.891)	underlines	that	in	the	case	of	global	environmental	governance	the	state	needs	to	be	rescaled	and	“new	spheres	of	authority	within	which	climate	change	is	being	governed”	need	to	be	created.			 In	 the	MLG	 perspective,	 the	main	 challenge	 that	 is	 posed	 to	 the	 state-centered	thinking	 of	 international	 policy-making	 is	 the	 argument	 that	 non-state	 stakes	 can	
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influence	EU	policy-making	without	recourse	to	the	nation	state’s	help	(Moravcsik	1994;		1998).	MLG	 theory	 helps	 in	 analysing	 this	 shift	 while	 looking	 at	 process	 and	 venues.	Political	actors	strategically	choose	policy	venues	to	reach	their	goals:	“they	try	to	alter	the	 roster	 of	 participants	 who	 are	 involved	 in	 the	 issue	 by	 seeking	 out	 the	 most	favourable	venue	for	consideration	of	their	issues”	(Baumgartner	&	Jones	1991,	p.1045);	a	process	also	called	“venue	shopping”	(Baumgartner	&	Jones	1991,	p.1050).		 Furthermore,	 MLG	 theory	 is	 able	 to	 contribute	 to	 understanding	 the	 issues	analysed	in	this	thesis	as	 in	governance	frameworks	there	 is	a	consensus	that	some	of	the	states’	power	is	being	transferred	to	or	given	up	for	NGOs	or	epistemic	communities	as	well	as	other	actors	(Bulkeley	2005,	p.878)	interacting	with	each	other	globally.	Not	only	 this,	 also	 the	 scales	 of	 environmental	 problems	 intersect	 with	 each	 other	 –	 the	global	 is	 being	 disembodied	 into	 various	 “sites	 and	 scales	 of	 governance”	 (Bulkeley	2005,	p.878).	Thanks	to	this,	a	larger	picture	of	interactions	can	be	mapped	and,	what	is	more,	 the	 interactions	 can	 be	 considered	 at	 a	 dynamic	 stage	 instead	 of	 being	 a	 set	 of	monolithic	 institutions.	 The	 activity	 of	 rescaling	 contributes	 thus	 to	 mapping	 the	fluctuating	opportunity	structures	for	different	actors.			 Even	 more	 importantly,	 the	 environmental	 policy	 of	 the	 EU	 has	 been	 seen	 as	exemplifying	 the	 essence	 of	 MLG	 (Fairbrass	 &	 Jordan	 2005).	 The	 EU’s	 complex	 and	multi-level	 decision-making,	 intersecting	 constituencies	 and	 pressures	 coming	 from	non-EU	countries	are	all	ingredients	of	the	MLG	approach.	The	EU	has	been	viewed	as	a	complex	entity	that	MLG	theory	manages	to	grasp:		“the	EU	 is	 transforming	politics	and	government	at	 the	European	and	national	levels	 into	 a	 system	of	multi-level,	 non-hierarchical,	 deliberative	 and	 apolitical	governance,	via	a	complex	web	of	public	private	network	and	quasi-autonomous	agencies,	which	is	primarily	concerned	with	the	re-regulation	and	de-regulation	of	the	market”	(Hix	1998,	p.54).		In	a	similar	way	Marks	looks	at	the	EU	in	the	MLG	context	using	a	dynamic	and	process-focused	 language:	 “system	 of	 continuous	 negotiation	 among	 nested	 governments	 at	several	 territorial	 tiers	 –supranational,	 national,	 regional	 and	 local	 –	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	broad	process	of	institutional	creation	and	decisional	reallocation”	(Marks	1993,	p.392).	These	 two	quotes	 show	 that	 the	EU’s	 complexity	 can	be	grasped	only	 if	 these	various	levels,	venues	and	actors	are	duly	taken	into	account.			 One	more	argument	needs	to	be	presented	here.	The	analysed	issue	concerns	the	EU	ETS,	which	is	a	market	mechanism,	devised	by	a	political	organization	(and	not	just	
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one	individual	nation	state).	The	political	part	of	the	issue	is	well	explained	by	Lederer	who	 observes	 that	 carbon	 markets	 “deal	 with	 a	 highly	 fictitious	 commodity,	 depend	entirely	on	good	regulation	in	order	to	function	properly”	(2012,	p.3).	By	employing	the	EU	 ETS,	 the	 EU	 aspires	 to	 regulate	 non-state	 actors	 and	 in	 the	 analysed	 case	 this	regulation	goes	even	beyond	the	EU	borders.	This	extension	of	 the	scheme	to	aviation	meant	however	that	the	regulation	of	non-state	actors	(airlines)	that	were	coming	from	non-EU	 countries	 compelled	 engagement	 of	 nation-states	 as	 regulators	 of	 national	carriers.	 MLG	 theory	 enables	 uncovering	 of	 the	 relations	 between	 institutions	 that	address	 market	 regulation	 and	 how	 it	 is	 being	 run.	 It	 looks	 at	 the	 interacting	 levels,	includes	 private	 authority	 and	 new	modes	 of	 claiming	 legitimacy	 (Vira	 2001;	Hudson	2001).	 Furthermore,	 through	 the	 use	 of	 global	 level	 analysis	 not	 only	 can	 the	interactions	of	non-EU	countries	be	grasped,	but	applying	MLG	theory	also	brings	 into	the	 spotlight	 relations	 between	 the	 EU	 ETS	 and	 other	 global	 climate	 initiatives.	 By	employing	this	perspective,	links	to	Kyoto	Protocol	mechanisms,	ICAO	negotiations	and	WTO	proceedings	can	be	brought	into	the	explanatory	framework,	as	they	can	be	seen	as	 concurrent	processes	of	negotiation	 that	 affect	EU	policy-making	 in	 climate	arenas.	Given	 that	 the	geographical	 impact	of	 the	EU	ETS	goes	beyond	Europe,	 this	additional	level	needs	to	be	included	in	the	analysis.		 To	sum	up,	MLG	theory	is	able	to	contribute	to	this	thesis	thanks	to	its	potential	in	bringing	order	to	the	multiple	activities,	hierarchies,	 jurisdictions	and	authorities.	 It	also	offers	an	institutional	focus	and	explores	the	spatial	dimension	that	permeates	the	decision-making	process	and	pertains	to	the	problem	of	extending	sovereignty.			 As	with	every	 theory,	MLG	theory	also	has	 its	 shortcomings.	Probably	 the	most	widespread	one	pertains	to	the	lack	of	territoriality	when	MLG	theory	is	in	question.	The	theory	 while	 focusing	 on	 the	 roles	 and	 positions	 of	 individual	 actors	 misses	 the	territorial	 aspects	 of	 policy-making	 arrangements.	 Faludi	 coming	 from	 a	 planning	perspective	 (2012)	 asks	 however:	 can	 we	 criticize	 MLG	 theory	 for	 this,	 if	 the	interactions	it	 talks	about	are	obviously	nested	in	between	territorial	administrations?	He	concludes,	“multi-level	governance	is	ambiguous.	It	often	refers	to	vertical	relations	between	 bodies	 of	 government	 within	 a	 multi-level	 polity	 and	 not	 to	 the	 more	comprehensive	 process	 called	 governance”	 (Faludi	 2012,	 p.207).	 The	 second	 criticism	he	 formulates	 relates	 to	 MLG	 theory’s	 failure	 to	 “problematise	 the	 territorialist	underlying	metageography”	(Faludi	2012,	p.207)	and	hence	it	conceptualizes	the	issues	
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of	 boundaries,	 spatial	 jurisdictions	 and	 administrations	 in	 an	 inadequate	 manner.	 As	further	argued,	MLG	theory	fails	to	comprehend	“that	the	EU	cannot	be	grasped	solely	in	terms	of	territorial	vocabulary	associated	with	the	modern	state	system”	(Murphy	2008,	p.16).	Is	it	however	the	role	of	MLG	theory	literatures	to	explain	these?	It	appears	that	it	poses	 a	 problem	 for	 planners	 and	 geographers	 rather	 than	 political	 scientists	 or	economists.	The	MLG	theories	never	had	an	ambition	to	execute	such	problematization.	However,	Murphy	 (2008,	 p.8)	 argues	 for	 the	 view	 that	MLG	 should	not	 be	only	 about	politics,	economy	and	institutions	but	“with	a	concern	for	the	ways	in	which	territorial	understanding	and	arrangements	are	shaping	how	things	are	organized	on	the	ground	and	 how	 people	 conceptualize	 Europe	 as	 a	 geographical	 construct.”	 Even	 more	interestingly,	he	also	looks	at	the	problem	of	sovereignty	that	follows:	it	“can	no	longer	be	understood	 in	 terms	of	 the	sovereignty	norms	of	 the	modern	state	system	because	governmental	 competencies	 are	 no	 longer	 concentrated	 in	 discrete	 political	 spaces	organized	at	a	single	scale	or	level”	(Murphy	2008,	p.7).	Although	MLG	theory	does	not	focus	on	the	issues	related	to	sovereignty	it	implicitly	assumes	that	the	world	is	in	a	sort	of	“post-sovereign”	state	(Karkkainen	2004).	If	one	looks	at	policy-making	through	the	post-sovereignty	 lenses,	 they	 would	 see	 the	 state	 that	 operates,	 just	 as	 one	 of	 many	actors,	 on	 various	 levels.	 For	 this	 thesis,	 the	 analysed	 context	 is	 non-hierarchical	 and	exclusiveness	in	decision-making	processes	is	rare.	Indeed,	theories	of	post-sovereignty	capture	some	of	the	issues	that	MLG	theorists	seek	to	explore.		 In	 the	MLG	 theory	 context	 discussion	 about	 sovereignty	 is	 somehow	blurred	 if	one	 understands	 sovereignty	 as	 a	 right	 to	 regulate	 (McCarthy	 2005).	 The	 theory	considers	large	inputs	from	business,	think-tanks	or	NGOs,	which	clearly	undermine	the	state’s	 position	 as	 the	 main	 policy-provider.	 The	 state’s	 role	 is	 even	 more	 limited	 in	cases	of	self-governance.	As	some	claim,	“multilevel	governance	pulls	the	private	sphere	into	 the	 political”	 and	 “eradicates	 the	 traditional	 distinction	 between	 domestic	 and	international	 politics”	 (Aalberts	 2004,	 p.24).	 For	 this	 thesis,	 deliberations	 concerning	state	 sovereignty	 within	 the	 EU	 (Hooghe	 &	Marks	 2001a;	 Marks	 et	 al.	 1995)	 are	 not	sufficient,	since	one	of	the	important	issues	analysed	here	is	international	resistance	to	the	 EU	 ETS.	 In	 such	 cases,	 the	 literature	 offers	 references	 to	 transnational	 (climate)	governance	 (Pattberg	 &	 Stripple	 2008).	 The	 authors	 illustrate	 this	 with	 reference	 to	CDM,	a	carbon	mechanism	linked	to	the	EU	ETS,	where	“authority	is	delegated	to	a	range	of	 non-nation	 state	 actors	 and	 their	 responsibilities	 diverge	 in	 every	 step	 of	 the	 CDM	
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project”	 (2008,	 p.375).	 Additionally,	 the	 whole	 mechanism	 has	 been	 created	 through	international	 bargaining	 within	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 framework,	 hence	 in	 a	 context	 of	sovereignty	 exercised	 by	 aligning	 blocks	 of	 like-minded	 countries.	 The	 issue	 of	sovereignty	 in	 the	ETS	 /	 governance	 context	 has	been	picked	up	by	opponents	 of	 the	inclusion	 of	 aviation	 (as	 shown	 in	 Chapters	 5	 and	 7),	 who	 did	 not	 feel	 compelled	 to	comply	with	regulation	coming	neither	from	ICAO	nor	themselves.	While	MLG	theorists	would	 like	to	see	a	gradually	decreasing	role	 for	sovereignty,	 it	will	be	shown	that	the	state’s	 sovereignty	 still	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 international	 policy-making	 with	regards	to	climate.			 What	 has	 been	 described	 as	 “frustrating”	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 multi-level	governance	 perspective	 is	 its	 focus	 on	 “context,	 processes,	 and	 bargaining”	 (Peters	 &	Pierre	2004,	p.75).	Peters	and	Pierre	(2004)	claim	that	 instead	the	interest	of	scholars	should	 be	 strengthened	 in	 the	 area	 of	 the	 incremental	 character	 of	 the	 changes	 that	occur	 in	 international	 policy-making.	 They	 would	 also	 argue	 that	 the	 multi-level	governance	 concept	 has	 been	 employed	 in	 a	 too	 optimistic	 manner:	 as	 a	 “cozy”	 and	“consensual	 process”,	 which	 given	 the	 lack	 of	 legislative	 framework	 and	 sometimes	unofficial	character	of	negotiations	is	obviously	missing	a	large	part	of	hard	bargaining	over	 power	 (2004).	 In	 such	 a	 context	 a	 re-scaling	 of	 governance,	 extending	 the	territorial	reach	of	some	entities	over	others	is	often	being	contested.	As	an	answer	to	these	they	suggest	that	governance	should	be	looked	at	from	four	distinct	angles.	Firstly	governance	 should	 be	 considered	 an	 intellectual	 concept,	 secondly	 a	 notion	 that	comprises	several	levels	of	government.	Thirdly	they	use	a	notion	of	“negotiated	order,	which	 characterizes	 the	 relationship	 among	 these	multiple	 and	often	 at	 least	 partially	autonomous	 levels”.	 The	 final	 angle	 views	 governance	 as	 a	 political	 game	 where	democratic	values	can	be	exchanged	for	successful	and	efficient	policy-making	(Peters	&	Pierre	2004,	p.77).	
3.4.2 Space	for	power			 Multi-level	 governance	 theory	 looks	 at	 explaining	 how	 and	 why	 reality	 is	changing	 and	 how	 these	 changes	 are	 related	 to	 power	 that	 causes	 them.	While	 MLG	theory	focuses	on	authority	on	various	levels	in	a	context	of	expanding	collective	power,	careful	attention	needs	to	be	given	to	the	notion	of	power	itself.	Additionally,	presented	circumstances	of	the	research	indicate	that	actors	or	groups	of	actors	were	bargaining	
Chapter	3:	Theoretical	discussion 
	 69	
over	 power	 to	 influence	 the	 shape	 of	 inclusion	 of	 aviation	 into	 the	 EU	 ETS.	 What	 is	probably	the	most	exciting	 feature	of	governance	theories	 is	 the	attention	they	give	to	the	changes	that	are	happening	in	decision-making.			 The	 conceptualizations	 of	 power	 in	 political	 science	 are	 numerous	 and	 this	paragraph	 is	only	 touching	 the	surface	 to	explain	governance	approaches	 to	power	by	firstly	 involving	with	widely	applicable	considerations	 for	power	by	modern	 theorists.	Bachrach	 and	Baratz	 (1962)	would	 argue	 that	 instead	 of	 investigating	who	 possesses	power,	 researchers	 should	 rather	 study	 so	 called	 “mobilization	 of	 bias”	 and	 look	 at	Dahl’s	paradigm:	“A	has	power	over	B	to	the	extent	 that	he	can	get	B	to	do	something	that	B	would	not	otherwise	do”	(1957,	pp.202–203).	On	the	other	hand,	they	should	also	look	 at	 agenda	 setting	 activities.	 For	 Bachrach	 and	 Baratz	 this	 too	 is	 an	 exercise	 of	power.	Lukes	(2005)	advances	their	view	by	claiming	that	there	are	three	dimensions	of	power.	 He	 criticizes	 the	 previous	 two	 faces	 of	 power	 for	 superficiality.	 He	 engages	therefore	 the	 third	 face	 of	 power	 and	 argues	 that	 only	 by	 adding	 the	 third	 layer	 of	arguments	power	can	be	viewed	apart	from	a	behavioural	focus.	It	is	explained:	“What	one	may	have	is	a	latent	conflict,	which	consists	in	a	contradiction	between	the	interests	of	 those	 exercising	 power	 and	 the	 real	 interests	 of	 those	 they	 exclude”	 (Lukes	 2005,	p.28).	His	ideas	are	then	build	around	a	non-conflict	and	a	situation	in	which	one	actor	may	be	in	a	situation	when	they	are	not	aware	of	the	best	interest	they	have.	As	a	result	of	 following	 this	 reasoning,	 he	 delivers	 the	 third	 dimension:	 “is	 it	 not	 the	 supreme	exercise	of	power	to	get	another	or	others	to	have	the	desires	you	want	them	to	have	–	that	 is	 to	 secure	 their	 compliance	 by	 controlling	 their	 thoughts	 and	 desires”	 (Lukes	2005,	p.27).	Therefore,	in	the	context	of	international	environmental	policy-making	it	is	not	about	one	actor	setting	a	standard	or	procedure,	which	can	be	seen	as	ambitious,	but	it	is	about	gaining	capacity	to	influence	the	actors	more	subtly.		 The	 subtlety	 is	 further	 explained	 by	 Flyvbjerg(1998),	 who	 not	 necessarily	drawing	 on	 Lukes,	 focuses	 on	 the	 rationality	 and	 rationalization	 that	 in	 his	 eyes	 are	crucial	 for	 the	 exercise	 of	 power.	 As	 suggested:	 "Power	 determines	 what	 counts	 as	knowledge,	 what	 kind	 of	 interpretation	 attains	 authority	 as	 the	 dominant	interpretation”(Flyvbjerg	 1998,	 p.226).	 Flyvbjerg	 was	 also	 able	 to	 prove	 that	 “(...)	rationality	 is	 context-dependent	 and	 that	 the	 context	 of	 rationality	 is	 power.	 Power	blurs	the	dividing	line	between	rationality	and	rationalization.	Rationalization	presented	as	 rationality	 is	 shown	 to	 be	 a	 principal	 strategy	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 power”	 (Flyvbjerg	
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1998,	p.2).	These	claims	are	particularly	important	given	the	interest	for	IPA	this	thesis	espouses.		 Where	 is	 the	 space	 for	 power	 in	 the	 governance	 debate?	 Governance	 theories	characterise	a	 leaving	behind	of	 stable	 reality	and	switching	 towards	 “a	change	 in	 the	meaning	of	government,	referring	to	a	new	process	of	governing;	or	a	changed	condition	of	ordered	 rule;	 or	 the	new	method	by	which	 society	 is	 governed”	 (Rhodes,	1996,	pp.	652–653).	In	a	natural	way,	 it	 looks	more	at	process	than	institutions	(Peters	&	Pierre	2004,	 p.77).	 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 by	 giving	 priority	 to	 a	 neoliberal-institutionalist	approach,	power	in	general	becomes	obsolete	in	the	governance	debate.	Some	even	see	this	 deviation	 as	 one	 of	 the	 important	 deficiencies	 of	 governance	 as	 a	 research	framework	 since	 it	 does	 not	 take	 into	 account	 for	 example	 social	 power	 relations	(Kütting	&	Lipschutz	2009,	p.3).	These	however	are	of	lesser	important	for	the	research	conducted	in	this	project.			 Similarly,	governance	 is	seen,	normatively,	as	a	means	of	uniting	the	public	and	the	 private	 for	 the	 common	 good	 (Pekkonen,	 1994;	 Rhodes,	 1996;	 Stoker,	 1998)	 –	retaining	 however	 the	 central	 role	 of	 the	 state.	 MLG	 challenges	 this	 approach	 while	looking	at	processes.	 In	 the	 same	way	 it	questions	 the	 spatiality	of	power.	 It	does	not	look	any	more	at	power	that	accumulates	around	certain	centres	of	resources	(Agnew	1994,	 p.501)	 but	 it	 looks	 at	 the	 recently	 mobilized	 actors:	 international	 social	movements	and	advocacy	coalitions	that	are	more	detached	from	the	centre–periphery	dynamics	of	resource-centered	theories.	Governance	investigates	the	actors	that	are	not	easy	to	include	in	the	classic	power	debate	as	they	“operate	outside	existing	structures	of	authority”	(Williams	1994,	p.100).	Consequently,	it	may	be	deduced	that	power	would	be	considered	merely	as	the	ability	of	some	actors	to	affect	the	others	 in	the	way	they	wish	to	see	reality,	however	the	power	constituency	is	enlarged.			 For	this	thesis	scale	and	space	need	to	be	considered	as	subthemes	of	the	power	debate.	The	transboundary	aspect	of	the	issues	tackled	here	calls	for	a	geographical	take	on	 this	 debate.	 How	 should	 the	 scale	 be	 understood	 here?	 In	 the	 very	 conventional	approach,	 scale	 is	 viewed	as	 a	nested	hierarchy	 (Haggett	1965)	but	 such	perspectives	have	 proved	 to	 be	 anachronistic	 given	 the	 complexity	 of	 dynamics	 between	 scales	related	to	each	other	(Howitt	1993,	p.36).	Today’s	understanding	of	scale	became	much	more	fluid.	It	has	been	argued	that	scale	is	transformed	regularly	and	cannot	be	viewed	as	fixed	(Herod	1991).	This	means	that	scale	is	not	a	given	but	socially	constructed	and	
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the	process	of	construction	is	closely	related	to	economic,	social	and	political	processes	(Delaney	&	Leitner	1997;	Howitt	1993).	What	is	more	this	process	is	seen	as	continual	or	 even	 an	 “unending	 chain	 of	 events”	 (Delaney	 &	 Leitner	 1997,	 p.95).	 Similarly,	Swyngedouw	 observes	 that	 scale	 therefore	 cannot	 be	 seen	 as	 politically	 neutral	 if	constructed	 –	 it	 conveys	 power	 relationships	 (1997).	 As	 some	 argue,	 in	 this	 way	 the	(re)construction	 of	 scale	 is	 essential	 to	 reconcile	 contradictions	 that	 stem	 from	capitalism	(Kelly	1999,	p.382).		 This	 feature	 of	 the	 process	 creates	 challenges	 for	 analysts:	 the	 product	 of	 the	process	will	always	be	likely	to	change	and	difficult	to	grasp.	What	is	more,	“scale	is	not	as	 easily	 objectified	 as	 two-dimensional	 territorial	 space,	 such	 as	 state	 borders”	(Delaney	&	Leitner	1997,	p.97).	Similarly,	when	one	looks	at	networks,	they	operate	by	transcending	 boundaries	 and	 they	 are	 engaged	 in	 “dividing	 the	 spaces	 of	 hierarchical	modes	of	governance		(e.g.,	they	may	cross	national	boundaries	or	boundaries	between	the	 states	 in	 a	 single	 nation),	 thereby	 making	 it	 harder	 for	 network	 activities	 to	 be	regulated	 or	 governed	 from	within	 existing	 geographical	 spaces”	 (Leitner	 et	al.	 2002,	p.287).		 Such	 discussions	 about	 scale	 have	 consequences	 for	 MLG	 theory	 as	 well.	 The	constant	constructing	and	re-constructing	of	scale	reshapes	the	role	of	actors	active	on	different	 levels	of	governance.	These	reconfigurations	are	probably	most	visible	 in	 the	position	 of	 the	 state	 (Kelly,	 1999;	 Swyngedouw,	 1997;	Weiss,	 1997);	 it	 is	 claimed	 for	example	 that	 the	 power	 of	 the	 state	 is	 reconfigured	 through	 re-scaling	 (Kelly	 1999,	p.391);	but	implications	are	not	confined	to	state	actors.	
3.4.3 Geographical	approaches	vs.	MLG	theory			 The	issue	of	scale	that	concludes	the	previous	section	relates	to	the	insights	that	geography	 can	 offer	 in	 this	 thesis.	 There	 is	 a	 visible	 link	 between	 MLG	 theory	 and	geographical	 perspectives	 on	 scale	 and	 governance,	 which	 is	 further	 explored	 in	Chapters	 6	 and	 7	 where	 sovereignty	 issues	 are	 concerned.	 As	 presented	 by	 Piattoni	(2009,	p.172),	“the	levels	connected	by	MLG	must	be	understood	primarily	as	territorial	levels	each	commanding	a	certain	degree	of	authority	over	the	corresponding	territory	and	 the	 individuals	 residing	 in	 it”.	However,	 there	 are	 claims	 that	 such	 territories	 are	becoming	obsolete:	 the	 issue-specific	authority	of	one	state	can	be	questioned	or	even	contested	and	challenged	by	another	when	 facing	global	 issues	such	as	environmental	
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externalities	(Agnew	2005,	p.438).	This	may	happen	as	 those	 issues	usually	cannot	be	dealt	with	only	on	a	state-level	without	both	regional	and	 international	actions.	At	 the	same	time,	Agnew	would	claim	that	sovereignty	or	political	authority	“may	be	exercised	non-territorially	 or	 in	 scattered	 pockets	 connected	 by	 flows	 across	 space-spanning	networks”	 (2005,	 p.441).	 The	 geographical	 perspective	 focused	 on	 spatial	 relations	contributes	 to	 understanding	 the	 changes	 of	 decision-making	 processes	 in	 an	international	dimension.	“The	local”	is	being	upgraded	in	its	importance	and	the	number	of	interactions	towards	a	global	level	increases	(Held	et	al.	1999).	As	some	would	put	it,	“political	power,	therefore,	is	exercised	from	sites	that	vary	in	their	geographical	reach”	(Agnew	1994,	p.501).		 Another	 claim	 made	 by	 political	 geographers	 refers	 to	 relations	 between	property	and	territory.	As	Agnew	claims	“there	is	a	concomitant	decreased	association	between	 property	 rights	 and	 state	 territoriality”	 (Agnew	 1994,	 p.513).	 On	 one	 side	 it	means	 that	 the	 competitiveness	 between	 firms	 in	 one	 industry	 is	 increased	 by	 non-territorial	 factors.	 If	 we	 then	 look	 at	 the	 emissions	 trading	 concept	 as	 an	 issue	 of	property	rights	(see:	Section	2.2)	the	debate	needs	to	be	opened	towards	ideas	related	to	territoriality.	Market	mechanisms	work	across	territories,	and	the	EU	ETS	is	a	prime	example	of	this.	EU	ETS	through	its	architecture	flattens	out	state	territoriality	and	MLG	theory	 does	 not	 really	 address	 this	 problem.	 Rosenau	 would	 claim	 that	 governance	happens	via	“spheres	of	authority”	(1997,	p.159)	and	these	can	be	either	linked	to	any	given	 territory	 or	 not.	 He	 puts	 therefore	 emphasis	 on	 the	 coordination	 of	 activities	rather	than	the	area	where	activities	are	conceived	or	performed.	Territory	takes	then	a	secondary	 position	 in	MLG,	 it	 is	 even	 taken	 for	 granted,	 a	 self-evident	 element	 of	 the	framework.	Finally,	aviation	is	seen	as	a	“multi-territorial	activity”	given	that	passengers	or	goods	are	 transported	between	states,	 the	planes	 fly	over	 international	waters	and	enter	 airspaces	 of	 various	 countries	 while	 in	 transit	 (Hertogen	 2012,	 p.282).	 For	 the	case	 of	 aviation	 and	 its	 inherent	 mobility,	 it	 is	 important	 therefore	 to	 be	 mindful	 of	territorial	issues	when	engaging	in	debate	related	to	sovereignty.		
3.5 Combining	the	three	approaches	to	the	policy	process			 This	 final	 section	 draws	 together	 the	 material	 presented	 in	 Chapter	 3	 and	explains	how	the	three	approaches	are	integrated	and	employed	in	this	thesis.	IPA	and	PNA	 can	 be	 considered	 complementary	 to	 each	 other	 and	 they	 will	 address	 several	
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issues	that	are	examined	in	this	thesis:	policy	change,	policy	stability,	attention	to	beliefs	and	the	 focus	on	narratives.	 IPA	and	PNA	talk	 to	each	other	by	 involving	directly	with	policy	actors	and	both	pay	attention	to	change	and	stability	dynamics.	What	is	more,	IPA	provides	 a	 structure	 that	 holds	 together	 the	 networks	 observed	 by	 PNA.	 These	 two	approaches	 call	 however	 for	 a	 framework	 that	 could	 bind	 them	 and	 offer	 a	 better	understanding	 of	 a	 larger	 policy	 context	 present	 in	 the	EU	 as	well	 as	 in	 the	US.	Here,	MLG	theory	 is	charged	with	 this	 task.	 It	 succeeds	better	 in	grasping	 large	scale,	multi-level	 perspectives.	 It	 has	 been	 employed	 in	 studies	 on	 international	 policy-making	where	indeed	it	has	been	supplemented	by	other	approaches	(Gupta	&	Pahl-Wostl	2013;	Howlett	&	Newman	2010;	Kassim	&	Le	Galès	2010).	MLG	allows	a	more	sophisticated	spatial	 structure	 where	 the	 interactions	 tracked	 by	 interpretive	 policy	 and	 policy	network	analysis	are	projected	against	dependent	and	independent	systems	focused	on	negotiation,	 coordination	 and	 regulation.	 These	 reciprocal	 influences	 are	 ordered	 in	space	 by	MLG	 theory.	 The	 approach	 answers	 also	 the	 criticism	of	 policy	 analysis	 that	looks	at	discourses	(and	to	certain	extent	both	approaches	employed	here	use	them)	as	it	 does	 not	 neglect	 the	 “localized	 patterns	 of	 political	 activity”	 (Murdoch	 2004,	 p.50).	Discourses	 and	 interactions	 between	 the	 stakeholders	 involved	 are	 both,	 as	 in	Murdoch’s	work,	pinned	down	and	kept	closer	to	the	spaces	they	originated	from.		 MLG	 theory	 addresses	 also	 the	 lack	 of	 neatly	 separated	 areas	 of	 policy-makers	and	 policy-receivers	 that	 both	 PNA	 and	 IPA	would	 like	 to	 see,	 however	 the	 reality	 of	environmental	policy	is	more	complex.	In	the	case	of	environmental	or	climate	policies,	the	 boundaries	 between	 the	makers	 and	 receivers	 are	 blurred	 and	 the	 links	 between	various	 stakeholders	 tend	 to	 be	 more	 entwined.	 While	 PNA	 and	 IPA	 would	conventionally	be	employed	to	smaller-scale	analyses,	where	these	intertwinements	are	relatively	easy	to	see,	here	MLG	theory	allows	upgrading	PNA	and	IPA	to	 investigate	a	large-scale	issue.	Secondly,	MLG	theory	is	centered	on	the	actors	and	a	larger	polity	they	operate	 within,	 rather	 than	 their	 networks	 only.	 It	 also	 allows	 grasping	 the	 global	aspects	 of	 the	 problem	 analysed	 while	 looking	 at	 supranational	 mobilization	 in	 the	policy-making	sphere.	At	the	same	time,	MLG	theory	is	derived	from	research	on	the	EU,	adding	to	its	suitability	for	the	problems	investigated	in	this	thesis.			 As	mentioned	before,	IPA	and	PNA	contribute	to	understanding	better	the	nature	of	 the	 change	 in	 regulation	 that	 this	 research	examines.	MLG	 theory	 is	 able	 to	 look	at	these	changes	from	the	pure	international	policy-making	perspective.	Additional	issues	
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such	 as	 the	 interests	 of	 individual	 actors	 and	 actors’	 groupings	 as	 well	 as	 their	underlying	motivations	are	 targeted	by	the	 IPA	 lenses.	Network	analysis	complements	the	MLG	theory	mapping	of	actors	by	 indicating	relations	across	 the	 institutions	while	the	interpretative	approach	contextualises	these	interactions	and	gives	a	more	humane	angle	to	the	whole	topic	going	beyond	power	relations,	economic	trade-offs	and	policy-bargaining.	What	is	more,	it	also	helps	to	show	how	discourses,	through	which	power	is	exercised,	are	legitimized.		 Additionally,	 MLG	 operates	 via	 networks	 seen	 as	 “a	 cluster	 of	 actors,	 each	 of	which	 has	 an	 interest,	 or	 ‘stake’	 in	 a	 given…policy	 sector	 and	 the	 capacity	 to	 help	determine	policy	success	or	 failure”	(Peterson	&	Bomberg	1999,	p.8),	hence,	 there	 is	a	visible	 link	 between	 the	 MLG	 and	 the	 network	 approaches.	 These	 networks	 operate	across	institutional	networks	and	therefore	this	can	ideally	supplement	levels	that	MLG	theory	 is	 looking	 at.	 In	 practice,	 such	 configuration	 translates	 into	 investigating	 the	effects	 of	 stakeholders’	 networks	 involvement	 in	 a	more	 horizontally	 oriented	 policy-making.	Given	 the	 international	dimension	of	 the	 research,	 the	most	 relevant	 angle	of	the	 network	 analysis	 is	 the	 one	 that	 looks	 at	 transnational	 governance	 networks	(Keohane	 &	 Nye	 1971),	 through	 which	 decision-making	 processes	 are	 influenced.	 As	argued	by	Betsil	and	Bulkeley	(2004)	there	are	three	types	of	those	networks:	epistemic	communities,	 transnational	 advocacy	 coalitions	 and	 civil	 society	 networks	 of	 global	scope.	For	this	research	the	analysis	of	transnational	advocacy	networks	is	particularly	suitable	 as	 these	 networks	 gather	 around	 values	 (Evans	 2012,	 p.107).	 Moreover,	according	to	some		“the	analysis	of	governance	networks	as	discourse	can	illuminate	the	bonding	 in	 networks	 that,	 initially,	 may	 seem	 disjoint	 and	 unstructured”	 (Hajer	 &	Versteeg	2005b,	p.341).		 Similarly	to	interpretative	policy	analysis,	networks	analysis	is	rather	scale	free.	Had	this	thesis	employed	a-scalar	interpretive	analysis	and	the	policy	network	approach	exclusively,	 the	 attention	 to	 intersecting	hierarchies	 and	boundaries	would	have	been	lost.	 This	 is	 where	 MLG	 theory	 recompenses	 these	 aforementioned	 deficiencies	 by	inclusion	of	institutional	and	scalar	dimensions	to	the	argument.			 One	 more	 angle	 needs	 to	 be	 underlined	 while	 looking	 at	 the	 advantages	 of	blending	 the	 three	 theories.	 Interpretivism	 assumes	 that	 various	 types	 of	 data	 can	 be	engaged	 to	 analyse	 an	 issue	 (Bevir,	 2003,	 p.	 283).	 The	 practical	 angle	 of	 this	 theory	cannot	be	missed.	While	MLG	offers	a	sophisticated	framework	to	scale	the	events	and	
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actors	 it	does	not	 talk	much	about	how	data	should	be	gathered	or	worked	with	(see:	Chapter	 4).	 This	 deficiency	 is	 in	 turn	 addressed	 by	 a	 wealth	 of	 methodological	 tools	offered	 by	 both	 PNA	 and	 IPA.	 Finally,	 while	 underlining	 the	 intimate	 relationship	between	the	parts	and	the	wholes,	 the	 interpretative	approach	allows	one	to	elucidate	links	between	the	levels	and	large	concepts	and	their	understanding	of	individuals.		 As	 it	 was	 mentioned	 in	 Section	 3.3,	 employing	 IPA	 itself	 puts	 into	 risk	 the	generalizability	of	given	research	due	to	its	emphasis	on	rich	description.	This	however	is	remedied	by	MLG	theory,	which	provides	a	robust	framework	and	allows	greater	level	of	 generalization.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 underlined	 that	 since	 a	 case	 study	approach	 is	 adopted,	 the	 generalizations	 extend	 only	 as	 far	 as	 the	 research	 design	allows.		 Furthermore,	 MLG	 theory	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 most	 inclusive	 and	 appropriate	theory	 to	 use	 in	 the	 context	 of	 this	 research.	 It	 was	 shown	 that	 it	 successfully	investigates	 the	 processes	 and	 is	 able	 to	 engage	with	 various	 actors.	 These	 capacities	mean	 however	 that	 some	 of	 the	 smaller	 interactions	 between	 the	 actors	 or	 the	contextual	 subtleties	 may	 be	 missed.	 This	 is	 the	 main	 reason	 for	 employing	 two	additional	approaches	while	using	MLG	theory	as	the	main	framework.		 The	composite	methodology	of	this	thesis	allows	going	beyond	what	each	of	the	approaches	 offers	 but	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 cumbersome.	 Although,	 not	 instantaneously	straightforward,	 the	 utilisation	 of	 three	 approaches	 helps	 to	 capture	 the	 various	dimensions	of	 interactions	between	the	stakeholders	and,	 importantly,	organizes	them	in	 a	 scalar	way.	The	 three	 approaches	 applied	 situate	 the	 stakeholders	 geographically	(PNA	 and	 MLG)	 as	 well	 as	 institutionally	 (IPA).	 The	 interactions	 are	 captured	 and	analysed	simultaneously	through	three	theoretical	lenses	chosen.		The	difficulties	of	this	three-way	 approach	however	 include	 a	 time-consuming	process	 of	 applying	 the	 three	theories	to	the	empirical	material	gathered.	This	translates	also	to	limiting	the	wealth	of	the	material	 that	can	be	considered	for	 this	study	due	to	time	 limitations.	At	 the	same	time,	 the	material	 collected	 achieved	discursive	 saturation	 and	 thus	 further	 collection	would	not	affect	the	results	to	a	significant	extent.			 Apart	from	this,	such	an	approach	makes	the	replicability	of	the	study	potentially	difficult,	as	 the	decisions	concerning	how	the	 theoretical	 lenses	are	applied	may	differ	according	to	the		stakeholders	considered.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	not	possible	to	explain	the	 application	 of	 the	 theories	 to	 each	 and	 every	 policy	 statement	 (document,	 media	
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appearance,	 part	 of	 a	 research	 interview).	Nevertheless,	 the	 explanatory	power	of	 the	composite	 theoretical	 model	 outbalances	 the	 risks	 related	 to	 limited	 replication	possibilities.			 Thirdly,	 as	 with	 other	 more	 conventional	 approaches,	 the	 applicability	 of	 this	theoretical	approach	across	 the	research	area	needs	to	be	tested,	 to	see	 if	 it	genuinely	delivers	 additional	 insights.	 In	 this	way,	 this	 approach	 is	 to	 some	extent	 experimental	and	 requires	 further	 testing	 in	 order	 to	 confirm	 its	 validity,	 value	 and	 applicability	 to	cases	different	than	the	EU	ETS.		
3.6 Conclusions			 Drawing	on	the	context	of	the	research,	the	research	questions	and	contemporary	approaches	 to	 studying	 policy-making	 with	 regards	 to	 climate	 change	 under	 EU	circumstances,	 this	 chapter	has	 set	down	and	explained	 the	 theoretical	underpinnings	for	 the	 study.	 As	 demonstrated,	 the	 three	 approaches	 employed	 stand	 out	 among	 the	others	used	in	the	discipline.	Recognizing	the	weaknesses	and	building	on	each	other’s	strengths	 the	current	approach	offers	a	more	robust	 theoretical	 framework	 to	answer	the	research	questions.		 More	precisely,	the	theoretical	 framework	chosen	extends	the	three	approaches	(PNA,	 IPA	 and	 MLG)	 thanks	 to	 drawing	 from	 their	 strengths	 and	 mitigating	 their	shortcomings.	While	MLG	offers	a	global	and	inclusive	perspective,	it	tends	to	miss	the	meso-level	 accommodated	 by	 PNA	 or	 closer	 investigation	 of	 understandings	 on	individual	and	 institutional	 levels.	The	theoretical	 framework	employed	allows	a	 focus	on	 the	 process	 (including	 stakeholders,	 venues,	 effects	 of	 policy	 decisions)	 and	 the	issues	related	to	the	international	dimensions	of	the	problem	in	question.	Furthermore,	as	 shown	 above,	 all	 three	 theoretical	 approaches	 have	 been	 previously	 successfully	utilized	 for	 research	 on	 the	 EU	 and	 thus	 the	 framework	 applied	 here	 can	 involve	literatures	 from	 these	 three	 strands.	 Finally,	 by	 supplementing	MLG	 theory	with	 PNA	and	 IPA,	 the	 investigative	 framework	 is	 enhanced	by	 the	methodological	 toolkits	 they	advance,	which	in	turn	is	quite	limited	for	MLG	theory.			 The	 three	approaches	are	principally	blended	 together,	 as	 it	was	mentioned,	 to	address	weaknesses	 of	 IPA,	 PNA	 and	MLG,	 and	 to	 construct	 explanatory	 pictures	 that	could	 link	 small-scale	 interactions	 and	 arguments	 to	wider	 political	 and	 international	
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4.1 Introduction			 The	 previous	 chapter	 has	 explained	 the	 theoretical	 principles	 that	 this	 thesis	follows.	 It	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 choices	 regarding	 the	 theoretical	 underpinnings	 clearly	translate	 into	 the	methods	 that	need	 to	be	 employed	 in	order	 to	 answer	 the	 research	questions.	 This	 is	mostly	 due	 to	 extended	 considerations	 regarding	methodology	 that	IPA	 and	 PNA	 can	 offer.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	MLG	 directs	 the	 research	 towards	 a	more	global	approach	to	the	problem	tackled	in	this	thesis.	As	previously	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	policy	analysis	itself	(be	it	analysis	focused	on	interpretation	or	network)	has	major	shortcomings	 that	need	 to	be	addressed	not	only	at	a	 theoretical	 level,	but	also	 in	 the	methodological	realm.		 If	a	straightforward	policy	analysis	approach	toolkit	had	been	employed	for	this	thesis,	the	results	would	not	extend	beyond	a	map	of	 interactions	supplemented	by	an	investigation	 of	 policy	 understandings.	 Similarly,	 IPA	 is	 claimed	 to	 be	 able	 to	 employ	various	data	such	as	“participant-observation,	questionnaires,	interviews,	mass	surveys,	statistical	 tests,	 and	 models,	 as	 well	 as	 read	 memoirs,	 newspapers	 and	 official	 and	unofficial	 documents”	 (Bevir	 2003,	 p.283)	 but	 it	 is	 parsimonious	 in	 discriminating	between	 them.	 Elsewhere,	 Bevir	 together	with	Rhodes	 (Bevir	&	Rhodes	 2004,	 p.170),	would	call	for	the	following:	“we	would	urge	political	scientists	to	study	the	texts	–	the	writings,	 lectures,	 interview	transcripts	and	actions	–	of	civil	 servants	 to	 identify	 their	beliefs.	 Second,	 conventional	 accounts	 offer	 the	 reader	 the	 author’s	 analysis	substantiated	 by	 short	 quotes	 from	 civil	 servants	 selected	 to	 support	 the	 argument”.	This	 being	 said,	 there	 is	 no	 consensus	 if	 the	 interpretive	 methods	 pertain	 more	 to	political	 science,	 as	 claimed	 by	 Yanow(2000)	 or	Wagenaar	 (2011)	while	 Bevir(2003)	sees	them	more	suitable	for	anthropology	and	history.	Thirdly,	MLG	does	not	offer	much	precise	 guidelines	 responding	 to	 the	 question:	 “how	 to	 design	 and	 execute	 a	 study?”	These	 considerations,	 reflecting	 the	 theoretical	 choices,	 lead	 to	 a	 composite	methodology	based	on	a	case	study	design	informed	by	interviews	and	document/media	analysis	that	allow	an	in-depth	involvement	with	the	issues	investigated.		 The	methodological	choices	made	here	derive	from	two	main	flows.	Firstly,	they	are	 theory-driven	 and	 draw	 from	 the	 methodological	 guidelines	 provided	 by	 the	
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theories	employed.	This	allows	building	a	methodological	framework,	which	is	coherent	with	the	theoretical	framework	and	hence	reinforces	the	robustness	of	the	research.	It	also	means	 that	 inquiry	 into	 causal	 processes	 and	meaning-making	 activities	must	 be	conducted	 through	 insiders	 of	 the	 process,	 i.e.	 stakeholders	 involved.	 Furthermore,	given	 IPA’s	 interest	 in	 beliefs,	 the	 interview	 schedules	 have	 to	 be	 relatively	 loosely	structured	in	order	to	elucidate	these	beliefs.			 Secondly,	 the	 choice	 of	 the	 methods	 employed	 has	 been	 influenced	 by	 the	questions	this	thesis	poses.	For	example,	identification	of	the	important	stakeholders	is	carried	out	both	via	media	analysis	and	through	interviews,	which	limits	an	opportunity	to	downplay	or	eliminate	certain	stakeholders	from	the	case.	On	the	other	hand,	analysis	of	 the	 differences	 in	 the	 shape	 of	 regulations	 or	 resolution	 of	 these	 on	 a	 global	 level	stems	from	the	document	analysis	and	is	advanced	through	interviews.			 This	 chapter	 explains	 the	 methodological	 principles	 that	 drive	 this	 thesis.	 It	focuses	 first	on	briefly	presenting	 the	 logic	of	 inquiry	driving	 this	 thesis	 (4.2).	 Section	4.3	justifies	the	use	of	a	case	study	design	and	Section	4.4	explains	the	principles	of	the	desktop	 analysis	 conducted.	 The	 next	 section,	 Section	 4.5	 presents	 interviews	 as	 the	main	source	of	data.	It	also	demonstrates	the	range	of	methods	used	while	interviewing.	Sections	4.6	 and	4.7	 give	detailed	 accounts	of	 the	 course	of	 fieldwork	 in	Brussels	 and	Washington,	DC	respectively.	Further,	in	Section	4.8	the	chapter	explores	the	methods	of	analysing	 the	data	obtained.	While	 Section	4.9	 addresses	 the	 issues	of	 research	 ethics	that	 are	 relevant	 to	 this	 thesis,	 Section	 4.10	 concludes	 the	 methodological	considerations.	
4.2 Logic	of	the	inquiry			 Drawing	on	 the	 theories	 employed,	 this	 section	presents	 the	underpinnings	 for	the	 inquiry	 presented.	 The	 two	 most	 often	 used	 research	 strategies	 employed	 are	deductive	 and	 inductive	 reasoning.	 While	 the	 first	 one	 sets	 a	 hypothesis	 and	 tests	 it	using	 the	 data,	 the	 second	 approach	 begins	with	 data	 collection	 followed	 by	 drawing	conclusions	from	the	context-rich	data.	Additionally,	there	are	also	deductive-inductive	approaches	 that	 aim	 at	mitigating	 problematic	 issues	 that	 applying	 either	 of	 the	 two	brings	 (Fereday	 &	 Muir-Cochrane	 2006).	 They	 advise	 to	 inductively	 formulate	 the	concepts	 and	 subsequently	 interpret	 them	 by	 using	 deductively	 derived	 theoretical	frameworks	 and	 explanations.	 As	 it	 has	 been	 mentioned	 before,	 the	 attention	 to	 the	
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context,	 in	which	decisions	are	made,	 is	 crucial	 for	 this	 research.	Equally	 important	 is	the	 focus	 on	 the	 agent	 (Yanow	2006,	 p.13).	 This	 closely	 relates	 to	 the	wider	 research	philosophy,	as	explained	by	some:	“post-positivist	approaches	hold	 that	 to	understand	policy	 change	 fully	 requires	 focus	 on	 the	 meanings	 that	 particular	 policies	 have	 for	particular	 stakeholders,	 in	 particular	 how	 different	 actors	 in	 the	 policy	 process	interpret,	or	make	sense	of,	or	give	meaning	to	policy-making”	(Kay	2009,	p.51).	These	premises	 have	 clearly	 affected	 the	 research	 strategies	 that	 IPA	 recommends.	 For	example,	Yanow	explains:		"interpretive	 research	 follows	 an	 abductive	 logic	 of	 inquiry:	 it	 begins	 with	 a	puzzle,	a	surprise	or	a	 tension	arising	 from	the	 juxtaposition	of	expectations	 	 -	themselves	 deriving	 from	 a	 priori	 knowledge,	 whether	 theoretical	 or	experimental	 -	 with	 field	 observations,	 experiences,	 and/or	 readings"(2014,	p.143).	Yanow’s	idea	has	been	followed	in	this	research	as	the	rationale,	for	this	thesis	derives	from	a	whole	set	of	puzzles:	ranging	from	why	the	reactions	to	the	inclusion	of	aviation	into	the	EU	ETS	have	been	so	powerful,	through	a	surprising	sureness	of	the	EU	that	the	inclusion	 would	 succeed,	 and	 ending	 on	 inaction	 in	 the	 area	 of	 curbing	 aviation	emissions	 regardless	 of	 a	 growing	 awareness	 of	 climate	 change.	 Such	 an	 approach	results	 in	a	situation	when	the	processes	of	collecting	data	and	 juxtaposing	 them	with	theories	is	simultaneous:	“in	some	sense,	the	researcher	is	simultaneously	puzzling	over	empirical	materials	 and	 theoretical	 literatures”	 (Schwartz-Shea	 &	 Yanow	 2012,	 p.27).	This	approach	helps	to	underpin	the	collection	of	a	wealth	of	data	while	at	the	same	time	preserving	their	details.	This	means	that	it	departs	from	setting	a	set	of	hypotheses	and	allows	the	researcher	to	be	surprised	while	collecting	the	data.	In	this	way,	the	research	framework	is	more	open	towards	the	new	and	the	unexpected	while	the	rigorousness	of	research	is	maintained.	
4.3 Case	study	design			 Before	engaging	with	the	case	study	design	as	an	inquiry	method,	it	is	important	to	reflect	on	a	question	fundamental	for	this	part:	what	is	the	EU	ETS	debate	a	case	of?	The	first	chapter	has	indicated	several	ways,	in	which	this	thesis	advances	knowledge	by	analysing	 the	prospective	extension	of	emissions	 trading	 to	aviation.	These	pertain,	 to	name	 a	 few,	 to	 international	 policy-making,	 climate	 leadership	 and	 state-industry	relations.	 The	 main	 contribution	 is	 however,	 provided	 by	 analysing	 a	 case	 of	 policy	
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change	 embodied	 in	 the	 inclusion	 of	 aviation	 into	 the	 EU	 ETS	 and	 reaction	 (or	 as	discussed	here:	resistance)	to	it.	While	being	a	case	of	change	in	policy-making,	it	takes	the	EU	as	the	 field	of	analysis,	which	 is	enriched	by	the	 international	background.	The	analysed	 situation	 is	 thus	 a	 case	 of	 change	 in	 the	 international	 context	 that	 provides	special	attention	to	the	non-state	actors.	By	such	discrimination,	 the	case	study	allows	for	an	in-depth	analysis	of	the	process	of	inclusion,	negotiation	and	resistance	to	a	new	policy.	 As	 explained	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 the	 thesis	 pertains	 to	 a	 phenomenon	 of	 a	 blocked	implementation	of	a	EU	policy	but	also	to	a	more	general	governance	problems	such	as	role	of	state	sovereignty	versus	non-state	actors	or	importance	of	sectoral	organisations.	The	case	of	the	EU	ETS	exemplifies	this	by	both	its	content	and	its	setting.	As	far	as	the	content	 of	 the	 issue	 is	 concerned	 it	 considers	 sectoral	 regulation	with	 regards	 to	 CO2	emissions	mitigation	being	implemented	by	an	agent	non-specialized	in	the	matter	(EU).	It	 also	 involves	 the	 issue	 of	 resistance	 to	 the	 change	 and	how	 this	 resistance	 is	 being	dealt	 with.	 The	 change	 happens	 in	 an	 internationally-saturated	 context	 of	 ICAO,	 EU	Member	 States	 representing	 differing	 interests	 and	 non-EU	 countries	 opposing	 the	scheme.	These	issues	are	being	grasped	through	an	extensive	contextual	analysis	of	the	case	and	mapping	of	the	networks	present	within	the	inclusion	of	aviation	into	the	EU	ETS.		 The	case	study	design	presents	a	 trade-off	between	 investigating	the	depth	and	the	breadth	of	the	issue	in	question.	Firstly,	an	extensive	inclusion	of	positions	of	states	that	were	vocal	in	the	EU	ETS	case	would	allow	capturing	the	breadth	of	the	case	and	its	international	 setting.	 Secondly,	 collecting	 data	 in	 more	 regions	 (especially	 in	 China,	Russia	 and	 India)	 would	 enable	 building	 a	 more	 comprehensive	 picture.	 Although	considering	 these	 two	 approaches	 would	 warrant	 valid	 and	 rich	 data,	 the	 in-depth	analysis	 of	 the	 process	 was	 found	 more	 relevant	 due	 to	 a	 series	 of	 reasons.	 Firstly,	capturing	the	networks	between	the	aviation	sector	and	policy-makers	in	the	EU	and	the	US	 addresses	 a	 topical	 and	 controversial	 research	 gap.	 Secondly,	 focussing	 on	 these	issues	 in	 depth	 allows	 answering	 the	 questions	 pertaining	 to	 the	 understandings	 and	beliefs	that	would	inevitably	be	lost	if	a	big	picture	perspective	was	adopted	throughout.	Thirdly,	the	in-depth	study	made	the	study	respond	to	the	current	research	on	the	ETS	that	has	been	calling	for	a	more	detailed	analysis	of	the	aviation	case	(Lindenthal	2014).		 This	thesis	is	also	informed	by	the	case	study	approach	in	the	desire	to	gather	a	full,	multi-faceted	understanding	of	a	conceptually	bounded	phenomenon.	This	has	been	
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chosen	 while	 discriminating	 against	 surveying	 high	 profile	 officials,	 business	representatives	and	other	possible	partners	(NGOs,	think-tanks,	media)	and	employing	quantitative	 methods	 of	 analysis.	 The	 surveys	 could	 provide	 a	 broader	 participation	basis	however	 for	 the	research	questions	 this	 thesis	asks,	a	more	 important	 facet	was	related	to	gaining	access	to	the	figures	central	to	the	process	and	receiving	from	them	an	in-depth	account.	 Employing	 a	 case	 study	 does	 not	 automatically	 prescribe	 using	qualitative	 or	 quantitative	 methods	 (Becker	 1992).	 Also,	 the	 PNA	 scholars	 clearly	indicate	 that	even	 if	 a	 case	study	 is	 chosen	as	an	enquiry	method,	 their	 theory	can	be	researched	 both	 quantitatively	 and	 qualitatively	 and	 both	 approaches	 are	complementing	 each	 other	 (Sciarini	 1996).	 However,	 as	 argued	 by	 Börzel:	 “the	qualitative	approach	(…)	is	more	process	oriented.	It	focuses	less	on	the	mere	structure	of	 interaction	 between	 actors	 but	 rather	 on	 the	 content	 of	 these	 interactions	 using	qualitative	 methods	 such	 as	 in-depth	 interviews	 and	 content	 and	 discourse	 analysis”	(1998,	 p.255).	 While	 this	 thesis	 concentrates	 indeed	 on	 the	 process,	 the	 qualitative	approach	appears	more	suitable	for	the	theories	applied	and	research	questions	asked.			 The	 case	 study	 design	 allows	 investigation	 of	 “a	 contemporary	 phenomenon	within	 its	 real-life	 context,	 especially	when	 the	boundaries	between	phenomenon	and	context	are	not	clearly	evident”	(Yin	2003,	p.13).	In	the	case	of	policy-making	this	claim	seems	to	be	extremely	valid	–	the	larger	canvas	on	which	the	processes	happen	cannot	be	omitted.	Moreover,	 this	 design	 is	 chosen	 as	 “the	 issue	 is	 not	 explored	 through	one	lens,	but	rather	a	variety	of	lenses	which	allows	for	multiple	facets	of	the	phenomenon	to	be	revealed	and	understood”	(Baxter	&	Jack	2008,	p.544).		 Having	this	in	mind,	the	case	study	focusing	on	governance	and	policy	processes	is	 employed	 to	 research	 the	 EU	 ETS	 in	 the	 multi-level	 governance	 context.	 Firstly,	 it	allows	 the	 investigation	 of	 the	 wider	 phenomena	 that	 this	 case	 highlights:	 sectoral	exceptionalism,	 emissions	 trading	 as	 an	 economic	 and	 policy	 tool	 as	 well	 as	 green	leadership	of	the	European	Union.	Secondly,	MLG	assumes	that	“actors	are	driven	by	a	mixture	of	behavioural	mechanisms”	(Skjaerseth	&	Wettestad	2008,	p.17)	and	as	will	be	shown	 below,	 a	 case	 study	 design	 enables	 in	 depth	 analysis	 of	 such	 mechanisms	 by	employing	qualitative	methods.			 Following	 Yin’s	 (2003)	 reasoning,	 there	 are	 four	 principles	 that	 ought	 to	 be	covered	if	a	case	study	is	to	be	employed:	“how”	and	“why”	questions	are	the	main	focus	of	 the	 research,	 the	 researchers	do	not	 influence	 the	case	by	 their	enquiry,	 contextual	
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nuances	are	important	for	the	study,	and	finally	it	is	difficult	to	differentiate	between	the	phenomenon	and	its	context.	The	case	study	approach	gives	an	excellent	opportunity	to	provide	illustrative	examples	of	the	wider	phenomena,	as	here:	the	case	of	a	governance	process	as	well	as	the	case	of	actors	(both	within	the	EU	and	from	the	third	countries)	colliding	with	each	other	to	produce	a	policy	outcome.			 In	the	research	on	the	EU,	especially	the	EU	environmental	and	climate	policies,	the	 case	 study	 design	 seems	 to	 be	 overwhelmingly	 predominant	 (Burch	 et	 al.	 2014;	Johannsdottir	 2014;	 Matzdorf	 &	 Meyer	 2014).	 Also	 while	 addressing	 the	 EU	 ETS	scholars	 would	 often	 use	 a	 case	 study	 research	 design	 to	 analyse	 various	 sectors	included	 in	 the	 scheme	 (Laurikka	 &	 Koljonen	 2006;	 Demailly	 &	 Quirion	 2008).	 The	studies	of	influences	of	the	EU	policies	on	various	sectors	would	also	use	case	studies	to	explain	how	these	rules	work	or	do	not	work	in	practice.	The	method	became	prevalent	in	the	EU	studies	and	has	advanced	in	the	last	years	from	simple	description	of	the	EU	reality	to	multi-linked	studies	displaying	a	“theoretically	pluralist	research	community”	(Pahre	2005,	p.114).			 A	number	of	decisions	were	taken	 in	delineating	 the	boundaries	of	 the	case.	By	investigating	 the	 non-EU	 reactions	 to	 the	 EU	 ETS	 inclusion	 of	 aviation	 and	 the	 global	dimension	of	the	issue,	it	is	assumed	that	a	view	of	outsiders	needs	to	be	included.	This	is	 also	 related	 to	 the	 governance	 theory	 used	 in	 this	 thesis,	 which	 as	 discussed	 in	Chapter	 3	 underlines	 the	 importance	 of	 non-state	 actors,	 which	 have	 been	 extremely	active	 in	 the	 US.	 The	 boundaries	 of	 this	 case	 study	 thus	 go	 beyond	 the	 EU	 and	 equal	attention	is	given	to	the	US	policy-makers,	US	aviation	industry	and	eNGOs	based	in	the	US.	This	allows	gathering	primary	data	from	these	actors	who	exercised	pressure	on	the	EU,	 however,	 given	 the	 politico-spatial	 context	 were	 not	 directly	 involved	 in	 the	 EU	policy-making.	 Furthermore,	 this	 approach	 supports	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 rich	contextualisation	 for	 the	analysed	situation.	Even	 though	 the	EU	and	US	are	 the	areas	where	the	data	are	gathered,	it	is	not	a	comparative	study.	This	thesis	addresses	rather	a	multi-arena	situation.	As	some	describe	the	EU	policy	process,	it	is	a	“multi-level,	multi-arena	 and	 multi-venue	 game”	 (Richardson	 2000,	 p.1013)	 and	 here	 it	 is	 further	complicated	 by	 added	 non-EU	 actors.	 This	 means	 that	 a	 simple	 comparative	 design	would	 not	 sufficiently	 explore	 and	 analyse	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 issue	 and	would	 not	address	 fully	 the	research	questions	asked	 in	 the	MLG	context.	The	choice	of	one	case	only,	 instead	 of	 comparative	 design	 is	 also	 related	 to	 the	 “extensive	 immersion	 in	 a	
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setting”	(Yanow	2014,	p.146),	which	is	needed	to	properly	elucidate	data	needed	by	IPA.	At	the	same	time	the	two	stages	of	the	fieldwork	inform	each	other	and	have	to	be	seen	as	inseparable	for	the	analysed	case:	analysis	of	the	US	opposition	cannot	be	conducted	without	in-depth	investigation	of	the	EU	policy-process	and	consideration	exclusively	of	the	EU	side	cannot	yield	sufficient	results	for	the	proposed	research	questions.		 Simultaneously,	 there	 are	 more	 arenas	 than	 just	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 US	 that	 play	important	 roles	 for	 this	 research.	These	 for	example	are:	Russia,	China,	 India	and	 to	a	lesser	degree	Brazil.	An	ideal	scenario,	would	involve	conducting	interviews	with	similar	sets	 of	 stakeholders	 in	 these	 countries,	 however,	 this	 level	 of	 ambitiousness	 was	 not	possible	to	achieve.	In	order	to	employ	empirical	data	from	outside	the	main	EU/US	axis	of	 this	 research,	 instead	 of	 directly	 interviewing	 the	 representatives	 of	 the	 above,	 the	EU-	and	US-based	 interviewees	were	asked	about	BRIC	positions,	 actions	and	 “behind	the	 scenes”	 activities.	 To	 safeguard	 objectiveness,	 the	 answers	 were	 juxtaposed	 with	official	 documents	 (press	 releases,	 declarations,	 etc.)	 and	 also	 media	 content	 drawn	from	quality	 and	 sectoral	 press,	 as	 explained	 below.	 The	 table	 below	 summarises	 the	methods	used	for	particular	research	questions:		
Table	1:	Outline	of	the	research	methods	used		 Interviews	 Policy	documents		 Media		 Grey	literature	Research	Question	1	 x	 x	 x	 x	Research	Question	2	 x	 x	 x	 	Research	Question	3	 x	 	 	 x	Research	Question	4	 x	 	 	 x	Research	Question	5	 x	 x	 x	 x		
4.4 Desktop	analysis			 Although	the	abductive	logic	employed	here	would	advise	researchers	to	depart	from	 a	 puzzle	 and	 be	 open	 for	 the	 surprises,	 essential	 desktop	 work	 needed	 to	 be	conducted	before	 the	beginning	of	data	collection	 in	 the	 field	 (for	example:	 to	 identify	
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the	 actors	 and	prepare	 the	 interview	 schedules).	Once	 the	 fieldwork	has	been	 started	the	desktop	analysis	continued	due	to	new	documents	emerging	from	the	interviews.		 How	has	 the	 case	 then	been	examined?	Having	 in	mind	 the	principles	of	policy	network	 analysis,	 firstly	 attention	 was	 given	 to	 the	 actors	 present	 in	 the	 debate	 and	through	 their	participation	 the	 events	 can	be	 reconstructed	 chronologically	 as	well	 as	placed	 in	space.	Since	PNA	pays	special	attention	to	the	 influence	produced	within	the	network,	especially,	dependencies	between	its	actors,	the	data	it	is	concerned	with	can	be	 derived	 both	 from	 policy	 document	 analysis	 and	 later	 supplemented	 by	 the	interviews.	In	relation	to	this,	a	series	of	official	documents	were	looked	at	–	these	were	policy	 documents	 accompanying	 the	 actual	 Directive,	 that	 included	 aviation	 into	 the	scheme,	 as	well	 as	 the	materials	 available	 at	 the	Directorate	 General’s	 Climate	 Action	(DG	CLIMA)	website.	Similar	data	collection	has	been	conducted	with	regards	to	the	EU	ETS	Prohibition	Act	through	the	“Thomas”,	an	on-line	legislative	service	of	the	Library	of	Congress,	and	allowed	accessing	the	minutes	from	the	hearings	as	well	as	submissions	of	 the	 stakeholders	 who	 took	 part	 in	 them.	 	 This	 involvement	 with	 the	 official	documents	 was	 complemented	 with	 policy	 statements,	 legislation	 and	media	 content	concerning	 the	 issue	of	EU	ETS	and	aviation.	However,	 this	 research	does	not	address	directly	 the	policy-making	process	per	 se,	 therefore,	 the	 choice	of	 the	documents	was	dictated	mostly	by	their	usefulness	for	deepening	understanding	of	the	legislation	and	to	see	the	positions	of	the	actors	involved,	as	much	as	it	was	possible.			 Once	 all	 the	 most	 relevant	 documents	 were	 downloaded	 and	 saved,	 the	researcher	started	identifying	other	key	actors	engaged	in	the	debate.	This	proceeded	in	three	ways:	 firstly	via	scholarly	 literature	reviews	regarding	the	EU	ETS,	 then	through	analysis	 of	 the	 media	 related	 to	 the	 carbon	 market,	 (Reuters	 Point	 Carbon)	 aviation	(GreenAir	Online)	 and	 finally,	 systematic	 searches	were	 run	with	 the	quality	press	by	using	 their	 web-enabled	 search	 engines.	 The	 media	 outlets	 chosen	 were:	 “The	Guardian”,	 “The	 Independent”	 “The	 New	 York	 Times”	 and	 “Frankfurter	AllgemeineZeitung”,	 which	 were	 used	 in	 previous	 research	 to	 look	 at	 environmental	policy	 issues	 (Feindt&Cowell	2010;	Feindt&Kleinschmit	2011;	Feindt&Oels	2005).	The	searches	included	words	“EU	ETS”,	“aviation”	and	“coalition	of	unwilling”.	Since	this	tool	was	used	only	as	an	additional	means	of	 identifying	 the	actors	engaged	 in	 the	debate,	there	 is	 no	 further	 need	 to	 present	 the	 exact	 results	 (such	 as	 number	 of	 articles	mentioning	the	EU	ETS	or	their	detailed	content)	offered	by	the	searches	performed.	In	
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the	next	step,	the	positions	of	actors	identified	as	active	in	the	debate	that	were	publicly	available	were	tracked.	These	were	reports,	press	releases,	official	policy	statements	by	industry	 and	 NGOs.	 It	 is	 widely	 argued	 that	 as	 much	 data	 as	 possible	 needs	 to	 be	collected	before	engaging	with	any	further	fieldwork,	particularly	if	the	method	chosen	are	interviews	(Richards	1996;	Lilleker	2003;	Leech	2002).	This	allowed	tailoring	of	the	interview	 guidelines,	 but	 also	 ensured	 that	 interviews	 focused	most	 closely	 on	 those	questions	that	have	not	been	answered	somewhere	else.		 The	desktop	analysis	led	also	to	a	decision	to	group	the	actors	present	according	to	three	groups.	The	employed	research	framework	suggested	structuring	the	research	around	 three	 sets	 of	 actors:	 the	 industry,	 the	 NGOs	 and	 a	 group	 of	 states	 and	 EU	institutions	together.	The	last	group	includes	both	states	and	the	EU,	as	for	the	analysed	case	 they	 can	 be	 considered	 equal	 counterparts.	 As	 it	 will	 become	 clear	 in	 the	 next	chapters,	 there	 have	 been	 also	 other	 representatives	 (for	 example	 think-tanks	 and	media),	who	escape	this	categorisation,	however,	they	should	be	seen	more	as	providers	of	supplementary	information	than	important	players	in	the	case.	This	categorisation	of	actors	 into	 three	 main	 groups	 is	 pertinent	 both	 to	 the	 research	 questions	 that	investigate	 the	 importance	 of	 stakeholders	 and	 in	 two	ways	 relates	 to	 the	 theoretical	framework.	Firstly,	drawing	on	governance	theories,	 it	provides	space	for	the	 industry	and	 NGOs.	 Secondly,	 deriving	 from	 PNA,	 it	 aims	 at	 uncovering	 networks	 and	 the	relationships	 between	 them.	 Dividing	 the	 actors	 present	 into	 three	 groups,	 enhances	clarity	 and	 also	 allows	 observing	 differences	 within	 these	 categories.	 Such	 research	strategy	is	also	able	to	advance	the	research	on	the	EU	climate	policy	in	general	and	on	the	 EU	 ETS	 in	 particular.	 This	 is	 possible	 as	 instead	 of	 focusing	 on	 the	 industry	 only	(Markussen	 &	 Svendsen	 2005;	 Pinkse	 &	 Kolk	 2007;	 Skodvin	 et	 al.	 2010)	 or	 giving	priority	to	the	non-governmental	actors	(Betsill	&	Corell	2001;	Doh	&	Guay	2006)	and	only	rarely	considering	both	groups	(Gullberg	2008)	it	provides	a	more	complex	picture,	covering	also	 interactions	between	groups.	The	previous	 research	has	been	 limited	as	far	as	bringing	a	wider	representation	of	interests	or	showcasing	(dis)unity	of	positions	between	the	groups	is	concerned,	which	is	mitigated	here.	
4.5 Interviews	–	why	interview?		 The	decision	to	 interview	is	related	to	the	emic	perspective	taken	 in	this	study.	This	means	 that	 the	data	 is	provided	by	 the	persons	who	have	experience	 in	 the	 field	
Chapter	4:	Methodology	
	 87	
and	are	able	to	expand	on	the	investigated	issues	in	detail.	As	the	members	of	the	policy	networks,	 they	 are	 able	 to	 give	 accounts	not	 only	 about	what	happened	but	 also	how	and	why	things	happened.	This	in	turn	is	crucial	for	the	theoretical	framework	applied.	Moreover,	 given	 the	 MLG	 framework	 involved,	 interviews	 promise	 to	 be	 the	 most	feasible	when	 it	 comes	 to	collecting	data.	Also,	MLG	while	 looking	at	 the	relationships	between	 the	 various	 levels	 of	 governance	 is	 very	 much	 focused	 on	 the	 actors	 who	operate	at	and	between	these	levels.	Consequently,	the	account	provided	by	those	who	are	participating	 in	 the	 interactions	and	 those	who	are	observing	 them	(media,	 think-tanks)	indicate	the	usefulness	of	interviewing	as	a	source	of	data.	Finally,	given	all	these	circumstances,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 conduct	 interviews	 in	 a	 one-to-one	 format,	 which	provides	space	for	firstly	a	more	detailed	account	and	secondly,	allows	sharing	some	of	the	 details	 that	 would	 probably	 remain	 unrevealed	 in	 a	 focus	 group	 or	 a	 discussion	setting.	One	to	one	 interviews	are	also	easier	to	arrange	 in	a	high-profile	environment	where	 tight	 schedules	prevail	 and	 coordination	of	 for	 example	 focus	groups	would	be	almost	impossible.		What	is	more,	given	that	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation	is	a	relatively	new	project,	any	historic	 analysis	 is	 rather	 difficult.	 Furthermore,	 the	 literature	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 offer	studies	 in	 the	 context	 of	 MLG	 where	 participant	 observation	 or	 focus	 groups	 are	employed.		As	Wagenaar	underlines	 “interviewing	 is	not	about	asking	questions,	but	about	working	 with	 the	 respondent	 to	 produce	 useful	 data”	 (2011,	 p.251).	 The	 process	 of	“working”	 was	 based	 on	 the	 prior	 literature	 and	 media	 search	 focused	 on	 the	proceedings	 of	 the	 decision-makers	 (US	 House	 of	 Representatives	 Committee	 on	Transportation	 and	 Infrastructure,	 US	 Senate	 Committee	 on	 Environment	 and	 Public	Works	and	the	European	Commission	–	DG	CLIMA	and	DG	Mobility	and	Transport	(DG	MOVE)	 as	 well	 as	 the	 European	 Parliament	 (EP)	 –	 Committee	 on	 Environment	 and	Committee	on	Transport	and	Tourism),	views	of	 the	 industry	and	eNGOs	expressed	 in	their	various	media	appearances,	policy	papers	or	press	statements	(as	noted	above).	By	completing	 the	 preceding	 investigation,	 the	 researcher	 was	 then	 able	 to	 direct	 the	interview	towards	the	areas	that	are	not	explained	in	the	policy	documents	or	publicly	available	 documents.	 The	 choice	 of	 the	 particular	 policy-makers	 interviewed	 was	determined	by	their	participation	in	the	drafting	of	the	legislation	including	aviation	into	the	EU	ETS	(EU	side)	and	the	EU	ETS	Prohibition	Bill	(US	side).	
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4.5.1 Semi-structured	interviews		 Once	 the	 rationale	 for	 the	 interviews	 has	 been	 outlined,	 one	 can	 proceed	 to	 a	more	detailed	explanation	of	the	process	of	interviewing	itself.	This	study	employs	semi-structured	 interviews,	as	 they	 “can	provide	detail,	depth,	 and	an	 insider’s	perspective,	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 allowing	 hypothesis	 testing”	 (Leech	 2002,	 p.665).	 The	 open-ended	 questions	 are	 claimed	 to	 give	 the	 interviewees	 an	 occasion	 to	 express	 their	thoughts	 in	 the	way	 they	prefer	 to	structure	 their	views.	This	consequently	 “increases	the	validity	of	the	responses	and	is	best	for	the	kind	of	explanatory	and	in-depth	work	(…)	 but	 it	 makes	 coding	 and	 then	 the	 analysis	 more	 difficult”	 (Aberbach	 &	 Rockman	2002,	p.674)	as	the	answers	may	include	a	growing	body	of	new	topics,	which	has	also	been	the	case	for	this	study.		Others	 argue	 that	 semi-structured	 interviews	 ensure	 also	 “openness	 to	 change	the	 sequence	and	 forms	of	questions	 in	order	 to	 follow	up	 the	answers	given	and	 the	stories	told	by	the	subjects”	(Kvale	1996,	p.124).	Furthermore,	while	interviewing	elites	in	the	semi-structured	format,	one	can	expect	to	receive	a	coherent,	and	well-developed	answer	(Aberbach	&	Rockman	2002,	p.675).	This	form	of	interviews	can	thus	“yield	rich	insights	 into	people’s	biographies,	opinions,	values,	aspirations,	attitudes	and	 feelings”	(May	2001,	p.131).	Most	importantly,	semi-structured	interviews	are	“open	to	new	and	unexpected	 information”	 (Daugbjerg	 1998,	 p.15),	 which	 in	 cases	 of	 relatively	unexplored	ground	provide	an	unmissable	opportunity.	This	rationale	 follows	also	 the	abductive	 research	 strategy	 utilised	 in	 this	 thesis.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 is	 also	 seen	sometimes	 as	 “the	 riskiest	 but	 potentially	 most	 valuable	 type	 of	 elite	 interviewing	 -	requires	interviewers	to	know	when	to	probe	and	how	to	formulate	follow-up	questions	on	 the	 fly”	 (Berry	 2002,	 p.629).	 Finally,	 it	 has	 been	 underlined	 many	 times	 that	 the	open-ended	questions	are	preferred	by	elite	 interviewees	as	 they	dislike	being	 limited	by	a	structured	interview	(Schoenberger	1991;	Aberbach	&	Rockman	2002;	Rice	2010).		
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	 The	 interview	 guidelines	 (two	 examples	 of	 master	 guidelines	 are	 provided	 in	Appendices	A	 and	B)	used	both	 in	 the	US	 and	Europe	were	 adjusted	 to	 the	 groups	of	interviewees,	with	some	parts	tailored	to	individuals	where	more	detailed	issues	were	investigated.	 The	 schedules	 were	 designed	 to	 cover	 broad	 areas	 rather	 than	 being	restricted	to	set	questions	(Richards	1996,	p.202).	The	interviews	were	divided	into	four	parts	 relating	 to:	 background	 of	 the	 interviewee	 and	 of	 the	 organisations	 they	represented,	 issues	and	experiences	regarding	the	EU	ETS	and	aviation,	policy-making	in	the	context	of	 the	EU	ETS	(in	the	US	with	a	special	 focus	on	the	EU	ETS	Prohibition	Bill),	the	involvement	of	various	actors	and	their	coalitions	in	the	examined	case.	At	the	end	 of	 each	 interview,	 participants	 were	 given	 an	 opportunity	 to	 add	 any	 other	information	that	they	were	not	asked	during	the	interview	and	that	they	think	may	be	important	 for	 the	 study.	 The	 participants	 were	 also	 asked	 for	 recommendations	 for	other	potential	interviewees.		
4.5.2 Who	are	the	experts?		 The	interviews	for	this	study	were	conducted	with	persons	who	were	experts	in	their	 field,	 however,	 this	 is	 not	 reduced	 to	 technical,	 scientific	 expertise,	 but	 also	expertise	about	 the	political	processes.	The	expertise	was	attributed	to	 the	experience	the	interviewees	had	and	positions	they	were	working	on.		It	needs	to	be	underlined	though,	that	in	general,	the	expertise	is	granted	by	the	researchers	 themselves,	 as	 they	 are	 responsible	 for	 choosing	 the	 pool	 of	 experts	 they	contact.	While	Meuser	and	Nagel	argue	that	an	expert	in	an	interview	can	be	identified	as	a	person,	whose	knowledge	assumed	by	the	researcher	is	“not	accessible	to	anybody	in	 the	 field	 of	 action	 under	 study”	 (2009,	 p.18),	 in	 the	 case	 of	 this	 research	 the	knowledge	 was	 accessible	 to	 a	 number	 of	 staff,	 however	 due	 to	 busy	 Congressional	schedules,	the	researcher	was	able	to	interview	only	one	person	per	office.		The	main	reason	 to	employ	expert	 interviews	 in	 this	project	was	related	 to	 the	issues	researched	here	being	closely	related	to	the	activities	in	which	the	interviewees	had	been	engaged.	This	means	that	the	interview	partners	offered	a	first-hand	account	of	the	process.	Apart	from	that,	they	are	aware	of	the	whole	set	of	actors	who	have	been	involved	in	setting	the	agenda	and	defending	their	positions.		As	underlined	by	Bogner,	Littig	 and	 Menz	 (2009,	 p.2),	 the	 expert	 interviews	 offer	 an	 efficient	 and	 intensive	method	 at	 the	 explanatory	 stage	 of	 the	 project.	 They	 see	 experts	 as	 “crystallization	
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points”	and	they	“are	interviewed	as	surrogates	for	a	wider	circle	of	players”	(2009,	p.2).	Therefore,	 this	 type	 of	 interview	 aims	 at	 uncovering	 a	 broader	 context	 than	 just	 the	individual	circumstances	of	the	interviewee.	It	needs	to	be	remembered,	that	the	expert	interview	“is	not	a	specific	method	of	data	collection	but	includes	all	forms	of	qualitative	interviews	that	are	conducted	with	experts”	(Gläser	&	Laudel	2009,	p.119).	It	becomes	quickly	apparent	that	there	is	an	additional	facet	of	the	interviewing	process,	namely,	the	interviewees	enjoy	a	high	social	status	and	can	be	viewed	as	elites.	These	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 “those	 with	 close	 proximity	 to	 power	 or	 policy-making”	(Lilleker	 2003,	 p.207).	 They	 would	 also	 “hold	 or	 have	 held	 a	 privileged	 position	 in	society	and,	as	such,	as	far	as	political	scientist	is	concerned,	are	likely	to	have	had	more	influence	 on	 political	 outcomes	 than	 general	members	 of	 the	 public”	 (Richards	 1996,	p.199).	This	position	of	the	interviewees	needs	to	be	taken	into	consideration	initially	at	the	stage	of	designing	questionnaires	and	later	while	interviewing.	“In	elite	interviewing	(…)	the	investigator	is	willing	and	often	eager	to	let	the	interviewee	teach	him	what	the	problem,	 the	 question,	 the	 situation,	 is”	 (Dexter	 2012,	 p.19).	 The	 elite	 label	 in	 the	context	 of	 this	 research	 is	 attributed	 to	 the	 high	 ranking	 aviation	 industry	representatives,	staffers	of	the	senators	and	representatives	as	well	as	the	staffers	of	the	DG	Climate.	The	elite	interviewing	in	the	semi-structured	format,	is	however,	sometimes	seen	as	contentious:	“the	valuable	flexibility	of	open-ended	questioning	exacerbates	the	validity	 and	 reliability	 issues	 that	 are	 part	 and	 parcel	 of	 this	 approach”	 (Berry	 2002,	p.679).	 This	 risk	 was	 however	 minimised	 by	 engaging	 with	 non-elite	 interviewees,	juxtaposing	the	content	of	 the	 interviews	with	policy	documents	and	press	statements	as	well	as	very	careful	preparation	for	the	interviews	themselves.			 Finally,	 the	 question	 that	 remains	 to	 be	 addressed	 is	 the	 sufficiency	 of	 the	number	of	 interviews	conducted,	or	 ‘saturation’.	 It	has	been	argued	that	 “saturation	 is	the	 key	 to	 excellent	 qualitative	 work”	 however,	 it	 is	 also	 noted	 that	 “there	 are	 no	published	 guidelines	 or	 tests	 of	 adequacy	 for	 estimating	 the	 sample	 size	 required	 to	reach	 saturation”(Morse	 1994,	 p.147).	 The	 issue	 of	 saturation	 needs	 to	 be	 viewed	separately	 for	 the	 fieldwork	 conducted	 in	 Brussels	 and	 in	 Washington,	 DC.	 While	interviewing	 in	Washington	after	having	conducted	approximately	 five	 interviews,	 the	interview	 partners	 began	 suggesting	 the	 same	 potential	 interviewees.	 There	were	 no	other	potential	partners	suggested	at	all	after	the	fifteenth	interview.	It	became	visible	that	 in	 terms	 of	 policy	 network	 the	 number	 of	 people	 engaged	 in	 the	 discussion	
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concerning	the	EU	ETS	was	limited.	Also	the	answers	provided	by	the	interviewees	were	coherent	within	the	group	of	interview	partners	they	represented.		 The	 situation	 was	 much	 different	 in	 the	 EU	 where	 there	 were	 new	 potential	partners	 proposed	 until	 the	 very	 last	 interview	 given	 a	 very	 large	 policy	 community	present	in	Brussels	and	EU	ETS	being	conceived	by	the	EU.	Therefore,	in	the	European	context	the	researcher	was	more	focused	on	the	saturation	of	the	narrative.	It	would	not	have	 been	 possible	 to	 interview	 all	 the	 suggested	 partners,	 therefore,	 the	 focus	 was	placed	on	the	repetitiveness	of	the	answers	provided	by	the	interviewees,	especially,	to	the	questions	concerning	the	process	and	actors	who	were	able	to	shape	the	legislation	processes	 both	 in	 the	 EU	 and	 in	 the	 US.	 Overlaps	 and	 recurrence	 of	 themes	 and	understandings	 began	 to	 appear	 after	 two	 interviews	with	 Commission	 staff	 and	 two	interviews	with	the	Parliamentary	staff.	Obviously,	certain	issues	would	still	appear	new	in	in	the	interviews	conducted	at	the	end	of	the	data	collection	period,	however,	the	core	narrative	would	remain	the	same.	The	only	negative	influence	of	reducing	the	number	of	interviewees	on	the	European	side	was	probably	related	to	the	continuous	divergences	with	 regards	 to	 prioritising	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 actors	 present	 in	 the	 debate.	 This	issue	is	dealt	with	in	the	analysis	part	of	this	thesis.		
4.5.3 Preparation	for	the	interviews		 The	potential	interviewees	were	informed	about	the	research	project	via	e-mail,	via	phone	call	or	an	on-line	 form	on	 the	Senator’s	or	Representative’s	website	 (where	appropriate).	If	there	was	no	answer	for	the	e-mail	sent	or	form	submitted,	a	reminder	was	sent.	If	this	in	turn	did	not	yield	any	effects,	the	offices	were	called.	The	researcher	would	 call	 the	 Congressional	 offices,	 as	 this	 is	 a	 more	 efficient	 way	 of	 proceeding	 in	Washington.	The	Congressional	offices	or	individual	staffers	usually	would	not	disclose	their	 e-mail	 addresses	 and	 would	 prefer	 to	 be	 contacted	 through	 phone.	 With	interviewees	 recommended	 by	 a	 previous	 interviewee,	 e-mails	were	 sent	 including:	 a	participant	information	sheet	and	a	participation	consent	form.	In	Brussels,	however,	e-mail	 communication	 proved	 to	 be	 more	 useful	 than	 calling.	 The	 e-mails	 to	 the	interviewees	included	also	a	description	of	the	project	to	provide	informed	consent	(see:	Section	 4.7).	 The	 potential	 interviewees	 contacted	 were	 also	 offered	 a	 possibility	 to	receive	the	interview	guideline	prior	to	the	interview,	however,	only	three	interviewees	asked	for	the	questions	to	be	supplied.		
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Drawing	 on	 the	 literature	 regarding	 interviewing	 one	more	 aspect	 needs	 to	 be	addressed:	 vulnerability	 of	 the	 interviewees	 (Olson	 2011).	 The	 issues	 around	vulnerability	mostly	pertain	to	studies	that	involve	particularly	vulnerable	populations,	which	 is	 not	 much	 a	 case	 here,	 however,	 several	 points	 need	 to	 be	 addressed.	 The	“vulnerability”	 in	 this	project	 is	mostly	 related	 to	anonymity	and	a	possibility	 that	 the	interviewees	could	be	identified.		As	mentioned	before,	the	chosen	interview	partners	would	not	find	an	interview	situation	uncommon,	thus	the	interview	context	would	not	be	a	stressful	situation.	The	data	generated	was	anonymised	and	the	personal	identification	of	the	interviewees	was	made	 impossible.	 In	 several	 interviews,	 the	participants	were	extremely	 careful	 about	the	anonymity		and	quotation	from	the	interviews.	Twice,	the	researcher	was	asked	if	he	wished	 to	 receive	 a	 version	 of	 the	 discussions	 around	 the	 inclusion	 of	 aviation,	 that	presents	the	organisation’s	official	statement	or	a	more	insightful	account	that	must	not	be	attributable	to	the	entity	represented.	In	these	cases,	given	the	official	press	releases,	documents	 and	 media	 coverage	 that	 provide	 evidence	 of	 the	 official	 line,	 the	interviewees	were	asked	to	disclose	the	less	official	interpretations.	Also	close	attention	was	 given	 to	 the	 practice	 of	 anonymization.	 Within	 the	 Congress,	 the	 interviewees	would	 prefer	 to	 be	 quoted	 as	 Congress	 staffers.	 Another	 interviewee	 asked	 to	 remain	anonymous	 also	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 type	 of	 organisation	 represented.	 Similarly,	 the	European	Commission	interviewees	would	prefer	to	be	referred	to	as	“Commission	staff	/	official”	with	no	further	details	concerning	their	position	or	DG	they	worked	for.	The	same	participants	were	also	interested	closely	in	data	storage	and	the	use	of	data	in	any	other	publications	beside	 the	 thesis	 itself.	They	were	 interested	 in	 tentative	schedules	for	publications	and	submission	of	the	thesis	that	might	be	seen	as	proof	that	the	issue	under	investigation	was	very	“live”	at	the	time	of	the	research.	As	shown	above,	various	steps	 have	 been	 enacted	 to	 reduce	 the	 vulnerability	 and	 ensure	 the	 anonymity	 of	 the	interviews.		The	 next	 two	 sections	 present	 the	 data	 collection	 process	 in	 Brussels	 (Section	4.6)	and	in	Washington	(Section	4.7).	For	practical	and	methodological	reasons	the	first	set	of	interviews	was	conducted	in	the	US.	The	rationale	to	begin	with	the	fieldwork	in	Washington	was	related	to	the	political	situation	in	the	European	Union.	The	debate	on	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation	was	still	very	intense	in	the	EU	in	2012	and	2013	and	therefore,	even	if	the	questions	to	the	interviewees	would	pertain	mostly	to	the	processes	taking	
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place	as	early	as	in	2006,	they	would	probably	not	offer	a	possibility	to	interview	them.	In	 the	USA	 in	 turn,	 the	EU	ETS	Prohibition	Bill	was	 already	approved	by	 the	 time	 the	fieldwork	was	planned	and	the	discussions	were	much	more	settled	at	the	beginning	of	2013.	 The	 decision	 was	 therefore	 to	 first	 gather	 background	 information	 on	 the	 EU	policy	process	related	to	the	EU	ETS	and	aviation	to	later	engage	with	the	epicentre	of	the	resistance	to	the	inclusion.	Even	if	for	practical	reasons	the	Washington	interviews	were	conducted	first,	the	explanation	of	the	Brussels	fieldwork	is	presented	in	the	thesis	first,	due	to	the	centrality	of	the	EU	in	this	study’.	
4.6 Fieldwork	in	Brussels			 This	part	 of	 the	 study	was	 conducted	 in	Brussels	 in	 the	period	between	March	and	May	2014.	 In	 this	 time,	 the	researcher	was	based	 in	 the	Royal	Library	of	Belgium	(Bibliothèque	Royale	de	Belgique)	and	the	European	Commission	Central	Library,	both	headquartered	 in	Brussels.	Given	 the	period	between	 the	 two	waves	of	 fieldwork	and	the	possibility	to	engage	with	the	data	gathered	in	the	US,	the	data	collection	process	in	Brussels	 was	 informed	 by	 the	 data	 already	 obtained	 in	 the	 US.	 This	 in	 turn	 allowed	further	refinement	of	the	interview	schedules	and	a	perspective	on	the	issues	with	the	wider	international	context	in	mind.	At	the	same	time,	the	researcher	took	great	care	not	to	be	biased	by	the	ideas	already	gathered.	This	period	to	conduct	field	work	in	Brussels	was	chosen	due	to	both	the	political	situation	(upcoming	elections	to	the	EP	in	late	May	2014	 that	 could	 possibly	 reshuffle	 the	 EP	 membership)	 and	 the	 developments	 of	legislation	related	to	the	EU	ETS	–	further	suspension	of	the	application	of	the	EU	ETS	to	flights	 from	 outside	 of	 the	 EU10 .	 Several	 interviewees	 preferred	 to	 schedule	 the	interviews	 after	 the	 vote,	 even	 though	 they	were	 aware	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 interview	would	 not	 concern	 any	 events	 after	 2013.	 In	 the	 European	 part	 of	 the	 study	 21	interviews	 were	 conducted	 and	 are	 reported	 in	 the	 table	 below	 (see:	 Table	 2).	 The	interviews	lasted	from	45	to	110	minutes.				
																																																								10The	 European	 Council	 endorsed	 the	 compromise	 7th	 March	 2014.	 Following	 this	 the	 Environment	Committee	of	 the	European	Parliament	voted	on	 it	19th	March	2014	and	the	plenary	vote	took	place	3rd	April	 2014	where	EU	ETS	 for	 aviation	was	 reduced	 in	 scope	 to	 flights	 between	 the	 airports	within	 the	European	Economic	Area	(regardless	of	the	nationality	of	the	carrier).	
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to	the	high	profile	interviewees			 The	Commission	has	been	called	"one	of	the	world's	most	powerful	international	administrations”	 (Kassim,	Peterson,	Bauer,	et	al.	2013,	p.1)	and	 therefore	access	 to	 its	staff	 can	 cause	 numerous	 issues.	 	 The	 specificity	 of	 the	 European	 Commission	communications	is	that	they	are	always	conveyed	by	the	Commissioner	respective	to	the	field	a	DG	deals	with.	For	this	particular	issue,	the	person	in	question	would	be	Connie	Hedegaard	who	 took	up	 the	position	on	10th	February	2010	at	 the	newly	established	directorate.	 It	 was	 created	 through	 splitting	 the	 DG	 for	 Environment	 and	 separating	climate	change	related	issues	from	larger	environmental	policy.			 DG	Climate	Action	was	contacted	firstly	in	February	2014	via	a	form	provided	on	the	DG’s	website,	however	no	answer	was	given.	Following	this	 failure,	 the	researcher	involved	 his	 personal	 contacts	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 suitable	 interviewees	 within	 DG	Climate	Action,	which	yielded	positive	results.	Eventually,	four	officials	from	DG	Climate	Action	were	interviewed,	their	positions	are	not	revealed	for	anonymity	reasons.	All	of	them	were	serving	also	in	other	positions	in	the	last	five	to	ten	years,	where	they	were	dealing	with	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation.			 Additionally,	 two	 more	 high-ranking	 officials	 DG	 Mobility	 and	 Transport	 were	interviewed	 as	 they	 were	 indicated	 by	 the	 DG	 Climate	 Action	 staff,	 however	 due	 to	anonymity	reasons	no	further	details	can	be	provided.	
4.6.2 Accessing	the	European	Parliament			 Given	 the	 intensive	 pre-election	 period	 at	 the	 European	 Parliament,	 this	constituency	 seemed	 to	 be	 the	most	 inaccessible	 among	 all	 considered	 in	Brussels.	 In	principle,	 the	 interviews	 conducted	 in	 the	 EP	 can	 be	 divided	 into	 two	 categories:	advisors	 to	 the	 Parliamentary	 groups	 and	 staffers	 of	 the	 Members	 of	 the	 Parliament	(MEP).	 The	 advisors	 to	 the	 political	 groups	 were	 chosen	 due	 to	 their	 role	 in	 the	Parliamentary	 Committees.	 They	 are	 following	 very	 closely	 policies	 within	 the	Committee	 they	work	 for	 and	 advise	 the	 Committee	Members	with	 regards	 to	 voting	decisions.	Thus,	they	are	considered	the	agents	able	to	provide	a	broader	rationale	for	the	 position	 taken	 by	 the	 group	 and	 the	 motivations	 of	 certain	 policy	 decisions.	
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However,	 given	 their	 limited	 availability	 only	 advisors	 of	 three	 major	 groups	 were	interviewed.		
4.6.3 Accessing	the	environmental	NGOs			 The	 environmental	 NGOs	 landscape	 in	 Brussels	 proved	 to	 be	 very	 different	 to	that	in	Washington,	DC.	In	Brussels,	there	is	only	one	organisation	that	was	dealing	with	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation,	namely	Transport	and	Environment	(T&E)	whose	“mission	is	to	promote,	at	EU	and	global	level,	a	transport	policy	based	on	the	principles	of	sustainable	development”	 (Transport	 and	 Environment	 2014).	 T&E	 represents	 around	 fifty	European	 organisations	 and	 coordinates	 the	 International	 Coalition	 for	 Sustainable	Aviation	(ICSA)	 that	holds	observer	status	at	 ICAO(Transport	and	Environment	2014).	All	the	other	Brussels-based	interviewees	have	confirmed	the	status	of	T&E	as	the	only	all-European	eNGO	active	in	the	discussions	about	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation.		 Additionally,	 a	 representative	 of	 a	 UK-based	 NGO	 Aviation	 Environment	Federation	 (AEF)	 was	 interviewed.	 Although	 its	 constituency	 is	 mostly	 British,	 AEF	holds	an	observer	status	at	ICAO	and	can	be	considered	the	European	eNGO	community	representation	at	ICAO.		
4.6.4 Accessing	the	aviation	industry			 The	 European	 aviation	 industry	 is	 strongly	 represented	 in	 Brussels.	 All	 major	European	carriers	(British	Airways,	Air	France,	KLM,	Lufthansa)	have	their	offices	there.	Similarly,	 associations	 of	 airlines,	 airports	 and	 aircraft	 producers	 are	 very	 visible.	Altogether,	six	 interviews	with	 industry	representatives	were	conducted.	No	problems	arose	in	accessing	the	industry	interviewees.		




4.7 Fieldwork	in	Washington,	DC	 			 This	 study	 has	 been	 firstly	 informed	 by	 a	 series	 of	 semi-structured	 interviews	conducted	 between	 March	 and	 May	 2013	 in	 Washington,	 DC	 (see:	 Table	 3).	 In	 that	period	the	researcher	was	a	Research	Fellow	at	the	John	W.	Kluge	Center	at	the	Library	of	Congress.	Altogether,	for	the	US	part	of	this	study	nineteen	people	were	interviewed	in	 seventeen	 interviews	 (two	 interviews	were	 given	 by	 two	 persons	 simultaneously).	Fourteen	 of	 them	 were	 face-to-face	 meetings	 that	 lasted	 between	 forty	 and	 ninety	minutes.	Two	more	interviews	were	conducted	over	the	phone	due	to	the	interviewee’s	limited	availability	in	Washington.	Additionally,	one	interview	was	conducted	via	Skype	in	May	2013,	when	the	researcher	had	returned	to	Cardiff.			
Table	3:	Interviews	conducted	in	the	USA	Interview	date	 Category	 Details	01.03.2013	 US	Senate	 Staff	of	a	Senator	22.03.2013	 eNGO	 World	Wide	Fund	for	Nature	08.04.2013	 not	to	be	disclosed	 not	to	be	disclosed	09.04.2013	 EU	Representation	to	the	USA	 European	Commission	17.04.2013	 Industry	association		 Airports	 Council	 International	 –	North	America	18.04.2013	 Aviation	organization		 ICAO	(former	officer)	via	phone	19.04.2013	 US	House	of	Representatives	 US	Congressman	staff	22.04.2013	 US	Senate		 US	 Senate	 Aviation	 Subcommittee	(former	staff)	24.04.2013	 eNGO	 Environmental	Defense	Fund	25.04.2014	 Industry	association	 Airlines	for	America	
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30.04.2013	 Other	 US	Congress	Research	Service	30.04.2013	 US	Senate	 US	 Senate	 Aviation	 Subcommittee	(former	staff)	01.05.2013	 Industry	association	 Aerospace	Industries	Association	02.05.2013	 Industry	association	 National	 Business	 Aviation	Association	(via	phone)	02.05.2013	 US	Senate	 US	Senator	staff	03.05.2013	 Think-tank	 Center	for	American	Progress	22.05.2013	 Non-profit	 public	 interest	 law	organization	 Earth	Justice		
4.7.1 Identification	of	the	potential	interviewees	at	the	Congressional	level		 A	 pivotal	 point	 of	 the	 discussion	 on	 US	 participation	 in	 the	 EU	 ETS	 was	 the	announcement	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	 Prohibition	 Act	 in	 the	 House	 of	 Representatives,	 which	shows	formal	American	disagreement	with	the	EU-brokered	idea	to	curb	emissions	from	aviation.	 The	discussion	 around	 the	Bill	 clearly	 translates	 into	 the	 potential	 interview	partners	in	the	US,	as	the	individuals	involved	with	the	Bill	had	stakes	in	the	debate.			 Interviewees	were	identified	in	two	main	ways.	“In	a	case	study,	respondents	are	selected	on	the	basis	of	what	they	might	know	to	help	the	investigator	fill	in	pieces	of	a	puzzle	 or	 confirm	 the	 proper	 alignments	 of	 pieces	 already	 in	 place”	 (Aberbach	 &	Rockman	2002,	p.673)	–	this	guideline	was	followed	in	the	whole	process	of	contacting	potential	 interviewees.	 In	 the	 US,	 firstly	 the	 federal	 legislative	 process	 of	 the	 US	Congress	was	taken	 into	consideration.	This	means	that	 the	researcher	 focused	on	the	European	Union	Emissions	Trading	Scheme	Prohibition	Act	 that	was	passed	by	the	US	House	 of	 Representatives	 (H	 2594)	 and	 the	 US	 Senate	 (S1956)	 and	 looked	 at	 the	politicians	who	were	sponsoring	the	bill	 in	both	the	House	of	Representatives	and	the	Senate.	 These	 were	 accordingly	 representatives	 John	 Mica	 and	 senator	 John	 Thune.	Contacts	were	made	with	their	offices	via	phone	to	schedule	an	appointment	with	their	staffers	who	were	 dealing	with	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	 and	 aviation.	 Simultaneously,	media	 search	 was	 run	 to	 identify	 other	 representatives	 and	 senators	 to	 broaden	 the	
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scope.	 Interviewees	were	conducted	with	 four	members	of	staff	at	 the	Senate	and	one	staff	 member	 at	 the	 House	 of	 Representatives.	 Representative	 Mica’s	 staff	 were	 not	willing	 to	 take	 part	 in	 the	 research	 –	 numerous	 attempts	 to	 contact	 them	 were	unsuccessful.	At	the	same	time	letters	inviting	participation	in	the	research	were	sent	to	the	Committee	of	Infrastructure	and	Transportation	and	to	the	Aviation	Subcommittee	that	work	at	the	House	of	Representatives.		 Secondly,	 snowballing	 (Flick	 2007)	 played	 an	 important	 role.	 As	 mentioned	before,	 each	participant	was	 asked	 to	 nominate	 potential	 interviewees.	 	 This	 not	 only	provided	a	broad	list	of	contacts	and	establish	networks	(Richards	1996,	p.200)but	also	enabled	 the	researcher	 to	understand	which	actors	were	seen	as	 important	players	 in	the	discussions	on	the	EU	ETS.	Interestingly,	there	was	one	recurring	reference	in	all	of	the	 interviews,	 namely	 the	 Airlines	 for	 America,	 as	 the	 entity	 that	 in	 view	 of	 the	participants	 had	 to	 be	 interviewed.	 This	 was	 not	 the	 case	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 other	potential	 interviewees	 –	 for	 example	 different	 eNGOs	 were	 suggested	 by	 different	interviewees	or	different	persons	to	access	at	the	Congressional	level.	The	saturation	of	the	 network	 was	 achieved	 when	 no	 new	 participants	 were	 suggested	 and	 the	 same	names	were	being	suggested.	Also,	it	became	visible	that	the	discourse	surrounding	the	issues	discussed	 is	 saturated	 as	 answers	 to	 questions	 asked	 started	 to	 re-appear.	 The	next	sections	describe	the	sampling	among	other	groups.	
4.7.2 Accessing	the	eNGOs			 A	different	approach	to	the	one	used	for	the	Congress	was	undertaken	to	identify	the	interviewees	representing	the	eNGOs.	The	media	search	proved	that	several	eNGOs	were	 more	 vocal	 than	 others,	 namely	 World	 Wildlife	 Fund	 (WWF),	 Environmental	Defense	Fund	(EDF)	and	Natural	Resources	Defense	Council	(NRDC).	Additional	groups	were	identified	through	a	 joint	 letter	that	American	eNGOs	sent	to	the	senators	and	to	the	 President11	All	 the	 organisations	 who	 signed	 the	 letter	 where	 contacted	 with	 an	interview	request.	The	researcher	received	answers	to	all	e-mails,	however,	most	of	the	organisations	 preferred	 to	 provide	 contacts	 to	 people	 they	 felt	 more	 engaged	 than	themselves.	 This	 was	 the	 case	 for	 the	 Sierra	 Club,	 Friends	 of	 the	 Earth	 and	 Climate																																																									
11	The	letter	was	made	available	by	one	of	the	US	eNGO	interviewees.	It	was	signed	by	350.org,	Center	for	Biological	 Diversity,	 Climate	 Solutions,	 Conservation	 Law	 Foundation,	 Earthjustice,	 Environmental	Defense	Fund,	Environment	America,	 Environment	Northeast,	Greenpeace	USA,	 League	of	 Conservation	Voters,	Natural	Resources	Defense	Council,	Oxfam	America,	Sierra	Club,	US	Climate	Action	Network,	and	World	Wildlife	Fund.		
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Action	 Network	 (which	 mostly	 serves	 as	 an	 umbrella	 organisation	 and	 is	 not	 an	independent	 entity).	 Finally,	 two	 NGOs	 have	 been	 surveyed:	 WWF	 and	 EDF.	 The	interviewees	representing	WWF	and	EDF,	indicated	the	same	list	of	people	and	claimed	that	although	 the	 list	of	 signatories	of	 the	 letters	opposing	 the	EU	ETS	was	 large,	only	three	environmental	NGOs	were	particularly	active	in	the	debate:	WWF,	EDF	and	NRDC.	WWF	 is	 an	 international	 eNGO	 mostly	 dedicated	 to	 the	 wildlife	 conservation	 and	endangered	species,	but	also	working	with	climate	change,	hence	the	interest	in	the	EU	ETS.	EDF	understands	 its	mission	as	“to	preserve	the	natural	systems	on	which	all	 life	depends”	(Environmental	Defense	Fund	2013).	They	are	seen	as	a	strong	court	player	in	the	US.		
4.7.3 Accessing	the	sectoral	organisations			 The	third	group	of	interviewees	consisted	of	representatives	of	the	industry	who	were	 identified	 through	various	 channels.	Airlines	 for	America	 (A4A)	was	approached	first,	 given	 the	 importance,	 other	 interviewees	 attributed	 to	 it.	 Moreover,	 their	representative	testified	at	the	hearing	of	Senate	Committee	on	Commerce,	Sciences	and	Transportation	 on	 June	 6th	 2012.	 The	 National	 Business	 Aviation	 Association	 was	identified	 by	 the	 interviewee	 from	 A4A	 and	 was	 approached	 via	 their	 Press	 Office.	Airports	 International	 Council	 –	 North	 America	 (ACI-NA)	 and	 Airspace	 Industries	Association	 (AIA)	were	 recommended	 by	 one	 of	 the	 interviewees	who	 reserved	 their	own	complete	anonymity,	including	the	type	of	organisation	they	represented.	In	all	four	cases,	 the	 interviews	were	conducted	with	staff	 that	were	dealing	directly	with	the	EU	ETS.			 The	 Air	 Line	 Pilots	 Association	 (ALPA)	 and	 General	 Aviation	 Manufacturers	Association	(GAMA)	that	have	been	recommended	by	a	number	of	interviewees	did	not	respond	to	the	researcher’s	numerous	queries	–	neither	their	press	office,	nor	persons	indicated	by	the	interviewees.		
4.7.4 Accessing	the	administration			 The	fourth	group	of	the	interviewees	can	be	labelled	as	a	mouth-sealed	group	and	it	 included	 the	 Federal	 Aviation	 Administration	 (FAA),	 the	 White	 House,	 the	 US	Department	 of	 Transportation,	 the	 Environmental	 Protection	 Agency	 and	 the	 US	Department	 of	 State.	 Within	 these	 organisations,	 only	 individuals	 who	 were	 directly	
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engaged	 in	 the	 issue	were	contacted	–	 this	was	possible	 through	recommendations	by	the	 previous	 interviewees.	 All	 of	 the	 listed	 actors	 expressed	 their	 interest	 in	 the	research,	 however,	 declined	 participation	 in	 the	 interviews.	 The	 reasons	 given	 were	related	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 issue	 investigated	 is	 still	 in	 progress.	 One	 of	 the	 answers	framed	 the	 issue	 as	 following:	 “these	negotiation	are	 at	 a	 sensitive	point	 and	 I	 do	not	think	 it	 would	 be	 appropriate	 for	 me	 to	 participate	 in	 your	 research	 at	 this	 time”.	Another	answer	had	a	similar	undertone:	“I’m	afraid	the	issue	of	your	research	remains	very	much	a	“live	 issue”	 today	and	consequently	one	that	would	be	difficult	 to	discuss	fully”.	 In	 relation	 to	 these,	 the	 remaining	 strategy	 to	 analyse	 the	 positions	 of	 the	aforementioned	actors	is	to	track	their	statements	in	media	and	official	press	releases	as	well	 as	 rely	 on	 the	 other	 actors’	 perceptions.	 It	 could	 be	 argued,	 that	 the	 researcher	could	 have	 waited	 for	 a	 more	 suitable	 moment	 to	 come	 back	 to	 the	 interviewees,	however,	given	the	further	suspension	of	the	scheme	until	2016,	the	time	of	expectation	would	prolong	the	duration	of	the	project	excessively.		




4.8.1 Remarks	on	transcription			 Once	the	interviews	are	concluded	the	researcher	transcribed	them	unaided.	It	is	believed	 that	 this	 increases	 the	 reflexivity	 of	 the	 researcher	 as	 well	 as	 the	trustworthiness	of	the	data	(Alcock	&	Iphofen	2007).	Also,	given	the	need	to	secure	data,	self-reliance	 assures	 that	 any	 information	 gathered	 will	 not	 be	 leaked.	 Although,	 the	transcription	process	was	time-consuming,	 the	process	was	beneficial	 for	the	research	and	allowed	further	reflection	on	the	data	collected.			
4.8.2 Data	analysis			 The	 data	 analysis	was	 based	 on	 the	material	 gathered	 in	 the	 field	 triangulated	with	the	policy	documents	on	one	side	and	media	content	on	the	other.	The	explanatory	part	of	this	thesis	calls	for	variation	of	the	sources	of	data	in	order	to	better	understand	the	 context	 and	 look	 at	 the	 problem	 from	 various	 perspectives.	 For	 example,	 the	information	 provided	 in	 a	 confidential	 non-recorded	 interview	 with	 a	 European	Commission	official	is	different	than	what	is	presented	in	the	official	statements	issued	by	DG	CLIMA.	However,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 official	 line	 is	 the	 one	 that	 reaches	 the	regulated	 entities	 and	 cannot	 be	 downplayed.	 Equally,	 it	 has	 been	 rightly	 pointed	 out	that	 the	 information	 provided	 by	 the	 interviewees	 cannot	 be	 seen	 as	 “unproblematic	windows	onto	the	social	on	natural	world”	(Potter	&	Mulkay	1985,	p.266),	therefore,	the	role	 of	 the	 researcher	 is	 to	 interpret	 how	 the	 reported	 world	 is	 constructed	 in	 their	accounts.			 The	 data	 has	 been	 analysed	 with	 assistance	 of	 NVivo	 –	 one	 of	 the	 leading	computer	assisted	qualitative	data	analysis	software	(CAQDAS)	packages.	The	software	was	used	 for	coding	 the	data	and	developing	 theories.	The	main	reason	of	deciding	 to	use	 CAQDAS	 is	 to	 increase	 rigour	 and	 consistency	 without	 compromising	 speed	 and	efficiency	(Stewart	2012,	p.503).	Although,	some	claim	that	using	CAQDAS	may	distance	the	 researcher	 from	 the	 data	 (King	 2010),	 here,	 given	 that	 all	 the	 interviews	 were	conducted	 and	 transcribed	 by	 the	 researcher,	 the	 close	 connection	 to	 the	 interviews	content	was	 not	 jeopardised	 unduly.	 In	 this	 research,	 all	 the	 saved	 secondary	 data	 as	well	 as	 transcripts	 and	 field	 notes	 were	 uploaded	 to	 NVivo	 and	 coded	 within	 the	software	environment.		
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	 In	 relation	 to	 the	 research	 questions	 that	 this	 thesis	 asks	 and	 the	 theoretical	framework	chosen,	the	coding	process	(see:	Table	4)	was	centred	on	three	main	themes:	EU’s	leadership,	the	nature	of	the	opposition	to	the	EU	ETS,	international	implications	of	the	 countermeasures	 to	 the	 EU	ETS	 (such	 as	 at	 ICAO	 and	 International	 Air	 Transport	Association	 (IATA)	 levels).	 	 Thus,	 the	 codes	 emerge	 from	 the	 research	 questions	(Mauelshagen	et	al.	 2014),	but	 are	also	 informed	by	 the	actual	material	 gathered.	The	themes	chosen	were	divided	into	sub-categories	(Saldaña	2015)	pertaining	to	the	types	of	 actors	 interacting	 with	 each	 other	 (states,	 institutional,	 non-governmental,	 media,	private	 companies	 or	 their	 associations)	 and	 types	 of	 interactions	 (influence,	observation,	 criticism,	 etc.).	 The	 themes	 and	 the	 sub-categories	 underwent	 revisions	once	all	the	data	collection	has	been	finished.	For	example	the	data	collected	in	the	EU	demonstrated	that	focusing	on	the	US	exclusively	is	not	sufficient	and	the	implications	of	the	 EU	 ETS	 are	 much	 more	 international	 rather	 than	 only	 affecting	 EU-US	 bilateral	relations.	While	rather	broad,	the	codes	were	able	to	cover	the	whole	research	agenda	of	the	 thesis	 and	 allowed	 navigating	 through	 a	 rather	 complex	 and	multi-faceted	 set	 of	data.	
Table	4	Types	of	codes	employed	Theme	 Sub-category		(types	of	actors)	 Type	of	interaction	EU’s	leadership	 state,	NGO,	media,	private	company,	sectoral	association,	think-tank	
observation,	criticism,	influence	Nature	of	the	opposition	International	implications		Apart	 from	 that,	 the	 discourses	 reflecting	 the	 interpretation	 of	 the	 motivations	 and	interests	 that	 the	members	 of	 the	 policy	 network	 have	 (coming	 both	 from	 interviews	and	 textual	 data),	 are	 coded	 separately	 to	 provide	 a	 distinct	 analysis	 of	 the	meaning-making	activities	that	the	policy	community	engages	with.	The	other	two	elements	of	the	theoretical	 frameworks	 were	 reflected	 in	 the	 coding	 process	 as	 well.	 The	 MLG	component	translated	into	the	main	theme	of	“International	implications”.	The	focus	on	various	layers	and	geographies	of	policy-making	was	derived	from	the	MLG	interest	in	
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interactions	 between	 stakeholders.	 Additionally,	 for	 this	 research,	 these	 interactions	were	 mostly	 international.	 The	 coding	 process	 involved	 the	 PNA	 through	 observing	influence	between	the	stakeholders	mapped	via	PNA.			 The	 codes	 enabled	 the	 researcher	 to	 systematically	 analyse	 collected	 data	 and	limit	 the	 risk	 of	 missing	 any	 significant	 answers	 provided.	 Given	 the	 qualitative	character	of	this	project,	focus	has	been	placed	more	on	a	larger	discourse	present	in	the	narratives	than	quantification	of	phrases	and	drawing	conclusions	 from	frequencies	of	certain	expressions	or	words.	The	approach	taken	here	is	guarded	against	viewing	the	policy	process	“not	of	its	participants’	making,	but	of	its	analysts’	insistence”	(Schegloff	1997,	p.183)	by	a	careful	triangulation	to	limit	speculation	or	subjectivity.	At	the	same	time,	while	relying	on	coding	and	NVivo,	there	has	been	an	on-going	process	of	reading	full	 transcripts	 and	 listening	 to	 the	 recorded	 interviews	 over	 the	whole	 period	when	analysis	has	been	conducted.	
4.9 Research	Ethics			 Special	attention	has	been	given	to	research	ethics	throughout	the	duration	of	the	project.	The	researcher	complied	with	the	best	practices	available	in	the	discipline	(BSA	2002;	 ESRC	 2010;	 SRA	 2003)	 and	 received	 the	 appropriate	 ethical	 approval	 from	 the	School	of	Planning	and	Geography	at	Cardiff	University.	Given	that	the	research	design	included	 conducting	 interviews,	 several	 issues	 needed	 to	 be	 addressed:	 informed	consent	 of	 the	 participants,	 confidentiality	 and	 anonymity	 of	 the	 interviewees	 and	storage	of	the	data.		
4.9.1 Informed	consent		 The	concept	of	informed	consent	assumes	that	“prospective	research	participants	should	be	given	as	much	information	as	might	be	needed	to	make	an	informed	decision	about	 whether	 or	 not	 they	 wish	 to	 participate	 in	 a	 study”	 (Bryman	 2008,	 p.121).	Following	this	rationale,	all	the	participants	were	provided	with	information	concerning	the	 project,	 its	 background,	 aims	 and	 objectives.	 They	were	 informed	 that	 they	 could	withdraw	at	any	time	without	stating	the	reason.	Information	regarding	audio	recording	of	 interviews	 was	 included	 in	 the	 communication	 with	 all	 interviewees.	 Before	 each	interview,	 the	 interviewees	were	handed	a	hardcopy	of	 the	research	outline	and	were	asked	to	sign	a	consent	form.	None	of	the	participants	withdrew.		
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4.9.2 Confidentiality	and	anonymity		 All	the	participants	of	this	study	were	granted	anonymity	and	the	data	gathered	was	kept	only	in	the	digital	form	in	a	password-protected	computer	and	in	a	password-protected	 file.	 In	order	 to	 guarantee	 anonymity	 to	 the	 interviewees,	 their	names	have	been	translated	into	alphanumeric	codes.	These	procedures	follow	the	Flick’s	reflection	on	confidentiality:	“in	the	analysis	of	qualitative	data,	anonymity	and	confidentiality	are	central	issues	from	the	angle	of	ethics	–	in	transcription,	in	analysis	itself	and	most	of	all	in	presenting	results	and	excerpts	from	data”	(Flick	2007,	p.103).	The	interviewees	were	given	a	choice	if	they	wanted	to	receive	the	transcription	of	their	interviews	and	several	availed	themselves	of	this	opportunity.		







5.1 Introduction			 The	 previous	 chapters	 have	 given	 an	 overview	 of	 the	 researched	 area	 and	 the	contexts	of	the	case	employed	here,	as	well	as	the	methods	used	to	answer	the	questions	that	are	addressed.	The	following	chapters	will	present	the	analysis	of	the	empirical	data	collected.	The	data	is	organised	in	the	following	way:	the	next	three	chapters	respond	to	the	research	questions	while	chapters	8	and	9	conclude	the	thesis.	In	particular,	Chapter	5	addresses	question	1	(What	were	the	effects	of	the	EU’s	attempt	to	include	aviation	in	the	 ETS?)	 and	 3	 (Why	were	 particular	 venues	 of	 policy	 processes	 regarding	 aviation	emissions	preferred?)	and	to	a	lesser	degree	addresses	also	question	4	(Why	do	the	EU	and	non-EU	countries	differ	on	the	shape	of	a	global	aviation	emissions	policy?).	Chapter	6	responds	to	research	question	2	(Who	are	the	most	prominent	actors	of	the	debate	on	inclusion?)	 and	 continues	 addressing	 research	 questions	 3	 and	 4.	 It	 also	 responds	 to	question	5	(How	are	the	policy	differences	between	the	US	and	the	EU	being	resolved	at	the	international	level?).	Finally,	Chapter	7	completes	the	response	to	questions	two	and	four.	Given	the	interconnectedness	character	of	the	issues	analysed	and	empirical	data	derived	 from	 two	 waves	 of	 fieldwork,	 chapters	 5	 to	 7	 engage	 with	 the	 research	questions	 in	a	 thematic	way	rather	 than	a	sequential	way,	and	seek	where	possible	 to	present	 coherently	 the	 way	 that	 the	 policy	 change	 unfolded	 at	 different	 levels	 and	arenas.		 		 The	main	aim	of	this	first	empirical	chapter	is	to	look	at	the	EU’s	actions	related	to	climate	policy	and	the	parallel	process	at	the	ICAO	level.	This	chapter	looks	closer	at	the	EU’s	actorness12	and	the	policy	network	relations	within	the	analysed	case.	Firstly,	it	looks	 at	 the	 ICAO	 initiatives	 addressing	 curbing	 CO2	 emissions,	 as	 well	 as,	 recent	changes	to	the	 internal	dynamics	of	 the	organisation.	Further,	 it	pays	special	attention	on	the	interplay	between	ICAO	and	the	EU	in	the	context	of	the	inclusion	of	aviation	into																																																									




the	EU	ETS.	In	the	final	part,	it	looks	at	the	power	dynamics	between	the	two	Directorate	Generals	that	were	engaged	in	including	aviation	into	the	EU	ETS.	The	last	part	gives	a	more	nuanced	view	on	the	Commission’s	work	related	to	the	EU	ETS	and	presents	some	of	the	internal	tensions	that	so	far	have	received	insufficient	attention	in	the	literature.	Special	 attention	 is	 given	 to	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 interplay	 between	 EU	 and	 ICAO	 with	regards	to	CO2	curbing	initiatives	and	the	potential	of	the	EU	to	accelerate	action	at	the	ICAO	 level.	 On	 a	 broader	 canvas,	 the	 chapter	 also	 considers	 the	 extent,	 to	 which	 the	inclusion	of	aviation	is	a	step	to	expand	EU’s	leadership	in	climate	policy.		 Given	the	theoretical	 framework	employed	in	this	thesis,	 the	analysis	takes	into	consideration	 a	wide	 range	 of	 voices	 present	 in	 the	 policy	 networks	 involved.	 It	 goes	therefore	beyond	the	role	of	individual	EU	Member	States,	but	looks	at	the	EU	and	ICAO	architectures	 interplaying	 on	 various	 levels,	 including	 the	 bureaucratic	 side	 of	 the	European	 Commission.	 The	 interactions	 between	 the	 organisations	 and	 within	 the	Commission,	which	is	a	focal	point	here,	uncover	the	governance	patterns	on	both	macro	and	micro	levels.	The	latter	is	expressed	by	close	engagement	with	the	data	coming	from	the	 interviews	 to	 explore	 the	meaning-making	 activities	 and	 the	 role	 of	 individuals	 in	policymaking	 and	 climate	 governance.	 Finally,	 the	 governance	 perspective	 allows	consideration	of	the	EU’s	endeavours	to	become	an	important	player	in	a	rather	nation	state-dominated	context	like	ICAO.			 On	 a	 broader	 perspective,	 this	 chapter	 addresses,	 the	 overarching	 issue	 of	 the	EU’s	potential	to	change	aviation	regulation	patterns	and	the	EU’s	ability	to	exercise	its	leadership	in	regulation	of	a	sector	that	has	been	exceptionally	treated	with	regards	to	taxation,	government	aid	or	subsidies.	 ICAO	being	 the	main	aviation	 forum	worldwide	provides	the	first	layer	of	the	interactions	between	the	two	areas	analysed.	The	chapter	is	structured	as	follows:	it	begins	with	the	analysis	of	ICAO’s	involvement	with	aviation	emissions	and	continues	to	analyse	EU-ICAO	relations.	Furthermore,	the	focus	is	moved	to	 the	 EU’s	 role	 in	 catalysing	 international	 action	with	 regards	 to	 aviation	 emissions.	Finally,	this	chapter	unpacks	the	issues	that	emerged	between	the	Directorate	Generals	for	the	analysed	case.		
































UNFCCC	talks	and	if	they	seem	to	have	accepted	any	action	on	their	carriers	to	tackle	climate	change	than	it’s	a	precedent	to	say,	well	your	aviation	industry	is	part	 of	 the	 battle,	 why	 not	 the	 rest	 of	 your	 national	 economy.”	 (Interview	16.06.2014)		 Given	 the	 change	 of	 dynamics	 at	 ICAO	 and	 the	motivations	 offered	 above	 it	 is	plausible	 that	 the	 ICAO’s	work	 on	 climate	 issues	will	 be	 hampered	 by	 the	 developing	countries	 as	 a	 collateral	 to	 their	 tactics	 towards	 UNFCCC	 negotiations	 and	responsibilities.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 however,	 it	 can	 be	 claimed	 that	 the	 developing	countries	 are	 unhappy	 with	 regional	 schemes	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 delegating	 their	sovereignty	to	an	international	body.	This	has	been	the	argument	used	by	the	US	when	challenging	 the	 EU	 ETS	 inclusion	 of	 aviation	 though	 it	 seems	 perfectly	 applicable	 to	other	 ICAO	 Contracting	 States,	 including	 developing	 countries.	 The	 developing	countries’	issues	“had	always	been	marginal	to	the	thrust	of	the	UNFCCC,	have	become	even	more	marginalised	in	recent	COPs	as	energy	has	had	to	be	diverted	to	get	reluctant	northern	 countries	 to	 accede	 to	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol”	 (Najam	 et	 al.	 2003,	 p.222).	 The	change	of	dynamics	in	ICAO	gives	them	a	space	to	raise	their	concerns	and	influence	the	international	policy-making	with	regards	to	aviation	emissions,	which	will	be	growing	in	developing	countries	due	to	aviation	expansion	(Airbus	2013).	








	 Another	 high-ranking	 EC	 official	 underlined	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 EC’s	involvement	 before	 the	 ICAO	 Assemblies	 while	 it	 is	 responsible	 for	 equipping	 the	Member	States	with	common	positions	or	information	notes.	These	are	discussed	at	the	European	 Council	 in	 order	 to	 have	 a	 coherent	 strategy	 and	 a	 unified	 position	 before	sending	representatives	off	 to	Montreal.	As	evaluated	by	 the	 interviewee:	 “Normally	 it	works,	with	a	lot	of	work	it	works	fairly	well”	(Interview	28.04.2014).		The	ICAO	process	is	 then	 much	 less	 formal	 than	 preparation	 of	 positions	 for	 international	 climate	negotiations	 or	 in	 the	 United	 Nations	 Commission	 on	 Sustainable	 Development	process(Delreux	&	Van	den	Brande	2013).		 Another	 interviewee	admitted	 that	 in	 case	of	discussions	on	 emissions	 trading:	“There	was	 a	 bit	 of	 frustration	 and	 a	 lot	 of	 criticism	but	 nobody	broke	 the	EU	 ranks”	(Interview	 24.09.2014).	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 interviewees	 highlighted	 also	 that	 at	times	the	EU	Member	States	felt	that	they	did	not	really	receive	instructions	on	how	to	act	with	the	EU	ETS	 file	at	 ICAO.	What	 is	worse,	 they	sensed	that	 there	 is	a	dual	voice	coming	 from	the	EC,	probably	a	 result	of	division	of	 tasks	between	DG	CLIMA	and	DG	MOVE	(see:	Section	5.5).		




Conference	 of	 the	 Parties	 on	 Climate	 Change	 between	 1999	 and	 2003.	 As	mentioned	before,	 the	EU	has	only	had	observer	status	at	 ICAO	therefore	the	only	pressure	 it	can	exert	is	through	its	Member	States.	However,	Jos	Delbeke	who	was	considered	by	many	of	the	interviewees	as	the	father	of	the	whole	EU	ETS	(but	not	particularly	of	the	idea	of	including	 aviation	 into	 the	 scheme)	 represents	 Belgium	 at	 ICAO	 de	 iure,	 however	 de	








registration	may	hold	shares	of	the	airlines	and	the	airlines	employ	large	numbers	in	the	countries	of	registration.	Lufthansa	Group	for	example	employs	almost	120	000	people	in	Europe	and	beyond	(Interview	25.03.2014).	As	highlighted	by	one	of	the	Commission	interviewees:	“From	the	outside	aviation	may	look	like	a	very	international	sector	but	in	fact	it	is	about	the	flag	that	is	placed	on	an	aircraft.”	(Interview	29.04.2014)		 Given	the	context	provided	above,	it	becomes	clear	that	the	EU	could	not	impose	on	 ICAO	a	preferred	solution	or	obtain	an	agreement	 from	EU’s	 international	partners	where	 they	would	 assure	 compliance	with	 the	 EU	 ETS	when	 arriving	 at	 or	 departing	from	 the	 EU	 airports.	 The	 EU	 was	 therefore	 trying	 to	 exercise	 its	 power	 via	transgovernmental	networking	based	on	learning	and	socialising	(Checkel	2005;	Dobbin	
et	al.	2007;	Gilardi	2012).	As	claimed	by	the	Commission’s	interviewees,	there	has	been	a	 lot	 of	 educational	 work,	 discussions	 and	 exchange	 of	 information	 done	 before	 the	inclusion	 of	 aviation	 was	 actually	 enacted.	 The	 EU,	 and	 mostly	 the	 Commission,	 was	trying	to	approximate	the	global	aviation	policy	as	much	as	possible	to	the	EU	planned	standards	in	order	to	firstly	lower	the	costs	of	implementation	and	secondly	address	the	possible	discontent	of	third	countries	who	were	against	any	aviation	regulations	outside	the	realm	of	 ICAO.	The	 familiarisation	and	 involvement	with	 the	EU	polices	 (Freyburg	2014)	that	could	be	expected	as	a	result	of	the	aforementioned	actions	did	not	happen.	Even	 though	 the	 networks	 used	 by	 the	 EU	 provided	 a	 venue	 ‘to	 push	 their	 vision	 of	sector	 best	 practices’	 (Bach	 &	 Newman	 2007,	 p.672),	 these	 strategies	 did	 not	 bring	expected	results.		 Finally,	 before	 ICAO	 experienced	 regulatory	 competition	 coming	 from	 the	European	 Union,	 it	 was	 seen	 as	 competing	 with	 the	 UNFCCC	 regime	 that	 in	 the	 late	1990s	and	early	2000s	was	powerful	 in	establishing	 its	own	regulatory	authority.	For	example	 at	 the	10th	Conference	of	 the	Parties	 in	2004,	Rajendra	Pachaur,	 chairman	of	IPCC	 insisted	 on	 including	 aviation	 into	 the	 Kyoto	 regime(Wit	 et	al.	 2005,	 p.80).	 This	competition	 would	 be	 observed	 by	 the	 ICAO	 Assembly	 as	 rather	 unwelcome	interference	 within	 its	 exclusive	 realm	 of	 aviation	 (Abeyratne	 2001,	 p.38;	 Oberthür	2003,	p.196).	








binding	 targets	 caused	 the	 aviation	 trade	 association	 IATA	 to	 propose	 its	 own	commitments.	 The	 pledge	 of	 50%	 reduction	 of	 emissions	 by	 2050	 compared	 to	2005(IATA	2009)	is	however	more	technology	following	than	technology	forcing.			 Furthermore,	dynamics	like	this	translate	into	any	process	related	to	the	EU	ETS.	The	expertise	needed	is	usually	used	from	outside,	for	example	the	EU	commissions	the	studies	 related	 to	 its	 policies	 (Wit	 et	 al.	 2005).	 Both	 at	 the	 ICAO	 level	 and	 the	 EU	Representation	 at	 ICAO,	 as	 mentioned	 before,	 the	 representatives	 have	 transport	backgrounds	 and	 environmental	 impacts	 of	 aviation	 are	 not	 their	 main	 focus.	 The	redistributive	effects	of	the	EU	ETS	are	higher	on	the	agenda	if	the	organisations	dealing	with	the	issue	are	not	specifically	environmental.			 This	does	not	however	mean	that	ICAO	and	the	EU	are	not	delivering	any	results	in	 the	 aviation	 emissions	 area.	 Conversely,	 it	 appears	 that	 due	 to	 this	 uneasy	relationship	 the	 problem	 started	 to	 receive	 international	 attention	 and	 entered	 the	wider	climate	change	discourse.	The	 lack	of	a	specific	environmental	organisation	that	would	tackle	the	problem	meant	that	the	frictions	between	the	EU	and	ICAO	produced	a	fertile	 ground	 for	 a	 discussion	 on	 holding	 the	 aviation	 sector	 responsible	 for	 its	 CO2	emissions.		
5.4 “Without	us	there	would	be	no	development	at	ICAO!”	Can	the	EU	be	




















(2.05.2013)	rather	than	constructive	discussion	on	the	future	regulation	of	aviation.	The	Congress	interviewees	did	not	delve	into	the	dynamics	of	ICAO	extensively	as	opposed	to	the	EU	interviewees.	They	agreed	that	the	EU	managed	to	influence	the	process	and	would	refrain	from	commenting	any	further.			 All	things	considered,	it	can	be	maintained	that	the	EU	has	succeeded	in	exerting	pressure	internationally	to	accelerate	and	intensify	the	discussion	on	aviation	emissions.	It	is	claimed	that	“a	leader	is	not	only	a	party	that	fulfils	theoretical	criteria;	a	leader	is	one	that	is	perceived	as	a	leader”	(Gupta	&	Van	der	Grijp	2000,	p.67).	In	the	context	of	the	EU	ETS,	 the	 recognition	of	 the	EU	programme	has	been	widely	acknowledged	and	made	the	ICAO	Contracting	States	bring	the	 issues	related	to	the	aviation	emissions	to	the	working	groups	and	assembly	deliberations.	Although	the	definition	“enactment	of	environmental	 policies	 to	 address	 global	 problems	 while	 other	 countries	 remain	inactive”	(Urpelainen	2013,	p.26)	describes	unilateral	action,	and	one	can	argue	whether	the	 inclusion	 of	 aviation	 into	 the	 EU	 ETS	 can	 be	 classified	 as	 one	 or	 not,	 it	 perfectly	elucidates	the	stepping	up	strategy	of	the	EU.	The	issue	of	aviation	emissions	did	enter	the	discourse	at	the	global	level	and,	once	it	proved	to	be	a	complex	issue,	it	also	gained	a	lot	of	attention	within	the	EU.			 	
5.5 “Perhaps	it	wasn’t	pain	in	the	ass…	but	a	bit	it	was”:	issues	between	the	
















DG	MOVE	present	 in	the	meetings	 in	Brussels	concerning	the	EU	ETS,	which	is	a	 fairly	standard	pattern	with	regards	to	issues	that	are	of	interest	of	more	than	one	DG.		 It	 is	 difficult	 to	 assess	 to	 what	 extent	 the	 issue	 would	 have	 been	 addressed	differently	under	 the	DG	MOVE	 lead	or	 co-lead,	however,	while	 looking	at	 the	EU	ETS	from	the	governance	perspective,	 this	ambivalent	relation	between	the	DGs	negatively	affected	the	bargaining	power	of	 the	EU	and	 its	 leadership	at	 the	 ICAO	 level.	The	“bad	vibes”	mentioned	by	one	of	the	interviewees	would	affect	the	EU	interests	well	beyond	the	 environmental	 issues	 and	 could	 have	 undermined	 long-lasting	 alliances	 at	 ICAO.	Furthermore,	the	EU	was	not	able	to	fully	employ	its	ICAO	position	and	knowledge	of	the	Montreal	 environment,	 as	 there	 were	 discrepancies	 between	 the	 two	 Directorate	Generals.	 The	 efforts	 to	make	 the	EU	a	 visible	 and	 strong	 actor	were	 confronted	with	diverging	 visions	 of	 how	 the	 file	 should	 be	 led	 and	 to	what	 degree	 the	 EU	 should	 be	pushing	for	ambitious	goals	globally	and	allow	discretion	for	regional	solutions.		 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 interpretative	 policy	 analysis,	 the	 tensions	 reported	above	represent	also	a	discursive	clash.	 It	 is	based	on	how	to	 treat	aviation	compared	with	other	businesses	and	to	what	extent	the	EU	wanted	to	curtail	exceptional	treatment	of	 the	 sector.	 In	 short,	 DG	 MOVE	 underlined	 the	 sectoral	 context	 and	 the	 need	 to	comprehend	 the	 legal	 framework	 under	 which	 aviation	 operates,	 while	 DG	 CLIMA	propagated	the	view	that	this	exceptionalism	should	be	ceased.	These	discourses,	as	any	other,	 clearly	 translate	 into	 socio-political	 relations	 and	 also	 have	 policy	 implications	(Hobson	 2002)	 or	 even	 directly	 affect	 policy-makers.	 This	 division	 raises	 then	challenges	 about	 fitting	 abstract	 market	 models	 to	 particular	 sectoral	 and	 spatial	contexts.	Firstly,	it	fragments	the	messages	coming	from	the	regulator	and	thus	weakens	its	 impact	 on	 the	 regulated	 entities.	 This	 matters	 a	 lot	 for	 the	 analysed	 case,	 as	ambiguities	concerning	how	to	read	the	inclusion	have	been	mounting	even	before	the	split	between	 the	DGs	became	visible.	Secondly,	 lack	of	clear	message	regarding	equal	cross-sectoral	 treatment	can	be	 translated	 into	resistance	coming	 from	any	other	new	sectors	to	be	included	or	those	already	covered	by	the	system.		





















tranche	of	data	was	gained	through	research	interviews	as	they	provide	a	wider	context	 than	 the	 rather	 terse	 statements	 found	 in	 the	media	 that	 comment	 on	rather	than	explain	beliefs	and	understandings.		
Table	5:	EU	ETS	Prohibition	Act	Timeline	Date	 Event		27.07.2011	 Subcommittee	on	Aviation	hearing	“The	European	Union’s	Emissions	Trading	Scheme:	A	Violation	of	International	Law”	07.12.2011		 Bill	introduced	to	the	Senate	(S.1956)	24.10.2011	 Bill	(H.R.	2594)	Passed	at	the	House	of	Representatives	16.12.2011	 Clinton	-	LaHood	Letter	to	the	EC	06.06.2012	 Hearing	at	the	Senate	(ALPA,	EDF,	A4A,	EC,	NBAA,	Secretary	of	Transportation	testifying)	22.09.2012	 The	Bill	(S.1956)	Passed	at	the	Senate	13.11.2012	 The	Bill	(S.1956)	Passed	at	the	House	of	Representatives	16.11.2012	 The	Bill	(S.1956)	presented	to	the	President	27.11.2012	 Signed	by	the	President	and	became	Public	Law	No:	112-200		
6.2 The	aviation	industry	in	the	US			 This	 first	section	investigates	briefly	the	regulatory	circumstances	of	the	US	 airlines	 in	 order	 to	 set	 the	 scene	 for	 the	US	 opposition	 to	 the	 EU	ETS.	 The	analysis	provided	here	starts	from	the	late	1970s’,	which	is	a	period	that	shaped	modern	aviation	 in	 the	US.	The	milestone	year	 for	US	passenger	aviation17	was	1978	when	the	government	decided	 to	deregulate	 the	sector18,	which	reflected	the	general	agenda	among	the	aviation	powers	such	as	the	US,	Britain,	France	or	Germany	with	 regard	 to	 aviation	 policy.	 This	 step	meant	 that	 the	 government	withdrew	itself	from	the	control	of	market	entry	for	new	airlines,	and	regulation	of	 tariffs	 and	 routes.	 Aviation	 became	 exposed	 to	 free	market	 powers	 and	 US	aviation,	pioneering	this	solution,	faced	strong	competition	from	non-US	airlines	that	were	still	protected	by	their	countries	of	registration	(Gourdin	1998,	p.13).	Only	 later,	 in	 the	1980s’,	did	 the	US	deregulation,	via	 spillover	effect,	 influence																																																									17Aviation	 understood	 as	 carriers,	 aircraft	 manufacturers	 and	 airport	 operators	 feeds	 many	more	interrelated	sectors,	some	of	them	closely	knit	with	the	operations	such	as	security	firms,	fuel	 providers,	 companies	 servicing	 aircraft	 or	 hotel	 chains	 that	 are	 located	 at	 the	 airport	terminals	and	even	agricultural	or	gas	drilling	sites	situated	at	the	airport	lands.	
18“An	Act	 to	 amend	 the	 Federal	 Aviation	Act	 of	 1958,	 to	 encourage,	 develop,	 and	 attain	 an	 air	transportation	 system	 which	 relies	 on	 competitive	 market	 forces	 to	 determine	 the	 quality,	variety,	and	price	of	air	services,	and	for	other	purposes”	(Air	Deregulation	Act)	was	signed	into	law	by	President	Jimmy	Carter	on	October	24,	1978.	
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the	global	structure	of	aviation	business	and	the	1990s’	are	seen	as	a	decade	of	transatlantic	 liberalization19.	 In	Europe	deregulation	was	 carried	out	either	via	bilateral	 Air	 Service	 Agreements	 or	 later	 via	 multi-lateral	 policies	 of	 the	European	Commission	(Schipper	2001).	Now	it	is	the	EU	that	best	approximates	to	 “a	 market	 without	 state-imposed,	 anti-competitive	 restrictions	 (Dempsey	2004,	p.4).			 In	 the	 United	 States,	 the	 initial	 extreme	 growth	 in	 demand	 has	 slowed	down	and	the	prices	remained	at	a	much	lower	level	than	they	used	to	be	before	deregulation.	As	claimed	by	Graham	(1993,	p.130),	deregulation	in	the	US	caused	“attenuation	of	 competition	 through	consolidation	and	bankruptcy”.	 In	 relation	to	 this,	 the	 post-deregulation	 market	 was	 a	 brand	 new	 world	 for	 previously	state-protected	airlines.	The	carriers	quickly	became	aware	that	while	operating	on	the	profit	margins	in	a	still	highly	regulated	environment	(for	example	in	the	area	 of	 safety	 and	 security)	 they	 needed	 to	 have	 substantial	 bargaining	 and	lobbying	 power	 at	 the	 US	 Congress.	 Such	 a	 strategy	 was	 necessary	 to	 protect	their	interests	in	a	competitive	environment.	According	to	some	authors,	the	US	airlines	were	given	a	special	recognition	for	their	position	with	regards	to	policy	development	and	implementation	as	early	as	the	late	1970’s	and	since	then	the	sector	 has	 been	 enjoying	 its	 exceptional	 position	 (Button	 &	 Stough	 2000b).	Margolis	(2014,	p.95)would	argue	that	until	 today	the	airline	lobby	is	powerful	enough	to	oppose	any	reforms	that	would	affect	the	aviation	business	in	the	US,	even	at	the	expense	of	consumers.		 Apart	 from	 individual	 airlines	 approaching	 Congress	 members	 for	lobbying	 purposes,	 most	 US	 airlines	 are	 united	 through	 Airlines	 for	 America	(A4A)20,	 an	 organisation	 established	 in	 1936	 that	 today	 includes	 90%	 of	 US	passenger	 traffic	 and	 cargo	 (Airlines	 for	 America	 2014a).	 Its	 main	 aim	 is	advocacy	on	behalf	of	the	member	airlines	related	to	safety	and	security,	which	is	 based	 on	 collaboration	 with	 labour	 organisations,	 the	 Congress	 and	Administration	 (Airlines	 for	 America	 2014a).	 A4A’s	 presence	 at	 the	 Hill	 was																																																									
19More	 details	 about	 the	 deregulation	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 US	 in	 the	 context	 of	 varied	character	of	the	EU-US	agreement	can	be	found	in	Margolis	(2014).		
20The	 organisation	 changed	 its	 name	 in	 2011	 and	 was	 formerly	 known	 as	 Air	 Transport	Association	 of	 America.	 For	 the	 clarity	 of	 the	 chapter,	 A4A	 is	 consistently	 used	 in	 this	 thesis	referring	both	to	actual	A4A	and	ATA.	 
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visible	also	during	the	period	when	the	Civil	Aeronautics	Board	(federal	aviation	regulation	authority)	was	created.	The	Association	took	also	an	active	part	in	the	deregulation	 debate.	 According	 to	 the	 US	 Lobbying	 Disclosure,	 in	 the	 period	between	 2011	 and	 mid-2014,	 A4A	 spent	 18,8	 million	 dollars	 on	 lobbying	activities	 at	 the	 House	 of	 Representatives	 and	 the	 Senate	 (US	 House	 of	Representatives	 2014).	 A	 more	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 A4A’s	 role	 in	 the	 EU	 ETS	issue	is	provided	in	section	6.4.		 The	United	States	is	an	important	aviation	market	with	over	800	million	passengers	departing	or	landing	in	the	country	in	2012,	which	is	approximately	29%	 of	 global	 passenger	 traffic.	 According	 to	 A4A,	 aviation	 provides	 the	 US	economy	 with	 11	 million	 jobs	 and	 approximately	 5%	 of	 GDP	 (Airlines	 for	America	 2014b).	 Airlines	 alone	 employ	 over	 380	 000	 workers	 in	 the	 US	 (US	Department	 of	 Transportation	 2014)	 and	 contributed	 19	 billion	 dollars	 in	federal	 taxes	and	 fees	 in	2013	(Airlines	 for	America	2014c).	Together	with	 the	EU,	the	USA	constitutes	60%	of	world	traffic	(European	Parliament	2007).		 As	 far	 as	 regulation	 is	 concerned,	 civil	 aviation	 in	 the	 US	 at	 the	 federal	level	 is	 regulated	 by	 the	 US	 Department	 of	 Transportation,	 and	 its	 modal	organisation	Federal	Aviation	Administration	(FAA).	The	FAA’s	vision	underlines	that	 the	 organisation	 strives	 “to	 reach	 the	 next	 level	 of	 safety,	 efficiency,	environmental	 responsibility	and	global	 leadership”	 (FAA	2014).	FAA	has	been	called	(together	with	the	US	Nuclear	Regulatory	Commission)		“perhaps	the	most	prominent	regulators	of	complex	technologies	anywhere	in	the	world:	framing,	promulgating	and	implementing	an	extensive	network	of	specifications	and	regulations	governing	the	 design,	 use,	 and	 manufacture	 of	 civil	 aircraft	 in	 the	 world’s	most	significant	aviation	market”(Downer	2010,	p.84).	The	US	policy-making	 for	aviation	 is,	however,	seen	as	“concerned	 largely	with	the	 regulation	 of	 imperfections	 in	 the	 liberalized,	 competitive	 and	 increasingly	globalized	market-place”	more	than	with	sustainability	issues	(Goetz	&	Graham	2004,	p.265).	If	these	enter	the	interest	of	policy-makers,	they	rather	pertain	to	regulating	 airports	 than	 carriers.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 there	 has	 been	 a	 strong	conviction	 that	 international	 bodies	 should	 have	 as	 little	 to	 say	 about	international	operations	and	aviation	regulation	 in	 the	US	as	possible.	There	 is	an	on-going	concern	among	the	US	policy-makers	“about	losing	control	of	what	is	
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considered	a	domestic	matter”	(Button	&	Stough	2000d,	p.68).	This,	however,	is	not	 an	 exclusively	US	way	 of	 thinking.	 In	 general,	 governments	 tend	 to	 favour	that	 their	 national	 carriers	 satisfy	 the	 demand	 and	 they	 believe	 that	 the	 less	international	intervention	there	is,	the	better	(Margolis	2014,	p.84).			 To	supplement	this	background	description	of	the	US	aviation	situation,	it	is	important	to	mention	that	the	US	aviation	enjoys	several	environment-related	exemptions.	For	example	glycol-based	deicing	fluids	have	long	been	exempt	from	regulations	 concerning	 discharge	 of	 substances	 to	 the	 environment	 (Bridger	2013,	p.49).	The	US	Environmental	Protection	Agency	(EPA)	released	its	Effluent	Limitation	Guidelines	only	in	2012,	containing	rules	explaining	how	and	to	what	extent	the	residual	deicing	substances	need	to	be	collected	and	disposed	of	(EPA	2014).	 The	 animal	 rights	 campaigners	 also	 bring	 up	 the	 issue	 of	 airport	authorities	 receiving	 permissions	 to	 kill	 protected	 bird	 species	 at	 airport	premises	to	ensure	flights’	safety	(Bridger	2013,	p.65).			 Finally,	 as	 has	 also	 been	 pointed	 out	 elsewhere,	 the	 interests	 of	 the	airplane	 manufacturers	 are	 aligned	 with	 the	 interests	 of	 their	 regulators	(Downer	2010,	p.92).	To	some	extent	this	is	exemplified	by	one	more	exemption.	In	 the	 US	 Freedom	 of	 Information	 Act21	(FOIA)	 there	 is	 a	 special	 clause	 that	states	that	conversations	between	the	government	and	the	industry	on	matters	affecting	 international	 competitiveness	 of	 aviation	 do	 not	 fall	 under	 the	 FOIA	regulations22.		
6.3 “Sending	the	money	to	Europe	did	not	seem	like	a	good	idea	to	
anybody”	–	between	financial	and	sovereignty	issues			 This	section	analyses	the	beliefs	and	interpretations	of	the	EU	ETS	in	the	US,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 actions	 these	 interpretations	 fuelled.	 It	 opens	 with	 the	introduction	to	the	legal	case	against	the	scheme	(Section	6.3.1),	which	is	more																																																									
21The	Freedom	of	Information	Act,	5	U.S.C.	§	552,	As	Amended	By	Public	Law	No.	110-175,	121	Stat.	2524,	and	Public	Law	No.	111-83,	§	564,	123	Stat.	2142,	2184	 is	a	US	 law	first	enacted	 in	1966	and	“provides	that	any	person	has	a	right,	enforceable	in	court,	to	obtain	access	to	federal	agency	records,	except	to	the	extent	that	such	records	(or	portions	of	them)	are	protected	from	public	disclosure	by	one	of	nine	exemptions	or	by	one	of	 three	special	 law	enforcement	record	exclusions”	(US	Department	of	Justice	2014).	
22Aviation	is	not	explicitly	listed	on	the	official	record	of	exemptions	from	FOIA.	The	information	concerning	 the	 clause	 for	 aviation	was	 provided	 by	 an	 interviewee	whose	 organisation	 filed	 a	FOIA	request	being	concerned	about	the	US	government	role	in	the	EU	ETS	case	at	the	European	Court	of	Justice.	The	request	met	refusal	on	grounds	of	special	exclusion	of	aviation.	
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industry	centred,	 then	 follows	 the	Congressional	 legislative	process	against	 the	EU	ETS	(Section	6.3.2).	Section	6.3.3	highlights	the	main	issues	related	to	the	EU	ETS	 Prohibition	 Bill,	 while	 Sections	 6.3.4-6.3.6	 explore	 the	 reasons	 for	 the	 US	resistance	to	the	EU	ETS.		 The	 previous	 chapter	 outlined	 how	 the	 EU	 was	 working	 on	 emissions	trading	for	aviation	within	the	ICAO	framework,	whereas	in	Section	6.3	the	focus	is	 placed	 on	 the	 EU	ETS	 as	 perceived	 in	 the	US.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 is	 not	 an	“outsider”	perspective	as	the	US	became	deeply	engaged	with	the	issue.	This	way	of	proceeding	allows	an	examination	of	different	 interpretations	and	how	 they	are	significant	for	various	parts	of	the	policy	network.	Furthermore,	it	allows	an	investigation	 of	 how	 discourses	 support	 network	 building.	 In	 relation	 to	 the	above,	the	boundaries	of	the	EU	policy	community	are	stretched	geographically	and	 the	 external	 understandings	 are	 seen	 to	 complement	 the	 views	 from	 the	inside,	which	 altogether	 feed	 back	 to	 the	 global	 nature	 of	 aviation	 framework.	The	 US	 became	 engaged	 with	 the	 EU	 ETS	 due	 to	 a	 variety	 of	 reasons	 shown	below	but,	to	reiterate,	the	volume	of	air	traffic	between	the	EU	and	the	US	left	the	Americans	highly	exposed	to	 the	EU	ETS-related	regulations.	With	a	strong	tradition	of	a	powerful	airline	lobby	and	sensitiveness	towards	its	sovereignty,	it	was	predictable	that	the	US	would	become	the	most	important	player	in	this	file,	no	matter	what	narrative	was	to	be	employed.		 The	 resistance	 in	 the	US	 started	 to	build	up	 first	 in	 the	airline	 industry,	without	much	 formal	 and	open	 support	 from	policy-makers.	At	 the	 ICAO	 level,	the	US	would	signal	its	reluctance	to	accept	regional	emissions	trading	schemes,	but	the	language	of	sovereignty,	infringement	of	international	law	that	appeared	later,	was	absent.	It	was	only	the	EU	ETS	that	triggered	legislative	action	at	the	federal	level	and	activated	the	use	of	this	new	language.		
6.3.1 Legal	case	against	the	EU	ETS			 The	issue	that	probably	received	most	of	the	scholarly	attention	in	the	EU	ETS	context	was	the	court	case	submitted	to	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	 (CJEU).	 Drawing	 on	 the	 existing	 literature,	 this	 section	 further	 unpacks	this	issue.		
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	 A4A	was	unhappy	with	the	idea	of	including	all	the	flights	landing	at	and	departing	from	the	EU	airports	within	the	ETS	from	the	very	beginning.	In	2008	at	the	Sustainable	Aviation	Network	Europe	conference,	the	A4A	representative	Nancy	 Young	 underlined	 that	 the	 way	 the	 EU	 wanted	 to	 include	 aviation	breached	Articles	1,12,15	and	25	of	the	Chicago	Convention.	Young	said:	“The	 US	 presidential	 candidates,	 even	 if	 they	 believe	 emissions	trading	 is	 a	 good	 policy,	 do	 not	 necessarily	 agree	 it	 is	 right	 for	aviation	 and	 both	 are	 very	 committed	 to	 US	 sovereignty	 in	 its	airspace.	So	the	thought	that	the	US	will	give	up	on	this	dispute	is	wrong.	I	think	we	will	be	in	the	courts	over	this	sometime	in	the	next	two	years.”(GreenAir	Online	2008)	This	quote	manifests	the	carriers’	self-confidence	and	that	a	strategy	was	in	their	minds	as	early	as	2008.	Consequently,	unsatisfied	with	 the	policy	 responses	of	the	European	Commission	to	the	proposition	to	exclude	the	third	countries	from	complying	 with	 EU	 ETS	 for	 aviation,	 the	 predecessor	 of	 A4A,	 Air	 Transport	Association	 of	 America	 (ATAA),	 filed	 a	 case	 to	 the	 High	 Court	 of	 Justice	 of	England	 and	Wales	 on	 December	 16th	 200923.	 The	 case	was	 filed	 to	 a	 British	court	as	the	UK	was	the	administrator	of	the	ETS	for	the	US	airlines	challenging	the	 legislation.	 The	 rationale	 behind	 the	 case	 was	 based	 on	 three	 grounds:	breach	 of	 principles	 of	 customary	 international	 law,	 the	 fact	 that	 international	aviation	should	be	negotiated	and	adopted	under	the	auspices	of	ICAO	and	finally	the	 ATAA	 claimed	 that	 the	 EU	 ETS	 is	 in	 practice,	 a	 tax.	 Therefore	 it	 interferes	with	 the	 freedoms	 granted	 by	 the	 Chicago	 Convention	 on	 International	 Civil	Aviation	 (Bogojević	 2012).	 In	 the	 media	 the	 issue	 was	 depicted	 by	 A4A’s	spokesperson	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 preserve	 the	 rights	 of	 A4A’s	 members	 “to	challenge	implementation	of	the	EU	ETS	as	applied	to	aviation”	and	also	to	move	the	 issue	 of	 emissions	 trading	 back	 to	 ICAO	 (GreenAir	 Online	 2009).	 The	 A4A	interviewee	would	also	add	that		“the	 legal	 issues	 are	 a	 very	 specific	 stylized	 way	 to	 reflect	 our	concern,	but	the	bigger	picture	is	what	is	the	right	way	to	regulate	international	 aviation	 and	we	 think	 that	 the	 unilateral	 approach	that	was	taken	was	wrong	and	it	leads	to	the	policy	concerns	that	we	have.”	(Interview	25.04.2013)																																																									23The	EU	ETS	as	a	whole	was	also	challenged	beforehand.	There	were	over	40	cases	brought	to	courts	both	by	member	states	and	private	operators	.		
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have	seen,	our	airlines	have	abided	by	their	decision.25”	(Interview	25.04.2014)	A	European	Commission	interviewee	was	even	more	direct	by	stating	that	even	though	the	CJEU	states	that	the	EU	ETS	is	not	a	tax,	A4A	would	still	use	the	word	“tax”	when	discussing	the	issue.	According	to	that	 interviewee,	the	Commission	was	happy	with	what	CJEU	established,	but	the	feeling	was	that	third	countries	have	taken	relatively	little	account	of	this.	When	asked	about	the	influence	of	the	Court’s	verdict	on	the	Americans,	they	would	underline:		“even	though	the	airlines	took	the	EU	ETS	to	court	when	the	ECJ	[ECJ	 is	 another	 abbreviation	 used	 for	 CJEU]	 brought	 out	 its	judgment	I	 think	 it	was	viewed	quite	dismissively	by	the	airlines	and	 by	 third	 countries,	 which	 again	 is	 a	 shame	 in	 terms	 of	importance	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 (…)I	 don’t	 see	 that	 it	 has	 changed	their	views.	The	Court	said	it	is	not	a	tax	and	they	continue	to	say	it’s	a	tax.	It	is	not	a	tax.”	(Interview	16.04.2014)	A	 further	 explanation	 was	 provided	 by	 an	 interviewee	 close	 to	 the	 Climate	Commissioner	 who	 thought	 that	 the	 case	 had	 shown	 that	 the	 third	 countries	would	 not	 stop	 opposing	 the	 inclusion	 of	 aviation	 once	 the	 verdict	 was	published:		“We	of	 course	were	 very	happy	 about	 that	 ruling	 and	we	 saw	 it	might	make	 a	difference	but	 ultimately	 this	was	 a	political	 issue	and	 the	 opponents	 played	 it	 very	 well,	 they	 played	 it	politically.”(Interview	28.04.2014)	A	 different	 reading	 of	 the	 actions	 following	 the	 lost	 case	 was	 provided	 by	 an	interviewee	representing	a	green	NGO:	“After	the	court	case	really	was	decided,	A4A	got	really	aggressive.	And	 I	 think	 they	 thought	 there	were	going	 to	win	 the	court	 case	and	then	they	got	really	aggressive	and	they	started	travelling	all	over	 the	world	and	convincing	other	countries	 to	oppose	 the	EU	ETS”	(Interview	22.03.2013).	This	allegation	was	dismissed	by	an	A4A	representative	in	a	research	interview.	They	claimed	 that	A4A	was	a	US	organisation	 focused	on	 the	US	and	 therefore	they	 would	 not	 focus	 on	 external	 lobbying.	 A4A	 was	 assuring	 that	 the	
																																																								25The	 airlines	 abided	 by	 the	 decision	 in	 a	 way	 that	 they	 continue	 reporting	 their	 emissions	according	 to	 the	 EU	 ETS	 rules,	 however	 they	 did	 not	 end	 lobbying	 activities	 against	 their	participation	in	the	scheme.	
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organisation	 was	 not	 engaged	 in	 running	 a	 coalition	 of	 the	 unwilling.	 The	understandings	 of	 the	 actions	 and	 reactions	 of	 policy	 actors	 were	 therefore	diverging,	which	supports	the	claim	that	the	actors	of	the	policy	community	such	as	 sectoral	organisations,	 eNGOs	and	policy-makers	were	networked.	Although	they	 were	 operating	 in	 a	 relatively	 small	 policy	 community,	 they	 were	 still	disparately	make	meanings	of	actions.	At	the	same	time	the	core	beliefs	located	at	the	extremes	of	the	spectra	would	remain	stable:	agreement	with	the	inclusion	or	sharp	opposition	to	the	project.	Furthermore,	one	can	observe	here	a	smaller	policy	community	(aviation	sector)	that	exists	within	a	larger	issue	network	and	operates	at	a	meso-level.	The	closely	integrated	communities	are	set	on	a	larger	policy	network	canvas	“because	of	continuity	and	consensus	or	because	there	is	a	 powerful	 dominant	 interest”	 (Marsh	&	Rhodes	 1992,	 p.250).	 The	 differences	between	 a	 policy	 community	 and	 an	 issue	 network	 are	 visible	 for	 example	through	the	lenses	of	discrepancy	between	the	level	of	integration	of	the	groups	(for	 example	 stable	 membership	 for	 policy	 communities	 and	 differing	membership	 for	 issue	 networks).	 They	 are	 observable	 also	 through	 broad	spectrums	 of	 interests	 versus	 mostly	 economic	 ones	 as	 well	 as	 through	 the	power	struggles	that	appear	in	the	large	network	but	are	more	balanced	within	the	policy	 community	 (Marsh	&	Rhodes	1992,	p.251).	The	aviation	 community	has	been	strongly	solidified	by	its	economic	interest,	and	given	their	resources,	their	access	to	the	policy-makers	was	virtually	unlimited.		 With	 regards	 to	 the	 legal	 case	 against	 the	 EU	 ETS,	 one	more	 quotation	merits	discussion.	It	was	offered	by	an	EU	representative	working	in	Washington	who	was	 close	 to	 the	EU	ETS.	They	 explain	 that	 the	US	 aviation	 industry	 once	defeated	 at	 the	 CJEU	 did	 not	 consider	 further	 litigation.	 Although	 the	 feelings	towards	 the	 EU	 ETS	 for	 aviation	 remained	 negative,	 the	 new	 strategies	 of	opposing	it	had	to	be	taken	on	board:			“I	 think	 that	 the	 aviation	 industry	has	 accepted	 that	 this	was	no	longer	an	avenue	for	them	to	go	forward,	even	though	in	private	conversations	you	hear	that	they	are	convinced	that	this	is	legally	wrong.	 So	 some	 of	 the	 aviation	 lobbyist	 are	 themselves	 lawyers	and	have	very	strong	opinions	about	this.”	(Interview	9.04.2014)	After	 the	 second	 failure	 and	 the	 CJEU	 ruling,	 the	 US	 airlines	 and	 their	 allies	focused	on	lobbying	the	Congress	to	block	the	application	of	the	scheme.	At	the	
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same	time,	A4A	was	assisting	some	of	its	members	in	preparation	to	comply	with	the	 scheme,	 in	 case	 opposition	would	 not	 bring	 about	 the	 desired	 effects	 and	compliance	was	enforced.	The	airlines	found	themselves	in	an	insecure	position	and	the	decision	to	 intensify	 lobbying	activities	at	 the	Congress	was	taken.	The	next	section	looks	at	the	concrete	steps	taken	at	Congress	level.		
6.3.2 US	formal	resistance	against	the	EU	ETS			 This	section	looks	at	specific	steps	taken	by	the	US	aviation	sector	and	US	authorities,	with	regards	to	the	EU	ETS,	once	the	Court	case	was	lost	by	the	US	airlines.	It	unpacks	the	reasons	for	the	US	resistance	and	narratives	employed	in	arguing	against	the	inclusion.			 The	discussions	about	the	EU	ETS	inclusion	of	aviation	started	in	the	US	almost	 parallel	 to	 the	 European	 debates.	 These,	 however,	 did	 not	 translate	directly	into	legislative	action.	Given	that	none	of	the	interviewees	were	able	to	recall	when	precisely	 the	 topic	of	blocking	 the	application	of	 the	scheme	 to	US	carriers	entered	law-making	agendas	in	the	US,	an	assumption	is	made	that	this	issue	 emerged	 first	 through	 airline	 circles	 around	 2007-2008.	 This	 has	 been	indicated	by	numerous	interviewees	during	the	legal	case	against	the	EU	ETS	at	the	CJEU.	Firstly,	 it	was	the	aviation	 industry	(mostly	airlines)	that	approached	the	US	policy-makers.	The	issue	reached	the	US	eNGO	community	only	later	on.	This	delay	was	an	effect	of	 the	US	eNGO	community	not	monitoring	closely	the	House	 Transport	 and	 Infrastructure	 Committees	 and	 Senate’s	 Committee	 on	Commerce,	Science	and	Transportation	(Interview	22.03.2014).			 US	 pressure	 on	 the	 European	 Commission	 had	 been	 growing,	 however	there	was	no	answer	from	Brussels	that	would	satisfy	the	US	aviation	or	the	US	policy-makers.	Interestingly	enough,	the	idea	of	Americans	resisting	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation	was	first	present	in	the	EU	stakeholders’	circles,	probably	before	the	Americans	 actually	 learnt	 about	 the	 European	 plans.	 When	 the	 European	Commission	 was	 initially	 discussing	 the	 possible	 inclusion	 with	 the	 European	aviation	 representatives,	 they	 would	 very	 quickly	 flag	 up	 the	 possible	 US	resistance	 and	 tried	 to	 sensitize	 the	 EU	 officials	 towards	 that	 issue.	 In	 the	interviews	conducted	 they	claimed	that	 the	 issue	had	been	overlooked	and	the	EC	did	not	consider	the	US	resistance	as	viable	(Interview	28.04.2014).		
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therefore,	the	EU	ETS	was	not	its	core	interest.	Nevertheless,	the	reference	to	the	scheme	 shows	 that	 the	 US	 policy-makers	 were	 well	 aware	 of	 the	 potential	repercussions	 of	 the	 inclusion	 and	 of	 therewith-related	 airlines	 concerns.	 The	Sense	 of	 Congress	 prompted	 the	 US	 eNGO	 community	 to	 address	 a	 letter	 to	Senators	 urging	 them	 “to	 reject	 the	 House-passed	 ‘Sense	 of	 the	 Congress’	language	asserting	 that	 the	European	Union’s	Aviation	Directive	 is	 inconsistent	with	international	 law”(EDF	2011d).	The	eNGO	community	decided	to	bring	up	the	issue	as	the	Senate’s	version	of	the	bill	(S.	233)	did	not	mention	the	EU	ETS	at	all,	and	the	EU	ETS	part	was	introduced	only	at	the	House.			 Formally,	 one	 of	 the	 first	 EU-US	 closer	 discussions	 on	 the	 EU	 ETS	 for	aviation	 once	 the	 court	 case	 was	 lost,	 took	 place	 in	 Oslo	 June	 22nd	 2011	 (US	Department	of	State	2011).	During	this	meeting,	the	US	delegation	also	delivered	also	 their	 formal	objection	against	 the	 inclusion	of	US	carriers	 into	 the	EU	ETS	(US	Department	of	State	2011).	The	meeting	took	place	just	10	days	after	the	EU	ETS	 Prohibition	 Act	 was	 introduced	 in	 the	 Senate	 (read	 and	 referred	 to	 the	Committee	on	Commerce,	Science	and	Transport).			 Not	long	after,	the	US	pressure	intensified,	as	can	be	seen	in	the	Financial	
Times-leaked	 letter	 signed	 by	 the	 US	 Secretary	 of	 State	 Hillary	 Clinton	 and	Secretary	 of	 Transportation	Raymond	LaHood	 to	 the	EC	 top	 officials27.	 Clinton	and	LaHood	said	“we	strongly	object	on	legal	and	policy	grounds	to	the	EU’s	plan	to	subject	our	operators	to	the	EU’s	ETS”.28	Further,	they	argued	that	the	EU	ETS	inclusion	 of	 aviation	 is	 “inconsistent	 with	 the	 legal	 regime	 governing	international	aviation	and	with	ICAO	guidance	on	emissions	trading”.	The	letter	closes	with:	 “we	will	be	compelled	to	 take	appropriate	actions”	and	a	 list	of	43	countries	publicly	opposing	the	application	of	EU	ETS	to	non-European	airlines.	Although	the	“actions”	are	not	specified,	one	could	expect	immediate	blocking	of	the	compliance	by	the	US	Department	of	State	or	US	Department	of	Transport	or	even	forms	of	trade	war	against	the	EU	countries.	At	that	time,	the	letter	and	its																																																									27The	addressees	of	 the	 letter	 included:	EC	Vice	President	Catherine	Ashton,	EC	Vice	President	Siim	Kallas,	European	Climate	Commissioner	Connie	Hedegaard,	Johannes	Leitenberger,	Head	of	Cabinet	of	 the	EC	President	 Jose	Manuel	Barroso,	Franciskus	van	Daele,	Head	of	Cabinet	of	 the	European	Council	President	Herman	van	Rompuy.	28Information	about	the	letter	was	first	published	by	Financial	Times	19.12.2011(Clark	&	Parker	2011)	 (Clark	 &	 Parker	 2011),	 the	 researcher	 received	 a	 copy	 of	 the	 letter	 from	 one	 of	 the	interviewees.	
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content	was	probably	not	a	big	surprise	for	the	Commission,	though	it	can	also	be	 seen	 as	 another	way	 of	 showing	 that	 the	 administration	 took	 on	 board	 the	arguments	 of	 the	 industry.	 The	 coordinated	 and	 well-organised	 pressure	 was	becoming	 more	 and	 more	 visible.	 One	 of	 the	 interviewees	 representing	 an	organisation	independent	from	the	legislative	process	would	mention	the	letter	unprompted:		“We	 had	 a	 letter	 from	 Secretary	 Clinton	 and	 Secretary	 LaHood,	basically	 stating	opposition	on	 this	bill	 around	 the	EU	ETS	and	 I	think	that	[the	EU	ETS	Prohibition	Act]	was	just	a	mirror	of	that.	because	during	the	hearings	on	this,	especially	I	remember	going	to	the	hearings	to	the	House,	the	members	were	hiding	behind	the	administration.	The	letter	that	LaHood	and	Clinton	sent	provided	cover	for	that.”(Interview	3.5.2013)	This	explanation	was	given	only	by	one	interviewee,	however	the	minutes	from	the	hearing	clearly	indicate	that	indeed	the	letter	was	used	as	one	of	the	reasons	why	 the	 Congress	 should	 engage	 legislatively	 in	 the	 EU	 ETS	 discussion.	 The	arguments	 used	 by	 Clinton	 and	 LaHood	 very	 much	 resembled	 the	 narrative	employed	 by	 the	 airlines	 and	 only	 added	 potential	 action	 that	 may	 be	 taken,	which	was	absent	in	the	aviation	community	message.	
6.3.3 The	EU	ETS	Prohibition	Bill	and	its	significance	as	observed	by	the	
policy	actors			 This	 section	 analyses	 the	 way	 US	 aviation	 industry,	 policy-makers	 and	eNGOs	viewed	the	inclusion	of	aviation	on	a	larger	regulatory	context.	It	engages	thus	 in	 studying	 the	 EU	 ETS	 from	 the	US	 perspective	 and	 concentrates	 on	 the	multiple	 understandings	 of	 the	 inclusion.	 Secondly,	 it	 focuses	 on	 the	 EU	 ETS	Prohibition	Bill	and	its	significance	for	the	Americans.		 According	to	most	of	the	US	interviewees,	the	EU	ETS	Prohibition	Bill	was	started	by	the	US	airline	industry	that	believed	that	the	European	project	needed	to	 be	prevented	 from	applying	 to	US	 carriers.	 To	 achieve	 this,	 a	 Congressional	action	was	essential.	An	interviewee	representing	a	legal	firm	closely	working	on	the	EU	ETS	in	the	US	declared:		“The	 tactics	of	 the	airline	 industry	shifted	 [after	 the	CJEU	ruling]	to	 lobbying	 in	 Washington.	 They	 drafted	 [a	 proposal]	 and	 had	Senator	Thune	proposed	for	them	this	Bill	that	would	prohibit	the	
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US	 airlines	 from	 complying	 with	 the	 EU	 ETS”.	 (Interview	22.05.2013)	Slightly	different	explanations	were	given	in	the	EU.	An	interviewee	representing	a	European	aviation-related	organisation,	would	argue	that:		“From	the	American	point	of	view,	I	think,	it	started	off	being	that	they	didn’t	see	an	alternative	or	credible	alternative	to	the	EU	ETS	so	 why	 pay	 more	 if	 we	 don’t	 have	 to.	 Fight	 it	 because	 if	 this	doesn’t	happen	nothing	will.”	(Interview	16.06.2014)	This	 statement	 can	 be	 complemented	 with	 a	 view	 of	 a	 Congress-related	interviewee:	“For	the	EU	it	was	a	natural	extension	of	what	they	were	doing	and	kind	of	a	final	component	of	the	EU	ETS	but	this	situation	is	quite	different	here”	(Interview	 30.04.2014).	 The	 interpretation	 of	 the	 issue	 among	 the	 eNGO	community	was	also	 in	 line	with	an	 “offensive”	narrative,	as	 claimed	by	one	of	the	 interviewees:	 “my	 notion	 at	 the	 beginning	 was	 just	 that	 there	 were	 US	companies	 attacking	 EU	 climate	 law”	 (Interview	 22.03.2014).	 One	 of	 the	 high-ranking	members	of	staff	of	a	Representative	engaged	in	the	process	would	see	some	 reluctance	with	 regards	 to	 actual	prohibiting	 the	 airlines	 to	 comply	with	the	EU	ETS:	“I	don’t	 think	anyone	was	really	willing	 to	have	 to	do	something	like	 that.	 I	 think	 there	was	 hope	 that	 “OK,	 the	EU	will	 somehow	change	 or	 abandon	on	 revamp	 the	program”	 that	 kind	of	 thing.”	(Interview	19.04.2014)	This	quote	reveals	that	some	of	the	US	policy-makers	would	firmly	believe	that	the	EU	ETS	would	undergo	changes	 in	a	way	that	 it	would	not	be	applicable	to	extra-EU	flights.	Secondly,	it	indicates	that	the	desire	to	pro-actively	confront	the	project	was	not	an	 instant	reaction	to	the	EU	ETS	at	the	House	 level.	The	same	interviewee	 would	 also	 provide	 insights	 into	 understanding	 the	 nature	 of	 the	problem	and	importance	of	venues	in	the	case:	“We	didn’t	see	 that	as	a	purely	environmental	 issue.	That	wasn’t	really	the	argument	that	was	in	the	discussion.	That	was	just	‘Can	EU	 do	 this	 to	 non-EU	 carriers	 in	 non-EU	 airspace?’	 our	 concern	was	more	 the	 kind	 of	 aviation	 ICAO	 regulatory	 structure	 versus	climate	change.	We	did	not	make	that	the	argument:	‘We	shouldn’t	be	doing	this	because	climate	change	is	not	an	issue.’	That	wasn’t	the	 question.	 It	 was	 ‘What’s	 the	 proper	 forum	 to	 address	 those	
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issues	 for	 a	 global	 industry	 or	 a	 global	 activity	 like	 aviation?’	(Interview	19.04.2014)		 As	mentioned	before,	 the	eNGOs	were,	however,	not	as	 important	as	the	aviation	sector	in	discussing	the	EU	ETS	Prohibition	Bill.	Clearly,	the	distribution	of	power	has	been	unequal,	which	is	emblematic	for	the	issue	networks	(Rhodes	2006).	 Ingold	 (2011),	 employing	 in	 her	 research	 ACF,	 also	 confirmed	 a	hypothesis	 that	 if	 the	 power	 balance	 between	 actors	 is	 not	 preserved,	 the	coalition	equipped	with	better	resources	is	able	to	substantially	influence	policy-making	and	achieve	 its	policy	goals.	 In	 the	US	context,	 claims	 that	 “established	economic	interests”	(McFarland	1987,	p.135)	prevail	were	present	in	the	in	the	late	 1980s.	 Although	 the	 US	 policy-making	 has	 changed	 in	 the	 past	 30	 years	substantially,	 the	eNGO	representatives	would	still	 claim	 in	 the	 interviews	 that	their	access	to	decision-making	circles	would	be	limited	and	incomparable	with	the	access	available	to	the	industry.			 Furthermore,	 it	 is	enough	to	 look	at	 the	 title	of	 the	2011	hearing	on	 the	Bill:	 “The	 European	 Union’s	 Emissions	 Trading	 Scheme:	 A	 Violation	 of	International	 Law”	 (US	 House	 of	 Representatives	 2011a),	 to	 understand	 the	feelings	 towards	 the	 EU	 ETS	 when	 the	 issue	 entered	 the	 House.	 Also	 the	composition	of	the	witnessing	parties	suggests	that	industry	was	in	the	spotlight	at	 the	 initial	 stages	 of	 Congress	 proceedings	 on	 the	 bill.	 The	 first	 panel	 of	 the	hearing	 was	 populated	 by	 state	 officials,	 featuring	 representatives	 of	 the	 US	Department	of	Transportation,	 the	US	Federal	Aviation	Administration	and	 the	US	 Department	 of	 State.	 The	 second	 part	 was	 entirely	 given	 to	 the	 industry	represented	 by	 Air	 Line	 Pilots	 Association	 and	 Air	 Transport	 Association	 of	America	 (before	 it	 changed	 name	 to	 A4A).	 The	 industry	 perspective	 was	reinforced	also	by	the	statements	from	the	Allied	Pilots	Association,	Coalition	of	Airline	 Pilots	 Association	 and	 also	 a	 declaration	 by	 the	 Latin	 American	 Civil	Aviation	Commission.			 The	EU	Delegation	to	the	US	submitted	its	letter	and	a	16-page	brochure	explaining	the	scheme	and	partly	addressing	the	US’s	concerns.	The	Delegation,	however,	 did	 not	 testify	 at	 the	 hearing.	 Additionally,	 EDF	 submitted	 its	 paper	opposing	 the	 EU	ETS	 Prohibition	Act	 as	well	 as	 a	 letter	 from	 a	 charity	 and	 an	
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environmental	 organisations	 group29was	 sent	 to	 the	 Representatives	 arguing	that	prohibiting	the	participation	of	the	US	in	the	scheme	is	not	the	way	forward	to	reach	a	global	agreement.	They	underlined	that	the	passing	of	the	Bill	would	“worsen	 the	 air	 pollution”	 and	 make	 the	 US	 passengers	 use	 only	 European	carriers	as	US	ones	would	not	be	able	to	serve	the	routes	to	Europe	(US	House	of	Representatives	 2011a).	 Although	 it	 has	 been	 claimed	 that	 the	 civil	 society	representatives,	 such	 as	 eNGOs	 engaged	 in	 the	 case,	 are	 able	 to	 exert	 more	influence	 in	 the	 situation	 where	 there	 is	 “a	 changing	 institutionalization	 of	political	 authority”	 (Sending	 &	 Neumann	 2006),	 they	 did	 not	 succeed	 in	preventing	 the	 industry	 claiming	 victory.	 The	 situation	 of	 the	 EU	 proposing	 a	policy	solution	and	others	aligning	to	the	new	situation	provided	eNGOs	with	a	space	to	express	their	views	on	a	previously	unexplored	topic.	The	eNGOs	were,	however,	 not	 able	 to	 achieve	 their	 policy	 goals:	 the	 rejection	 of	 the	 proposed	Prohibition	Bill.			 The	 second	hearing	 took	place	on	 June	6th	2012	and	 the	 composition	of	the	panels	was	more	inclusive.	The	testimonies	were	given	by:	Raymond	LaHood	-	Secretary	of	Department	of	Transportation,	 Jos	Delbeke	-	Director-General	 for	Climate	Action,	 Sean	Cassidy	 -	First	Vice	President	 representing	Air	Line	Pilots	Association,	Edward	Bolen	-	President	and	CEO	of	the	National	Business	Aviation	Association,	 Annie	 Petsonk-	 International	 Counsel	 for	 EDF	 and	 Nancy	 Young,	A4A	Vice	President	for	Environmental	Affairs.	This	hearing	added	more	tension	between	 the	 Congress	 and	 US	 Department	 of	 Transportation.	 The	 discussion	between	Secretary	LaHood	and	the	Senators	appeared	to	accuse	the	Department	of	 a	 lack	 of	 proactivity	 in	 the	 case,	 for	 example	 by	 not	 considering	 filing	complaint	 under	 Article	 84	 of	 Chicago	 Convention	 on	 a	 similar	 procedure	through	 WTO	 agreements.	 LaHood	 would	 claim	 though	 that	 the	 Department	would	discuss	various	approaches	that	could	be	applied	to	the	EU	ETS	issue.	The	ground	was	then	left	to	the	Congress	and	its	action	to	oppose	the	EU	ETS.			 The	 invitation	 to	 the	 EC	 to	 send	 its	 representative	was	 a	 fairly	 unusual	procedure,	as	normally	the	international	partners	would	not	be	invited	to	testify	at	 hearings.	 As	 explained	 by	 the	 Chairman	 of	 the	 Commerce,	 Science	 and																																																									29The	letter	was	signed	by	Action	Aid	USA,	Earthjustice,	Environmental	America,	Environmental	Defense	 Fund,	 Greenpeace	 USA,	 League	 of	 Conservation	 Voters,	 Natural	 Resources	 Defense	Council,	Oxfam	America,	Sierra	Club,	World	Wildlife	Fund.	
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Transportation	 Committee,	 John	 Rockefeller,	 Delbeke	 was	 invited	 “to	 help	 us	better	understand	EU’s	 carbon	 trading	policy”	 (US	Senate	2012).	As	one	of	 the	interviewees,	 also	 present	 at	 the	 hearing	 would	 say:	 “US	 Senators	 do	 not	 get	elected	by	people	from	Brussels,	so	while	they	occasionally	have	foreigners	come	in	and	testify	they	hardly	ever	listen	to	them	really”	(Interview	24.04.2014).	The	EU	representative	focused	on	explaining	how	the	EU	ETS	is	different	from	a	tax	and	 that	 EU	 ETS’s	 application	 to	 non-EU	 routes	 is	 consistent	 with	 Chicago	Convention,	 and	 therefore	 addressed	 the	 issues	 most	 debated	 in	 the	 US.	 The	statement	 prepared	 by	 Delbeke	 triggered	 only	 a	 few	 questions	 and	 the	discussion	that	followed	the	testimonies	focused	on	use	of	the	revenues	from	EU	ETS	in	Europe	and	also	potential	cuts	of	emissions	in	general,	not	referring	to	the	EU	ETS	itself.		 The	 two	 statements	 that	 were	 presented	 by	 the	 airlines	 (and	 as	mentioned	 before,	 also	 a	 larger	 aviation	 community’s	 view)	 feature	 several	elements	that	merit	closer	scrutiny.	The	speech	delivered	by	Nancy	Young,	A4A’s	Vice	President	for	Environmental	Affairs,	opens	with	a	strong	description	of	the	scheme	saying	that	 it	 is	“the	unilateral	and	extraterritorial	European	Emissions	Trading	Scheme,	a	scheme	that	poses	a	threat	to	our	Nation’s	airlines,	economy	and	 jobs,	 and	 also	 to	 advancing	 the	 right	 kind	 of	measures	 to	 further	 address	aviation	greenhouse	gas	emissions”.	A	very	similar	opening	was	provided	a	year	later	before	the	Senate	Committee	on	Commerce,	Science	and	Transportation	in	2012.		 Studying	 more	 closely	 the	 A4A’s	 appearances	 at	 the	 2011	 and	 2012	hearings	 allows	 the	 identification	 of	 additional	 frames	 used	 to	 look	 at	 the	 EU	ETS.	The	2011	speech	was	followed	by	a	further	discussion	on	the	scheme	where	Young	claimed:	“(…)	but	the	fact	that	they’re	[EU]	choosing	to	tax	US	citizens	in	US	airspace	to	fund	whatever	Europe	decides	to	spend	the	money	on	in	 European	 pet	 project	 I	 think	 is	 a	 fundamental	 flaw	 with	 the	scheme,	 and	 it	 violates	 our	 sovereignty”	 (US	 House	 of	Representatives	2011a).		It	 becomes	 then	 visible	 that	 the	 sovereignty	 claim	 is	 closely	 related	 with	earmarking	of	the	EU	ETS	revenue.	The	issue	expands	from	“sending	money”	to	“what	happens	with	the	money”.	There	has	been	a	belief	in	the	US	that	the	funds	
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raised	via	EU	ETS	were	to	be	spent	according	to	the	needs	of	governments	and	not	environmental	urgency.			 Furthermore,	the	portrayal	of	the	EU	ETS	as	a	tax	was	prevalent	in	the	US	aviation	 community.	 At	 the	 2011	 hearing	 the	 ETS	 was	 nicknamed	 by	 an	 A4A	representative	 an	 “illegal,	 exorbitant	 and	 counterproductive	 tax	 on	US	 citizens	diverting	US	dollars	and	threatening	thousands	upon	thousands	of	US	jobs”	(US	Senate	2012).	The	arguments	related	to	labour	were	also	reiterated	by	the	pilots’	representation.		 The	 persistent	 representation	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	 as	 a	 tax	 is	 in	 strong	opposition	to	the	EU-branded	discourse	where	the	scheme	is	always	viewed	as	a	cost	effective	policy	instrument,	but	never	as	a	tax.	Although	the	EU	ETS	enables	the	EU	to	raise	revenue,	the	Commission	would	always	underline	flexibility	that	the	 partaking	 entities	 had	 (establishing	 their	 own	 scheme,	 limiting	 emissions,	agreeing	 on	 a	 global	 scheme,	 etc.).	 The	 US	 aviation	 business	 dismissed	 this	flexibility	 and	 would	 always	 see	 the	 mechanism	 as	 a	 tax	 allowing	 negative	connotations	and	also	elucidating	arguments	related	to	sovereignty,	as	taxes	are	essentially	national	in	their	ambit.			 One	more	document	merits	recalling	here	to	show	how	broad	the	anti-EU	ETS	 industrial	 coalition	 in	 the	 US	 was.	 A	 letter	 sent	 to	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	Hillary	Clinton	and	the	Secretary	of	Transportation	Ray	LaHood	dated	30th	 July	2012	 that	 advocates	prohibition	of	US	participation	 in	 the	EU	ETS	 for	 aviation	and	encourages	Administration	to	file	a	case	against	the	EU	under	the	article	84	of	Chicago	Convention	was	signed	by	nineteen	aviation-related	organisations30.	These	 included	 the	 actors	 very	 vocal	 before	 such	 as	 A4A	 and	 Air	 Pilots	Association,	 but	 also	 those	who	were	 not	 visible	 earlier	 in	 the	 debate	 such	 as	Global	 Business	 Travel	 Association	 or	 the	 Airline	 Division	 of	 the	 International	Brotherhood	 of	 Teamsters.	 The	 composition	 of	 the	 group	 shows	 large	mobilization	 within	 the	 aviation	 community.	 The	 arguments	 though,	 were																																																									30The	full	list	of	signatories	includes	Aerospace	Industries	Association,	Air	Line	Pilots	Association,	Aircraft	 Owners	 and	 Pilots	 Association,	 Airlines	 for	 America,	 Airports	 Council	 International-North	America,	American,	Society	of	Travel	Agents,	Cargo	Airline	Association,	Consumer	Travel	Alliance,	 Independent	 Pilots	 Association,	 Interactive	 Travel	 Services	 Association,	 General	Aviation	 Manufacturers	 Association,	 Global	 Business	 Travel	 Association,	 National	 Air	 Carrier	Association,	 National	 Air	 Transportation	 Association.	 National	 Business	 Aviation	 Association,	Regional	 Airline	 Association,	 International	 Brotherhood	 of	 Teamsters	 –	 Airline	 Division,	 U.S.	Chamber	of	Commerce,	U.S.	Travel	Association.	
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similar	 to	 these	presented	beforehand.	 The	EU	ETS	was	described	 as	 unlawful	and	undermining	the	US	position	 internationally:	“As	each	day	goes	by	without	an	 EU	 act	 to	 halt	 or	 suspend	 the	 ETS,	 the	 harm	 to	 US	 airlines	 and	 aircraft	operators	 and	 the	 threat	 to	U.S.	 sovereignty	 grow	while	 the	U.S.	 government’s	credibility	is	weakened”	(NBAA	2012).			 In	the	debate	on	prohibiting	US	carriers’	participation	in	the	EU	ETS,	the	dominance	 of	 the	 industry	 is	 to	 some	 extent	 apparent.	 Several	 interviewees	would	perceive	the	aviation	sector	as	the	author	of	the	Act	proposal.	Even	if	that	was	true,	the	Bill	has	been	heavily	edited.	If	one	looks	at	the	EU	ETS	Prohibition	Act	retrospectively	and	analyses	the	original	idea	of	blocking	the	US	compliance	with	the	Aviation	Directive	completely	and	then	 looks	at	 the	Prohibition	Bill	as	signed	 into	 law,	 it	becomes	visible	how	significant	 the	changes	made	were.	For	example,	 instead	of	 simply	prohibiting	 the	 airlines	 complying	with	 the	EU	ETS	rules,	the	Bill	 instructs	the	Secretary	of	Transportation	to	prevent	airlines	from	participating	only	if	that	is	deemed	necessary	and	only	after	a	public	hearing	has	been	organised.	Apart	from	this,	the	operators	of	aircrafts	were	promised	to	be	“held	harmless”	from	the	EU	ETS,	which	means	that	the	airlines	would	not	need	to	 cover	 the	 costs	 of	 the	penalties	 for	noncompliance	 (100	euros	per	 tonne)31.	One	 of	 the	members	 of	 the	 US	 eNGOs	 community	 saw	 their	 role	 in	 the	 policy	debate	as	extremely	important:	“We	 made	 that	 bill	 [EU	 ETS	 Prohibition	 Act]	 toothless.	 We’ve	spent,	X,	Y[names	removed	for	anonymity	reasons]	and	I	spent	a	lot	of	time	making	that	bill	 toothless.	 It	 is	toothless.	 It	doesn’t	do	anything”	(Interview	22.03.2014).	Their	view,	however,	was	moderated	by	the	others	from	the	same	eNGO	community:		
																																																								
31	International	Air	Transport	Competitive	and	Fair	Pricing	Act	explains	 that	 if	 the	Secretary	of	Transportation	 finds	 that	 a	 third	 country	 is	 treating	 US	 airlines	 unfairly	 or	 is	 discriminating	against	 them	 in	 some	 way,	 the	 Secretary	 is	 authorized	 to	 impose	 penalties	 on	 that	 country’s	airlines	when	they	fly	into	the	United	States.	Secretary	holds	those	penalties	on	a	special	account	and	once	the	airline	is	able	to	prove	how	much	it	has	been	harmed,	the	Secretary	then	gives	the	money	 to	 the	 disadvantaged	 airlines.	 If	 this	 route	was	 followed	 then	 a	 fully-fledged	 trade	war	scenario	 could	 be	 enacted	 with	 Americans	 blaming	 European	 countries	 and	 the	 other	 way	around	for	subsidies	and	penalties.	
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It	 [The	 EU	ETS	Prohibition	Bill]	 is	 not	 entirely	 toothless	 but	 the	changes	we	made	were	able	 to	put	 into	 the	Bill	do	 raise	hurdles	for	 actually	 getting	 a	 determination	 and	 the	 statement	 that	 the	airlines	 are	 prohibited	 from	 complying,	 so	 yes,	 I	 think	 that	 was	successful	as	damage	control	(Interview	22.05.2014).		When	 the	 House	 of	 Representatives	 interviewee	 was	 asked	 to	 respond	 to	 the	claim	 that	 through	 changes	 made	 to	 the	 original	 proposal	 the	 bill	 became	“toothless”,	the	reaction	would	be	a	smile	and	an	answer	followed	by	laughter:	“That	was	the	major	part	that	was	saying	that	the	airlines	should	be	prohibited	from	participating,	but	I	think	that	the	fact	that	you	passed	 legislation	 like	 that	 in	 a	 relatively	 easy	way,	 hopefully	 it	has	 effect,	 I	would	 have	 imagined	 the	 Europeans	were	watching	that”	(Interview	19.04.2014).		This	directs	the	reading	of	the	significance	of	the	Bill	outwards,	and	suggests	that	it	should	be	considered	a	signalling	tool	to	the	EU,	but	also	to	a	larger	community	interested	in	the	topic:	the	international	aviation	industry	and	their	regulators	as	well	as	other	third	countries	who	indicated	possible	legal	actions	against	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation.	The	Congress	would	see	then	the	EU	ETS	Prohibition	Bill	as	an	instrument	to	affect	the	actors	on	all	possible	levels.			 As	mentioned	above,	the	eNGOs	were	considerably	weaker	in	persuading	the	Congress	to	accept	its	claims.	This	was	related	to	poorer	resources	but	also,	as	ACF	would	assume,	that	“in	a	high	conflict	situation”,	and	the	EU	ETS	debate	can	 be	 qualified	 as	 such,	 opponents	 are	 viewed	 as	 more	 powerful:	 the	 actors	“remember	defeats	more	than	victories”	(Sabatier	1998,	p.109).	The	eNGOs	were	aware	 of	 their	modest	 positioning	within	 the	US	 policy-making	 structures	 and	could	 feel	 their	 bargaining	 inferiority	 when	 confronted	 with	 the	 aviation	industry.	This	translated	also	into	the	small,	albeit	larger	than	in	Europe,	number	of	organisations	involved	with	the	case.	EDF,	WWF,	and	NRDC	were	the	only	US-based	organisations	who	were	actively	 trying	 to	 influence	 the	policy-making	at	the	 Congress	 level	 to	 block	 the	 EU	 ETS	 Prohibition	 Act	 and	 persuade	 the	Congressmen	that	opposing	the	Europeans	will	not	redirect	discussions	back	to	ICAO	but	only	prolong	the	global	process.	Although	the	eNGOs’	efforts	 targeted	both	 industry	 and	 policy-makers,	 they	 were	 unable	 to	 mobilize	 significant	resources	 for	 this	 file.	 The	 organisations	 would	 explicitly	 defend	 the	 EU,	 for	
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example	 by	 addressing	 the	 industry.	 In	 a	 letter	 signed	 by	 several	 eNGOs32and	sent	to	the	Chairman	and	CEO	of	American	Airlines	they	claimed:	“The	European	Union	 deserves	 kudos,	 not	 lawsuits,	 for	 acting	 to	 reduce	 airline	 pollution	 -	particularly	 given	 that	 the	 international	 community	 has	 proven	 incapable	 of	doing	so	despite	more	than	a	dozen	years	of	negotiations”(EDF	2011b).	A	similar	endorsement	for	the	EU’s	actions	is	provided	in	the	letter	concerning	the	Sense	of	Congress.			 The	 environmental	 organisations	would	 act	 even	beyond	promoting	 the	EU’s	approach	and	they	would	assume	a	role	of	the	industry	critics.	In	a	letter	to	A4A,	 they	 claimed	 “American	 [Airlines]	 and	 United/Continental	 [both	 are	Members	 of	 A4A]	 are	 hypocritically	 and	 publicly	 touting	 their	 commitment	 to	environmental	protection	while	simultaneously	working	actively	to	undercut	the	world’s	 first	 program	 [EU	 ETS]	 to	 reduce	 carbon	 pollution	 from	 aviation	activities”	(EDF	2011c).			 Furthermore,	 the	 US	 environmental	 organisations	 engaged	with	 the	 EU	ETS	 file	 saw	 the	EU	as	 the	only	 advocate	 for	 a	 timely	 response	 to	 the	growing	aviation	 emissions	while	 their	 faith	 in	 ICAO’s	 delivery	 of	 a	 global	 solution	was	low.	 In	another	 letter,	 the	eNGO	community	tried	to	persuade	the	US	president	that	“rather	than	seeking	to	block	the	only	program	in	the	world	[EU	ETS]	that	sets	 enforceable	 limits	 on	 carbon	 pollution	 from	 aviation,	 the	 Administration	should	 join	with	 the	EU	 in	 taking	meaningful	 steps	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 aviation	sector	significantly	reduces	its	contribution	to	global	warming”(EDF	2011a).		 The	understandings	of	 the	EU	ETS	Prohibition	Bill	 can	be	supplemented	here	by	a	perspective	offered	by	a	Senate	interviewee	who	in	general	was	against	the	idea	of	prohibiting	the	airlines	compliance	with	the	EU	law:	“it’s	largely	a	political	manoeuvre	by	two	Senators	who	are	trying	to	 improve	 their	 credentials,	 their	 conservative	 credentials	 (…)	 I	think	 they	 jumped	on	 that	opportunity	 to	be	against	Europe	and	their	socialist	policy.	That’s	what	was	driving	it.	The	significance	I	think	(…)	it	feels	like	probably	this	Bill	had	to	some	degree	some	impact	on	the	EU’s	decision	to	delay,	because	if	you	have	major	air	carriers	 in	 your	 sovereign	 airspace	 that	 are	 not	 going	 to	participate”	(Interview	2.05.2014).																																																										32	The	 letter	was	 signed	 by	 Center	 for	Biological	Diversity,	 Earthjustice,	 Environment	America,	Environmental	Defense	Fund,	Natural	Resources	Defense	Council	and	Sierra	Club.	
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	 The	staff	of	a	Senator	that	was	supporting	the	Bill	would	argue,	however,	that	 the	 main	 impact	 of	 the	 Bill	 was	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 forced	 a	 delay	 in	implementation	 (Interview	 1.03.2013).	 A	 staffer	 of	 the	 Senate	 subcommittee	who	 was	 working	 on	 aviation	 until	 just	 before	 the	 work	 on	 the	 EU	 ETS	Prohibition	 Act	 started,	 saw	 the	 significance	 of	 the	 bill	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 initiate	dialogue.	They	also	stressed	the	importance	of	the	industry’s	further	steps	once	the	 bill	 has	 been	 signed	 into	 law:	 “they	 [the	 industry]	 are	 they	 going	 to	work	their	 asses	 off	 to	 drive	 the	 ICAO	agenda.	Or	 is	 ICAO	going	 to	 do	 an	honest	 job	here?	 [This]	 is	what	we	worked	 out	 and	 [we]	 see	 if	 they	 can	 actually	 get	 that	from	the	industry”	(Interview	30.04.2013).		 Finally,	arguably,	as	mentioned	above,	 the	 idea	of	 the	Bill	emerged	 from	the	aviation	 industry,	 therefore,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	see	how	the	sector	understands	the	 importance	 of	 the	 bill	 given	 all	 the	 changes	 that	 were	 introduced	 to	 the	original	 text.	 The	 A4A	 interviewee	 provided	 an	 extensive	 comment	 on	 the	importance	of	the	bill	identifying	two	main	points:	“at	 the	 time	that	was	really	critical	 in	 terms	of	application	of	 the	EU	 ETS	 to	 our	 2012	 flights	 and	 the	 requirement	 to	 surrender	allowances	in	2013,	it	was	a	very	very	clear	statement	of	US	policy	that	 the	 president	 signed	 that	we	 don’t	want	 to	 see	 this	 kind	 of	unilateral	measure”	(Interview	25.04.2013)	Apart	 from	 demonstrating	 their	 disagreement,	 the	 interviewee	would	 also	 see	the	bill	as	a	tangible	tool	that	can	be	used	against	compliance:	“so	I	think	having	that	tool	if	it	needs	to	be	employed	and	direct	us	not	to	comply,	is	an	important	one.	Not	just	as	a	signal	but	as	an	actual	defence”	(Interview	25.04.2013).			 The	 situation	 drawn	 above	 presents	 a	 case	 of	 two	 fenced	 communities	that	 communicate	 mostly	 formally	 between	 each	 other	 and	 operate	 under	different	circumstances	and	different	capabilities,	which	were	mostly	related	to	lobbying.	According	to	some,	 “the	existence	of	networks	cannot	be	denied.	 It	 is	far	 better	 to	 face	 this	 fact	 and	 analyse	 how	 they	 work,	 looking	 for	 ways	 to	improve	 them	 rather	 trying	 to	 ignore	 or	 abolish	 them”	 (Kickert	 et	 al.	 1997,	p.171).	 The	 networks	 emerging	 here	 definitely	merit	 a	 closer	 analysis	 as	 they	constituted	a	whole	body	of	content	crucial	for	this	case:	the	two	separate	policy	networks,	 one	 based	 on	 the	 aviation	 industry	 and	 the	 other	 one	 on	 the	
Chapter6:	The	nature	of	the	opposition	to	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation	in	the	US	
	 159	
environmental	 organisations	 and	 their	 supporters.	 The	 two	 clusters	 would	concentrate	 on	 different	 values	 that	 bound	 them.	 The	 eNGOs	 and	 their	supporters	tended	to	underline	the	EU’s	leadership	and	the	need	to	address	the	problem	given	 the	 stalemate	 at	 ICAO.	They	would	 therefore	 strive	 to	orientate	the	discussion	towards	making	rapid	steps	and	agreeing	on	binding	solutions.	On	the	other	side,	there	was	the	aviation	industry	line	of	argumentation	that	based	its	discourse	on	sovereignty,	 the	global	 solution	as	 the	only	viable	one	and	 the	dissent	 concerning	 any	 payments	 to	 be	made	 to	 cover	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	allowances.	 While	 examining	 the	 US	 policy	 networks	 Rhodes	 would	 make	 a	distinction	 between	 the	 insiders	 and	 outsiders,	 where	 outsiders	 “are	 kept	 on	arm’s	 length”	 and	 seen	 as	 extremist	 (2006,	 p.427).	 It	 is	 claimed	 here	 however	that	 in	 the	 issue	 analysed,	 this	 dynamic	 did	 not	 appear.	 The	 eNGO	 community	would	argue	however	that	due	to	limited	resources	they	were	able	to	employ	for	this	file,	they	were	not	in	a	position	to	engage	as	fully	as	the	industry.	This	in	turn	may	 have	 influenced	 the	 decision-making	 process	 of	 the	 policy-makers	 who	were	much	more	exposed	to	the	business	lobbying,	both	in	terms	of	number	of	meetings	requested	but	also	the	timing	–	the	aviation	industry	started	lobbying	the	Congressmen	well	before	the	others.		
6.3.4 Financial	issues:	what	money	is	to	be	sent?			 Apart	 from	 policy	 and	 legal	 issues	 related	 to	 the	 inclusion,	 a	 narrative	regarding	financial	burden	of	compliance	was	present.	An	airline	representative	pointed	out:		“sending	 the	money	 to	 Europe	 did	 not	 seem	 like	 a	 good	 idea	 to	anybody	(…)	I	mean,	you	can	have	all	kinds	of	concerns	about	the	mechanism	but	the	thought	that	the	US	consumers	and	US	airlines	will	 be	 pinning	 money	 to	 the	 European	 governments	 for	 those	governments	 to	 do	 whatever	 they	 wanted	 with	 it…”	 (Interview	25.04.2014)	Claims	related	to	finance,	but	pertaining	to	actual	costs	rather	than	earmarking	of	the	funds	raised,	were	made	in	a	letter	submitted	for	the	hearing	at	the	House	of	Representatives	Subcommittee	on	Aviation	on	July	27th	2011	by	the	president	of	Allied	Pilots	Association	David	J.	Bates,:	
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“APA’s	 opposition	 centres	 on	 the	 adverse	 economic	 impact	 the	ETS	would	have	on	our	nation’s	airline	industry(…)	the	ETS	could	cost	US	carriers	$1.3	billion	in	the	first	year	alone,	and	potentially	rise	 to	 an	 annual	 cost	 of	 $3.5	 billion	 2020”	 (US	 House	 of	Representatives	2011a).	The	APA’s	vision,	similarly	to	A4A’s,	represents	the	EU	ETS	as	a	cost	not	a	policy	instrument	 and	 rejects	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	 aviation	 sector	 being	 held	accountable	financially	of	its	externalities.	In	the	view	of	the	actors	opposing	the	EU	 ETS,	 the	 sector	 needs	 to	 remain	 outside	 of	 the	 EU	 regulations.	 The	 same	numbers	were	reported	by	A4A’s	Nancy	Young,	who	additionally	calculated	that	this	 amount	would	 support	 over	 39.000	 jobs	provided	 that	 the	 airlines	 do	not	comply	with	the	EU	ETS	(US	House	of	Representatives	2011a).			 The	 literature	 suggests	 however	 that	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	 would	probably	be	limited.	For	example	Malina	and	colleagues	conclude	that	the	effects	on	running	the	aviation	business	in	the	US	would	be	low	if	any	(2012).	Moreover,	a	 paper	 by	 Brian	 Pierce,	 IATA’s	 chief	 economist,	was	 published	 in	 2007	 about	how	 limited	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	 would	 be	 on	 the	 airline	 industry.	 This	paper	 was	 then	 withdrawn	 from	 the	 Internet	 and	 Pierce	 was	 asked	 not	 to	publish	texts	similar	to	the	2007	one	(Interview	28.04.2014).		 These	 cases	 call	 for	 alternative	 explanations	 of	 the	US’s	 opposition,	 and	there	 are	 two	 possible	 explanations	 that	 can	 be	 offered	 here.	 Firstly,	 the	opposition	was	gathered	around	discourses	that	were	the	binding	substance	for	the	participating	actors.	The	interviewees	would	most	often	quote	sovereignty.			 One	 could	 argue	 that	 the	 sovereignty	 recalled	 here	 appears	 under	 its	Foucauldian	 form	 of	 governmentality,	where	 the	 eminence	 of	 non-state	 actors	represents	a	wider	change	embodied	by	non-state	entities	becoming	both	object	and	subject	of	government	(Foucault	1982).	This	in	turn	means	that	no	transfer	of	power	towards	the	non-state	actors	occurs.	Elsewhere	Rosenau	(1999;	2002)	states,	 however,	 that	 the	 political	 authority	 transfers	 from	 the	 sovereign	 state	towards	“spheres	of	authority”	operating	via	policy	networks	where	 the	state’s	role	is	diminished.	Although	the	case	analysed	here	features	the	non-state	actors’	ability	 to	 strongly	 influence	 policy-making,	 the	 venues	 where	 the	 discussions	take	 place	 are	 still	 inherently	 state-centred	 (e.g.	 Congress,	 ICAO,	 European	Parliament).	Indeed,	the	states	cannot	ignore	the	interests	and	bargaining	power	
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6.3.5 Competition	issues:	measures	equivalent	to	the	EU	ETS			 The	EU-US	air	 transport	policy	 is	believed	to	be	based	on	concerns	over	ensuring	 competitiveness	 in	 the	 marketplace	 (Goetz	 &	 Graham	 2004).	 The	concerns	over	competitiveness	were	taken	on	board	by	the	European	legislators	while	working	on	the	EU	ETS	exactly	by	 including	all	 the	 flights	 that	 land	at	or	depart	 from	 the	 EU	 airports.	 However,	 there	 was	 a	 clear	 exemption	 for	 the	countries	 that	would	 apply	 comparable	measures,	 for	 example	 by	 establishing	another	 regional	 emissions	 trading	 scheme.	 The	 Article	 24a,	 of	 the	 Aviation	Directive	states	that:	“Where	a	third	country	adopts	measures	for	reducing	the	climate	change	 impacts	of	 flights	 (…)	 the	Commission	 (…)	 shall	 consider	options	 available	 in	 order	 to	 provide	 for	 optimal	 interaction	between	 the	 Community	 scheme	 and	 that	 country’s	 measure”		(Official	Journal	of	the	European	Union,	2008).	This	 feature	 was	 also	mentioned	 in	 the	 CJEU	 Advocate	 General	 opinion	 (CJEU	2011b)	 and	 subsequent	 ruling	 of	 the	 CJEU	 (CJEU	 2011a).	 Even	 though	 these	provisions	were	 underlined	 by	 the	 European	 representatives	 dealing	with	 the	issue	internationally,	the	discourses	around	the	EU	ETS	in	the	United	States	did	not	 include	 comparable	measures	 as	 a	 viable	 option.	Once	 the	American	Clean	Energy	 and	 Security	 Act	 (ACES)33	(also	 known,	 after	 its	 authors,	 as	Waxman	 –	Markey	Bill)	that	would	have	established	a	carbon	trading	system,	border	carbon	adjustments	 and	would	 have	 covered	 transportation	 fuels,	was	 blocked	 by	 the	Senate,	 any	 discussions	 regarding	 pricing	 carbon	 disappeared	 from	 the	legislative	agenda	at	Congress.	Although	the	eNGOs	pressed	to	enact	the	Bill	into	law	(EDF	2009)and	later,	also	were	underlining	the	possibility	to	receive	EU	ETS	exemption	 for	aviation	 (Interviews	24.04.2014	and	22.03.2013),	 there	was	not	enough	political	will	in	the	US	to	use	this	idea	as	a	vehicle	for	rethinking	ACES	or	any	equivalent	of	it.		
																																																								33	“A	 bill	 to	 create	 clean	 energy	 jobs,	 achieve	 energy	 independence,	 reduce	 global	 warming	pollution	and	transition	to	a	clean	energy	economy”	Introduced	in	the	House	of	Representatives	as	H.R.	2454	on	May	15th	2009	(US	House	of	Representatives	2009).	
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	 Moreover,	 the	 idea	 of	 equivalent	 measures	 was	 represented	 by	 the	 US	aviation	 community	 again	 as	 a	 sovereignty	 issue.	 Nancy	 Young	 claimed	 at	 the	2012	hearing	“(…)	that	our	government	should	take	orders	from	the	EU	on	how	to	fashion	US	law	is	an	astonishing	proposition.	Moreover,	it’s	a	recipe	for	chaos”	(US	Senate	2012)	and	the	2011	statement	was	followed	by	one	more	sentence:	“With	the	EU	unilaterally	determining	equivalence,	the	prospects	for	competitive	distortions	 and	 discriminations	 are	 enormous”	 (US	 House	 of	 Representatives	2011a).	 Similarly,	 the	 administration	 was	 not	 convinced	 by	 this	 way	 of	proceeding.	 In	 the	 aforementioned	 letter	 by	 the	 Secretaries	 of	 State	 and	 of	Transportation,	they	say:	“Simply	 offering	 the	 possibility	 of	 partial	 exemption	 under	 the	‘equivalence’	provisions	of	the	Directive	does	not	satisfy	the	need	for	 constructive	 negotiations	 and	 ignores	 the	 strong	 legal	 and	policy	objections	 that	have	been	articulated	by	countries	around	the	globe34”.			 It	is	true	that	the	EU	did	not	specify	what	the	equivalent	measures	should	be	 exempted	 from	 compliance.	 However,	 given	 the	 opportunity	 to	 release	administrative	burdens	that	the	Commission	(mostly	DG	CLIMA	and	DG	MOVE)	was	charged	with	the	EU	ETS,	they	would	most	possibly	welcome	the	equivalent	measures	rather	than	hamper	them	by	counting	on	negligible	revenue	from	the	allowances	bought	by	the	US	carriers.	This	seems	to	be	especially	valid	given	that	90%	 of	 allowances	 for	 aviation	were	 provided	 for	 free.	 The	 EU	 policy-makers	would	have	been	aware	that	any	ill	will	to	recognise	US’s	(or	others)	endeavours	would	meet	with	enormous	opposition.		 	




	 According	 to	 some,	 “air	 transport	 is	 a	 business	 naturally	 dominated	 by	short-termism	 and	 opportunist	 response	 and,	 crucially,	 by	 a	 fragmentation	 of	responsibility	among	its	policy-makers”	(Goetz	&	Graham	2004,	p.266).	To	some	extent	 this	may	 lead	 to	 an	 exclusively	 incremental	 approach	 to	 regulating	 the	sector	 with	 various	 policy-makers	 focussing	 on	 adding	 to	 the	 existing	regulations.	 The	 EU	 ETS	 case	 allows	 thinking	 that	 US	 incrementalism	 is	confronted	with	EU	“brinksmanship”	(Prum	&	Kisska-Schulze	2015)	and	as	some	argue,	with	unilateralism	(Scott	&	Rajamani	2012).	For	the	US	policy	community	the	 EU	 ETS	was	 a	 policy	 leap	 that	 they	 could	 not	 imagine	 after	 the	Waxman-Markey	 Bill	 failure.	 The	 US	 policy-makers	 started	 to	 view	 any	 carbon	 trading	initiatives	at	a	federal	level	as	unattainable.		 All	 the	US	 interviewees	were	asked	whether	 the	EU	ETS	Prohibition	Bill	constituted	a	change	in	approach	to	how	the	emissions	from	aviation	are	being	dealt	with	in	the	US.	Given	incrementalism	is	not	able	to	explain	completely	the	way	 policies	 are	 formed	 (Baumgartner	 et	 al.	 2014,	 p.69),	 it	 is	 important	 to	consider	 the	 explanations	 of	 policy	 choices	 provided.	 The	 interviewees	 were	consistent	in	answering	the	above	stated	question	and	although	some	claimed	it	was	 unprecedented,	 they	 would	 not	 see	 the	 Bill	 as	 a	 move	 towards	 a	 policy	change.			 The	airline	sector	would	view	the	US	disagreement	as	a	result	of	the	long-standing	 consensus	 among	 US	 policy-makers	 that	 international	 aviation	emissions	 should	 be	 regulated	 via	 ICAO.	 Secondly,	 the	 US	 policy-makers	underline	that	at	the	federal	level	no	industry	is	included	in	any	kind	of	market-based	measure	 to	 reduce	 emissions.	 In	 the	 second	part	 of	 their	 statement,	 the	airlines	representative	while	answering	the	question	would	argue:	“We	 don’t	 want	 the	 Europeans	 grabbing	 some	 jurisdiction	 over	our	 airlines	 when	 we	 are	 still	 formulating	 what	 is	 the	 role	 for	market-based	 measures	 in	 general.	 I	 think	 the	 anti-EU	 ETS	legislation	 is	 our	 Congress	 reacting	 to	what	 it	 sees	 as	 European	overreaching	on	this	issue”	(Interview	25.04.2014).		 	A	 similar	 answer	 was	 provided	 by	 an	 interviewee	 from	 within	 aerospace	manufacturers	and	suppliers	who	saw	that	the	Bill	confirmed	the	line	of	thinking	about	emissions	regulation	and	offered	a	remedy	to	 the	“jurisdiction-grabbing”	
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problem:	“if	there	is	something	to	be	done	in	emissions	and	it	is	through	aviation,	it	needs	to	be	done	internationally”	(Interview	1.05.2013).		 Another	 interviewee,	who	preferred	 to	 remain	anonymous,	 claimed	 that	not	 only	 does	 the	 EU	 ETS	 Prohibition	 Act	 does	 not	 constitute	 a	 change	 in	approach	but	even	solidifies	 the	US’s	Kyoto	Protocol	denial	as	well	as	 is	 in	 line	with	US	aviation	policy,		“which	 has	 always	 been	 that	 we	 demand,	 we	 impose	 on	 other	countries,	 we	 don’t	 always	 respect	 their	 opinions	 on	 aviation	policy	 and	 so	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 our	 quality	 level	 of	 screeners	 in	European	airports	and	international	flights	cannot	have	gambling	on	them	because	of	the	US	law.	We	believe	that	our	standard	is	the	most	important	standard”	(Interview	08.04.2013).		The	idea	about	the	US	standards	being	viewed	as	the	most	appropriate	by	the	US	policy-makers	 has	 been	 confirmed	 also	 by	 other	 interviewees	 who	 would	underline	 the	 US’s	 self-confidence	 at	 ICAO.	 The	 EU	 ETS	 Prohibition	 Act	 was	instrumental	for	the	US’s	position	and	outlook	on	any	changes	in	the	regulatory	constellations.	 Moreover,	 it	 has	 been	 also	 argued	 that	 the	 Prohibition	 Act	 is	consistent	with	 the	 US	 perspective	 because	 the	 US	would	 prefer	 to	 see	 action	that	 would	 help	 lower	 emissions	 on	 a	 global	 scale	 and	 the	 EU	 ETS	 has	 been	viewed	 by	 the	 Americans	 as	 clearly	 hindering	 the	 ICAO	 solutions	 (Interview	30.04.2013).		 A	 Senate	 interviewee,	 however,	 dismissed	 any	 policy	 importance	 of	 the	Bill:	 “I	 think	 that	 it	 was	 political	 winner	 for	 some	 people	 who	 needed	 some	political	points.	 I	don’t	think	it	says	anything	about	our	policy,	what	 it	ought	to	be”	 (2.05.2014).	 This	 pertains	 to	 a	 larger	 Congressional	 issue	 that	 has	 been	pointed	out	by	Rabe	(quoted	in	Sussman	&	Daynes	2013,	p.54)	who	claims	that	the	Congress	is	not	able	to	reach	an	agreement	on	climate	policy	but	is	prolific	in	discussing	 it.	 The	 debates	 and	 hearings	 then	 can	 serve	 as	 the	 venue	 for	“collecting	political	points”	without	any	binding	decisions.	Also,	if	one	looks	into	the	 Bill,	 it	 only	 instructs	 the	 Secretary	 of	 Transportation	 to	 prohibit	participation,	rather	than	directly	banning	compliance.			 These	 ideas	 related	 to	 the	 Congress	 being	 reliant	 on	 its	 long-standing	policies	 are	 complemented	 by	 the	 view	 that	 if	 any	 changes	 in	 emissions	reductions	 were	 to	 be	 agreed	 on	 in	 the	 US,	 it	 would	 be	 EPA-branded,	 even	 if	
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some	see	it	as	an	unelected,	bureaucratic	body	(Sussman	&	Daynes	2013).	This,	among	 other	 factors	 too,	 is	 caused	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 Congress	 constantly	challenges	 the	 Agency	 and	 is	 reluctant	 to	 accept	 pro-climate	 proposals	(Interview	3.05.2014).		 The	opposition	to	the	EU	ETS	needs	to	be	then	seen	as	a	continuation	of	the	US	not	addressing	the	CO2	emissions	from	aircraft.	Neither	is	it	a	departure	from	 the	 stance	 that	 international	 aviation	 issues	 should	 be	 dealt	 at	 an	international	venue,	unlike	 the	noise	or	water	and	air	pollution	 issues	 that	are	more	 federally	 regulated.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 power	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	was	 not	significant	enough	 to	 lead	 to	a	punctuated	equilibrium	situation	when	stability	and	 incrementalism	are	challenged	and	 the	policy	alterations	are	dramatic	and	drastically	 change	 the	 trajectory	 of	 policy	 direction	 (True	 et	 al.	 1999;	Baumgartner	et	al.	2009).	If	one	understands	the	stalemate	at	the	ICAO	level	as	a	situation	of	crisis,	 then	the	broad	inclusion	of	airlines	into	the	EU	ETS	could	be	viewed	 as	 questioning	 the	 status	 quo35	and	 offering	 the	 non-EU	 countries	 an	opportunity	 to	move	 away	 from	 it.	 As	 claimed,	 "American	political	 institutions	were	conservatively	designed	to	resist	many	efforts	at	change	and	thus	to	make	mobilizations	 necessary	 to	 overcoming	 established	 interests"	 (Baumgartner	 et	
al.	2014,	p.62).	The	mobilization	provoked	by	the	EU	ETS	was	focused,	however,	on	retaining	 the	status	quo.	More	 importantly,	 the	potential	punctuation	 in	 the	US	could	have	happened	owing	to	 the	 incremental	policy-making	 in	 the	EU	–	 if	one	sees	the	 inclusion	of	aviation	 into	the	EU	ETS	as	a	natural	extension	of	 the	system’s	scope.	Furthermore,	the	punctuated	equilibrium	theory	would	assume	much	 more	 bounded	 contexts	 for	 understanding	 changes,	 mostly	 national.	However,	 the	 case	 of	 aviation	 regulation	 clearly	 exhibits	 regulatory	 regimes	spanning	from	global	reach	down	to	regional	or	local	regulations	(pertaining	to	airports	for	example)	that	interact	with	each	other.				
																																																								35In	 the	Punctuated	Equilibrium	Theory,	 the	broad	 inclusion	of	 aviation	 into	 the	EU	ETS	 could	also	be	seen	as	exogenous	shock	or	exogenous	circumstances	given	the	external	to	the	US	policy	system	actors	(Jones	et	al.	1998;	Baumgartner	et	al.	2014).	
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6.4 The	importance	of	a	single	aviation	organisation		In	this	final	section,	attention	is	given	to	the	US	airline	industry	whose	role	in	the	case	 was	 accentuated	 previously.	 This	 section	 addresses	 several	 aspects	 of	research	 questions	 2	 and	 3	 concerning	 the	 actors	 in	 the	 case	 and	 their	preferences.	Firstly	a	picture	of	a	larger	airline	community	opposing	the	EU	ETS	is	presented	before	proceeding	to	look	at	A4A	itself.		
6.4.1 US	carriers	in	international	sectoral	organisations			 The	analysed	media	content	unambiguously	indicates	that	the	US	interest	around	 the	 inclusion	 of	 aviation	 into	 the	 EU	 ETS	was	 focused	 on	 the	 aviation	sector	–	government	line,	though	the	onus	of	the	lobbying	was	obviously	placed	on	the	sector	and	its	links	beyond	the	US.	According	to	a	representative	of	the	US	airline	industry,	the	sector	was	already	engaged	in	commenting	on	the	initial	EU	proposals	related	to	the	EU	ETS	in	the	early	stages	of	the	EU	work:	“As	 the	 EU	 is	 developing	 its	 proposals	 we	 worked	 with	 the	International	Air	Transportation	Association	and	 the	Association	of	 European	 Airlines	 and	 others	 to	 provide	 input	 into	 the	European	 process,	 so	 it	 started	 then	 as	 the	 legislation	 was	adopted	 we	 very	 immediately	 put	 comments	 in	 on	 the	development	 of	 things	 like	 the	 monitoring,	 reporting	 and	verification	 requirements	 and	 other	 requirements”	 (Interview	25.04.2014).			 The	 US	 sector	 was	 not	 working,	 however,	 in	 isolation.	 From	 the	 very	beginning	of	the	debate	the	International	Air	Transportation	Association	and	the	European	Airline	Association	are	mentioned	here	as	venues	(IATA)	or	partners	(AEA)	 for	 discussion.	 Although,	 the	 networked	 activities	 should	 not	 be	 of	 any	surprise	 in	 a	 business	 that	 is	 so	 closely	 interlinked,	 here	 the	 policy	 priorities	were	not	always	converging.	The	A4A	would	not	have	too	much	contact	with	its	European	 counterpart.	 The	A4A	 interviewee	would	mention	 the	AEA	 activities	only	with	regards	to	the	initial	proposals	of	the	Commission	concerning	EU	ETS.	The	 discourses	 the	 two	 organisations	 were	 engaged	 in	 played	 out	 differently.	While	 A4A	 was	 underlining	 the	 illegality	 of	 the	 scheme,	 the	 AEA	 was	 rather	underlining	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 global	 solution	 to	 be	 developed	 at	 the	 ICAO	level.	In	a	statement	concerning	the	legal	case	against	the	EU	ETS	the	Association	stated:	“AEA	supports	the	European	Union’s	commitment	to	reduce	the	impact	of	
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all	sectors,	including	air	transport,	on	climate	change.	However,	instead	of	taking	the	 lead	 and	 paving	 the	 way	 towards	 a	 global	 solution,	 the	 European	 Union’s	environmental	strategy	is	alienating	key	partners”	(AEA	2011).	The	AEA	was	not	sure	to	what	extent	the	European	Commission	would	cover	the	EU	carriers	and	in	the	case	that	all	the	transatlantic	routes	were	to	be	incorporated	in	the	scheme	then	 there	would	be	no	competitive	distortion	 for	 the	European	airlines.	Apart	from	this,	the	AEA	member	airlines	had	a	perspective	of	being	regulated	by	the	Commission	in	the	future,	while	for	A4A	there	was	no	such	likely	necessity	in	the	future.	The	main	implication	of	such	divergence	was	the	limited	influence	of	A4A	through	AEA	on	the	shape	of	the	EU	ETS	legislation	concerning	the	inclusion	of	aviation.	 Secondly,	 this	 further	 deepened	 the	 division	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 US	policy	communities	as	they	were	focused	on	different	venues	where	they	lobbied	and	were	also	using	different	arguments.			 The	US	 airlines	 understood	 and	 portrayed	 the	 EU	 ETS	 for	 aviation	 as	 a	threat	to	US	sovereignty	while	IATA	was	more	inclusive	 in	the	way	the	EU	ETS	was	 to	be	 tackled,	 therefore,	 it	 did	not	 condemn	 the	EU	ETS	 entirely.	 It	 rather	referred	to	the	regionally	applied	schemes	in	general:	“IATA	urges	governments	to	 agree	 on	 a	 global	 approach	 to	 market-based	 measures	 and	 refrain	 from	applying	 regional	 or	 national	 measures”	 (IATA	 2013b).	 IATA’s	 policy	 paper	explains	further:		“While	it	 is	simple	for	government	to	account	for	emissions	from	stationary	sources,	doing	this	with	mobile	sources	such	as	aircraft	is	a	lot	more	complex.	Also,	with	some	aircraft	operators	flying	to	almost	 one	 hundred	 different	 countries,	 the	 multiplication	 of	regional	 and	 national	 measures	 results	 in	 an	 unsustainable	patchwork	 of	 uncoordinated	 administrative	 and	 reporting	requirements”	(IATA	2013b).		In	 the	 IATA	69th	Annual	General	Meeting	Resolution	published	 in	 2013,	 it	was	underlined	that	a	global	solution	needs	to	developed	“as	opposed	to	a	patchwork	of	unilateral	national	and/or	regional	policy	measures”	(IATA	2013c).		 A	 similar	 idea	 was	 conveyed	 by	 an	 even	 broader	 coalition	 under	 the	umbrella	 of	 Air	 Transport	 Action	 Group	 that	 apart	 from	 the	 airlines	 (IATA)	includes	also	airports	(Airports	Council	International),	air	navigation	association	(Civil	 Air	 Navigation	 Services	 Organisation),	 business	 aviation	 (International	
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Business	 Aviation	 Council)	 and	 air	 space	 industry	 (International	 Coordinating	Council	of	Aerospace	Industries	Associations)(ATAG	2013).	These	organisations	were	 probably	 influenced	by	 their	US	members	who,	while	 preparing	 to	 block	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation,	had	already	provided	ideas	and	narratives	to	counter	the	European	 project.	 The	 mentioned	 position	 papers	 seem	 to	 offer	 a	 balanced	opinion	about	the	European	ambitions	concerning	aviation	emissions	regulation.	This,	however,	is	not	the	case	for	the	statements	of	the	prominent	IATA	figures.	For	 example,	 the	 previous	 Director	 General	 and	 CEO,	 Giovanni	 Bisignani,	 who	was	serving	at	IATA	between	2002	and	2011,	would	already	strongly	oppose	the	scheme	in	2007:	“This	 is	 a	 global	 industry	 and	 we	 need	 a	 global	 tool.	 Regional	trading	 schemes	 will	 not	 work.	 That	 is	 why	 170	 countries	 will	challenge	 Europe.	 Instead	 of	 working	 together	 to	 build	 a	 global	trading	 scheme,	 governments	 will	 be	 discussing	 legal	issues”(Milmo	2007).	Later,	 in	 the	 period	 of	 the	most	 heated	debate	 on	 the	EU	ETS,	 Tony	Tyler,	 the	Director	 General	 and	 CEO	 of	 IATA	 would	 be	 quite	 pointed	 in	 his	 public	appearances	concerning	the	scheme:	“As	 we	 approach	 2012	 the	 attention	 of	 the	 aviation	 world	 is	focused	on	Europe	with	its	misguided	plans	to	bring	international	aviation	into	its	emissions	trading	scheme	(ETS).	It	is	a	$1.2	billion	mistake	that	neither	the	industry	nor	the	environment	can	afford	(…)	 But	 the	 relentless	 determination	 to	 implement	 a	 flawed	regional	ETS	is	dividing	the	world	just	when	we	need	unity”	.		Elsewhere	 he	 would	 claim	 that	 the	 explanations	 provided	 by	 an	 EU	representative	at	the	Orient	Aviation's	Greener	Skies	were	“fascinating	linguistic	gymnastics	 of	 a	 wonderfully	 European	 type”	 (Winn	 2011).	 Even	 though	 the	statements	 by	 the	 directors	 do	 not	 bear	 the	 same	 importance	 as	 the	 policy	papers	 that	 are	 developed	 by	 the	 whole	 organisation,	 they	 show	 well	 the	atmosphere	and	emotions	that	the	industry	had	towards	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation.	Secondly,	IATA	and	ATAG	provided	international	venues	for	resistance	to	the	EU	ETS	–	these	were	probably	the	places	where	the	strategies	had	to	be	discussed	and	measures	to	counter	the	EU	scheme	were	developed.			 The	 atmosphere	 around	 the	 EU	 ETS	 in	 the	 United	 States	 very	 much	reflected	the	words	of	the	IATA	CEO.	The	narratives	were	mutually	reinforcing.	
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6.4.2 Consolidation	of	lobbying	efforts	in	Washington			 One	 of	 the	 most	 striking	 features	 of	 the	 interviews	 conducted	 in	Washington,	 DC	 was	 the	 agreement	 among	 all	 the	 interviewees	 that	 it	 was	crucial	 to	 discuss	 the	 EU	 ETS	with	 an	 A4A	 representative.	 Similarly,	 A4A	was	seen	as	the	key	player	by	the	Europeans.	The	quote	below	shows	perfectly	how	A4A	was	seen	in	Europe:	“I	think	the	American	Airlines	Association	[the	interviewee	meant	here	A4A]	has	been	particularly	adamant,	particularly	vigorous	in	this	 opposition.	 They	 have	 been	 lying	 about	 what	 the	 scheme	implies.	The	spin	they’ve	been	giving	to	the	Congress	about	what	this	 is,	 is	 incredible	 and	 contradicting	 the	 funding…	 The	 US	government	 has	 funded	 research	 by	 the	 MIT	 [Massachusetts	Institute	 of	 Technology]	 (…),	 who	 have	 found	 that	 the	 scheme	would	be	net	economic	benefit	 for	 the	US	as	a	region	because	of	the	 free	 allowances	 and	 windfall	 profits	 that	 allow	 this	 and	 yet	they’ve	continued	to	claim	that	this	would	cost	thousands	of	jobs	in	the	US.	It’s	just	over	the	top	and	ridiculous.(…)It	is	still	hard	for	me	 to	 understand	 why	 the	 airlines	 haven’t	 taken	 a	 bit	 more	strategic	approach	to	this.	I	think	they	basically	have	gambled	on	the	 bet	 that	 they	 can	 avoid	 this	 and	 anything.”	 (Interview	28.04.2014).	A	 very	 similar	 view	 emerged	 from	 the	 interviews	 provided	 by	 the	 eNGO	community,	who	considered	 the	 industry,	but	mostly	A4A,	as	 those	actors	who	were	deciding	how	the	 issue	will	be	played	out	 in	 the	Congress.	On	one	side	 it	can	be	understood	as	a	tactic	of	an	actor	whose	arguments	were	not	accepted	by	the	 policy-makers.	 They	 may	 be	 then	 trying	 to	 diminish	 its	 initial	 bargaining	power	and	also	amplify	the	impact	of	the	rivals.	On	the	other	side,	as	shown	in	this	chapter,	the	US’s	aviation	sector	is	treated	by	the	policy-makers	in	a	special	manner	as	well,	as	it	is	able	to	engage	substantial	financial	resources	in	lobbying	activities.	The	financial	perspective	on	this	issue	has	been	well-captured	by	one	of	the	interviewees	in	the	following	words:	“From	the	perspective	of	someone	who	works	for	a	public	interest	organization,	 for	 non-profits	 and	 for	 local	 communities,	Washington	 is	a	particularly	unfriendly	place.	 In	 that	 it	 is	money	
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and	 lobbying	 power	 that	 really	 pulls	 the	 strings	 in	 Washington	and	so	we	always	seem	to	be	operating	at	a	distinct	disadvantage”	(Interview	22.05.2013).	An	eNGO	interviewee	also	argued	as	follows:	“It	 was	 the	 airline	 industry	 that	 has	 poured	 so	many	 resources,	not	just	travelling	around	the	world	to	getting	people	worked	up	but	 also	 in	 the	 US	 getting	 a	 Bill	 passed	 through	 the	 House	 of	Representatives	 without	 anyone	 noticing	 is	 no	 joke.	 They	 put,	 I	mean…	 they	 talked	 to	 435	 members	 of	 Congress,	 multiple,	multiple	times;	they	had	a	lot	of	resources	put	in	this.”	(Interview	22.03.2013)	Airlines	 for	 America’s	 strategy	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 EU	 ETS	 can	 be	 seen	 as	exemplary	 and	 followed	 a	 well-rehearsed	 scenario	 of	 gaining	 access	 to	 the	policy-makers,	 “creating	 an	 attitude”	 of	 convergence	 between	 the	 policy	 goals	and	A4A’s	goals	and	finally	persuading	the	policy-makers	to	vote	or	at	least	be	in	favour	of	the	identified	objectives	in	the	future	(Thomas	&	Hrebenar	2009).	The	lobbyists	were	very	much	focused	on	framing	the	issue	in	the	way	they	wanted	to	portray	 it,	 hence	 the	 sovereignty	 and	 infringement	 of	 international	 law	 that	were	present	 in	 their	arguments.	As	claimed	by	Baumgartner,	 lobbyists	 “spend	much	of	their	time	attempting	to	convince	others	that	their	issue	should	be	seen	in	a	particular	light”	(2007,	p.485).	Furthermore,	for	this	issue,	the	success	was	based	 not	 only	 on	 employing	 an	 effective	 strategy	 but	 also	 the	whole	 aviation	industry	played	in	accord,	as	explained	by	one	of	the	Senate	interviewees:	“Often	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 aviation	 industry,	 aviation	 industry	issues,	 you	 typically	 have	 the	 companies	 on	 one	 side	 of	 the	argument	 and	 the	 unions	 on	 the	 other	 side	 or	 you	 have	 trade	versus	passenger,	but	this	is	an	example	where	the	entire	industry	was	 unified,	 so	 it	 made	 it	 a	 lot	 easier	 for	 Congress	 to	 unify”	(01.03.2013).	Indeed,	 as	 it	 emerges	 from	 the	 interviews	with	 other	 sectoral	 organisations	 in	the	US,	there	is	a	consensus	that	A4A	was	the	lead	one	working	on	the	EU	ETS,	while	the	others	would	rely	on	its	expertise.	At	the	same	time	the	wider	unity	of	airlines,	 pilots,	 business	 aviation,	 tourist	 organisations	 or	 general	 aviation	manufacturers	made	the	opposition	in	the	US	viable.	What	is	more,	the	individual	airlines	would	remain	relatively	silent	in	the	media	as	far	as	the	opposition	to	the	
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European	scheme	is	concerned.	Two	major	US	airlines	approached	for	a	research	interview	on	the	EU	ETS	deferred	immediately	to	A4A	for	the	EU	ETS	queries.			 Furthermore,	 the	 aviation	 industry	 lobbying	 was	 issue-based,	 which	 is	seen	 as	 the	 most	 efficient	 where	 communication	 with	 policy-makers	 is	concerned	(McGrath	2005,	p.87).	Building	on	this,	and	the	fact	that	the	issue	in	question	was	quite	technical	and	involved	foreign	and	international	aviation	law,	the	 aviation	 practitioners	 were	 seen	 as	 essential	 to	 interpret	 the	 regulations.	This	 task	was	assumed	by	A4A	who	provided	Congressman	with	 their	 insights	into	 the	 process.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 aviation	 law,	 A4A	was	 seen	 as	 an	 adequate	interpreter,	 however	 according	 to	 several	 eNGO	 and	 European	 Commission	interviewees,	 the	 organisation	 would	 often	 misinterpret	 core	 ideas	 of	 the	legislation,	to	make	the	EU	ETS	look	more	costly	for	them.	Also,	the	claim	that	all	the	fees	gathered	through	the	EU	ETS	would	feed	the	EU	countries’	budgets	was	widely	 spread.	 In	 line	 with	 this,	 a	 representative	 of	 the	 EU	 Delegation	 in	Washington	underlined	 that	 their	 staff	 had	 to	 spend	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	time	“trying	to	dispel	the	untruths	that	were	circulating	[in	the	US]”	(Interview	9.04.2013).			 The	industry	must	have	been	also	aware	that	for	them	it	would	be	easier	to	block	the	application	of	the	EU	ETS	in	the	US	than	to	impact	or	challenge	the	EU	 legislation	 within	 27	 EU	 Member	 States	 who	 were	 implementing	 the	 ETS	regulations.	Apart	 from	 this,	Washington	 is	 considered	 a	 distinctively	 different	ground	 for	 lobbying	 than	Brussels,	with	different	 strategies	 and	approaches	 to	influencing	the	policy-makers	(McGrath	2005;	Woll	2006).	The	US	lobbying	style	would	be	much	more	 aggressive	 and	would	not	 necessarily	 be	 listened	 to	 in	 a	much	 “softer”	EU	world	 (Gardner	1991).	The	Congress	was	 thus	an	 immediate	venue	offering	easier	access	 for	a	more	effective	 lobbying	 impact.	As	explained	by	one	of	 the	Senate	 interviewees	who	was	close	to	 the	process	of	drafting	the	legislation:	“In	 a	 meeting	 with	 Senator’s	 Thune	 [co-sponsor	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	Prohibition	 Act]	 staff	 about	 it,	 on	 Commerce	 Committee,	 they	[senators	 and	 their	 staff]	 were	 very	 knowledgeable	 about	 the	issue,	there’s	no	question	about	that.	 I	am	sure	that	they	worked	very,	 as	do	most	of	us,	worked	very	 closely	with	 the	 industry	 to	come	 up	 with	 the	 policy	 that	 they	 actually	 put	 forward	 and	
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making	 sure	 that	 it	 was	 exactly…	 it	 was	 what	 the	 industry	wanted.”	(Interview	2.05.2014)	The	 ease	 of	 access,	 knowledge	 of	 the	 ground	 and	 a	 much	 stronger	 voice	 or	bargaining	power	being	a	corollary	of	aviation’s	contribution	to	the	US’s	GDP	and	the	fact	that	the	sector	is	a	large	employer	in	the	US,	made	the	Congress	the	most	suitable	venue	for	the	airlines	to	argue	their	points	with	regards	to	EU	ETS.	Even	though	it	was	a	European	regulation	that	they	were	opposing,	the	US	was	much	more	fertile	soil	for	their	arguments.		
6.5 Conclusions			 This	 chapter	 has	 shown	 that	 there	 was	 no	 one,	 exclusive	 factor	 that	exacerbated	the	US	in	terms	of	aviation’s	inclusion	into	the	EU	ETS	but	rather	a	variety	of	issues	that	played	their	roles	at	different	points	of	time	and	at	different	venues.	The	data	analysed	demonstrates	that	 in	the	US	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation	was	very	much	a	political,	rather	than	a	legal	issue,	which	is	embodied	by	intense	opposition	to	the	EU	ETS	even	after	the	CJEU	verdict.		 First	of	all,	portraying	the	EU	ETS	as	a	tax	strongly	affected	the	Members	of	 Congress	 as	 taxes	 are	 viewed	 as	 inherently	 national	 instruments.	 This	mechanism	of	redefining	the	issue	so	it	 is	well-accommodated	by	the	discourse	sitting	 at	 the	 institution	 lobbied	has	been	explored,	with	 similar	 results,	 in	 the	Canadian	context	(Pralle	2003,	p.242).	It	is	not	possible	to	unambiguously	state	whether	 the	 tax-discourse	 was	 the	 real	 concern	 that	 the	 industry	 has	 had	 or	rather	a	rhetorical	tool	that	aroused	the	interest	of	the	Congress.	In	the	analysed	context,	where	aviation	is	largely	exempt	from	taxes	(mostly	international	taxes,	while	 covering	 some	 domestic	 taxes)	 and	 its	 externalities	 would	 be	 split	 into	various	fees,	the	tax	narrative	seems	to	be	instrumental	here.	The	airlines	were	underlining	 how	 much	 they	 are	 contributing	 to	 the	 US	 budget	 and	 another	financial	 burden	 would	 render	 their	 operations	 below	 profit	 margin.	 The	 tax	narrative	also	ensured	 large	support	 for	 their	disagreement	with	 the	EU	policy	and	maintained	the	issue	high	in	the	agenda.	The	presentation	of	the	EU	ETS	as	a	tax	has	clearly	been	what	Hajer	sees	as	producing	and	reproducing	of	 “specific	ensembles	 of	 ideas,	 concepts	 and	 categorization"	 (Hajer	 1995,	 p.44).	 The	 “tax	ensemble”	 produced	 played	 extremely	 effectively	 in	 the	 US.	 Additionally,	 the	
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sovereignty	 arguments	 reinforced	 the	 tax	 narrative.	 Furthermore,	 this	production	means	that	certain	facts	are	omitted	and	only	one	discourse	solidifies	and	solutions	become	preconfigured	as	a	part	of	the	narrative	(Hajer	1995,	p.44;	Fogel	 2007).	 Provided	 that	 the	 EU	 ETS	 was	 presented	 as	 a	 tax	 imposed	 by	 a	foreign	government	on	US	companies	and	on	activities	exercised	outside	of	 the	EU	territory	the	predetermined	solution	had	to	be	strong	opposition.		 Secondly,	attention	needs	to	be	given	also	to	the	international	dimension	of	the	US	opposition.	The	discussion	concerning	the	EU	ETS	that	was	taking	place	in	 the	 US	 would	 not	 take	 into	 consideration	 alternative	 scenarios	 to	 actually	opposing	 the	 scheme	 as	 it	 was.	 As	 explained	 above,	 the	 Americans	 were	 not	interested	 in	 introducing	 equivalent	 market-based	 measures	 or	 any	 type	 of	environmental	 charges	 that	 would	 reciprocate	 the	 EU’s	 steps.	 Although	reciprocity	 in	 international	 relations	 is	 usually	more	 likely	 (Keohane	 1986),	 it	did	 not	 occur	 in	 the	 analysed	 case.	 One	 of	 the	 reasons	 was	 probably	 the	Waxman-Markey	 proposal’s	 failure	 and	 poor	 interest	 in	 setting	 up	 a	 federal	market-based	measure	for	aviation.	Moreover,	the	US	would	then	break	the	line	of	 their	 international	 partners	 co-opposing	 the	 scheme	 and	 could	 be	 seen	 as	compliant	with	 the	EU	requirements.	Other	 than	 that,	 imposition	of	 charges	or	authoring	 a	 new	 scheme	 would	 be	 much	 more	 resources-consuming	 than	flagging	up	a	strong	opposition	that	would	pressure	the	EU	to	change	its	policy	concerning	the	scope	of	application	of	the	scheme.			 Thirdly,	 the	 issues	 surrounding	 sovereignty	 that	 are	 presented	 in	 this	chapter	 might	 not	 be	 easily	 extrapolated	 to	 other	 US	 sectors.	 As	 it	 has	 been	explained,	the	aviation	community	enjoys	a	strong	position	at	the	Congress	and	apart	 from	 that	 it	 is	 one	 of	 the	 last	 businesses	 whose	 regulation	 (or	 at	 least	regulation	of	 the	 international	 civil	 aviation)	 is	 inherently	 based	on	 inter-state	agreements	rather	than	anything	else.	The	sovereignty	frame	was	easily	related	to	the	presentation	of	the	EU	ETS	as	a	tax	and	created	a	coherent	narrative	that	was	not	countered	effectively	with	the	EU	or	eNGOs	arguments.				 On	a	broader	canvas	of	policy-making,	more	issues	come	into	play.	The	EU	policies	in	relation	to	climate	change	have	been	successfully	evolving	for	the	past	40	years.	 If	one	takes	into	account	the	first	Environmental	Action	Plan,	and	the	fight	 for	 low-carbon	society,	 ambitious	climate	policies	have	definitely	been	an	
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7.1 Introduction			 The	 EU	 ETS	 case	 offers	 one	 of	 the	 few	 examples	 of	 a	 structured	 and	persistent	 country-based	 coalition	 characterised	 by	 otherwise	 heterogeneous	interests,	 which	 all	 together	 coordinated	 an	 attempt	 to	 block	 an	 EU	 policy.	Furthermore,	the	case	illuminates	the	role	of	industry	in	derailing	application	of	the	EU	carbon	scheme	to	aviation.	This	chapter	expands	the	global	dimension	of	the	 explanation	 by	 presenting	more	 actors	 involved	 in	 the	 case	 and	 analysing	their	 reaction	 to	change.	Apart	 from	creating	a	whole	new	block	of	opposition,	the	 actors	 presented	 here	 have	 also	 strongly	 influenced	 understandings	 and	interpretations	of	the	EU	Member	States,	and	at	the	level	of	EU	institutions,	but	also	 affected	 the	 EU-US	 bilateral	 discussion	 on	 the	 EU	 ETS.	 Analysis	 of	 the	coalition	 also	 shows	 the	 extent	 to	which	 individual	 EU	Member	 States	 became	involved	in	the	debate	due	to	threats	they	faced.			 This	 chapter	 focuses	 thus	 firstly	 on	 the	 so-called	 ‘coalition	 of	 the	unwilling’,	secondly	on	the	simultaneous	involvement	of	BRIC	countries	(Brazil,	Russia,	 India	 and	 China)	 and	 thirdly	 on	 aircraft	 manufacturers’	 influence	 on	policy-making	 in	 the	 European	Union.	 At	 the	 theoretical	 level,	 this	 part	 draws	mostly	on	theories	related	to	policy	networks.	Provided	that	various	actors	are	taken	 into	 consideration	 here,	 mapping	 their	 involvement	 in	 an	 institutional	context	(Klijn	1997)	is	crucial	for	drawing	any	further	conclusions.	This	mapping	is	also	important	for	looking	at	the	governance	side	of	the	issue	characterised	by	continuous	 negotiation	 taking	 place	 between	 industry	 and	 civil	 society	 (Marks	1993).	The	chapter	also	engages	with	interpretive	policy	analysis,	specifically	by	looking	at	how	discourses	concerning	the	 inclusion	of	aviation	 into	the	EU	ETS	have	been	produced	by	opposing	countries.		 The	EU	ETS	Prohibition	Bill	analysed	in	the	previous	chapter	was	one	of	many	pronouncements	against	the	EU	ETS,	however	the	research	literature	has	focused	primarily	on	the	US	(Malina	et	al.	2012;	Scott	&	Rajamani	2012)	rather	than	 other	 international	 actors.	 This	 chapter	 addresses	 this	 gap	 by	 examining	
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more	closely	arguments	of	 the	non-EU	states	and	 industry,	 the	steps	 they	 took	and	the	results	they	achieved.			 Similarly	to	the	US,	 in	other	countries	aviation	is	a	sector	that	has	so	far	received	 exceptional	 treatment.	 Although	 this	 will	 not	 be	 scrutinized	 in	 detail	here,	it	merits	mention	that	drawing	on	the	EU	ETS	experiences,	countries	such	as	China,	South	Korea,	Japan,	India,	New	Zealand,	Australia	(though	for	a	limited	time	only)	(Dirix	et	al.	2013)	were	pursuing	or	planning	implementation	of	their	own	emissions	trading	schemes.	Yet	in	parallel,	they	would	oppose	the	scheme’s	application	to	aviation.	Furthermore,	there	is	a	prevalent	feeling	in	the	aviation	sector	globally	that	issues	pertaining	to	international	aviation	regulation	should	remain	at	the	discretion	of	ICAO.	This	thinking	is	firmly	present	also	in	the	four	big	 actors	 in	 this	 case:	 as	 shown	previously,	 the	US,	 but	 as	 this	 chapter	 shows	also	China,	India	and	Russia.	These	countries	were	indicated	by	the	interviewees	both	in	the	EU	and	the	US	as	those	most	involved	in	the	issue	and	also	the	most	powerful.			 By	 zooming	 out	 and	 looking	 beyond	 EU	 –	 US	 relations,	 this	 chapter	aspires	 to	 answer	 research	 questions	 2	 and	 4.	 These	 questions	 are	 split	 and	linked	with	more	detailed	considerations	regarding	extent	to	which	the	move	of	the	EU	marks	a	change	in	the	wider	governance	of	the	aviation	industry	and	the	characteristics	of	the	EU	–	BRICs	cooperation	on	a	global	policy	for	aviation.		
7.2 Coalition	of	the	unwilling			 Accumulation	of	 tension	around	the	EU	ETS	globally	had	to	 find	 its	vent	and	in	this	case	it	was	embodied	in	a	coordinated	attempt	to	block	application	of	the	 EU	 ETS	 to	 non-EU	 carriers	 serving	 EU-bound	 international	 routes.	 This	section	examines	the	coalition	of	the	unwilling	and	its	importance	for	the	EU	ETS	inclusion	 of	 aviation.	 It	 considers	 therefore,	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	 debate	happening	outside	of	ICAO.	Due	to	confidentiality	of	the	coalition’s	meetings,	the	information	 gathered	 through	 interviews	 is	 not	 exhaustive	 and	 collected	indirectly	 but	 allows	 analysis	 when	 supplemented	 with	 media	 content	 (for	details	see:	Chapter	3).		 The	coalition	of	the	unwilling	has	never	been	a	formally	organized	group	but	 rather	 a	 loose	 alliance	 of	 countries	 bound	 by	 a	 belief	 that	 the	 inclusion	 of	
Chapter	7:	The	voices	of	the	unwilling:	the	opposition	to	the	EU	ETS	on	a	global	scale	
	 179	
non-EU	 routes	 into	 the	 scheme	 was	 against	 the	 principles	 of	 the	 Chicago	Convention	and	infringed	non-EU	countries’	sovereignty.	The	name	of	the	group	was	 most	 probably	 coined	 by	 an	 EC	 high-ranking	 official	 who	 wanted	 to	underline	 the	 negative	 approach	 of	 the	 coalitionists.	 This	 was	 then	 quickly	picked	 up	 by	 the	media	 (Interview	 29.04.2014).	 The	 initiative	 to	 establish	 the	coalition	is	not	officially	attributed	to	any	of	the	group’s	participants	but	some	of	the	 interviewees,	 especially	 those	 based	 in	 the	 EU,	 saw	 the	 US	 playing	 an	important	 role	 in	 the	process.	For	example,	an	EC	 interviewee	claimed:	 “it	was	the	US	that	to	a	large	extent	organized	the	coalition	of	the	unwilling”	(Interview	26.03.2014).	 Similarly,	 the	 American	 eNGOs	 believed	 that	 the	 coalition	 was	inspired	by	 the	US	government	and	 to	a	 large	extent	 instructed	by	 the	airlines	and	 their	 association	 (Interviews	 22.03.2013,	 24.04.2013).	 Identifying	 one	exclusive	 actor	 running	 the	 coalition	 is	 difficult	 as	 opinions	 on	 this	 leadership	vary.	As	 claimed	by	one	of	 the	 interviewees,	who	was	engaged	 in	 reporting	on	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation	since	the	very	inception	of	the	scheme:	“If	you	talk	to	the	Indians	for	example,	which	I	haven’t	but	through	sort	of	 other	 sources,	 they	will	 say	 the	 coalition	 of	 the	 unwilling	was	 their	idea,	 they	would	be	 the	main	 ones	 behind	 it.	 I	 am	 sure	 the	Americans	will	see	themselves	as	kind	of	a	 lead	force	 in	 it.	The	Russians	too,	 I	am	sure	will	come	across	as	being	a	leader	on	this	issue.	And	I	am	sure	the	Chinese	equally.”	(Interview	9.04.2014)		 There	were	several	steps	that	led	to	a	more	consolidated	answer	to	the	EU	ETS	 at	 a	 global	 level.	 Although	 some	 interviewees	 believed	 that	 it	 was	 the	American	 airline	 industry,	 represented	 by	 A4A,	 which	mobilized	 governments	internationally	this	was	dismissed	by	the	A4A	interviewee.	They	claimed	that	it	was	exclusively	the	US	authorities	that	were	engaged	in	the	coalition	and	not	the	airlines	 (Interview	 25.04.2013).	 Indeed,	 in	 the	 meetings	 of	 the	 coalition,	representatives	 of	 the	 airlines	 were	 absent	 and	 the	 invitation	 to	 attend	 was	extended	to	government	officials	only.			 Before	the	coalition	became	a	fully-fledged	undertaking	there	were	earlier	signals	that	third	countries	might	oppose	the	EU	ETS.	One	of	these	is	a	letter	that	was	 sent	 to	 the	 Ambassador	 Peter	Witt,	 Deputy	 Permanent	 Representative	 of	Germany	to	the	European	Union	on	April	6th	2007	(Germany	was	presiding	the	Council	 of	 the	 EU	 in	 that	 period)	 signed	 by	 the	 representatives	 of	 Australia,	
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Canada,	 China,	 Japan,	 Republic	 of	 Korea	 and	 the	 US	 to	 the	 EU	Member	 States	(Corporate	Europe	Observatory	2007).	The	signatories	argued:	"we	want	 to	 convey	 our	 deep	 concern	 and	 strong	 dissatisfaction	with	the	 December	 20,	 2006,	 European	 Commission	 proposal	 to	 include	international	civil	aviation	in	the	EU	ETS.	Inclusion	of	our	airlines	in	the	EU	 scheme	 would	 potentially	 violate	 EU	 Member	 State	 international	obligations	under	the	Convention	on	International	Civil	Aviation,	as	well	as	bilateral	aviation	agreements”.	This	statement	was	however	only	a	prelude	for	much	stronger	resolutions	that	were	to	come	from	an	even	larger	anti-ETS	coalition.		
7.2.1 Coalition	meetings:	from	New	Delhi	to	Washington	via	Moscow			 The	coalition	of	the	unwilling	met	officially	for	the	first	time	in	New	Delhi	in	 2011	 where	 the	 parties	 worked	 on	 a	 common	 statement	 expressing	 their	views	 on	 the	 EU	 ETS	 for	 aviation.	 The	meeting	 resulted	 in	 a	 Joint	 Declaration	(Government	 of	 India	 2011;	 GreenAir	 Online	 2011a)	 that	 was	 produced	 by	 a	large	group	of	26	countries	 that	met	between	29th	 and	30th	September	201136.	Although	the	composition	of	the	coalition	may	surprise,	its	breadth	was	probably	imperative	 to	 achieve	 the	 desired	 effects	 and	 gain	 attention	 of	 the	 EU	institutions,	 EU	 Member	 States	 and	 international	 media.	 As	 one	 of	 the	Commission’s	 interviewees	 summarised:	 “they	 could	 not	 entertain	 such	 an	agreement	unless	China	and	India	were	part	of	it,	again	for	obvious	competitive	reasons”	(Interview	28.04.2014).		 The	Joint	Declaration	expresses	views	that	the	opposing	countries	hold	on	the	 illegality	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	 and	 call	 the	 Aviation	 Directive	 “inconsistent	 with	applicable	 international	 law”	 (Government	 of	 India	 2011).	 The	 document	 also	underlines	 that	 ICAO	 is	 the	body	 that	 should	 tackle	 this	 issue	 and	promises	 to	discuss	measures	to	counter	the	EU	initiative	(Green	Air	Online	2011).	Although	quite	 balanced	 in	 its	 message,	 it	 warns	 that	 “the	 members	 present	 most	importantly	 decided	 to	 intend	 to	 continue	 to	 work	 together	 to	 oppose	 the	imposition	of	the	EU	ETS	on	our	operators	and	invite	any	other	State	to	associate																																																									36The	Declaration	was	 signed	 by	 representatives	 of:	 Argentine	Republic,	 Brazil,	 Canada,	 China,	Chile,	Colombia,	Cuba,	Egypt,	India,	Japan,	Republic	of	Korea,	Malaysia,	Mexico,	Nigeria,	Paraguay,	Peru,	 Philippines,	 Qatar,	 Russian	 Federation,	 Saudi	 Arabia,	 Singapore,	 South	 Africa,	 Thailand,	Turkey,	United	Arab	Emirates	and	United	States	of	America.	Five	of	the	countries	present	(Chile,	Cuba,	Paraguay,	Peru	and	the	Philippines)	do	not	have	any	obligations	under	the	EU	ETS	as	at	the	moment	of	signing	the	declaration	they	had	no	carriers	serving	EU	destinations.	
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itself	 with	 this	 Declaration”	 (Government	 of	 India	 2011).	 The	 open	 formula	proposed	resulted	in	later	changes	to	the	composition	of	the	group.	It	has	shown	that	 the	 coalition	was	not	 a	 one	 off	meeting	 but	 had	 a	 longer-term	 strategy	 in	mind.	The	coalition	also	 features	a	certain	 level	of	polycentricism	where	actors	operate	 autonomously	 and	 transnationally,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 are	interdependent	 (Hajer	 &	 Versteeg	 2005b).	 This	 interdependence	 has	 been,	exactly	as	argued	by	Hajer	and	Versteeg,	not	the	absence	of	rules,	but	rather	lack	of	“consensus	about	which	rules	should	be	applied”	(2005b,	p.341).	Indeed,	the	CJEU	 ruled	 that	 the	 inclusion	 of	 aviation	 into	 the	 EU	 ETS	 has	 been	 lawful,	however	 the	 coalition	 of	 the	 unwilling	would	 still	 believe	 that	 it	 is	 against	 the	international	law	and	UN’s	guidance	to	give	ICAO	priority	to	tackle	regulation	of	CO2	emissions	from	aviation.			 Subsequently	the	countries	that	signed	the	Declaration	proposed	that	the	ICAO	 Council	 takes	 steps	 against	 the	 EU	 ETS,	 that	 would	 be	 in	 line	 with	 the	decisions	taken	in	New	Delhi,	which	is	an	unprecedented	way	of	dealing	with	any	problems	at	 the	 ICAO	 level	 (ICAO	2011b).	The	working	paper	submitted	 to	 the	ICAO	Council	explains:	“the	inclusion	of	international	civil	aviation	in	the	EU	ETS	violates	the	cardinal	principle	of	state	sovereignty	 laid	down	in	Article	1	of	 the	Chicago	 Convention	 viz.	 ‘the	 Contracting	 States	 recognize	 that	 every	 State	 has	complete	and	exclusive	sovereignty	over	the	airspace	above	its	territory’	”	(ICAO	2011b).	 Further,	 the	 paper	 implicitly	 adds	 the	 common	 but	 differentiated	responsibilities	 (CBDR)	 language	 dressed	 as	 “different	 social	 and	 economic	circumstances	of	different	States,	in	particular	developing	States”	(ICAO	2011b).	The	paper	builds	on	the	claims	made	 in	 the	Declaration:	 in	a	case	of	continued	application	of	 the	EU	ETS	 to	non-EU	 routes,	 the	opposing	 states	may	 establish	similar	 schemes	 as	 retaliatory	 measures	 (ICAO	 2011b).	 It	 expressed	 the	coalitionists’	ideas	in	a	more	pronounced	way	mentioning	possible	reciprocation.			 The	2011	actions	of	the	coalition	showed	however,	that	opposition	to	the	EU	ETS	 for	aviation	was	not	a	series	of	 fragmented	pronouncements	 that	were	spatially	and	politically	disconnected	but	evolved,	for	the	first	time,	into	a	semi-formal	(no	steering	 institution,	but	official	declarations)	body	objecting	to	non-EU	countries’	inclusion	in	the	scheme.	This	was	definitely	aimed	at	building	up	a	more	viable	opposition	that	could	affect	policy-makers	in	the	EU.	However,	none	
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of	 the	 interviewees	 believed	 that	 the	 Joint	 Declaration	 would	 affect	 EU	 policy	with	 regards	 to	 inclusion	 of	 aviation.	 One	 of	 the	 interviewees	 representing	 a	European	airline	claimed	that	the	EU	was	merely	trying	to	keep	up	appearances	and	did	not	reveal	how	strongly	the	coalition	has	influenced	their	Commission’s	decision-making:	“Because	it	is	quite	different	if	you	hear	from	us	that	the	Chinese	would	not	accept	the	system	as	oppose	to	Director	General	of	Civil	Aviation	 of	 China	 tells	 Connie	 Hedegaard	 “Listen,	 what	 you	thought	of,	we	are	not	going	to	buy	into	that,	forget	about	it”	that’s	far	more	credible.	That	made	them	realize	that	they	have	taken	a	step	too	far.	Of	course	they	could	not	admit	that	to	us.”	(Interview	8.04.2014)		 Not	 long	after	the	 first	meeting,	 the	coalition	convened	again	 in	Moscow	between	 21st	 and	 22nd	 of	 February	 2012.	 This	 second	meeting	 resulted	 in	 the	Moscow	 Joint	 Declaration	 signed	 by	 23	 countries	 and	 the	 composition	 of	 the	signatories	 changed	 from	 the	Delhi	 Joint	Declaration37(Russian	Aviation	2012).	The	countries	 that	did	not	 sign	 the	Declaration	have	not	provided	any	 reasons	for	 this;	 it	was	 not	 commented	 in	 the	media	 either.	 The	 tone	 of	 the	 document	approved	 in	 Russia	 was	 more	 determined	 than	 the	 Delhi	 Declaration	 and	 its	purpose	 was	 outlined	 “as	 a	 clear	 manifestation	 of	 their	 [the	 signatories]	unanimous	position	that	the	EU	and	its	Member	States	must	cease	application	of	the	 Directive	 2008/101/EC	 to	 airlines/	 aircraft	 operators	 registered	 in	 third	States”	(Russian	Aviation	2012).	In	the	period	during	which	the	coalition	met	in	Delhi	 and	 Moscow,	 the	 application	 of	 the	 Directive	 was	 however	 limited	 to	requiring	 the	 submission	 of	 emissions	 data,	 but	 no	 actual	 trading	 for	 aviation	had	been	 launched.	 In	addition,	 the	 coalition	 included	a	 list	of	possible	 actions	and	measures	that	the	coalition	was	considering	against	the	EU:	filing	application	for	 a	 resolution	 of	 dispute	 to	 ICAO,	 continue	 with	 national	 bills	 to	 prohibit	airlines	 from	 participation	 or	 using	 existing	 regulations	 against	 the	 ETS,	 hold	further	meetings	to	discuss	reciprocal	measures,	requiring	additional	data	from	EU	 carriers,	 assessing	 consistency	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	 with	 the	 WTO	 Agreements,																																																									37Canada,	Colombia,	Egypt,	Turkey,	United	Arab	States,	Qatar,	Malaysia,	Peru	were	the	countries	who	signed	the	Delhi	Declaration,	but	did	not	sign	the	Moscow	document	(Canada,	Egypt	and	the	UAE	abstained	from	signing,	though	were	present	at	the	meeting),	whereas	Armenia,	Republic	of	Belarus,	 Cameroon,	 Guatemala,	 Uganda,	 Seychelles	 joined	 the	 coalition	 of	 the	 unwilling	 at	 the	Moscow’s	meeting.	
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reviewing	Bilateral	Air	 Services	Agreements,	 and	discontinuing	negotiations	 to	improve	 operating	 rights	 for	 EU	 airlines	 (Russian	 Aviation	 2012).	 While	explaining	the	nature	of	possible	retaliatory	actions	the	Russian	Deputy	Minister	of	 Transport	 stated:	 “Every	 state	 will	 choose	 the	 most	 effective	 and	 reliable	measures,	which	will	help	 to	 cancel	or	postpone	 the	 implementation	of	 the	EU	ETS”	(Murray	2012).	The	EU	did	not	respond	to	these	threats	either.	The	lack	of	response	 might	 also	 have	 been	 caused	 by	 airlines	 of	 the	 coalition	 countries	(apart	 from	 India	 and	 China),	 as	 instructed	 and	 required	 by	 the	 EU	 Aviation	Directive,	submitting	their	CO2	emissions	data	concerning	2011	to	the	countries	where	 they	 were	 registered.	 By	 the	 deadline	 of	 March	 31st	 2012	 only	 eight	Chinese	 carriers	 who	 were	 instructed	 to	 do	 so	 by	 the	 government	 (Leung	 &	Kotoky	 2012),	 and	 two	 Indian	 airlines,	 failed	 to	 provide	 their	 figures.	Concurrently,	 around	 1200	 emission	 reports	 were	 submitted	 by	 the	 deadline	(European	Commission	2012a)	On	the	other	hand,	the	lack	of	official	statements	could	 have	 been	 offset	 by	 the	 Commission’s	 efforts	 to	 negotiate	 with	 its	international	 partners.	 As	 explained	 in	 chapter	 5,	 the	 Commission	 also	 had	internal	 issues	 pertaining	 to	 competencies	 of	 DG	 CLIMA	 and	 DG	 MOVE.	 This	could	have	influenced	reactions	to	steps	taken	by	the	coalition	of	the	unwilling.	As	explained	by	one	Commission	official	who	was	engaged	in	the	EU	ETS	file	at	the	ICAO	level:		“We	reacted	quite	strongly,	 I	would	say,	 to	that	[to	the	coalition	of	the	unwilling]	 because	 particularly	 in	 the	 context	 with	 relationship	 with	United	States	we	were	very	disappointed	 to	 see	 that	 the	United	States	was	sort	of	spearheading	this	 initiative	to	bring	all	these	countries	in	a	kind	of	alliance	against	us	and	do	 that	very…	at	 the	end	quite	an	open	and	active	way.”	(Interview	28.04.2014)		 The	 language	 employed	 and	 the	 possible	 retaliatory	 actions	 received	special	 attention	 from	 the	 European	 airline	 industry.	 For	 example	 the	 AEA	published	 a	 press	 release	 stating:	 “airlines	 must	 not	 become	 a	 target	 for	retaliatory	 action,	 triggered	 by	 a	 battle	 of	 sovereignty	 over	 European	 policy”	(AEA	2012).	Further,	its	Secretary	General	underlined:		“This	 situation	 is	 totally	 unacceptable.	 Airlines	 must	 not	 be	 taken	hostage	 by	 politicians	 or	 be	 forced	 to	 compete	 with	 serious	 market	distortions.	We	urgently	need	both	sides	to	focus	on	the	core	objective	–	managing	global	aviation	emissions	–	rather	than	on	winning	a	battle	of	sovereignty.”	(AEA	2012)	
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The	EU	again	remained	relatively	 reticent	with	 the	Climate	Commissioner	only	tweeting:	“Wonder	if	the	next	meeting	hosted	by	Saudi	Arabia	will	give	a	climate-friendly	 answer	 to	 the	 key	 question:	 what's	 your	 concrete	 alternative?”	(Hedegaard	2012).	When	one	considers	the	severity	of	the	proposed	retaliatory	actions	it	appears	that	the	EU	employed	quite	a	relaxed	strategy	in	response	to	challenges	 from	its	 international	partners.	The	EC	 interviewees	 implied	 though	that	EC	representation	at	ICAO	was	especially	very	constructive	in	improving	the	situation.	It	became	apparent	to	ICAO-based	EC	officials	that	simple	enforcement	of	 the	 EU	 ETS	 and	 imposing	 fines	 for	 non-compliance	 would	 not	 solve	 the	problem.	This	however	did	not	mean	that	 there	were	any	changes	made	to	 the	Directive	to	accommodate	issues	mentioned	in	the	Moscow	Declaration.		 The	most	recent	meeting	took	place	in	Washington	31st	July	2012	and	was	hosted	by	the	State	Department	and	the	Department	of	Transportation	(GreenAir	Online	2012a)	and	was	populated	by	representatives	of	17	countries:	Australia,	Brazil,	Canada,	Chile,	China,	Colombia,	India,	Japan,	South	Korea,	Mexico,	Nigeria,	Russia,	Saudi	Arabia,	Singapore,	South	Africa	and	the	United	Arab	Emirates	and	the	hosts,	the	US.	A	day	before	the	meeting	a	press	teleconference	was	held	with	Senior	Administration	Official	from	the	US	Department	of	State,	where	they	said:	“The	purpose	of	this	[coalition]	meeting	is	different.	I	would	not	regard	this	as	a	third	in	the	line	of	the	Moscow	and	Delhi	meetings.	The	purpose	of	this	meeting	is	really	to	try	to	explore	whether	there	might	be	a	basis	for	 a	 global	 solution	 to	 addressing	 greenhouse	 gas	 emissions	 from	aviation	and	a	global	solution	that	would	include	the	EU	and	would	set	aside	or	would	include	the	setting	aside	of	the	ETS	as	applied	to	foreign	carriers.”	(US	Department	of	State	2012b)	The	approach	taken	in	Washington	was	much	more	conciliatory,	even	though	the	date	 of	 the	 meeting	 coincided	 with	 the	 US	 Senate	 Committee	 on	 Commerce,	Science	and	Transportation	markup	hearing	on	the	EU	ETS	Prohibition	Act	that	accepted	the	bill.	This,	in	practice	meant	further	exacerbation	of	the	conflict	over	the	 ETS.	 The	 representatives	who	met	 in	Washington	DC	 did	 not	 produce	 any	concluding	 document,	 and	 the	 meeting	 was	 called	 “an	 informal	 small	 group	conversation”	(US	Department	of	State	2012a).	However	even	if	a	more	relaxed	format	was	used,	the	EU	officials	were	not	invited,	but	only	called	and	informed	“in	a	very	broad	sense	what	transpired	in	the	meeting”(US	Department	of	State	2012a).	 The	 aforementioned	 Senior	 Administration	 Official	 stated	 after	 the	
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meeting	 that	 it	 “confirmed	 the	 very	 solid	 and	 strong	 opposition	 to	 the	 ETS	 as	applied	 to	 foreign	 carriers,	 but	 also	 indicated	 that	 there	 was	 a	 lot	 of	 interest	among	 countries	 in	 continuing	 to	work	on	 the	 suite	of	 activities	 that	 ICAO	has	been	working	on”	 (US	Department	of	 State	2012a).	The	European	Commission	reacted	 to	 the	 outcomes	 as	 follows:	 “We	 welcome	 that	 they	 expressed	 their	commitment	 for	 concrete	 action	 and	 progress	 at	 ICAO,	 and	 hope	 this	 will	accelerate	 the	 process	 towards	 a	 global	 solution	 –	we	 have	 always	 pushed	 for	this,	 as	 you	 know”	 (GreenAir	 Online	 2012a)	 and	 also	 IATA	 appreciated	 “the	positive	outcomes	of	the	Washington	meeting”	(IATA	2012).		 After	 the	Washington	meeting,	 the	 coalition	did	 not	meet	 again.	 The	US	Department	of	State	Senior	Administration	Official	explained	 in	a	post-meeting	briefing:	“In	terms	of	whether	we	are	meeting	again	in	this	group	or	in	any	other	grouping,	we	haven’t	made	any	decision	on	that	yet.	I	think	it’s	entirely	possible,	but	really	–	there	isn’t	any	decision.”	(US	Department	of	State	2012a).	Given	that	the	 Commission	 announced	 suspension	 of	 enforcement	 of	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	non-EU	countries	 into	 the	EU	ETS	on	November	12th	2012	and	the	scheme	has	not	been	applied	to	non-EU	countries	ever	since,	the	coalition	apparently	did	not	see	the	exigency	to	meet	as	its	objective	to	delay	or	block	implementation	of	the	EU	ETS	to	third	countries	was	accomplished.	The	EU	deferred	enforcement	of	the	EU	ETS	for	aircraft	operators	flying	into	and	out	of	the	EU	to	assure	progress	at	the	ICAO	level	in	light	of	steps	taken	by	the	ICAO	Council	 in	November	2012	(a	promise	 to	 establish	 a	 high	 level	 policy	 group	 on	 market-based	 measures	 for	aviation	 and	 explicit	 references	 to	 a	 global	 MBM	 for	 aviation)	 (European	Commission	 2012b;	 European	 Commission	 2012c).	 No	 matter	 how	 positively	framed	the	official	statement	was,	the	EC’s	decision	was	a	sign	of	the	European	surrender	 and	 ceding	 to	 pressures	 while	 the	 opposing	 parties	 achieved	 their	goal:	 suspension	 of	 application	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	 on	 flights	 into	 and	 out	 of	 EU	airports.		 In	 terms	 of	 policy	 networks,	 the	 coalition	 of	 the	 unwilling	 brings	additional	dynamics	to	the	issue	as	it	adds	an	external	pressure	group	while	its	members	are	also	ICAO	Members	and	have	bilateral	air	service	agreements	with	the	EU	Member	States.	These	dynamics	are	even	more	important	because	the	EU,	wanting	 to	regulate	aviation	emissions,	paradoxically	precipitated	creation	of	a	
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previously	absent	coalition.	The	coalition’s	“members”	(there	was	not	any	formal	process	of	joining	the	coalition	and	the	only	proof	that	a	country	would	be	in	the	coalition	 would	 be	 their	 delegates	 signing	 one	 of	 the	 coalition’s	 declarations)	were	 concurrently	meeting	 at	 the	 ICAO-related	 venues	 and	 events	where	 they	would	lobby	against	the	EU	ETS.	All	of	them	were	also	able	to	discuss	the	issues	while	 meeting	 at	 ICAO	 Council	 meetings38.	 The	 collective	 efforts	 of	 the	 whole	coalition	 orchestrated	 production	 of	 declarations	 that	 poignantly	 sum	 up	 the	opposition’s	 core	 issues	 and	 they	 received	 much	 more	 attention	 than,	 for	example,	 reservations	 to	 the	 ICAO	 Resolutions.	 Meetings	 of	 the	 coalition	introduced	a	sense	of	urgency	and	also	brokered	unprecedented	unity	given	the	highly	 varied	 membership	 of	 the	 group.	 The	 coalition	 also	 demonstrates	 that	nation	states	remain	pivotal	for	governance	of	climate	change	(Held	et	al.	2011).	Giddens	 (2008)	 claims	 that	 states	 should	 incentivise	 solutions	 (acting	 as	enablers)	for	collective	action	problems,	however	here	the	situation	is	reversed.	The	 solution	 chosen	 by	 one	 block,	 the	 EU,	 is	 contested	 by	 another	 block	 of	countries.	The	opposition	employs	a	mechanism	of	out-of-ICAO	consultations	to	underline	 its	mandate	 to	object	 the	EU	ETS.	 It	 can	be	 considered	as	 creating	 a	new	 venue	 or	 rather	 a	 non-venue	 with	 high	 level	 of	 openness	 towards	 like-minded	countries,	who	were	invited	to	join	any	time.	Paradoxically,	this	in	turns	redirects	attention	away	from	EU	ETS	to	the	global	deliberations	where	a	wider	participation	 is	required	and	has	to	be	guaranteed	for	binding	decisions.	There	are	several	features	that	allow	the	coalition	of	the	unwilling	to	be	classified	as	a	policy	community:	the	structure	of	the	coalition	is	quite	loose,	the	membership	is	relatively	open	(as	long	as	a	potential	coalitionist	is	willing	to	oppose	the	EU	ETS,	hence	 shares	 the	 policy	 beliefs),	 and	 finally	 that	 the	 countries’	 interests	 are	persistent	over	time	(Rhodes	2006).	Although	the	hierarchical	dimension	of	the	coalition	 is	 difficult	 to	 analyse	 due	 to	 the	 community’s	 reserved	 character	 (no	official	hierarchy,	limited	press	appearances,	lack	of	a	face	leading	the	coalition),	it	 seems	 that	 the	 core	 of	 the	 group	 was	 constituted	 by	 the	 most	 powerful	
																																																								38In	the	period	between	2011	and	2013	the	ICAO	Council	there	was	a	significant	overlap	between	the	 countries	 serving	 a	 three-year	 mandate	 at	 the	 Council	 and	 the	 countries	 engaged	 in	 the	coalition	 of	 the	 unwilling,	 among	 them:	 Argentina,	 Brazil,	 China,	 India,	 United	 Arab	 Emirates,	United	States.	
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members	 (China,	 India,	 Russia,	 US)	 and	 the	 other	members	were	 delivered	 by	the	four	countries.			 From	 an	 interpretive	 policy	 analysis	 perspective,	 the	 coalition	 of	 the	unwilling	 poses	 several	 problems.	 Firstly,	 being	 covered	 by	 Chatham	 House	Rule39,	 the	 coalition	 did	 not	 say	 much	 about	 itself	 and	 its	 members	 were	extremely	 reserved	 about	 the	 outcomes	 of	 the	 meetings	 beyond	 the	 official	declarations	 thus	 the	 “possibilities	 of	 multiple	 interpretations”	 (Yanow	 2000,	p.5)	 seen	 as	 prerequisite	 for	 interpretive	 methods	 are	 limited.	 The	 meaning-making	processes	of	the	addressees	of	the	coalition’s	messages	are	also	blurred	given	that	 the	EU	did	not	want	to	officially	comment	on	the	coalition’s	steps.	 It	gives	however,	 a	hint	 that	 the	 issue	was	 regarded	as	difficult	 to	deal	with,	 and	provided	 severe	 retaliatory	 options.	Another	 argument	 supporting	 this	 view	 is	split	 opinions	 on	 how	 to	 deal	with	 the	 opposition	 between	DG	 CLIMA	 and	DG	MOVE.	 This	 poses	 further	 questions	 pertaining	 to	 framing	 the	 policy	 issue	 in	question	by	 the	key	actors	 taking	part	 in	 the	debate.	The	EU-branded	 frame	of	“the	 unwilling”	 is	 in	 stark	 contrast	 with	 the	 coalition’s	 efforts	 to	 direct	 the	discussion	on	emissions	trading	for	aviation	to	ICAO.	The	coalition	however,	did	not	 manage	 to	 label	 itself	 more	 positively	 and	 until	 today	 it	 is	 referred	 to	 as	“unwilling”.	 Provided	 that	 the	 frames	 “direct	 attention	 towards	 some	elements	while	 simultaneously	 diverting	 attention	 from	 other	 elements”	 (Yanow	 2000,	p.11)	the	EU	has	managed	to	portray	the	opposition	as	a	negative	component	of	the	 debate,	 which	 was	 reinforced	 by	 Hedegaard’s	 tweet	 about	 the	 lack	 of	constructive	 proposals	 coming	 from	 the	 coalition.	 The	 coalitionists,	 to	 some	extent	pressured	by	the	aviation	industries	in	their	countries,	could	have	actually	been	 satisfied	 with	 the	 EU	 framing.	 It	 clearly	 conveyed	 their	 unwillingness	 to	accept	 the	EU’s	aviation	emissions	regulation	plans.	As	 the	next	 section	shows,	this	 unwillingness	 had	 various	 faces	 depending	 on	 the	 opposing	 parties’	circumstances.	






















China	 Sovereignty		 Suspension	of	the	Airbus	contracts		 Possibility	of	cancelling	Airbus	orders	(pressure	on	individual	Member	States)	
Yes		 Yes	Fees	perceived	as	a	barrier	for	development		
	The	four	countries	were	identified	through	the	media	on	one	side	and	secondly	by	interviewees	both	in	Europe	and	the	US.	Respondents	were	asked	to	list	the	most	 significant	 actors	 for	 the	 EU	 ETS	 file	 internationally	 and	 the	 BRICs	were	almost	 invariably	 mentioned.	 One	 of	 the	 airline-related	 interviewees	 saw	 the	BRICs	as	even	more	outspoken	than	the	US	in	the	EU	ETS	file:		“to	be	fair,	the	US	for	quite	some	time	was	rather	quiet	on	the	EU	ETS.	So	when	 the	 opposition	 really	 started	 it	 was	 more	 China,	 Russia,	 India,	Brazil	 that	 started	 what	 then	 became	 the	 Delhi	 and	 Moscow	Declaration”	(Interview	25.03.2014).		Although	Brazil	was	not	too	vocal	as	 far	as	 individual	actions	are	concerned,	 it	was	a	part	of	the	coalition	of	unwilling	(all	 four	signed	both	Joint	Declarations)	and	 interviewees	 collectively	 talked	 about	 BRIC,	 hence	 Brazil	 is	 given	considerably	 less	 space	 here	 but	 it	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 committed	 to	 the	 issue,	though	more	on	the	governmental	than	airline	side	(de	Paula	Domingos	2012).		 A	 common	 reason	 for	 opposition	 coming	 from	 BRIC	 is	 the	 situation	 of	their	aviation	industries	and	the	industries’	prospects	for	growth.	Although	this	appears	 to	apply	mostly	 to	China	and	 India,	 the	Russian	and	Brazilian	aviation	markets	are	expanding	quickly	too,	with	Brazil	being	the	fastest	growing	in	Latin	America	 (Airbus	2013).	According	 to	Airbus	estimates,	aviation	 is	a	sector	 that	exemplifies	relative	convergence	theory	(2013),	which	in	this	case	means	that	in	nations	whose	propensity	to	fly	 is	 lower	now	(emerging	countries),	 the	growth	of	 traffic	 will	 be	 stronger	 than	 in	 developed	 countries,	 where	 flying	 is	 an	established	 way	 of	 travelling.	 This	 dynamic	 has	 been	 already	 visible	 at	 ICAO	when	 developing	 countries	 were	 able	 to	 outvote	 the	 traditionally	 leading	developed	countries	group	(see:	Chapter	5).	
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	 Furthermore,	 BRICs	 are	 also	 seen	 in	 general	 as	 less	 proactive	 towards	climate	change.	Their	approach	to	curbing	emissions	can	be	seen	as	ambivalent.	As	 explained	 by	 one	 of	 the	 EC	 interviewees:	 “I	 think	 the	US	 industry	 is	 not	 as	fundamentally	opposed	to	a	scheme	like	this	as	the	Chinese,	the	Russians	and	the	Brazilians	 because	 there	 you	 have	 the	 common	 but	 differentiated	responsibilities	 (CBDR)	 argument”	 (Interview	 26.03.2014).	 CBDR	 has	 been	called	a	“statement	of	compromise	between	the	South	reflecting	concerns	about	equity	on	the	part	of	Southern	nations	and	the	reluctance	of	Northern	countries	to	assume	total	responsibility	for	addressing	the	climate	problem	(Fisher	2012,	p.130).	 CBDR-related	 arguments	 are	 even	 stronger	 for	 China,	 India	 and	 Brazil	that	are	members	of	G77,	a	grouping	established	in	1964	that	gathers	developing	countries	 and	 helps	 them	 coordinate	 common	 positions	 in	 United	 Nations	structures.	 The	 CBDR	 principle	means	 for	 BRICs	 not	 only	 that	 they	 should	 be	provided	 with	 special	 consideration	 for	 their	 circumstances	 but	 also	 expect	financial	and	technological	assistance	as	well	as	leadership	from	the	global	North	(Harris	2012).	This	however	further	translates	into	BRICs,	and	especially	China,	opposing	any	legally	binding	emission	reduction	targets	(Schröder	2012,	p.103).	Also	 India	 subscribes	 very	much	 to	 this	 idea	 (Fisher	 2012).	 In	 the	 EU	ETS	 file	BRICs	simply	translated	the	CBDR	principle	into	their	exclusion	from	the	scheme	and	wanted	to	move	any	negotiations	on	a	global	measure	for	aviation	to	ICAO.	Strategically	however	 the	move	towards	 ICAO	did	not	have	 to	promise	an	easy	recognition	of	the	CBDR	principle.	As	argued	in	the	literature	“the	international	climate	 regime	 works	 under	 differentiated	 premises,	 through	 the	 principle	 of	common	 but	 differentiated	 responsibilities	 and	 respective	 capabilities	(CBDRRC),	whereas	equal	treatment	is	the	general	rule	in	the	ICAO”	(Romera	&	van	 Asselt	 2015,	 pp.260–261).	 If	 the	 CBDR	 were	 to	 overwrite	 the	 equal	treatment	principle,	 it	would	 then	happen	 through	 the	UNFCCC	process	 rather	than	ICAO.	The	CBDR	seems	to	become	here	yet	another	rhetorical	tool	used	to	oppose	 inclusion.	Also	 the	EU	had	been	 explaining	 that	 given	 the	 specificity	 of	the	 regulated	 sector,	 the	 equal	 treatment	 cause	 should	 prevail	 in	 EU	 ETS	inclusion	 with	 provisions	 for	military	 flights	 and	 consideration	 for	 de	minimis	principle	 (exclusion	of	small	emitters).	Even	 if	 there	had	been	EU	stakeholders	who	wanted	to	see	amendments	to	the	Aviation	Directive	that	aimed	at	including	
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CBDR	 language,	 they	 have	 never	 been	 accepted	 (Romera	 &	 van	 Asselt	 2015,	p.277).			 As	 far	 as	 carriers	 are	 concerned,	 one	 of	 the	 EC	 interviewees	 while	commenting	 on	 the	 CBDR	 issue	 stated:	 “Chinese	 carriers,	 Indian	 carriers,	 they	feel	they	should	have	a	right	to	grow	in	the	future”	(Interview	28.04.2014).	The	ETS	 is	 viewed	 by	 them	 as	 an	 obstacle	 to	 the	 growth	 pathway.	 This	 is	 well	illustrated	 by	 the	 reservations	 to	 the	 ICAO	 Resolution	 A37-17/2	 concerning	climate	change	submitted	by	Argentina,	which	also	contained	an	appendix,	where	a	declaration	by	a	group	of	developing	countries41	was	attached.	The	declaration,	apart	from	mentioning	at	various	points	the	CBDR	principle,	also	sheds	light	on	understandings	 held	 by	 developing	 countries	 on	 emissions	 reductions	 through	emissions	trading:		“So	 why	 is	 it	 that	 large	 developing	 countries	 like	 China,	 Brazil,	India,	 etc.	 have	 problem	 in	 agreeing	 to	 this	 declaration	 in	 its	present	 form?	This	 is	because	we	do	not	want	 to	seal	 the	 fate	of	our	future	generation	and	deprive	them	of	the	economic	benefits	of	 aviation	 solely	 created	by	 the	developed	 countries.	We	would	like	our	future	generations	to	reap	the	benefits	of	development	as	enjoyed	 by	 certain	 developed	 nations,	 we	 must	 find	 more	innovative	solutions	to	the	problem	of	climate	change	rather	than	putting	a	cap	on	our	growth.”	(ICAO	2010a)		 It	 has	 also	 been	 claimed	 that	 BRIC	 self-interest	 would	 not	 be	 strong	enough	to	persuade	them	to	pledge	any	significant	emissions	reductions	(Tian	&	Whalley	2010).	Only	if	the	financial	transfers	used	as	a	carrot,	or	tariffs	used	as	a	stick	were	 employed,	 would	 they	 agree	 to	 participate	 (Tian	 &	Whalley	 2010).	According	to	estimates,	these	financial	transfers	would	need	to	be	as	high	as	3%	of	 the	 combined	 GDP	 of	 BRICs,	 which	 makes	 this	 scenario	 rather	 improbable	(Tian	&	Whalley	2010,	p.63).	Moreover,	at	the	2009	COP15	in	Copenhagen	Brazil,	India	and	China	(Russia	was	excluded	from	this	evaluation)	were	seen	as	a	group	preventing	 a	 meaningful	 agreement:	 “they	 consistently	 blocked	 substantive	policy	 proposals	 and	 refused	 to	 reciprocate	 to	 Western	 concessions	 with	 any	policy	commitments	of	their	own”	(Dimitrov	2010,	p.796).	On	a	broader	canvas,	it	has	been	claimed	that	when	it	comes	to	climate	governance,	even	if	universal																																																									41The	filed	document	mentions	a	group	of	countries	including	“China,	India,	Brazil,	Saudi	Arabia,		Cuba	and	Libya	and	others	who	constitute	almost	a	half	of	world’s	population”(ICAO	2010a).	
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architecture	 for	 tackling	 climate	 change	 would	 be	 more	 efficient,	 this	 way	 of	proceeding	 is	 not	 feasible	 and	 thus	 international	 policy-making	 ends	 up	producing	a	system	of	fragmented	responsibilities	(Zelli	et	al.	2010;	Biermann	et	
al.	 2010).	 As	 the	 EU	 ETS	 case	 illustrates,	 BRIC	 countries	 were	 interested	 in	making	 sure	 that	 if	 one	 global	 solution	 was	 to	 be	 adopted	 for	 aviation,	 their	circumstances	were	taken	into	consideration.	This	then	meant	that	opposing	the	EU	ETS	and	trying	to	redirect	discussions	to	ICAO	were	the	only	ways	to	try	to	secure	CBDR	language	absent	from	the	Aviation	Directive.			 Another	 common	 point	 for	 Brazil,	 Russia,	 India	 and	 China	 was	 the	influence	 they	 were	 able	 to	 exert	 on	 the	 EU	 simply	 because	 they	 constitute	important	trade	partners	for	EU	Member	States.	The	EU	states	felt	threatened	by	any	retaliatory	action	that	the	BRICs	could	have	deployed.	They	were	also	more	anxious	 about	 their	 particular	 interests	 than	 the	 common	 EU	 interest42.	 An	industry	representative	saw	special	importance	of	India	and	China	with	regards	to	this	part	of	the	issue:	“Of	course	when	you	have	India	and	China	protesting	against	the	ETS	 individual	 Member	 States	 consider	 it	 very	 seriously	 even	though	they	are	supposed	to	curb	emissions.	This	 is	supposed	to	be	 the	big	goal	 to	reduce	emissions,	but	when	 I	 think	about	 jobs	and	all	these	things	it	came	first,	I	guess.”	(Interview	17.04.2014)	A	similar	view	was	offered	by	an	EC	interviewee	who	was	involved	closely	with	the	 EU	 ETS	 file	 argued	 that	 even	 though	 the	 US	 formally	 opposed	 the	 EU	 ETS	through	the	EU	ETS	Prohibition	Bill,	the	mind-set	of	the	opposing	BRICs	is	quite	different	to	the	American	one:	“At	 the	 same	 time	you’ve	got	 states	 like	China,	 India	 and	Russia,	Brazil	who	are	 looking	 to	maybe	 finding	alternative	ways	or	not	necessarily	 committed	 in	 the	 same	way	 that	 Europe	 and	 the	 US	and	 others	 might	 be	 delivering	 something	 effective	 in	 2016.”	(Interview	28.04.2014)		 Furthermore,	 the	narrative	concerning	 impact	on	 individual	EU	Member	States	was	underlined	by	a	European	Parliament	interviewee	who	focused	on	the	implementation	 phase	while	 arguing	 that	 countries	 like	 China,	 India	 or	 Russia																																																									42Brazilian	government	decided	in	the	last	moment	not	to	sign	air	service	agreement	with	the	EU	during	October	2011	EU	–	Brazil	Summit.	As	some	argue,	the	reason	for	this	was	the	EU’s	request	“not	 to	 be	 questioned	 about	 domestic	 measures	 regarding	 environmental	 actions	 in	 aviation	sector”	(de	Paula	Domingos	2012,	p.81).	
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were	 able	 to	 influence	 the	 implementation	 process,	 which	 they	 viewed	 as	political	 and	 felt	 they	 could	 therefore	 exert	 pressure	 on	 the	Member	 States	 so	bypass	EU	institutions	(Interview	22.04.2014).		 However,	when	one	looks	at	the	chronology	of	events,	it	appears	that	the	EU	 ETS	 Prohibition	 Act	 had	 a	 larger	 impact	 than	 BRIC	 actions.	 Although	 the	decision	to	suspend	the	EU	ETS	cannot	be	entirely	credited	to	the	Americans,	a	high-ranking	 EC	 interviewee	 summarised	 the	 BRIC	 activities	 in	 comparison	 to	the	US	 as	 follows:	 “None	of	 them	have	 the	 intellectual	 firepower	of	 the	United	States”	 (Interview	 16.03.2014).	 The	 “firepower”	 could	 refer	 to	 the	 legal	inventiveness	or	 soft	power	 capacities,	but	was	not	 explained	 further.	But	was	that	really	the	case?	The	following	sections	look	more	closely	at	the	involvement	of	India,	China	and	Russia	in	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation	and	their	tactics	to	oppose	the	EU	ETS.		
7.3.1 India			 Indian	involvement	in	the	EU	ETS	case	seems	to	be	built	on	more	grounds	than	that	of	the	other	three	BRICs.	New	Delhi	had	objections	to	the	infringement	of	sovereignty	over	its	territory,	lack	of	CBDR	language	in	the	Aviation	Directive	and	the	costs	the	scheme	would	entail	for	Indian	airlines.	India	also	regarded	the	scheme	as	a	unilateral	trade	measure.	This	section	unpacks	further	some	of	these	issues.		 The	 Indian	position	 in	 the	EU	ETS	 file	was	strong	and	visible	as	soon	as	the	issue	attracted	the	attention	of	policy-makers	in	non-EU	countries.	Although	official	 statements	 about	 the	EU	ETS	were	not	 as	 often	 seen	 as	 in	 for	 example	United	States,	they	leave	little	space	for	misunderstanding	the	Indian	standpoint	on	 the	 issue.	 The	 Civil	 Aviation	 Secretary	 of	 India,	 Syed	 Nasim	 Ahmad	 Zaidi	underlined:	“passengers	and	Indian	carriers	may	end	up	paying	a	few	thousand	[Rupees]	 every	 year,	 while	 EU	 will	 collect	 billions	 of	 dollars	 over	 the	 coming	years”	 (The	Economic	Times	2011).	 Similarly,	 the	 Indian	Aviation	Minister	Ajit	Singh	was	against	the	ETS	and	announced	before	the	2013	ICAO	Assembly:	“We	would	 request	 the	 delegates	 to	 oppose	 any	 unilateral	 environment	 measures	imposed	 by	 a	 state	 or	 group	 like	 the	 EU	 and	work	with	 ICAO	 to	 evolve	 global	environment	 protection	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 equity	 and	 consensus”	 (Business	
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Standard	 2012).	 One	 of	 the	 Commission	 officials	 believed	 that	 New	Delhi	was	very	 serious	 for	 this	 file:	 “the	 Indians	 took	 a	 strong	 view	 that	 ‘you	 cannot	regulate	 our	 flights	 for	 whatsoever’”	 (Interview	 16.04.2014).	 An	 interviewee	from	 the	European	Parliament	added:	 	 “I	have	always	been	 told	 that	 India	 is	 a	bigger	problem	because	China	is	negotiating,	but	India	is	just	saying	no,	we	don’t	want	to	engage	at	all”	(Interview	25.03.2014).	Indian	airlines	were	instructed	by	the	Indian	aviation	authorities	not	to	comply	with	the	EU	ETS43	and	as	a	result	of	this	 Air	 India	 and	 Jet	 Airways	 failed	 to	 submit	 their	 emissions	 data	 to	 the	European	 Commission	 (GreenAir	 Online	 2012b).	 It	 was	 the	 government	 that	decided	 to	 be	 in	 the	 front	 line	 of	 the	 opposition	 not	 the	 airlines	 themselves.	Furthermore,	that	the	first	meeting	of	the	coalition	of	the	unwilling	was	held	in	New	Delhi	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 sign	 of	 India’s	 importance	 in	 building	 up	 the	opposition.			 Before	looking	into	the	understandings	of	the	Indian	opposition	it	merits	mention	 that	 Indians	 in	 general	 did	 not	 contest	 the	 EU’s	 leadership	 in	environmental	 policy.	 As	 reported	 by	 Jain	 and	 Pandey,	 Indians	 saw	 the	 EU’s	environmental	 leadership	 as	 rather	 positive	 or	 at	 least	 would	 recognize	 its	power:	 “the	 European	 Union	 was	 considered	 a	 normative	 power	 primarily	because	of	its	role	in	global	climate	negotiations	and	trade	talks	and	described	by	some	 ‘elites’	 as	 a	 major	 player	 in	 terms	 of	 agenda	 setting	 and	 regulating	 the	norms	of	international	behaviour”	(2010,	p.204).	Also	elsewhere,	India	would	be	portrayed	as	viewing	Europe’s	 leadership	 in	positive	 terms,	however	 this	does	not	imply	simply	following	the	leader	(Torney	2014).	India	itself,	for	a	long	time	had	climate	policy	 that	has	not	been	worth	 the	name44	and	 the	EU’s	activity	 in	the	area	was	seen	in	India	as	an	inspiration.		 Given	 all	 this,	 understanding	 Indian	 resistance	 and	 then	 crafting	 a	strategy	to	accommodate	the	partner’s	needs	for	persuasive	tools	to	defuse	the	opposition	was	a	difficult	task	for	the	European	Commission:																																																										43The	 text	 of	 the	 original	 decree	 instructing	 the	 airlines	 not	 to	 comply	with	 the	 EU	ETS	 is	 not	available	but	the	Indian	officials	mentioned	the	document	several	times.	For	example,	the	Indian	Minister	of	Aviation	declared	in	his	speech	addressing	the	Parliament	in	March	2012:	“No	Indian	carrier	 is	 submitting	 them	 in	 view	of	 the	 position	 of	 the	 government.	Hence	 the	 imposition	 of	carbon	tax	does	not	arise”	(Toh	2012).	44It	 is	claimed	that	until	2008	when	the	National	Action	Plan	on	Climate	Change	was	published,	India	did	not	have	any	climate	policy	and	only	some	consideration	to	climate	change	was	given	in	policies	addressing	energy,	transport	or	land-use	changes	(Fisher	2012).	
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“It’s	 really	 difficult	 to	 know	what	 really	motivates	 them	 I	would	say,	 but	 India,	 I	 think	 it’s	 also	 this	 broader	 climate	 negotiations	and	being	a	bit	of	 a	 rebel	 in	a…	 in	general	being	 fearful,	 anxious	about	 this	 being	 a	 trade	 measure	 of	 some	 sort	 but	 also	 the	precedence	 that	 this	 could	 set	 for	 broader	 climate	negotiations.”	(Interview	28.04.2014).	This	 explanation	 is	 in	 line	with	 the	 literature	 that	 sees	 Indian	 consistency	 and	leadership	in	promoting	and	safeguarding	the	CBDR	principle	(Fisher	2012)	that	was	threatened	by	the	inclusion	of	airlines	into	the	EU	ETS	regardless	of	the	level	of	development	of	their	countries	of	registration.			 Apart	 from	 the	 CBDR	 emphasis,	 India	 employed	 also	 the	 “unilateral	measure”	language.	India	began	trying	to	derail	EU	attempts	to	include	aviation	into	the	scheme	on	its	own	at	the	COP17	in	Durban	in	2011,	where	it	proposed	additional	 agenda	 items	 in	 the	 provisional	 agenda.	 The	 proposal	 concerned	“unilateral	 trade	 measures”	 and	 explicitly	 targeted	 the	 EU	 ETS	 inclusion	 of	aviation.	As	the	then	submitted	document	explains:		“the	EU	scheme,	subject	to	a	few	limited	exceptions,	applies	to	all	airlines.	The	scheme	stands	in	violation	of	the	UNFCCC	as	it	does	not	 respect	 the	 principles	 of	 CBDR	of	 developed	 and	 developing	countries	 and	 proposes	 to	 operate	 the	 ETS	 outside	 the	 EU	boundaries	without	multilateral	or	bilateral	 consent.	Further,	EU	member	 states	 have	 the	 discretion	 to	 determine	 how	 revenues	from	the	auctioning	of	GHG	allowances	will	be	spent.”	(UN	2011)		 In	light	of	this,	India	proposed	that	“the	COP	should	decide	and	prohibit,	in	 prescriptive	 language,	 Parties	 from	 engaging	 in	 unilateral	 trade	 and	 other	measures	 in	 the	 name	 of	 climate	 protection”	 (UN	 2011).	 The	 proposal	 was	however	not	accepted.	This	did	not	kill	the	idea	of	calling	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation	a	 unilateral	 trade	measure.	 The	 “unilateralism”	 frame	 returned	 in	 2012,	when	the	Indian	environment	minister	Jayanthi	Natarajan	stated:		"I	 strongly	 believe	 that	 as	 far	 as	 climate	 change	 discussions	 are	concerned,	this	is	unacceptable	(…)	For	the	environment	ministry,	for	me	 it	 is	 a	deal	breaker	because	you	 simply	 cannot	bring	 this	into	 the	 climate	 change	 discourse	 and	 disguise	 unilateral	 trade	measures	under	climate	change”	(Mukherjee	2012).		 As	 in	 other	 countries	 that	 opposed	 the	 EU	ETS,	 so	 in	 India	 the	 aviation	sector	 also	 played	 its	 role.	 Firstly,	 the	 aviation	 industry	 saw	 the	 EU	 ETS	 as	 a	burden	to	the	growth	of	the	industry.	Given	that	the	demographic	forecasts	used	
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to	estimate	future	air	traffic	will	be	growing	in	this	area	as	Delhi,	Shanghai	and	Mumbai	will	be	the	most	populated	cities	in	the	world	after	Tokyo	(Airbus	2013,	p.26)	 the	 collateral	 growth	 in	 demand	 for	 air	 travel	 is	 almost	 certain.	 Poor	understanding	of	how	the	EU	ETS	works	(Interview	28.04.2014)	on	one	side	and	a	fear	of	a	rapid	increase	in	allowance	prices	caused	airlines’	to	oppose	inclusion	into	the	scheme.	A	second	set	of	arguments	relate	to	the	financial	situation	of	the	Indian	 carriers.	 As	 one	 of	 the	 European	 Commission	 interviewees	 stated:	 “the	poor	economic	state	of	the	airlines	has	a	lot	to	say	as	this	[the	EU	ETS	case]	came	in	an	unfortunate	time	when	some	of	the	airlines	concerned	already	were	doing	very	 poorly”	 (Interview	 28.04.2014).	 Another	 interviewee	 claimed	 that	 for	 Air	India,	the	EU	ETS	if	not	blocked,	could	have	caused	further	deterioration	of	their	situation:		“The	airline	industry	is	not	everywhere	thriving	and	if	you	are	just	about	there	and	if	a	little	bit	happens	in	addition	then,	you	are	just	falling	below.	Air	 India	has	also	problems,	not	all	 Indian	airlines,	but	 Air	 India	 specifically	 and	 some	 American	 airlines	 had	problems	 and	 these	 airlines	 were	 generally	 concerned	 that	 this	could	 happen	 because	 they	were	 struggling	 on	many	 fronts.	 (…)	That	indeed	there	would	be	a	serious	impact	on	Air	India	to	come	in	and	that	would	eat	away	the	profits.	That	is	the	main	argument	of	 the	 airlines.	 They	 don’t	 care	 so	much	 about	 the	 passengers,	 I	think	 to	 the	extent	 that	 the	airlines	would	 just	pass	on	 the	costs	and	 they	 could	 than	 basically	 have	 their	 profits	 unaffected,	 that	would	be	fine	for	them.”	(Interview	14.04.2014)			 However,	it	was	also	believed	that	some	of	the	Indian	airlines	would	think	it	unlikely	that	the	costs	of	participation	in	the	EU	ETS	could	be	passed	entirely	onto	passengers	 and	 therefore	 the	 scheme	would	 strongly	affect	 their	 finances	(Interview	 14.04.2014).	 According	 to	 the	 interviewee	 this	 information	 “was	circulated	for	all	sorts	of	strategic	reasons”	(Interview	14.04.2014).		 One	more	strand	emerges	 from	 the	 interviews	conducted	 in	 the	EU:	 the	Indian	 lack	of	 a	 coordinated	and	coherent	vision	 for	opposition	 to	 the	EU	ETS.	For	 example,	 it	 has	 been	 claimed	 that	 the	 Indians	 have	 shown	 “lack	 of	knowledge,	 lack	 of	 understanding	 of	 the	 need	 for	 the	 airline	 industry	 and	 the	interest	 of	 the	 airline	 industry	 to	 ultimately	 embrace	 this	 agenda	 [emissions	trading	 for	 aviation]”	 (Interview	 28.04.2014).	 The	 EU-Indian	 discussions	were	also	 affected	 by	 difficulties	 in	 identifying	 appropriate	 negotiating	 partners	
Chapter	7:	The	voices	of	the	unwilling:	the	opposition	to	the	EU	ETS	on	a	global	scale	
	 198	
(Interview	9.04.2014).		Apart	from	that,	during	the	whole	process	they	“felt	very	upset	that	this	coalition	of	the	unwilling	have	left	them	very	visible,	having	told	their	airlines	not	to	comply,	everyone	else	seemed	to	have	done	it	anyway	and	I	think	at	that	point	the	tactics	changed”	(Interview	16.06.2014).	The	interviewee	believed	that:	“India	wasn’t	prepared	to	take	risks	anymore	and	I	think	the	idea	of	just	having	meetings	and	discussing	it	and	then	going	away	and	doing…	 they	 weren’t	 happy,	 they	 really	 wanted	 something	guaranteed	 at	 an	 ICAO	 level	 that	wouldn’t	 leave	 them	 visible	 as	one	 of	 the	 big	 blockades	 and	 barriers	 to	 this	 happening”	(Interview	16.06.2014).	The	 guarantees	 mentioned	 by	 the	 interviewee	 were	 not	 provided	 however.	Taking	 into	 consideration	 the	 poor	 economic	 state	 of	 Indian	 airlines,	 any	penalties	would	be	more	painful	for	them	than	for	the	Chinese	carriers	that	did	not	submit	their	data	either.	It	seems	that	India	was	hoping	for	a	quick	reaction	from	 the	EU	side	and	did	not	want	 to	 see	a	protracted	dispute,	hence	 the	very	strong	language	employed	from	the	very	beginning	and	India’s	willingness	to	run	the	first	meeting	of	the	coalition	of	the	unwilling.		
7.3.2 China			 The	 importance	of	China	 in	 the	EU	ETS	debate	was	emphasised	both	by	the	EU	and	US	interviewees,	and	was	also	very	visible	in	the	media.	The	Chinese	aviation	sector	is	expected	to	enter	a	path	of	rapid	liberalization,	which	will	fuel	future	 business	 opportunities	 by	 removing	 limits	 on	 air	 services	 and	 thus	enabling	 more	 passengers	 and	 cargo	 to	 be	 transported	 (Sun	 &	 Zhang	 2014).	Liberalization	has	already	accelerated	decisively	after	China	 joined	 the	WTO	 in	2001,	 though	 in	 aviation	 the	 process	 has	 been	 slower	 than	 in	 other	 sectors.	These	circumstances	made	possible	fees	to	be	rendered	to	the	EU	central	to	the	Chinese	aviation	agenda.			 Unexpectedly,	 China	 has	 recently	 found	 itself	 in	 the	 limelight	 of	 green	policy-making	 interest	after	 it	 announced	 its	 climate	pledges	 together	with	 the	US,	 which	 were	 understood	 as	 a	 “historic”	 step	 (BBC	 2014).	 The	 Chinese	declared	that	its	carbon	emissions	will	peak	in	2030	while	the	US	set	a	target	of	reductions	at	 the	 level	of	26-28%	compared	with	2005	 levels	 to	be	reached	by	
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2025	 (White	 House	 2015).	 This	 announcement,	 albeit	 quite	 vague,	 builds	 on	several	Chinese	programs	such	as	the	national	climate	change	plan	launched	in	2007,	 and	 establishment	 of	 two	 high-level	 groups	 that	 have	 been	 working	 on	climate	issues	both	in	China	and	internationally	(Lewis	2008).	At	the	same	time,	China	has	a	strong	sense	of	applying	to	itself	the	principle	of	CBDR,	which	means	that	even	if	the	country	signed	the	Kyoto	Protocol,	as	a	developing	nation,	there	are	 no	 binding	 targets	 for	 the	 Chinese.	 Furthermore,	 China	 has	 been	 very	sensitive	 towards	 opening	 some	 of	 its	 markets,	 preferring	 protectionism.	International	 climate	 regulations	 that	 the	 country	 would	 be	 obliged	 to	 follow	were	seen	as	possibly	denting	this	protectionism.	Opposition	to	the	EU	ETS	could	have	been	conditioned	by	these	circumstances	and	was	also	very	political	rather	than	anti-environmental.			 Together	 India	 and	China	 are	used	 to	 “placing	much	greater	 interest	 on	sovereignty	 and	 non	 interference,	 and	 thereby	 limiting	 the	 appeal	 of	 the	European	approach	 to	global	 climate	governance”	 (Torney	2014,	p.2).	China	 in	general	 has	 been	 viewed	 as	 a	 laggard	 as	 far	 as	 reduction	 of	 emissions	 is	concerned	due	to	its	dependence	on	coal	(Lewis	2008).	It	has	also	been	claimed	that	 in	 order	 to	 change	 the	 current	 trend	 of	 growing	 emissions	 in	 China	 “a	substantial	 shift	 away	 from	 coal	 or	 massive	 investments	 in	 capturing	 the	 CO2	emissions	 from	 coal-based	 energy	 sources”	 would	 be	 required	 (Lewis	 2008,	p.158).	Although	China	is	taking	steps	to	limit	its	emissions,	similar	to	the	case	of	the	 US,	 the	 EU	 ETS	 touched	 on	 the	 sensitive	 issue	 of	 authority	 over	 state	territory.			 One	 of	 the	 EC	 interviewees	 saw	 the	 Chinese	 two-way	 approach	 as	 a	governance	 issue	 since	 the	 country	 lacks	 a	 more	 structured	 framework	 to	discuss	 climate	 change	 issues	 on	 various	 levels	 and	 to	 enable	 communication	between	them:		“China	 is	 establishing	 its	 nine	 emissions	 trading	 pilots	 (…),	 they	take	climate	change	seriously	and	notably	because	they	are	going	to	 suffer	worse	 effects	 probably	 than	 Europe	 and	 America	 from	what	we	are	committing	ourselves	to	with	current	emissions.	But	this	 doesn’t	 necessarily	 carry	 through	 to	 the	 aviation	 officials,	which	brings	up	the	issue	of	governance.”	(Interview	16.04.2014)	Another	interviewee	also	saw	the	issue	as	important	and	believed	that	in	China	
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there	 are	 difficult	 internal	 divisions	 between	 regions.	 These	 tend	 to	 hamper	enactment	 of	 even	 domestic	 legislation	 across	 the	 country,	 not	 to	 mention	international	 negotiations	 in	 a	 highly	 mobile	 aviation	 sector	 (Interview	2.04.2014).		 An	interviewee	based	at	the	European	Parliament	for	more	than	10	years	at	the	time	of	the	interview,	explained	China’s	strong	disapproval	for	the	EU	ETS	rather	on	the	ground	of	Chinese	lack	of	experience	in	international	matters:		“Let’s	 put	 it	 like	 this:	 it’s	 a	 new	 democracy,	 it’s	 very	 difficult	 to	internally	manage	themselves.	It	is	even	more	difficult	for	them	to	sort	 of	 sign	 up	 to	 something	 at	 an	 international	 level.	 They	 just	want	 to	 have	 this	 sort	 of	 intellectual	 experience,	 often	 they	 are	capable	of	it	but	they	don’t	have	the	actual	experience	of	doing	it”	(Interview	02.04.2014).	Another	EC	official	read	the	Chinese	counteractions	towards	the	EU	ETS	as	more	benign	than	for	example	those	of	the	United	States.	China	could	then	be	seen	only	as	an	avid	follower	of	a	larger	tendency:	“As	 far	 as	 I	 can	 say	 that	 from	 observations,	 China	 was	 more	interested	 in	 finding	 a	 compromise	 and	 would	 have	 been	economically	 maybe	 open	 to	 just	 say	 let’s	 find	 a	 solution	somehow,	whereas	for	the	US	it	was	more	real	issue	of	principle.	It	comes	from	the	history:	kick	out	foreign	powers,	the	EU	wants	to	come	here	to	touch	our	airlines	or	our	airspace	even”	(Interview	14.04.2014).	Notwithstanding	this,	 the	same	interviewee	believed	that	the	Chinese	objection	was	strong	and	the	range	of	possible	solutions	not	too	wide:		“So	China	 could	have	done	 the	 same.	They	 could	have	auctioned	emission	rights	basically	 for	 international	 flights	and	 they	would	have	 kept	 their	 proceeds.	 They	 didn’t	 even	 entertain	 that.	 They	basically	 wanted	 to	 object	 to	 the	 whole	 thing.”	 (Interview	14.04.2014)	Also,	the	language	employed	by	the	Chinese	aviation	sector	(which	almost	equals	the	government’s	position)	in	the	most	 intense	period	of	discussions	on	the	EU	ETS	reflects	the	rigidity	of	the	Chinese	approach.	Wei	Zhenzhong,	the	Secretary	General	of	 the	China	Air	Transport	Association	 ,	which	has	among	its	members	three	 state-controlled	 carriers	 Air	 China,	 China	 Southern	 Airlines	 and	 China	Eastern	Airlines,	explained:		
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7.3.2.1 “The	Airbus	story”:	heavy	weapons	against	the	EU	ETS			 Analysis	of	Chinese	involvement	with	the	EU	ETS	would	not	be	complete	without	 taking	 into	consideration	 the	 role	played	by	Chinese	 threats	 regarding	orders	 for	 Airbus	 aircrafts.	 Although	 attention	 has	 already	 been	 given	 to	 the	industry	 in	 the	 previous	 chapters,	 here	 the	 focus	 switches	 from	air	 carriers	 to	aeroplane	manufacturers	and	completes	the	analysis	from	the	MLG	perspective,	by	the	industry	putting	under	the	spotlight.	Early	on,	Chinese	airlines	threatened	that	as	a	reaction	to	the	EU	ETS	application	to	their	flights	to	the	EU,	they	would	suspend	or	completely	cancel	orders	of	Airbus	aircraft.	As	reported	in	the	media,	the	 first	 cancellations45	happened	 in	 June	 2011	 and	 represented	 orders	worth	around	3,8	 billion	 dollars	 (Clark	 2011;	Willson	2011).	 Later	 in	 the	 year,	 China	was	to	call	off	more	orders,	as	a	consequence	of	which	Airbus	would	have	lost	up	to	12	billion	dollars	worth	of	purchases	(Hepher	et	al.	2012).	The	 interviewees	who	took	part	in	this	study,	would	dub	the	issue	of	cancelled	Airbus	orders	“the	Airbus	 story”.	 Just	 as	 the	American	EU	ETS	Prohibition	Bill	 has	 been	 the	most	visible	political	pronouncement	about	the	EU	ETS,	the	orders	cancellation	made	prominent	 the	 role	 of	 possible	 economic	 retaliation	 towards	 the	 EU	 Member	States.	Given	that	Airbus	is	based	in	France	with	plants	in	the	UK,	Germany	and	Spain,	the	retaliation	would	most	affect	these	countries.			 The	business	partnership	with	China	is	“to	be	or	not	to	be”	for	the	aircraft	manufacturers.	 Airbus	 forecast	 estimate	 that	 by	 2032	 Chinese	 domestic	 air	traffic,	growing	annually	by	6,4%	(Airbus	2013,	p.61),	will	be	the	 largest	 in	the	world	 (Airbus	 2013,	 p.45).	 China	 also	 plans	 to	 build	 82	 airports	 between	 the	years	2011-2015	(Airbus	2013,	p.32).	As	a	consequence,	the	airlines	will	need	to	increase	 their	 fleet	 to	 serve	 the	 growing	 demand.	 The	 strong	 involvement	 of	Airbus	is	then	not	difficult	to	understand	given	that	Chinese	airlines	already	use	Airbus	aircraft	and	therefore	would	probably	consider	further	Airbus	purchases																																																									45There	 are	 no	 official	 documents	 that	 explicitly	 mention	 cancellations.	 Although	 in	 the	 letter	from	the	Airbus’s	CEO	and	others	to	the	prime	ministers	of	France,	Germany,	the	UK	and	Spain,	the	 authors	 mention	 “suspension	 of	 orders”	 (Airbus	 2012b)	 rather	 than	 cancellations,	 in	 the	media	and	in	the	interviews,	the	phrase	used	would	be	“cancellation”.	
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to	 keep	 the	 fleet	 uniform.	 As	 a	 corollary	 of	 Airbus’s	 involvement,	 several	interviewees	 underlined	 the	 active	 position	 of	 the	UK,	 Germany	 and	 France	 in	the	 EU	 ETS	 case.	 For	 these	 countries	 the	 loss	 of	 orders	 could	 have	 translated	directly	into	redundancies	at	Airbus	and	Airbus-related	plants.	This	was	an	issue	that	was	also	visible	for	the	Commission,	which	on	one	side	was	negotiating	with	non-EU	 countries	 and	 on	 another,	 was	 exposed	 to	 lobbying	 from	 EU	Member	States.	As	explained	by	an	EC	interviewee:	“Then,	you	have	Member	States	who	may	have	interests	and	it	 is	also	clear	that…	it	was	or	it	is	still	the	Member	States	who	have	to	implement	it	so	this	is	their	role	in	the	whole	thing	and	of	course	single	 Member	 States	 were	 afraid	 of	 being	 singled	 out	 by	measures	by	China”	(Interview	26.03.2014).	A	Brussels-based	interviewee	representing	an	aviation	organisation	saw	the	role	of	 Airbus’s	 involvement	 as	 even	more	 powerful	 and	 attributed	 Britain,	 France	and	 Germany	 being	 in	 favour	 of	 suspending	 the	 EU	 ETS	 for	 aviation	 to	 the	company’s	lobbying:		“Of	 course	 Airbus	 was	 very	 into	 the	 stop	 the	 clock	 exemption,	from	 the	 start.	 They	 pushed	 for	 it	 because	 it’s	 famous	 for	 these	orders	 from	 China	 (…).	 They	 were	 afraid	 of	 possible	 trade	 war	from	third	countries	(…)	Obviously	they	were	the	big	big	ones	to	say	 to	 the	 European	 Parliament	 and	 to	 the	 Commission	 “be	careful”	 because	 the	 weight	 of	 this	 aircraft	 manufacturing	industry	 is	 huge	 in	 Europe.	 You	 don’t	 want	 to	 put	 this	 kind	 of	environmental	 regulation	 in	 the	 way.	 I	 think	 this	 is	 what	happened.	 I	 know	 that	 at	 the	 Council	 those	 were	 the	 ones	 that	pushed.	This	time	again	it	was	France,	Germany,	the	UK,	who	said	“We	want	stop	the	clock	extension”	(Interview	17.04.2014).	The	British,	French,	German	and	Spanish	prime	ministers	were	also	sent	a	letter	by	 Airbus’s	 CEO	 and	 several	 European	 carriers,	 in	which	 they	 expressed	 their	concerns	 over	 implementation	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	 and	 mentioned	 the	 suspended	Airbus	orders	 (Airbus	2012b).	 Similar	 correspondence	was	 sent	 to	 the	Climate	Commissioner	by	the	CEO	of	Airbus	and	CEO	of	Virgin	Atlantic,	where	they	state	that	 the	 EU	 ETS	 “will	 create	 a	 trade	 conflict	 with	 the	 world's	 most	 powerful	economic	and	political	players”	and	that	Airbus	and	European	airlines	will	be	the	first	to	feel	the	effects	of	Chinese	retaliations	(Flottau	et	al.	2011).			 The	order	cancellation	shows	also	that	in	China	it	was	impossible	to	draw	a	 line	 between	 the	 aviation	 industry	 and	 the	 government,	 which	 makes	 it	
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implausible	to	separate	the	roles	that	each	has	in	exercising	pressure	on	the	EU,	as	explained	by	a	high-ranking	EC	official:		“It	is	true	that	perhaps	in	some	respect	contrary	to	the	tradition	in	the	air	transport	and	then	of	course	carriers	like	the	Chinese…	you	cannot	 distinguish	 them	 either	 from	 the	 government,	 really.	 So	they	 have	 of	 course,	 perhaps	 from	more	 political	 reasons,	 been	banned	from	complying,	they	were	instructed	not	to	comply	with	the	 ETS	 by	 the	 Chinese	 government.	 I	 think	 there	 are	 different	concerns	behind	that.	It’s	the	broader	climate	negotiations,	which	are	in	the	background”	(Interview	28.04.2014).	A	 similar	 view	was	offered	by	another	EC	 interviewee	 representing	a	different	DG:	 “On	 the	 side	 of	 the	 airlines,	 as	 I	 understand	 it,	 the	 most	 active	 one	 was	Airlines	for	America.	If	you	look	at	China	or	India	it’s	the	government”	(Interview	26.03.2014).	 This	 understanding	 of	 the	 Chinese	 position	 may	 be	 an	oversimplification	 though	 that	 stems	 from	 the	 less	 visible	 nature	 of	 internal	Chinese	politics.	 It	 is	also	claimed	that	the	expectations	and	value	patterns	that	the	West	 has	 with	 regards	 to	 the	 Chinese	 policy-making	 can	 be	 quite	 limited	(Christiansen	&	Rai	 1996,	 p.2).	What	 the	European	 stakeholders	 saw	were	 the	mere	 results	 but	 they	 did	 not	 have	 a	 chance	 to	 observe	 closely	 the	 bargaining	process	on	the	Chinese	side,	hence	for	them	it	might	seem	that	the	government	is	much	more	present	than	in	the	case	of	EU	policy-making.	Making	an	assumption	that	in	China	(and	India)	the	government	is	the	only	actor	seems	logical,	however	it	 ignores	 the	 complexity	 of	 internal	 politics	 where	 other	 stakeholders	 are	present	too.			 Although	all	 the	negotiations	between	the	Chinese	and	Airbus	as	well	as	the	work	 that	 the	 EU	Member	 States	were	 engaging	 in	 is	 confidential,	 a	 letter	from	 Airbus	 CEO	 Fabrice	 Bregier	 to	 Li	 Jiaxiang,	 Chief	 of	 the	 Civil	 Aviation	Administration	 of	 China	 (ranked	 as	 minister)	 dated	 November	 16th	 2012	 was	leaked.	The	letter	was	not	widely	published	in	the	media,	but	it	was	obtained	by	the	non-governmental	actors	engaged	in	the	EU	ETS	and	later	published	online.	The	message,	sent	after	the	EC	announced	suspension	of	the	EU	ETS	for	non-EU	routes,	 attributes	 the	 success	 largely	 to	 Airbus’s	 lobbying:	 “through	 our	 joint	efforts,	 we	 have	 managed	 to	 ensure	 that	 Chinese	 airlines	 are	 not	 unfairly	impacted	by	 the	scheme	as	previously	planned.	 I	hope	we	at	Airbus	have	been	able	 to	 clearly	 demonstrate	 our	 strong	 support	 to	 Chinese	 aviation”	 (Airbus	
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2012a).	The	answer	to	this	letter,	if	there	was	any,	was	not	leaked	to	the	press,	however	China	stopped	mentioning	the	suspension	once	implementation	of	the	EU	 ETS	 for	 non-EU	 countries	 was	 deferred.	 In	 Brussels	 circles	 the	 letter	 was	understood	by	many	as	a	report	sent	by	Airbus	to	the	Chinese	partners	stating	that	 the	 problem	 pertaining	 has	 been	 solved	 and	 discussions	 on	 transactions	could	go	back	to	normal.	The	 industry	 felt	 therefore,	a	strong	ownership	of	 the	suspension	and	saw	itself	as	a	delegate	able	to	solve	the	problem	for	the	Chinese	government	and	the	country’s	carriers.		 “The	Airbus	story”	demonstrates	 further	 the	 influence	of	 the	 industry	 in	the	case	analysed,	however	 the	pressure	 from	the	Chinese	 is	much	different	 to	the	 American	 court	 case	 against	 inclusion	 or	 the	 EU	 ETS	 Prohibition	 Act.	 The	relationship	between	 the	Chinese	government	and	 the	aviation	 sector	partially	owned	 by	 the	 state	 exhibits	 a	 meso	 level	 of	 governance.	 It	 uncovers	 the	interconnected	 and	 impossible-to-disaggregate	 interests	 of	 state	 and	 industry	that	instead	of	challenging	the	EU	as	a	whole,	decided	to	announce	deployment	of	retaliation	clearly	affecting	only	some,	but	powerful,	Member	States.	By	this,	the	whole	 process	 of	 lobbying	 and	 bargaining	with	 the	 European	 Commission	and	the	European	Parliament	was	bypassed	or	even	excluded.	Furthermore,	this	situation	hints	that	since	some	of	the	power	of	the	EU	is	exercised	via	Member	States,	the	pressures	which	address	the	EU	policies	are	directed	to	the	Member	States	as	well.		 Finally,	 while	 China	was	 considering	 an	 embargo	 on	 Airbus	 aircrafts,	 it	can	 be	 argued	 that	 in	 the	 long	 term	 that	 would	 be	 detrimental	 for	 their	negotiating	 position	 as	 they	 would	 be	 left	 with	 one	 major	 supplier,	 namely	Boeing.	 Some	 of	 the	 interviewees	 would	 see	 such	 threats	 simply	 as	 a	 bluff	(Interviews	 9.04.2014	 and	 14.03.2014).	 The	 situation	 has	 been	 also	 described	more	poignantly	by	an	eNGO	representative:		“I	 am	 sure	 you	 know	 the	 Airbus	 story,	 but	 the	 idea	 that	 China	would	decide	what	airplanes	to	buy	based	on	whether	Europe	has	ETS.	 Do	 we	 really	 think	 that	 Chinese	 are	 that	 stupid?	 No	 way!	These	 are	 multimillion	 dollar	 purchases,	 the	 ETS	 costs	 nothing.	Like	please…”	(Interview	14.03.2014).	A	similar	view	was	provided	by	an	EC	 interviewee	who	was	closely	engaged	 in	the	process:	
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“So	 I	 think	 Airbus	 lobbied	 mostly	 when	 they	 felt	 that	 third	countries	would	possibly	disadvantage	them	in	their	deals,	which	was	 also	 a	 strategic	 threat	 only,	 if	 so.	 I	 don’t	 think	 China	would	ever	 have	 had	 disadvantaged	 Airbus	 compared	 to	 Boeing	 for	example,	 when	 ordering	 planes.	 They	 just	 used	 that	 to	 frighten	Europeans.”	(Interview	14.04.2014)	Rivalry	between	Airbus	and	Boeing	has	been	an	issue	in	trade	relations	between	the	US	and	the	EU	many	times	(Irwin	&	Pavcnik	2004).	 In	 the	EU	ETS	case	 the	Chinese	 side	 instead	 of,	 for	 example,	 limiting	 access	 to	 their	 airports	 for	European	 carriers	 or	 imposing	 a	 new	 levy,	 decided	 to	 exert	 its	 pressure	 via	Airbus	orders.	By	this	not	only	did	they	affect	the	EU	but	also	indicated	that	US’s	industry	is	relevant	here.	Given	that	Airbus	as	a	company	has	been	devised	as	an	answer	to	American	leadership	in	aircraft	production,	the	role	of	the	EU	Member	States	 has	 always	 been	 prominent.	 What	 is	 more,	 as	 claimed	 by	 some,	 “it	 is	difficult,	 if	not	impossible,	to	isolate	the	manufacture	of	 large	civil	aircraft	from	the	 role	 of	 the	 state,	 particularly	 a	 strong	 state	 that	 is	 capable	 of	 projecting	power	successfully	outside	its	borders”	(Francis	&	Pevzner	2006,	p.634).	In	the	EU	ETS	 case	 the	 intrinsic	 connection	between	 state	 and	 business	 doubled:	 the	Airbus	 countries	 and	 Airbus	 as	 a	 company,	 became	 confronted	 by	 Chinese	airlines	and	China.	This	created	another	channel	for	pressuring	EU	institutions	–	that	time	from	bottom	up	by	directly	threatening	to	impact	Member	States.		 Making	a	definite	judgement	whether	the	“Airbus	story”	has	been	the	nail	in	 the	 coffin	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	 is	 not	 possible.	 However,	 by	 starting	 to	 threaten	 a	long-cherished,	 highly-technical	 enterprise	 focussed	 on	 innovation	 and	contributing	 to	 a	 positive	 balance	 of	 trade,	 it	 definitely	 provided	 leverage	 to	Chinese	 actions	 and	 contributed	 hugely	 to	 involving	 EU	 Member	 States.	 The	following	 section	 exhibits	 further	 how	 another	 EU	 ETS	 opponent,	 Russia	 was	able	to	use	its	special	geographical	position	to	influence	EU	policy-making.		
7.3.3 Russia:	“The	Russians	are	a	challenge”46			 Each	time	European	interviewees	were	asked	about	Russian	involvement	with	 the	 EU	 ETS	 their	 faces	 would	 show	 concern.	 As	 stated	 by	 one	 of	 the	interviewees:	“the	Russians	are	a	challenge”	(Interview	2.04.2014).	Geographical																																																									46Interview	2.04.2014.	
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proximity	 to	 the	 EU	 and	 Russian	 ambivalence	 towards	 climate	 change	 issues	seem	to	be	the	key	issues	here.		 Russia’s	delegates	at	UNFCCC	negotiations	 in	early	1992	would	question	anthropogenic	climate	change	and	would	argue	about	potential	profits	 that	 the	country	 could	 harness	 if	 global	 warming	 continued	 (Howarth	 &	 Foxall	 2012).	This	 position	 has	 been	 changing	 and	 in	 2004	 Russia	 finally	 ratified	 the	 Kyoto	Protocol47.	 In	2009	 the	country	adopted	 its	new	policy	on	climate	change;	 that	was	called	a	 “drastic	change”	 (Schiermeier	2009,	p.496)	given	 that	 for	 the	 first	time	 Russia	 officially	 accepted	 that	 emissions	 should	 be	 reduced	 immediately	and	 climate	 change	 actually	 creates	 dangerous	 risks.	 Nevertheless,	 at	 climate	negotiations	 Russians	 are	 viewed	 as	 rather	 rarely	 taking	 the	 floor	 with	 their	involvement	in	the	debate	low	(Dimitrov	2010,	p.804).	Similar	to	other	countries	whose	position	has	been	analysed	here,	even	though	there	has	been	recognition	that	they	need	to	take	action	with	regards	to	climate	change	it	did	not	translate	into	supporting	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation	as	it	was	considered	a	European	attempt	to	 extend	 its	 sovereignty.	 Unlike	 with	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol,	 where	 Russia	 was	bound	 to	 harness	 profits	 from	 selling	 emissions	 credits	 (Henry	 &	 Sundstrom	2007),	 the	 EU	 ETS	 for	 aviation	 meant	 costs	 rather	 than	 benefits	 for	 Russian	carriers.	One	explanation	given	by	a	high-ranking	EC	official	saw	Russians	more	as	followers	than	forerunners	of	the	opposition:	“Russia,	 I	 think,	 didn’t	 have	 so	 much	 of	 this	 kind	 of	 rejection	principle.	They	don’t	 like	policies	on	climate	change	so	much	but	they	 didn’t	 really	 seriously	 object	 to	 that	 principle	 really.	 They	were	rather	clinging	on	to	the	opposition	coming	from	elsewhere.”	(Interview	14.04.2014)	This	hypothesis	is	however	not	entirely	persuasive	when	one	considers	that	the	coalition’s	second	meeting	took	part	in	Moscow	and,	moreover,	Russia	was	using	economic	threats	against	the	EU	carriers	to	influence	the	Commission’s	decision	on	the	scope	of	the	scheme.	Once	the	Moscow	Joint	Declaration	of	the	coalition	of	the	unwilling	was	published,	the	Russian	flag	carrier	Aeroflot	announced:		"The	 Russian	 government	 is	 now	 reviewing	 a	 bill	 prohibiting	Russian	 airlines	 to	 participate	 in	 emission	 trading:	 it	 means																																																									47More	 details	 about	 the	 politics	 of	 the	 delayed	 ratification	 of	 the	 Protocol	 can	 be	 found	 in	Henry’s	and	Sundstrom’s	paper	(2007).	
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considering	a	retaliatory	approach.	We	are	facing	a	new	initiative	by	the	EU	that	may	trigger	real	'trade	wars'	and	cause	damage	to	the	 world	 airline	 industry	 at	 one	 of	 its	 most	 critical	 stages"	(Bowker	2012).		This	 visibly	 shows	 that	 also	 in	 Russia,	 but	 probably	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 than	 in	India	or	China,	the	airlines	and	government	operated	in	concert.				 For	Chinese	partners	 the	bargaining	 chip	 in	 the	EU	ETS	debate	was	 the	Airbus	order.	Russia’s	national	carrier	Aeroflot	(state	owns	51%	of	the	carrier’s	shares)	operates	a	fleet	mainly	built	of	Airbus	aircraft,	but	probably	did	not	have	as	many	 orders	 as	 the	 Chinese	 carriers,	 therefore	Russia	 employed	 a	 different	strategy.	 The	 Russians	 threatened	 that	 they	 would	 limit	 access	 to	 flights	 over	Siberia	that	markedly	reduce	the	length	of	most	flights	from	Europe	to	East	Asia.		Russia	 also	 agreed	 in	 2006	 that	 the	 aforementioned	 fees	 for	 Siberian	overflights	 would	 be	 phased	 out	 by	 the	 end	 of	 2013	 (Buyck	 2006),	 however	Russia	announced	in	2012	that	as	a	response	to	the	EU	ETS	inclusion	of	aviation	it	 would	 suspend	 implementation	 of	 this	 agreement.	 The	 implementation	 of	phasing	out	was	further	postponed	in	2014	due	to	EU	sanctions	related	to	crisis	between	 Russia	 and	 Ukraine	 over	 Eastern	 territories	 of	 Ukraine	 and	 the	annexation	of	Crimea	(Borodina	2014).	According	to	one	of	the	EC	interviewees,	the	Russians	never	wanted	to	implement	the	agreement	to	keep	it	as	a	threat	in	relation	 to	 whatever	 file	 they	 would	 deal	 with	 in	 EU-Russia	 discussions.	 The	interviewee	 believed	 that	 Russians	 felt	 that	 linking	 Siberian	 overflights	 with	opposition	to	the	EU	ETS	was	a	well-fitting	strategy.			 The	 annual	 income	 that	 Russia	 receives	 from	 international	 airlines	(mostly	European)	for	Siberian	overflights,	which	are	based	on	the	bilateral	air	service	 agreements	 between	 Russia	 and	 third	 countries	 (Borodina	 2014;	Nuutinen	 2009),	 amounts	 to	 roughly	 320	million	 euro	 and	 a	 large	 part	 of	 this	sum	 goes	 to	 the	 Russian	 national	 carrier	 Aeroflot	 as	 a	 legacy	 of	 Soviet	 Union	rules	 (Piotrowski	 2014).	 According	 to	 Otkritie	 Capital,	 in	 2013	 the	 carrier	received	roughly	130	million	EUR	from	that	source	compared	with	170	million	euro	net	profit	 (Galouchko	et	al.	 2014).	Other	 sources	quote	up	 to	220	million	euro	subsidies	that	Aeroflot	receives	from	that	side	(Kiselyova	&	Stolyarov	2014)	and	European	Commission	estimates	 for	2008	declare	420	million	dollars	paid	by	 the	 EU	 carriers	 for	 the	 overflights	 alone	 (European	 Commission	 2011a)	
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Interestingly	the	Russians,	by	threatening	with	Siberia–related	sanctions,	placed	themselves	 in	 a	 similar	 situation	 as	 the	 Chinese	warning	 that	 the	EU	ETS	may	prevent	them	from	purchasing	Airbus	aircraft.	While	China	would	be	limited	to	one	producer	only,	Russia	and	its	airlines	would	lose	significant	income.			 However,	 one	 of	 the	 interviewees	 acknowledged	 that	 if	 the	 Siberian	airspace	 was	 closed,	 Finnair’s	 strategy	 to	 build	 its	 position	 serving	 Asian	destinations	offering	a	shorter	 flight	 time	 than	other	European	airlines	 (due	 to	Finland’s	 geographical	 position)	 would	 collapse	 and	 the	 carrier	 would	 go	bankrupt:	“Finnair	 has	 a	 business	 model	 where	 the	 Asian	 traffic	 over	Russian	airspace	is	the	only	thing	they	can	make	money	with	and	if	 Russia	 is	 using	 this	 not	 to	 grant	 them	with	 overflight	 rights	 it	was	a	big	drama.	I	would	have	been	lobbied	by	the	Finnish	Deputy	Representative	saying	that	if	this	goes	and	Finnair	goes	bankrupt	because	of	this	then	it’s	going	to	be	horrible	for	the	elections	and	anti-EU	people	etc.	It	didn’t	impress	our	Members	in	a	sense	that	it’s	 just…	We	still	 think	at	 the	European	 level	 that	 the	EU	should	stick	to	its	regulation”	(Interview	22.04.2014).	The	Russian	strategy	was	 then	also	very	much	 focused	on	 influencing	Member	States	 rather	 than	 discussing	 the	 scope	 of	 EU	 ETS’s	 application	 with	 the	Commission.	Although	the	example	cited	indicates	that	Siberian	airspace	closure	to	 EU	 airlines	 would	 be	 the	 most	 problematic	 for	 Finnair,	 other	 European	airlines	who	 serve	destinations	 in	 Japan	or	 South	Korea,	 such	 as	 carriers	 from	the	Lufthansa	Group,	would	also	be	affected.		 The	 Russian	 involvement	 with	 the	 EU	 ETS	 case	 was	 not	 however	 only	grounded	on	crude	opposition	with	no	space	for	discussion.	Russia	expressed	its	reservations	concerning	the	EU	ETS	in	2011:		“In	view	of	the	absence	of	an	evident	need	to	apply	market-based	measures	 prior	 to	 2020	 in	 the	 context	 of	 achieving	 the	 “global	aspirational	 goals”	 on	 CO2	 emissions	 reduction,	 the	 Russian	Federation	urges	Contracting	States	to	refrain	from	the	unilateral	application	of		market-based	measures”(ICAO	2010b).		An	EC	interviewee	saw	the	Russian	contributions	to	the	discussions	on	a	global	market-based	 measure	 as	 critical	 but	 useful	 and	 did	 not	 see	 any	 Russian	ambition	to	destructively	attack	the	EU	ETS.	At	the	same	time	an	EP	interviewee	believed	that	 in	general	 it	 is	very	difficult	 to	negotiate	with	the	Russian	side	as	
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their	 positions	 are	 often	 changing.	 Perhaps	 this	was	 less	 visible	 in	 the	EU	ETS	file,	but	at	the	climate	negotiations	they	are	seen	as	demanding	partners:	“if	 you	 look	 at	 the	 UN	 process	 on	 the	 Climate	 Convention,	 I	 am	now	 told	 at	 the	 very	 high	 spheres,	 the	 Russian	 idea	 often	 is	 to	make	no	commitment,	to	say	nothing	and	then	five	minutes	before	the	 final	 agreement	 they	 create	 turmoil	 by	 coming	 up	 with	 a	whole	new	list	of	previously	unheard	of	requests,	etc.	etc.	So	they	are	rather	difficult	negotiating	partners”	(Interview	2.04.2014).		Another	EC	interviewee	said:	“Who	can	predict	what	Russia	does?	We	see	these	days	that	Russia	can	be	quite	unpredictable”	(Interview	28.04.2014).		 The	 complexity	 of	 these	 debates	 has	manifold	 reasons.	 Probably	 one	 of	the	 best	 explanations	 of	 this	 and	 Russia’s	 negative	 view	 on	 the	 EU	 ETS	 was	provided	by	an	EC	interviewee	who	identified	a	combination	of	issues	emerging:		“some	degree	of	 ignorance	about	what	it	 is	about,	some	basically	just	don’t	believe	that	climate	change	is	happening,	there	are	also	people	expressing	that	view.	Some	are	fearful	about	the	economic	implications	 and	 then	 the	 wider	 political	 context,	 just	 a	 way	 of	scoring	points	 against	 the	EU.	We	 shouldn’t	 also	neglect	 the	 fact	that	 some	 carriers	 have	 older	 and	 less	 efficient	 fleets	 than	 the	others.	 In	 a	 context	where	 this	 is	 kind	 of	 being	 penalized	 under	the	 system,	 those	with	 inefficient	 fleets	 they	will	make	 a	 bigger	fuss;	 it	 may	 also	 go	 for	 the	 Americans	 by	 the	 way.”	 (Interview	28.04.2014).	This	heterogeneous	assemblage	of	reasons	fitted	well	 the	general	wide-ranging	disagreement	 for	 inclusion	 coming	 from	 other	 countries.	 Russia’s	 position	internationally	and	it	attachment	to	strong	authority	over	its	territory	resulted	in	the	country	keenly	contributing	to	opposition	to	the	EU	ETS.	
7.4 Conclusions			 The	 encounter	 between	 the	 EU	 ETS	 and	 the	 coalition	 of	 the	 unwilling	illustrates	a	number	of	key	conceptual	issues	for	this	research:	the	nature	of	EU	leadership;	 the	 exercise	 of	 powers;	 the	 centrality	 of	 venues	 and	 also	 the	importance	of	nation	states	in	the	debate.	These	will	be	discussed	in	the	chapter	that	follows,	but	it	is	worth	reviewing	here	the	role	of	discourse	and	interpretive	policy	analysis	in	understanding	the	conflict.			 The	 outcomes	 presented	 in	 this	 chapter	 can	 be	 situated	 together	 with	other	studies	that	claim	that	the	EU	has	recently	been	unable	to	have	one	voice	
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on	 international	 issues	 (Conceicao-Heldt	 &	 Meunier	 2014).	 This	 has	 been		especially	visible	in	the	Airbus	case,	where	the	EU	was	not	able	to	use	leverage	to	exert	 influence	 on	 non-EU	 countries	 (Schimmelfennig	 &	 Scholtz	 2010).	 In	 a	similar	way,	 the	EU’s	trade	policy	seemed	to	be	 insufficiently	 linked	with	other	policies	(Jurje	&	Lavenex	2014).		 Furthermore,	this	chapter	advanced	the	conclusions	drawn	by	Skovgaard	(2014)	who	claims	that	in	a	period	of	economic	crisis	different	frames	are	used	by	 different	 actors	 present	 in	 the	 policy	 network.	 The	 most	 stark	 differences	between	 the	 frames	 appear	 between	 the	Member	 States	 and	 the	 Commission,	that	would	use	respectively	trade-off	(environmental	policies	damage	economic	growth)	 and	 green	 growth	 frames	 that	 would	 see	 step-up	 strategies	 (and	including	aviation	into	the	EU	ETS	can	be	seen	as	one	of	these)	as	an	avenue	to	grow	economically.	In	the	context	analysed	here,	actors	using	economic	but	also	legal-political	 arguments	were	more	powerful	 than	 those	 supporting	 the	green	growth	 paradigm.	 Indeed,	 if	 one	 views	 the	 EU	 ETS	 discussion	 from	 that	perspective,	arguments	used	by	supporters	of	derogation	of	the	EU	ETS	for	third	countries	were	related	to	industry-centred	thinking.		 Although	 some	 argue	 that	 “economic	 forces	 became	 paramount	 in	shaping	public	policy”	(Wittneben	et	al.	2012,	p.1437),	the	case	analysed	shows	that	Russia	and	China	were	ready	to	sacrifice	 their	potential	economic	benefits	as	China	would	be	left	with	Boeing	as	a	sole	aircraft	supplier	and	Russia	would	lose	 fees	 for	 the	 Siberian	 overflights.	 This	 would	 happen	 due	 to	 very	 political	reasons:	 China	 and	 Russia	 wanted	 to	 emphasise	 their	 disagreement	 with	 the	principles	of	inclusion	and	their	sovereignty	issues.		 The	non-EU	countries’	arguments	pertaining	to	the	need	to	come	back	to	ICAO	and	its	deliberations	do	not	promise	timely	and	robust	solutions,	which	is	a	similar	case	for	UNFCCC	process	where	194	states	need	to	agree	on	reductions	and	 the	course	of	action	 to	achieve	 them	(Peel	et	al.	2012).	Nevertheless,	 ICAO	was	 very	 present	 in	 the	 arguments	 employed	 both	 by	 the	 coalition	 of	 the	unwilling	and	the	BRICs.	For	the	coalition,	ICAO	was	a	guarantee	to	prolong	the	process,	 whilst	 for	 India,	 China,	 Brazil	 and	 other	 developing	 countries	participating	 in	 the	 coalition,	 it	 was	 an	 opportunity	 to	 vocalize	 their	 concerns	over	safeguarding	 the	CBDR	principle.	This	way	of	arguing	also	meant	 that	 the	
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coalition	 demonstrated	 unity	 among	 several	 states	 that	 would	 fight	 for	 their	right	to	decide	how	high	their	aspirations	concerning	climate	change	will	be.			 The	view	of	the	EU	as	a	green	pioneer	and	leader	against	the	rest	of	 the	world	 is	 not	 entirely	 fair	 however.	 Lack	 of	 participation	 by	 third	 countries	 in	discussions	 on	 the	 shape	 of	 the	 EU	 ETS	 for	 aviation	 as	 well	 as	 inability	 to	embrace	 the	CBDR	principles	situates	 the	case	among	debates	on	participatory	and	 procedural	 justice.	 In	 the	 EC’s	 understanding	 (Interviews	 16.04.2014,	28.04.2014),	 inclusion	 was	 not	 extraterritorial,	 hence	 participation	 of	 non-EU	countries	was	a	priori	limited.	This	also	meant	that	the	European	External	Action	Service	was	almost	absent	from	the	process.	In	the	eyes	of	non-EU	countries,	this	was	 read	 as	 an	 obvious	 exclusion	 from	 the	 process	 and	 an	 exercise	 of	competencies	never	delegated	to	the	EU.		 The	interactions	analysed	between	the	EU	and	the	non-EU	countries	also	introduce	 the	 issue	of	power.	While	governance	 literature	would	not	 identify	a	single	 locus	 of	 power,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 coalition	 of	 the	 unwilling	 and	 BRICs	involvement,	 it	 seems	 that	 deliberations	 on	 aviation	 emissions	 reached	 a	situation	 in	 which	 one	 can	 easily	 go	 back	 to	 the	 afore	 mentioned	 Dahl’s	paradigm:	“A	has	power	over	B	to	the	extent	that	he	can	get	B	to	do	something	that	B	would	not	otherwise	do”	(Dahl	1957,	pp.202–203).	The	power	innate	to	a	sovereign	state	was	visibly	employed	here:	the	coalition	of	the	unwilling	used	its	very	 best	 soft	 power	 and	 retaliation	 threats	 to	 influence	 the	 EU’s	 position	 on	their	 carriers’	 participation	 in	 the	 EU	 ETS.	 The	 strong	 arguments	 used	 were	directed	 at	 various	 European	 levels:	 the	Member	 States,	 their	 carriers,	 the	 EU	institutions	and	the	European	airplane	manufacturing	sector	in	order	to	instigate	specific	behaviour	 -	suspension	of	 the	EU	ETS	or	special	provisions	(exclusion)	for	the	non-EU	bound	routes.	Although	the	opposing	countries	would	very	much	insist	 on	 moving	 the	 discussions	 back	 to	 ICAO	 it	 cannot	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 case	 of	“controlling	 desire”	 of	 the	 counterparts	 (Lukes	 2005)	 but	 rather	 firmly	disagreeing	with	a	proposed	solution.			 As	 pointed	 out	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 the	 structural	 power	 of	 the	 EU	 has	 been	challenged	by	strong	opposition	to	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation.	Chapter	5	illustrated	how	environmental	leadership	has	been	opposed	and	blocked.	Just	as	the	EU	was	leading	 efforts	 to	 identify	 ICAO’s	 inability	 to	 produce	 a	 global	 solution	 for	
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aviation,	BRICs	were	able	 to	reverse	 this	dynamic,	 re-frame	the	 issue	as	one	of	disregard	for	the	CBRD	principle	and	infringement	of	sovereignty.	As	argued	by	Hurrell	and	Kingsbury	(1992a,	p.5)	in	case	of	climate	related	legislation	the	level	of	ambition	is	dictated	by	the	party	that	is	the	least	ambitious.	While	considering	the	EU	ETS	 it	 is	difficult	even	 to	discuss	 the	 third	countries’	ambitions	as	 their	sole	 commitment	was	 to	 block	 the	 application	of	 the	ETS	 to	 their	 carriers	 and	possibly	 discuss	 emissions	measures	 for	 aviation	 within	 the	 ICAO	 framework,	without	supplying	any	detailed	provisions.	Even	though	the	EU	hoped	to	have	a	model	that	would	be	emulated	elsewhere	and	induce	a	regulatory	domino	effect,	what	 happened	 is	 the	 reverse.	 The	 third	 countries	 started	 to	 implement	 laws	forbidding	their	carriers	to	participate	in	the	EU’s	scheme	and	the	domino	tiles	started	 to	 fall	 in	 the	 other	 direction.	 BRIC	 involvement	 in	 the	 case	 made	 the	domino-falling	sound	of	retaliations.			 Analysis	 of	 BRIC	 involvement	 indicates	 that	 opposition	 to	 the	 EU	 ETS	from	the	US	was	far	better	documented	in	the	media	and	literature	but	the	truly	acute	sanctions	were	put	forward	by	China,	India	and	Russia.	The	EU’s	attempt	to	challenge	the	persistent	course	of	regulation	of	the	aviation	industry	-	chiefly	via	ICAO	-	was	confronted	by	retaliation	threats	and,	probably	very	unexpectedly	for	the	 European	 Commission,	 with	 accusations	 related	 to	 disregarding	 CBDR	principles.	For	the	EC,	the	protests	were	to	some	extent	surprising	as	the	scheme	has	 been	 purposefully	 designed	 in	 a	 manner	 that	 excludes	 any	 differentiation	between	 the	participating	airlines	 to	avoid	 issues	 regarding	unequal	 treatment	clauses	 in	 the	 Chicago	 Convention.	 Here	 one	 can	 see	 that	 the	 construction	 of	global	 environmental	 governance	 encounters	 rather	 different,	 fundamental	moral	principles	that	significantly	challenge	its	reach.	The	CBDR	position	is	that	such	governance	can	only	be	extended	if	it	is	more	differentiated.	This	however	conflicts	with	the	Convention’s	equal	treatment	principles.	 		 Furthermore,	 this	 chapter	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 EU’s	 attempts	 to	 include	aviation	 into	 the	 EU	 ETS	 were	 seen	 as	 political	 rather	 than	 environmental	 in	their	nature,	which	according	to	the	EC	and	EP	interviewees	is	not	entirely	true.	What	seemed	initially	barely	possible	to	contest	or	to	be	found	controversial	for	the	EU,	established	a	diplomatic	row	unprecedented	in	the	environmental	realm	of	the	EU.		
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	 The	dynamics	 observed	between	 the	EU	 and	 the	BRICs	 -	 or	 even	 larger		the	 coalition	 of	 the	 unwilling	 -	 is	 very	 much	 based	 on	 struggling	 to	 reach	discursive	hegemony,	a	situation	“in	which	actors	try	to	secure	support	for	their	definition	of	reality”	(Hajer	2005,	p.59).	This	includes	production	of	concepts	and	ideas	 and	 a	 coherent,	 persuasive	 story-line48,	 creating	 understandings	 of	 the	problem,	 reinterpretation	 and	 also	 “filling	 the	 gaps	 and	 ambivalences”	 (Hajer	2005,	 p.62).	 Once	 all	 these	 are	 provided	 the	 discursive	 hegemony	 vehicle	 can	proceed.			 The	coalition	of	the	unwilling	has	been	able	to	produce	a	counter-EU	story	line	 giving	 the	 issue	 an	 international	 sense	 of	 urgency	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	boldly	entering	the	struggle	 for	hegemony.	As	argued	by	Hajer,	 it	 is	story	 lines,	not	 interests	 that	 are	able	 to	hold	 coalitions	 together	 (2005,	p.65).	 It	has	been	shown	above	that	the	distinctiveness	of	the	individual	BRICs	and	more	broadly,	a	coalition	of	 the	unwilling	with	extremely	different	constituencies,	 interests	and	political	 structures,	 were	 able	 to	 gather	 around	 a	 relatively	 simple	 story	 line:	“the	EU	ETS	is	illegal	if	applied	to	non-EU	carriers	serving	non	EU-routes	and	any	decisions	concerning	civil	aviation	should	be	made	at	the	ICAO	level”.	However	the	 possible	 retaliation	 coming	 from	Russia,	 China	 and	 India	were	 different	 in	their	nature	but	at	the	same	time	they	can	be	seen	as	strong	demonstrations	of	critical	approaches	to	the	EU	ETS.		 The	 story-line	 produced	 by	 the	 European	 Commission,	 that	 the	 EU	was	forced	 to	 act	 by	 ICAO’s	 passivity,	 could	 not	 prevail	 over	 arguments	 of	 the	opposing	 parties.	 The	well-established	 and	 long-rehearsed	 tradition	 of	 dealing	with	 aviation	 issues	 at	 ICAO	 was	 only	 dented	 by	 the	 EU	 attempts.	 Strong	resistance	had	a	damaging	effect	on	the	EU	ETS	for	non-EU	aviation	–	although	it	did	 not	 abolish	 the	 programme	 completely,	 it	 has	 suspended	 its	 global	application,	probably	for	good.			









	 The	 remainder	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 organised	 as	 follows:	 Section8.1	considers	 the	 governance	 issues	 pertaining	 to	 CO2	 emissions	 regulation	 on	 a	wider	 MLG	 of	 climate	 change,	 also	 reviewing	 the	 EU-US	 dynamics.	 Section8.2	focuses	 on	 the	 EU	 leadership	 and	 leads	 to	 a	 discussion	 on	 the	 importance	 of	venue	 in	climate	politics,	which	 is	examined	 in	Section	8.3.	Section	8.4	engages	itself	 with	 the	 tensions	 in	 the	 international	 context	 and	 Section	 5	 gathers	discussions	 on	 aviation’s	 exceptional	 treatment.	 Section	 8.6	 concludes	 the	discussion.	
















possible	 retaliations	 in	 the	 form	 of	 re-routing	 planes	 coming	 to	 or	 via	 Europe	would	most	probably	have	the	largest	impact	on	the	lower	governance	levels	via	the	effects	on	different	airports.	Provided	that	the	retaliations	did	not	enter	into	force,	any	activity	from	lower	governance	levels	was	unlikely	to	arise.		 More	 recently	 within	 the	 UNFCCC	 structures	 there	 is	 recognition	 that	aviation	 needs	 to	 be	 addressed	 in	 a	multi-level	manner.	 For	 example,	 in	 2015	UNFCCC	started	discussing	broadening	the	scope	of	CDM	projects	in	a	way	that	aviation-related	 activities49	could	 be	 included.	 UNFCCC	 recognized	 the	 ICAO	leadership	 in	 the	 issue	 of	 tackling	 emissions	 from	 aviation,	 though	 also	underlined	that	the	emissions	from	domestic	aviation	are	a	matter	pertaining	to	individual	states.	Hence,	given	predicted	growth	in	emissions	from	non-Annex	I	countries,	 reductions	 of	 these	 emissions	 can	 be	 made	 eligible	 to	 be	 credited	under	the	CDM	(UNFCCC	2015).	






















(1998,	 p.226).	 As	 it	 became	 visible,	 the	 more	 powerful	 actors	 were	 able	 to	impose	 their	 interpretations	 (in	 Yanow’s	 or	 Flyvbjerg’s	 language)	 or	 narrative	(as	framed	by	Hajer	and	his	followers)	and	succeeded	in	the	anti-ETS	campaign.	This	success	to	a	great	extent	was	facilitated	by	representing	the	inclusion	of	EU-US	 routes	 into	 the	ETS	as	 an	 activity	which	was	 illegal,	 harmful	 and	breaching	sovereignty.	Hence	opposing	the	ETS	was	a	question	of	rationality,	rather	than	a	tough	 political	 decision.	 What	 is	 more,	 the	 lobbying	 efforts	 also	 made	 the	Congress	an	appropriate	venue	 for	 the	discourse	offered:	 the	 language	used	by	the	sponsors	and	supporters	of	 the	Bill	was	broadly	derived	 from	 the	 industry	opposition.	 As	 Flyvbjerg	 would	 explain,	 the	 rationality	 of	 one	 actor	 has	 been	taken	over	by	another,	as	he	says	"at	least	officially"	(1998,	p.102).	Given	that	the	representatives	 of	 the	 US	 administration	 (White	 House,	 Department	 of	 State,	FAA)	refused	to	give	interviews,	there	is	also	the	“unofficial”	part	involved.	One	of	 the	 reasons	 for	 this	 may	 be	 the	 process	 of	 rationalization	 that	 had	 to	 be	employed	 to	 present	 the	 opposition	 as	 the	 rationality	 and	 not	 rationalization	(Flyvbjerg	1998,	p.98).	Alternatively,	positioning	the	ETS	as	a	sovereignty	issue	constituted	a	powerful	rationality,	such	that	whether	the	mechanism	works	as	an	environmental	 policy	 instrument	 became	 irrelevant.	 This	 however	 could	 have	happened	only	out	of	public	sight	as	it	would	undermine	the	narrative	based	on	opposing	 the	 threats	 to	sovereignty.	This	means	 that	 the	opposition	 to	 the	ETS	was	reinforced	by	ensuring	that	the	explanation	focuses	only	on	the	public	face	of	argument.	








suspicion	about	their	degree	of	accountability”	(Kamarck	2007,	p.100).	Although	transgovernmental	 networks	 should	 be	 able	 to	 stand	 for	 “fora	 for	 mutual	regulatory	 approximation”	 (Lavenex	 2014,	 p.893),	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	hypermobile	 sector	 on	 one	 side	 and	 climate	 politics	 on	 the	 other,	 these	 rules	seem	not	 to	be	applicable.	 Instead	of	 leading	 to	approximation,	 the	 fora	can	be	used	as	 venues	 for	 aspirational	policy	 export	 that	 is	much	more	unidirectional	than	inducing	approximation.	Aviation	regulation	is	based	on	consensus	agreed	at	ICAO	level	and	firstly,	requires	abundant	time	to	be	elaborated	and	secondly,	often	 is	 introduced	 as	 a	 direct	 result	 of	 an	 actual	 event	 (a	 plane	 crash	being	 a	








This	 is	 in	 line	 with	 what	 Baumgartner	 and	 Jones	 (1991,	 p.1048)	 claimed	regarding	policy	processes:	“where	the	rhetoric	begins	to	change,	venue	changes	become	 more	 likely.	 Where	 venue	 changes	 occur,	 rhetorical	 changes	 are	facilitated”.	The	change	of	rhetoric	of	the	EU	happened	while	trying	to	galvanize	the	 international	 system	 towards	 regulation	 of	 aviation	 emissions.	 It	 caused	 a	wave	 of	 opposition,	 but	 also	 moved	 the	 rhetoric	 to	 discussing	 the	 creation	 of	market-based	 measures	 for	 aviation.	 The	 EU	 consciously	 decided	 against	 an	incremental	approach	to	aviation	emissions	issues	by	including	intra-EU	routes	into	 its	 scheme.	 This	 political	 belief	 that	 triggered	 inclusion,	 conceptualized	 as	broadly	as	possible,	has	been	supplemented	by	frustration	with	ICAO’s	inability	to	 progress	 the	 aviation	 emissions	 agenda	 and	 thus	 aimed	 at	 bypassing	 the	ICAO’s	consensus-based	decision-making.		 It	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 with	 regards	 to	 climate	 change	 issues	 the	 EU	would	 strongly	 support	 multilateralism	 over	 directing	 international	 partners	unilaterally	 (Vasconcelos	 2010).	 Furthermore,	 the	 European	 Commission	 sees	multilateralism	 as	 a	 “defining	 principle	 of	 its	 external	 policy”	 (European	Commission	2003).	In	the	realm	of	aviation,	multilateralism	virtually	equates	to	ICAO	with	 its	 broad	membership,	 democratic	 process	 that	 includes	 all	 the	 UN	principles,	and	ICAO	is	generally	perceived	as	the	universal	body	for	dealing	with	civil	aviation	issues.	The	problems	pertaining	to	ICAO’s	inability	to	act	on	a	global	market-based	measure	for	aviation	led	firstly	to	a	parallel	EU	process	of	creating	a	 regional	 mechanism	 that	 with	 time	 became	 entirely	 disconnected	 from	 the	ICAO	process.	This	 implied	 that	 the	EU	multilateralism	unexpectedly	entered	a	bilateral	trajectory.	




ticket	prices,	and	thereby	consistent	with	certain	conceptions	of	efficiency,	there	were	 options	 that	 would	 likely	 ensure	 larger	 CO2	 savings	 but	 would	 be	 more	expensive	 for	 the	end	users.	Even	 if	efficient	 for	other	sectors,	 for	aviation,	 the	EU	ETS	tended	to	divert	attention	 from	core	 issues	that	 the	sector	should	have	been	 dealing	 with	 regards	 to	 emissions	 control.	 Accordingly,	 the	 following	section	 focuses	on	 five	main	 issues:	access	 to	air	 transport,	aeromobility	 in	 the	EU,	 behavioural	 aspects	 of	 transport	 choices,	 technological	 features	 and	 finally	regulatory	circumstances	of	aviation.		




already	 included	 in	 the	 airfare	 (for	 example	 various	 noise-related	 fees).	 There	has	 not	 been	 any	 work	 done	 within	 EC	 on	 a	 measure	 that	 would	 address	tourism-induced	emission	from	travel.	








efficiency,	 weight	 of	 the	 aircraft	 and	 to	 some	 extent	 operational	 practices	(Hileman	 et	 al.	 2013).	 A	 more	 fundamental	 intersection	 is	 based	 on	 the	competitiveness	between	the	manufacturers	and	hence	providing	them	with	best	policy	 treatment	 that	 is	 available	 under	 international	 competition	 regulations.	The	EU	ETS	case	animated	Airbus’s	policy	involvement	and	the	climate	benefits	had	 to	 be	 outweighed	 by	 the	 economic	 ones.	 In	 the	 interaction	 between	 the	manufacturers	 and	 governments/EC	 the	 emissions	 trading	 was	 treated	 as	 an	obstacle	 that	 needed	 to	 be	 eliminated	 due	 to	 potential	 harm	 towards	 the	industry.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 the	 well-established	 relations	 between	 Airbus	 and	Airbus	countries	have	been	likely	to	affect	the	policy-making	at	the	national	and	European	levels.	The	industry’s	bargaining	power	has	been	very	much	based	on	the	 export	 orientation	 of	 the	 sector	 and	 its	 high-tech	 character.	 Even	 if	 the	number	of	people	employed	in	the	industry	is	not	as	high	as	in	labour	intensive	sectors,	 the	 value	 of	 transactions	 is	 extremely	 high,	 which	 makes	 the	 policy-makers	more	prone	to	accept	aircraft	manufacturers’	policy	views.	Already	in	the	1960s	Schattschneider	(1988,	p.4)	claimed	that	political	“conflicts	are	frequently	won	 or	 lost	 by	 the	 success	 that	 the	 participants	 have	 in	 getting	 the	 audience	involved	 in	 the	 fight	 or	 in	 excluding	 it	 as	 the	 case	may	 be”.	 The	 EU	 ETS	 case	greatly	 confirms	 this	 thesis	 by	 exhibiting	 how	 much	 the	 aviation	 sector,	especially	 the	 manufacturers	 and	 airlines,	 was	 able	 to	 close	 ranks	 with	 each	other.		




business	 is	operating	on	margins	of	profitability	and	any	additional	cost	would	cause	bankruptcies.	Additionally,	several	European	governments	have	significant	shares	 of	 European	 carriers,	 thus,	 it	 is	 not	 in	 their	 interest	 to	 weaken	 their	position	in	a	highly	competitive	sector.			 Policy-making	 for	 civil	 aviation	 so	 far	 has	 been	 one	 of	 the	 most	international	regulatory	regimes	but	still	is	very	deeply	connected	to	the	nation	states	 that	have	 the	authority	over	 their	 space	and	are	 free	 to	 regulate	 it.	This	framework	then	to	a	large	extent	relates	to	the	issues	pertaining	to	sovereignty	and	 power	 relations	 between	 states	 even	 if	 placed	 in	 a	 more	 networked	governing	 structures	 (Rosenau	 1999;	 Held	 &	McGrew	 2002).	 This	 can	 lead	 to	national	 interest-based	 decision-making,	 which	 takes	 into	 account	 the	importance	of	common	action	poorly	 if	at	all.	Nevertheless,	 the	EU	ETS	conflict	has	dented	business	as	usual	at	ICAO	and	has	accelerated	the	pace	of	discussions	between	the	nation	states	on	a	global	market-based	measure	for	aviation.		






















natural	extension	of	 the	scheme,	a	result	of	 the	EU	climate	policy	acting	across	economy	 sectors.	On	 the	 other	 side,	 the	EU	ETS	was	 indeed	 aiming	 at	 limiting	aviation’s	 privileges.	 However,	 the	 latter	 goal	 was	 rather	 a	 collateral	 effect	 of	broader	 policy	 thinking.	 The	 effects	 of	 the	 inclusion	 in	 this	 realm	 are	 rather	disappointing.	 The	 climate	 endeavours	 have	 not	 changed	 any	 tax	 rules	 for	 the	sector,	neither	affected	business	as	usual.	Nonetheless,	the	inclusion	of	aviation	into	 the	 EU	 ETS	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 having	 a	 deeper	meaning:	 it	 has	 hugely	impacted	 the	 discourse	 concerning	 aviation	 emissions	 abatement.	 In	 this	way,	the	 thesis	has	offered	new	 insights	 into	 research	on	meaning	making	activities	performed	 by	 policy-makers	 (Wagenaar	 2011).	 It	 has	 also	 highlighted	 how	greatly	 has	 aviation	 been	 neglected	 by	 the	 climate	 change	 governance	architecture	(Romera	&	van	Asselt	2015).		By	showing	its	international	partners	how	 the	 emissions	 policy	 for	 aviation	 could	 be,	 the	 EU	 provided	 a	 relevant	emissions	trading	experiment	that	even	if	it	failed	internationally,	made	a	change	in	 thinking	 about	 what	 can	 be	 possible	 and	 in	 this	 way	 affected	 wider	governance	 of	 the	 industry.	 This	 is	 now	 evidenced	 for	 example	 by	 China	considering	including	aviation	into	its	emissions	trading	system.	Furthermore,	it	is	believed	that	ICAO	has	started	more	concrete	work	on	a	global	market-based	system	through	its	working	groups.			
Research	 question	 2:	 Who	 are	 the	 most	 prominent	 actors	 of	 the	 debate	 on	
inclusion?	




sovereignty	 or	 trying	 to	 protect	 the	 CBDR	 principles.	While	 the	 literature	 has	indicated	 that	BRICs	may	understand	 their	 climate	 obligations	 differently	 than	the	developed	states	(Tian	&	Whalley	2010),	this	research	has	proved	that	they	are	 committed	 to	 safeguarding	 their	 special	 position	 and	 thus	 not	 necessarily	following	the	green	leaders.			 The	analysis	of	 the	US	 involvement	clearly	and	unambiguously	 indicates	however	 that	 the	 state’s	 action	 has	 been	 almost	 exclusively	 fuelled	 by	 the	aviation	 sectoral	 organisations	 involved	 in	 lobbying	 the	 Congress.	 In	 this	 way	this	research	is	instrumental	for	understanding	the	lobbying	activities	in	the	US	(McGrath	 2005;	 Thomas	 &	 Hrebenar	 2009).	 Additionally,	 by	 being	 a	 study	focused	on	one	sector	it	has	further	developed	the	studies	on	aviation	regulation	(Sgouridis	et	al.	2011;	Macintosh	&	Downie	2008;	Havel	&	Sanchez	2011a).	The	dynamics	between	the	airlines	and	their	associations	(especially	those	of	global	reach)	versus	the	EU	have	shown	that	the	pervasive	discourse	of	regulatory	and	governance	complexity	of	global	civil	aviation	is	able	to	block	any	other	solution	than	 one	 brokered	 by	 ICAO.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 European	 sectoral	organisations	 and	 aircraft	 operators	 remained	 less	 vocal	 with	 regards	 to	 the	scheme.	The	least	importance	was	ascribed	to	the	eNGOs	that	although	present	in	the	debate,	were	usually	unable	to	attain	their	policy	goals.			 Finally,	the	IPA	and	PNA	frameworks	applied	in	the	thesis	highlighted	the	importance	 of	 individuals	 in	 the	 debate	 (see:	 Section	 5.5).	 This	 extra	 layer	further	 reinforced	 the	 theoretical	 claims	 related	 to	 understandings	 of	 a	 policy	and	meaning-making	activities	in	which	the	stakeholders	were	involved	(Marsh	1998;	Wagenaar	2011;	Schwartz-Shea	&	Yanow	2012;	Yanow	2006).			
Research	 question	 3:	 Why	 were	 particular	 venues	 of	 policy	 processes	 regarding	
aviation	emissions	preferred?		




mostly	 motivated	 by	 ICAO	 being	 a	 guarantee	 of	 a	 global	 measure	 agreed	unequivocally.			The	EU	has	however	clearly	moved	the	discussion	out	of	ICAO	by	announcing	the	inclusion	of	aviation	into	the	EU	ETS.	At	the	same	time	the	EC	did	not	become	a	venue	par	excellence	for	aviation	emissions	policy,	but	rather	an	ad	




For	example,	the	EU	Member	States	underlined	risks	for	their	aviation	industries	when	 discussing	 the	 EU	 ETS	 with	 the	 Commission.	 Similarly,	 the	 US	 aviation	sector	developed	the	unilateralism/sovereignty	narrative	and	the	EC,	defending	its	 mechanism	 highlighted	 the	 inaction	 of	 ICAO	 rather	 that	 its	 own	 quest	 for	leadership.			 Given	 the	 ICAO’s	 importance	 for	 the	 sectoral	 regulation,	 it	 merits	attention	 when	 concluding	 the	 discussion	 on	 venues.	 ICAO	 structures	 had	 to	realise	 that	 they	 had	 to	 cave	 in	 to	 the	 pressures	 coming	 from	 more	 climate-oriented	states	while	still	being	aware	of	its	exclusive	position	with	regards	to	a	globally	 binding	market-based	measure	 for	 aviation.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 EU	ETS	 case	 has	 affirmed	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 powerful	 path-dependency	 of	 ICAO:	instead	of	 facilitating	greening	aviation	 through	emissions	policy	change,	 it	has	been	 putting	 a	 drag	 on	 any	 ambitious	 environmental	 plans	 that	 would	 entail	costs	for	the	airlines.		 By	providing	insights	into	the	ICAO	process	and	the	competition	between	ICAO	 and	 the	 EU,	 confirming	 a	 wider	 perspective	 of	 Oberthür	 (2003)	 and	Lindenthal	(2014),	the	thesis	has	demonstrated	that	a	global	organisation	based	on	 states	 cannot	 always	 serve	 as	 the	 best	 possible	 venue	 for	 collective	 action	problem	discussion.	The	environmentally	recalcitrant	policy	community	around	ICAO	 for	 the	 first	 time	 had	 to	 face	 a	 series	 of	 active	 commitments	 aiming	 at	triggering	 international	 action.	 It	 has	 been	 implied	 also	 that	 although	 the	“instigation”	phase	for	a	new	policy	direction	can	happen	through	a	fairly	small	number	of	 countries,	 an	agreement	 that	would	bind	aircraft	operators	globally	still	 needs	 to	 undergo	 a	 lengthy	 process	 of	 working	 groups,	 workshops	 and	decision-making	via	ICAO.		




Research	 question	 4:	Why	 do	 EU	 and	 non-EU	 countries	 differ	 on	 the	 shape	 of	 a	




Although	 a	 perfect,	 or	 close	 to	 perfect,	 solution	 would	 entail	 a	 global	 ICAO	scheme,	the	EU	came	to	a	conclusion	that	action	needs	to	be	taken	regardless	of	ICAO’s	 work.	 The	 EU	 Member	 States	 stood	 then	 in	 the	 frontline	 of	 aviation-addressing	 climate	 action,	 while	 the	 non-EU	 states	 have	 been	 pushing	 for	 an	ICAO	solution	offering	different	narratives	to	explain	the	policy	problem	(Bevir	2003).	As	explained	in	the	thesis,	this	could	be	considered	as	a	collateral	of	the	traditionally	 strong	 US	 position	 at	 ICAO.	 The	 ability	 of	 the	 US	 to	 persuade	 its	partners	 to	 keep	 unity	 in	 this	 case	 also	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 contributing	 to	deepening	the	differences.	Also,	the	non-EU	aviation	sector	has	been	much	more	vocal	on	the	issue	and	effectively	lobbied	their	respective	governments.	This	led	to	a	 situation	where	 the	non	EU-states	were	using	airline	arguments	while	 the	EU	countries	kept	reiterating	the	EC’s	discourse.			 Furthermore,	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 debate	 on	 emissions	 trading	 for	international	aviation	as	well	as	emissions	policy	for	the	sector	in	general	will	be	founded	 by	 the	 ICAO-contracting	 states	 on	 sovereignty	 and	 CBDR	 principle,	which	 broadens	 research	 done	 by	 Romera	 and	 van	 Asselt	 (2015).	 This	 also	means	that	the	discussions	on	a	global	measure	are	deemed	to	be	developed	at	a	global	 venue	 such	 as	 ICAO	 or,	 less	 likely,	 within	 UNFCCC	 negotiation	 process.	Consequently,	the	thesis	has	also	contributed	to	understanding	better	ICAO	as	a	venue	of	policy-making	(Motaal	2012;	Abeyratne	2001;	Mackenzie	2010).			 		
Research	question	5:	How	are	the	policy	differences	between	the	US	and	the	EU	








seem	viable	 that	 the	EU-US	 relations	would	be	 threatened	by	 the	 return	of	EU	ETS-related	retaliation	possibilities.		








context	 of	 the	 research	 was.	 This	 includes	 the	 constellation	 of	 stakeholders	present	 and	 the	 interactions	 between	 them,	 the	 strong	 international	 backdrop	and	also	the	focus	on	the	processes	happening	within	the	EU	ETS.			 The	 empirical	 research	 conducted	 for	 this	 thesis	 has	 signalled	 several	research	 avenues	 that	 merit	 further	 investigation.	 First	 of	 all,	 given	 the	 EU’s	aspiration	 to	 consider	 international	 shipping	 as	 another	 sector	 that	 could	potentially	 be	 included	 into	 the	 EU	 ETS,	 it	 is	 vital	 to	 explore,	 among	 similar	stakeholders	 as	 this	 thesis	 involved,	 their	 approach	 to	 that	 issue	 in	 order	 to	provide	policymakers	with	evidence(Psaraftis	2012;	Miola	et	al.	2011;	Hermeling	































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A.	Introduction	1) Self-introduction	-	short	description	of	the	project,	funder	if	asked	2) Thanking	for	the	participation	in	the	interview	3) Consensus	for	recording	(anonymity,	secure	storage	of	all	data)	
	
B.	Interviewee’s	background	1) What	is	your	mission	in	this	organization?	2) How	have	you	been	involved	with	the	issue	of	EU	ETS	and	aviation?	3) What	ideas	do	you	have	with	regards	to	curbing	emissions	from	aviation?		
C.	Policy	1) What	were	the	main	issues	you	have	encountered	with	regards	to	the	EU	ETS?	2) How	do	you	think	the	idea	of	including	aviation	into	the	EU	ETS	started	in	the	EU?	3) Were	there	any	moments	when	you	were	particularly	happy	with	the	process	of	inclusion	going	on	in	Brussels?	4) When	were	you	particularly	anxious?	5) What	in	your	view	was	the	role	of	experts	in	the	process	of	drafting	and	implementing	the	EU	ETS	for	aviation?	6) How	were	the	EU	/	non-EU	airlines’	views	included	in	the	process	of	drafting	the	proposal?	7) What	was	the	role	of	member	states	/	regions?			
D.	Opposition	to	the	EU	ETS	1) Why	do	you	think	the	non-EU	airlines	were	protesting	that	vocally	against	the	EU	ETS?	2) What	was	your	reaction	here	in	DG	Climate	to	the	process	of	forming	of	the	coalition	of	unwilling?	3) Who	were	the	main	actors	who	played	an	important	role	in	forming	the	actions	surrounding	the	countermeasures	against	the	EU	ETS?	4) Was	there	any	similar	process	(to	the	formation	of	the	coalition	of	unwilling)	happening	within	the	EU?	5) If	you	think	about	the	most	influential	players	on	the	issue,	who	comes	to	your	mind?	How	would	you	rate	importance	of	actors?	6) How	would	you	describe	the	approach	to	the	EU	ETS	that	the	European	airlines	have	been	promoting	here	in	Brussels?	7) How	would	you	describe	the	approach	to	the	EU	ETS	that	the	non-European	airlines	have	been	promoting	here	in	Brussels?	8) Could	you	explain	how	in	your	view	did	the	lobbying	process	look	like	at	the	European	Commission?	Elsewhere?						
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E.	Larger	regulatory	landscape	1) What	in	your	view	was	the	role	of	ICAO	in	the	EU	ETS	and	aviation	debate?	2) Do	you	think	that	the	EU	involvement	makes	the	US	work	closer	with	the	ICAO	on	a	global	solution	for	CO2	emissions	from	aviation?	3) Do	you	see	the	inclusion	of	aviation	as	a	part	of	a	larger	regulation	strategy	of	the	EU?	4) In	what	way	was	the	EU	ETS	case	different	to	other	policy	issues	if	you	look	at	the	relations	between	the	aviation	industry	and	the	EU?	5) What	would	be	your	preferred	approach	to	reducing	CO2	emissions	related	to	international	aviation?	a. Do	you	have	any	particular	policies	/	instruments	in	mind?	b. What	is	your	level	of	ambition	in	this	field?	c. Where	would	you	see	the	venues	to	discuss	your	approach?	6) Does	the	EU	ETS	make	a	global	deal	for	aviation	more	likely	to	be	realized?		
F.	Finish	1) Is	there	anything	else	you	think	I	might	be	interested	in?	2) Are	there	any	interview	partners	you	would	like	to	recommend?			




A.	Introduction	1) Self-introduction	-		short	description	of	the	project,	funder	if	asked	2) Thanking	for	the	participation	in	the	interview	3) Consensus	for	recording	(anonymity,	secure	storage	of	all	data)		
B.	Interviewee’s	background	1) What	is	your	mission	in	the	Committee/Subcommittee/organization	2) “How	have	you	been	involved	with	the	issue	of	EU	ETS	and	aviation?	3) What	ideas	do	you	have	with	regards	to	curbing	emissions	form	aviation?		
C.	Policy	1) What	where	the	main	issues	you	have	encountered	with	regards	to	the	EU	ETS?	2) How	do	you	think	this	issue	got	the	attention	of	the	Congress?	3) When	were	you	particularly	happy	with	the	process	going	on	in	Washington?	4) When	were	you	particularly	anxious?			
D.	Coalitions	1) How	do	you	think	the	idea	to	prohibit	participation	of	the	US	airlines	in	the	scheme	came	to	life?	2) Who	were	the	main	actors	who	played	an	important	role	in	forming	the	actions	surrounding	the	US	protest	against	the	EU	ETS?	3) How	would	you	rate	importance	of	actors	for	this	policy	change			a. Name	possible	actors	b. What	is	the	role	of	IATA	/	ICAO		
E.	Change	1) Do	you	think	that	the	EU	ETS	Prohibition	Act	constitutes	a	change	in	approach	to	aviation	pollution	problem	in	the	US?	a. If	yes:	what	are	the	driving	forces	of	that	change?	b. Was	the	change	EU-induced?	2) What	do	you	think	is	the	significance	of	the	EU	ETS	Prohibition	Act?	a. Were	people	happy	with	its	effects	b. Is	it	seen	as	a	way	to	influence	the	EU	policy	/	international	negotiations	/	American	public	policy	/	American	politics	3) Do	you	think	that	the	EU	involvement	makes	the	US	work	closer	with	the	ICAO	on	a	global	solution	for	CO2	emissions	from	aviation?	4) What	would	be	your	preferred	approach	to	reducing	CO2	emissions	related	to	international	aviation?	a. Do	you	have	any	particular	policies	/	instruments	in	mind?	b. What	is	your	level	of	ambition	in	this	field?	c. Where	would	you	see	the	venues	to	discuss	your	approach?		
F.	Finish	1) Is	there	anything	else	you	think	I	might	be	interested	in?	2) Are	there	any	interview	partners	you	would	like	to	recommend?		
Appendices 
	 305	
	
Additional	question:	Would	you	be	able	to	imagine	how	the	future	of	the	aviation	pollution	policy	if	there	were	no	steps	taken	by	the	EU?				
